WIENER STUDIEN ZUR TIBETOLOGIE UND BUDDHISMUSKUNDE
HEFT 50

DAVID SEYFORT RUEGG

THREE STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF INDIAN AND TIBETAN MADHYAMAKA PHILOSOPHY

STUDIES IN INDIAN AND TIBETAN MADHYAMAKA THOUGHT

PART 1

ARBEITSKREIS FÜR TIBETISCHE UND BUDDHISTISCHE STUDIEN UNIVERSITÄT WIEN

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Herausgeber und für den Inhalt verantwortlich:
Prof. Ernst Steinkellner, Reisnerstraße 6, 1030 Wien

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FOREWORD

Part I of these *Studies* in Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka philosophy consists of three sections. The first outlines the history of the Madhyamaka school in Tibet from its origins toward the end of the eighth century until the time it fully assumed its classical form in the early fifteenth century owing to the efforts of Tsoṅ kha pa and other eminent masters of approximately that time. An earlier publication, *The literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India* (Wiesbaden, 1981), has traced the history of the Madhyamaka school in India beginning with its source, Nāgārjuna, and extending to the early part of the second millennium of the common era when it was establishing itself firmly in Tibet.

Section II investigates the complex, and controversial, problem of whether a (Prāsaṅgika) Mādhyamika may, within the frame of his school's philosophy, assert a thesis (*pratijñā*) and maintain a philosophical position (*pakṣa, mata*). It is a reworked and expanded version of an earlier study: 'On the thesis and assertion in the Madhyamaka/dBu ma' in E. Steinkellner and H. Tauscher (ed.), *Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist religion and philosophy* (Proceedings of the Csoma de Kőrös Symposium held at Velm-Vienna, 13-19 September 1981 [Vienna, 1983], pp. 205-241).

Section III concerns the very significant place occupied in Tsoṅ kha pa's Madhyamaka philosophy by the ideas and methods of the epistemological and logical system (*pramāṇavidyā*) of Dharmakīrti. It is an expanded version of a study first published in 1991: 'On *pramāṇa* theory in Tsoṅ kha pa's Madhyamaka philosophy' in E. Steinkellner (ed.), *Studies in the Buddhist epistemological tradition* (Proceedings of the Second International Dharmakīrti Conference, Vienna, 11-16 June, 1989, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse, Denkschriften, 222. Band [Vienna, 1991], pp. 281-310).

Part II of these *Studies* will contain annotated translations of Candrakīrti's Sanskrit commentary on *Madhyamakakārikā* i.1 taken from his renowned *Prasannapadā madhyamakavṛttiḥ*, and of rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen's Tibetan Summary-Memorandum on the Eight Crucial Points in Madhyamaka philosophy (*dKa' gnad/gnas brgyad kyi zin bris*).

The last two studies in the present part have special reference to the historical background and context of Tsoṅ kha pa's Madhyamaka philosophy.

Concerning the epithet 'Indo-Tibetan' applicable to studies such as these, this descriptive term is not meant to convey the idea of a single monolithic – and monothetic – entity. Rather, over a large area of South and Central Asia and a period of more than a millennium, it refers to cultural and intellectual developments marked, polythetically, by continuities – and by what may be described as 'family resemblances' – as well as by discontinuities.

Once again I wish to express my sincerest and best thanks to Ven. Dvags po Rin po che Blo bzaṅ 'Jam dpal byams pa rgya mtsho for his kind assistance on many a difficult point, the reponsibility for any errors of course remaining mine alone. My thanks go also to Ernst Steinkellner for publishing this book. The debt I owe to fellow investigators in this still relatively unworked field of study will be clear from the notes. I wish also to thank Helmut Krasser and Burkhard Quessel for invaluable help in preparing computer files for publication.

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MK *(Prajñā-nāma-)Mūlamadhyamakakārikās*. Edited together with Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛttiḥ* by L. de La Vallée Poussin, Bibliotheca Buddhica IV, St Petersburg, 1903-13; and by J. W. de Jong, Adyar, 1977.

ŚS *Śūnyatāsaptati-kārikās*. Tibetan translation, sDe dge edition No. 3827. Verses 1-32 edited by F. Erb, *Die Śūnyatāsaptati des Nāgārjuna und die Śūnyatāsaptativṛtti*, Thesis, Hamburg, 1990; verses 1-14 edited by F. Erb, *Śūnyatāsaptativṛtti, Candrakīrtis Kommentar zu den "Siebzig Versen der Leerheit" des Nāgārjuna [Kārikās 1-14]*, Wiesbaden, 1997.

VV *Vigrahavyāvartanī*. Edited by E. H. Johnston and A. Kunst, in: *The dialectical method of Nāgārjuna*, Delhi, 1978.

YṢ *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā*. Tibetan translation, edited by C. Scherrer-Schaub, *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti*, Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques XXV, Brussels, 1991.

ĀRYA-DEVA

CŚ *Catuḥśataka*. Edited by K. Lang, *Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka*, Copenhagen, 1986. Chapters viii-xvi edited with Candrakīrti's *Vṛtti* by Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya, *The Catuḥśataka of Āryadeva*, Calcutta, 1931. Edited by K. Suzuki, *Sanskrit fragments and Tibetan translation of Candrakīrti's Bodhisattvayogācāracatuḥśatakaṭīkā* (Tōkyō, 1994).

BUDDHAPĀLITA

Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti. Tibetan translation, sDe dge edition No. 3842. Chapters i-xii edited by M. Walleser, Bibliotheca Buddhica XVI, St Petersburg, 1913-14.

BHAVYA (BHĀ[VA]VIVEKA)

MHK *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikās*. Tibetan translation, sDe dge edition No. 3855. Sanskrit and Tibetan texts of Chapter iii (Tattvaiṣaṇapariccheda) edited by Y. Ejima, *Chūgan-shisō no tenkai – Bhāvaviveka kenkyū*, Tōkyō, 1980.

TJ *Tarkajvālā*. Commentary on *MHK* attributed to the same author. Tibetan translation, sDe dge edition, No. 3856.

PP *Prajñāpradīpa-Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti*. Tibetan translation, sDe dge edition No. 3853. Chapters i-ii edited by by M. Walleser, Bibliotheca Indica New Series, No. 1396, Calcutta, 1914.

CANDRAKĪRTI

CŚṬ *Bodhisattvayogācāracatuḥśatakaṭīkā*. See *CŚ* under Ārya-Deva.

MA *Madhyamakāvatāra* and the author's own *Bhāṣya (MABh)*, Tibetan translation by Pa tshab, sDe dge edition Nos. 3861 and 3862. The older Tibetan translation of the Kārikās alone by Nag tsho is No. 5261 in the Beijing edition, which also contains the new translation of the Kārikās and Bhāṣya by Pa tshab and others as Nos. 5262 and 5263. See also the edition of *MA* and *MABh* by L. de La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti*, Bibliotheca Buddhica IX, St Petersburg, 1907-12, cited by page number.

PPMV *Prasannapadā Mūlamadhyamakavṛttiḥ*. Edited with Nāgārjuna's *MK* by L. de La Vallée Poussin, Bibliotheca Buddhica IV, St Petersburg, 1903-13. Corrections were published by J. W. de Jong, *Indo-Iranian Journal* 20 (1978), pp. 25-59, 217-52.

YṢV *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti*. Tibetan translation. See *YṢ* under Nāgārjuna.

TSOṄ KHA PA BLO BZAṄ GRAGS PA (1357-1419)

GR *dGoṅs pa rab gsal*. The *bsTan bcos chen po dbu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bšad dGoṅs pa rab gsal* (*c.* 1418). lHa sa (Žol spar khaṅ Šar dGa' ldan phun tshogs gliṅ) edition of the gSuṅ 'bum, vol. ma, cited by folio number. See also *dBu ma dgoṅs pa rab gsal*, Varanasi, 1973, cited by page number.

LRChB *Lam rim chuṅ ba*. The *sKyes bu gsum gyi ñams su blaṅ ba'i*

byaṅ chub lam gyi rim pa (1415). lHa sa edition of the gSuṅ 'bum, vol. pha, cited by folio number. See also the mTsho sṅon reprint of the sKu 'bum edition, in *rJe Tsoṅ kha pa chen po'i gsuṅ 'bum*, vol. pha, Xining, Qinghai, 1987, cited by page number.

LRChM *Lam rim chen mo*. The *(mÑam med tsoṅ kha pa chen pos mdzad pa'i) Byaṅ chub lam rim che ba* (1402). gTsaṅ (bKra šis lhun po) edition of the gSuṅ 'bum, vol. pa, cited by folio number. (Reproduced by Ngawang Gelek Demo, *The collected works (gSuṅ 'bum) of rJe Tsoṅ-kha-pa Blo-bzaṅ-grags-pa*, vol. 19-20, New Delhi, 1975-77.) See also the mTsho sṅon reprint of the Bya khyuṅ edition, in *mÑam med Tsoṅ kha pa chen pos mdzad pa'i Byaṅ chub lam rim che ba*, Qinghai, 1985, cited by page number. Annotations in: *The Lam rim chen mo of the Incomparable Tsoṅ-kha-pa with the interlineal notes of Ba-so Chos-kyi-rgyal-mtshan, sDe-drug mkhan chen Ṅag-dbaṅ-rab-brtan, 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bžad-pa'i-rdo-rje, and Bra-sti dge-bšes Rin chen don-grub*, reproduced with corrections from the Tshe mchog gliṅ blockprint by Chos-'phel-legs-ldan, New Delhi, 1972.

LŠÑP *Draṅ ṅes Legs bšad sñiṅ po*. The *Draṅ ba daṅ ṅes pa'i don rnam par phye ba'i* [v.l.: *'byed pa'i*] *bstan bcos Legs bšad sñiṅ po* (1408). lHa sa edition of the gSuṅ 'bum, vol. pha, cited by folio number. See also the mTsho sṅon reprint of the sKu 'bum edition, in *rJe Tsoṅ kha pa chen po'i gsuṅ 'bum*, vol. pha, Qinghai, 1987, cited by page number.

NŠRG *rNam bšad rigs pa'i rgya mtsho* (also known as *rTsa še ṭīk chen* and *rNam bšad chen mo*). The *dBu ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa šes rab ces bya ba'i rnam bšad Rigs pa'i rgya mtsho* (1408/9). lHa sa edition of the gSuṅ 'bum, vol. ba, cited by folio number. See also *rTsa še ṭīk chen Rigs pa'i rgya mtsho*, Varanasi, 1973, cited by page number.

TSOṄ KHA PA/RGYAL TSHAB DAR MA RIN CHEN (1364-1432)

KNZB *dKa' gnad/gnas brgyad kyi zin bris*. (For further details see the introduction to the translation of this work in Part II of the present publication.)

MKHAS GRUB DGE LEGS DPAL BZAṄ (PO) (1385-1438)

TThCh *sToṅ thun chen mo*. The *Zab mo stoṅ pa ñid kyi de kho na ñid rab tu gsal bar byed pa'i bstan bcos skal bzaṅ mig 'byed*. lHa sa (Žol spar khaṅ Šar dGa' ldan phun tshogs gliṅ) edition of the gSuṅ 'bum, vol. ka.

'JAM DBYAṄS BŽAD PA'I RDO RJE ṄAG DBAṄ BRTSON 'GRUS (1648-1721/2)

GCh *Grub mtha' chen mo*. The *Grub mtha'i rnam bšad raṅ gžan grub mtha' kun daṅ zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzaṅ žiṅ gi ñi ma Luṅ rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu'i re ba kun skoṅ*. Bla braṅ bKra šis 'khyil edition of the gSuṅ 'bum, vol. pha. Reproduced by Ngawang Gelek Demo, New Delhi, 1974.

LCAṄ SKYA ROL PA'I RDO RJE (1717-1786)

Grub mtha'i rnam bžag. The *Grub pa'i mtha' rnam par bžag pa Thub bstan lhun po'i mdzes rgyan*, vol. cha/ja of the gSuṅ 'bum. Reproduced by Lokesh Chandra, Śatapṭaka Series, New Delhi, 1977, cited by folio number. See also *Grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bžag pa gsal bar bšad pa Thub bstan lhun po'i mdzes rgyan*, Sarnath, 1970, cited by page number.

*

D	sDe dge edition.
H	lHa sa edition.
P	Beijing edition.
Ts	gTsaṅ edition.

I

AN OUTLINE OF THE EARLIER HISTORY OF THE TIBETAN MADHYAMAKA (DBU MA) FROM ITS ORIGINS IN THE EIGHTH CENTURY TO THE BEGINNING OF ITS 'CLASSICAL PERIOD' IN THE EARLY FIFTEENTH CENTURY

1. PERIODIZATION IN THE HISTORY OF MADHYAMAKA THOUGHT IN TIBET

Towards the end of the eighth century CE there took place a series of events to which Tibetan historiography has ascribed fundamental significance for the history and culture of Tibet. Among these events was what is known by the name of the 'Council of Tibet', or more specifically as the 'Great Debate' of bSam yas, an assembly of teachers and scholars called together by the Tibetan ruler at which various currents of thought within Buddhism met and were discussed. At this time Tibet was in fact one of the main centres of confluence for ideas in the Buddhist world, and encounters and sometimes also conflicts readily took place between Buddhist masters of different origins teaching there, as well as between their Tibetan followers. At this time also the Tibetans began, in greater or lesser dependence on teachers from China, India and Central Asia, more clearly to define their approach to the theory and practice of the Buddhism which they were assimilating, adopting as the core of so much of their civilization and making their own.[1]

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[1] On the reconstruction – and indeed the construction – of tradition in Tibetan historiography concerning the 'Great Debate' of bSam yas, on some of the historical and philological problems posed by the documentation connected directly or indirectly with this event, and on the complex religious- →

Immediately following this Great Debate the Tibetan ruler and Dharmarāja (*chos rgyal*) Khri Sroṅ lde btsan (*rg. c.* 755-797 ?) reportedly decreed that in Tibet the theory of Buddhism should thenceforth always follow Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka.[2] The Madhyamaka school of philoso-

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philosophical question of the so-called 'Theory/System of the Hva šaṅ' (*hva šaṅ gi lta ba/lugs*) as a Tibetan designation for a *type* of doctrine which is in fact of considerable antiquity in Buddhist religious and philosophical thought – and which thus predates the Chinese Ho-shang Mo-ho-yen who, as the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna, became in Tibetan historiography and doxography less a properly historical person than a somewhat emblematic figure representing typologically a variety of religious-philosophical thought in Buddhism –, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Buddha-nature, Mind and the problem of Gradualism in a comparative perspective* (London, 1989), Chapter ii. On the *hva šaṅ gi lta ba/lugs*, see below, § 5.

2 See e.g. the *sBa bžed žabs btags ma* (ed. R. A. Stein), p. 62: *deṅ slan chad [?] lta ba na ga rdzu na'i lta ba bzuṅ/ spyod pa pha rol tu phyin pa drug la bgyis la chos spyod bcu ñams su blaṅ/ bsgom pa šes rab rnam gsum la bgyis/ blo sbyoṅs la thabs šes zuṅ du 'brel bar bsgoms/*; Ñaṅ ral Ñi ma 'od zer, *Chos 'byuṅ Me tog sñiṅ po* (facsimile ed. by R. Meisezahl, *Die große Geschichte des tibetischen Buddhismus nach alter Tradition*, St. Augustin, 1985), f. 435b: *deṅ phyin chad lta ba ni na ga rdzu na'i lta ba bzuṅ/ /spyod pa pha rol tu phyin pa drug la gyis/ /chos spyod bcu ñams su loṅ/ /sgom pa šes rab gsum gyi blo sbyoṅs/ /thabs šes zuṅ du 'brel par gyis la bsgoms//*; and Bu ston, *Chos 'byuṅ*, f. 129b (writing of the time shortly before the death in his sixty-ninth year of Khri Sroṅ lde btsan and the accession to the throne of Mu ne btsan po): *de nas btsan pos da phyin chad lta ba klu sgrub kyi lugs zuṅs/ spyod pa chos spyod bcu daṅ pha rol tu phyin pa slob/ / ton mun gyi lugs byed du mi dbaṅ ṅo žes bka' stsal te hva šaṅ rgya'i yul du brdzaṅs/ dpe rnams bsdus te gter du sbas so//* (The expanded *sBa bžed* and Ñaṅ ral's *Chos 'byuṅ* thus agree in all but a few words, and Bu ston's account seems to be based on the *sBa bžed* or a common source.) See in addition dPa' bo gTsug lag phreṅ ba, *mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, ja, f. 113b: ... *phyin chad lta ba klu sgrub lugs su zuṅ/ /spyod pa dge bcu phar phyin drug spyod/ /sgom pa ži lhag zuṅ du 'brel bar gyis/ /lo tsās ma bsgyur paṇḍi tas ma bšad/ /rgyal pos bka' btags sbyin bdag ma byas pa'i/ /chos la spyad du mi gnaṅ bka' khrims bsgrags//*; f. 119a2; Padma dkar po, *Chos 'byuṅ bstan pa'i padma rgyas pa'i*

→

phy in fact occupied a central place in the history of Buddhist thought in Tibet from early times, and it has accordingly always exercised a very considerable influence in several sectors of Tibetan Buddhism.

The history of the Madhyamaka in Tibet may be roughly divided into four periods. Since all schools of Tibetan Buddhism did not develop at an equal pace and in identical ways, however, there is some overlapping between the later periods:

I. In the late eighth and the first part of the ninth centuries, during the 'Early Propagation' (*sṅa dar*) of Buddhism in Tibet, there took place the transmission of Indian Madhyamaka traditions and texts (chiefly Yogācāra-Madhyamaka and Svātantrika ones, but also a few *Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka ones[3]) – in particular through Śānta-rakṣita, his pupil Kamalaśīla, the Paṇḍit Jñānagarbha, Jinamitra,

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ñin byed, f. 165a; and dKon mchog lhun grub, *Dam pa'i chos kyi byuṅ tshul legs par bśad pa bstan pa rgya mtshor 'jug pa'i gru chen (Ṅor pa chos 'byuṅ)*, f. 23b. Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Buddha-nature, Mind and the problem of Gradualism*, pp. 83-86.

On Nāgārjuna as a major source for Tibetan Buddhism, see also the decree of Khri lDe sroṅ btsan cited at the beginning of the *sGra sbyor bam po gñis pa* (ed. Ishikawa [Tōkyō, 1990]), p. 2.

[3] On the origins, and also the limitations imposable on the use, of the appellations rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma = Yogācāra-Madhyamaka, mDo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma, dBu ma Raṅ rgyud pa = Svātantrika-Madhyamaka, and dBu ma Thal 'gyur ba = *Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka for currents or branches of the Madhyamaka, see below. Although the names Raṅ rgyud pa 'Svātantrika' and Thal 'gyur ba 'Prāsaṅgika' are not actually attested in extant Sanskrit sources as designations for schools of the Madhyamaka, and should therefore strictly speaking be marked by an asterisk, and even though this nomenclature has over the centuries been somewhat fluid in its application by Tibetan doxographers in so far as they do not correspond to two monolithic and immutable schools corresponding to essentialist definitions of the terms, the two names will, nevertheless, be used here as a taxonomic device and as convenient designations for the two currents, or branches, of the Madhyamaka descending respectively from Bhavya and Buddhapālita/Candrakīrti.

Dānaśīla and Śīlendrabodhi – and their first assimilation by Tibetans. To this period also belong significant early Tibetan efforts toward interpretation and systematization of Madyamaka thought, notably by the translator and scholar sNa nam Žaṅ Ye šes sde (*fl. c.* 800).[4]

II. From the end of the tenth or the beginning of the eleventh century to the fourteenth century, during the first four centuries of the 'Later Propagation' (*phyi dar, c.* 970 +) of Buddhism in Tibet, there followed the later transmission of Indian Madhyamaka traditions and texts (chiefly Svātantrika and *Prāsaṅgika ones) – in particular, to begin with, through Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna, Sūkṣmajana, Kanakavarman, Mahāsumati, Tilakakalaśa, Abhayākara, Muditāśrī, and Jayānanda – along with their full assimilation and reception by Tibetan thinkers such as the renowned Lotsāba Rin chen bzaṅ po (958-1055). This second period was characterized by continuing philosophical penetration and explication of Sūtra and, especially, Śāstra doctrines and philosophical ideas, accompanied by further important Tibetan achievements in the interpretation and systematization of Madhyamaka thought.[5]

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[4] In this first period there existed also an influence of Chinese Buddhism on Tibetan Buddhism, but this influence seems to have had relatively little impact on the Tibetan Madhyamaka, except by way of a reaction against what is termed (perhaps more emblematically or typologically than strictly historically) the System (*lugs*) or Theory (*lta ba*) of the Hva šaṅ(s), i.e. the Chinese Ho-shangs.

[5] Mi la ras pa (1040-1123) belongs chronologicaly to this period, but he is surely 'classical' in at least one sense of this word. He cannot be made to fit neatly into the present scheme of periodization of the Tibetan Madyamaka which he as it were transcends, a fact that makes problematic any rigid or simplified schematic periodization of Tibetan thought. lCaṅ skya Rol pa'i rdo rje, *Grub mtha'i rnam bžag*, kha, f. 19b = p. 299, considered Mi la ras pa's theory to have been in agreement with the Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka. Padma dkar po based his *dBu ma'i gžuṅ lugs gsum gsal bar byed pa Ṅes don grub pa'i šiṅ rta* on the *dBu ma yaṅ dag par brjod pa* attributed to Mi la ras pa.

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III. The classical-systematic period (mainly fourteenth to sixteenth centuries): the high point of Tibetan textual exegesis, philosophical penetration and systematic hermeneutics. In this period there took place the definitive constitution as philosophical schools of the principal Tibetan orders (*chos lugs*) – namely the rÑiṅ ma pa/rDzogs chen pa (with Kloṅ chen pa [1308-1363]), the doctrinally somewhat heterogeneous Sa skya pa (with Madhyamaka masters claiming spiritual descent from Sa skya paṇḍi ta Kun dga' rgyal mtshan such as Red mda' ba [1349-1412], Roṅ ston [1367-1449] and Go rams pa [1429-1489]), the dGa' ldan pa/dGe lugs pa[6] (Tsoṅ kha pa [1357-

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The transition from Period II to Period III, which is ill-defined in terms of the contents of the texts produced in these two periods, is marked by the historical-bibliographical circumstance that relatively few Madhyamaka works from before the fourteenth century are now generally accessible in Tibetan xylographic editions (exceptions for Prajñāpāramitā and Madhyamaka texts being some works by rṄog Blo ldan šes rab, Gro luṅ pa and rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus, in addition to the not specifically Madhyamaka-school writings of Mi la ras pa, sGam po pa, Roṅ zom pa and the Sa skya *goṅ ma*s), whereas Madhyamaka works dating from the fourteenth century onwards are available in great number in xylographic editions. This paucity of printed editions of these early works appears to indicate that in more recent years the earlier treatises of the Tibetan Madhyamaka have been relatively little used; mostly later works now constitute the corpus of classical treatises of the various Tibetan orders (*chos lugs*) studied in their seminaries (*bšad grva*).

6 It should be recalled that the designation dGe lugs (pa), denoting the dGa' ldan (pa) order or school, has been said to be euphonic for 'dGa' lugs (pa)', i.e. the school that has the 'Brog ri bo che dGa' ldan rnam par rgyal ba'i gliṅ monastery as its centre. See Thu'u bkvan Blo bzaṅ chos kyi ñi ma, *Grub mtha' šel gyi me loṅ*, dGe lugs Chapter, f. 1b = pp. 235-6 (of the Gansu ed. of 1989): *rje'i riṅ lugs la chos rje dga' ldan pa'i lugs žes 'bod pa byuṅ/ de tshig sna bsdus nas brjod pa'i tshe dga' lugs pa žes zer ba ma bde bas/ dge lugs pa žes 'bod pa rgyun chags pa yin no/ /rje'i riṅ lugs la dga' ldan lugs žes pa'i mtshan 'byuṅ ba'aṅ bka' gdams glegs bam las luṅ bstan pa yin te/... gnas mchog dam pa ni dga' ldan pa žes gnas miṅ gis chos lugs la khyab par bstan no/ /žes raṅ re'i dam pa 'ga' žig gsuṅ ṅo//* (The same author then cites →

1419] and his disciples beginning with rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen [1364-1432], mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzaṅ (po) [1385-1438] and dGe 'dun grub [Dalai Lama I, 1391-1474]), and the bKa' brgyud pa (notably Karma pa VIII Mi bskyod rdo rje [1507-1554] and 'Brug pa Padma dkar po [1527-1592] – along with some smaller, but historically and doctrinally significant, schools such as the Jo naṅ pa (with Dol po pa [1292-1361]).

IV. The post-classical scholastic period (mainly sixteenth century onwards): a period of philosophical consolidation and elaboration (sometimes but by no means always epigonal) comprising continued textual-exegetical and systematic-hermeneutical activity, largely within the bounds of the various established *chos lugs*. There also appeared in this period certain noteworthy trends toward cross-linkages between traditions and lineages (for instance in the development of the *gžan stoṅ* doctrine) and also toward a quasi encyclopaedic universalism (in the *ris med* movement that has been closely connected with this *gžan stoṅ*), especially during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries with exponents such as Koṅ sprul Blo gros mtha' yas/Yon ṭan rgya mtsho [1813-1899] and (in part) 'Ju Mi pham rnam rgyal rgya mtsho [1846-1912]).[7] More recently, the Amdo

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another explanation of the name dGe lugs pa which he describes as arbitrary: *rje rin po ches grub mtha' sger du bzuṅ bas sger lugs par 'bod pa phyis su sgra ñams nas dge lugs par grags zer ba ni 'dod rgyal smras par zad do.*)

[7] The term *ris (su) med (pa)* literally means unbounded or unlimited, and then impartial (i.e. *phyogs med* or *phyogs lhuṅ med pa*) or universalist. The *ris med* movement set out to be universalist by drawing on teachings from all traditions of Buddhism; in effect it was enclopaedic, and sometimes eclectic.

For the *ris med* movement, reference may be made to Koṅ sprul Blo gros mtha' yas/Yon tan rgya mtsho, *Ris med chos kyi 'byuṅ gnas mdo tsam smos pa Blo gsal mgrin pa'i mdzes rgyan* (bKa' mdzod, vol. ta); and (Rag mgo mchog sprul) Thub bstan bšad sgrub rgya mtsho (alias Padma Kun bzaṅ raṅ grol), *rGyal bstan grub mtha' ris med kyi chos 'byuṅ mdor bsdus Yid ches dad pa'i šiṅ rta* (Delhi, 1985). And for a historical sketch of the *ris med* movement and its links with the *gžan stoṅ* teachings, and of the work of its exponents Kaḥ thog Tshe dbaṅ nor bu (1698-1755), Si tu Chos kyi 'byuṅ gnas/bsTan pa'i ñin byed (1699/1700-1774), Koṅ sprul and 'Ju Mi pham, see →

scholar dGe 'dun chos 'phel (1903?-1951) – who lived for long in India and Sri Lanka as well as in Eastern Tibet where he was born and in Central Tibet where he died – is credited with having attempted a renewed interpretation of Madhyamaka thought in a controversial treatise entitled *Klu sgrub dgoṅs rgyan.*

During Period I and in the earlier part of Period II, Tibetan scholars worked together with Indian Paṇḍits either in the Indian subcontinent and the Himalayan area or in Tibet. Later, in Period II which was marked in the twelfth/thirteenth century by the decline of Buddhism in India, the centre of Madhyamaka studies shifted to Tibet (and thence also to Mongolia) where they flourished throughout Period III and into the twentieth century in Period IV. In the twentieth century – and especially since the Tibetan diaspora in the 1950s – the study of the Madhyamaka has no longer been confined mainly to Inner Asia. And thanks to the efforts being made on a global basis by scholars of Buddhism and philosophers, studies dealing with Madhyamaka thought that are neither exclusively culture-bound and regional (or parochial) nor cast in a purely Western European philosophical mould have begun to see the light of day.[8]

E. G. Smith, Introduction to Lokesh Chandra (ed.), *The autobiography and diaries of Si-tu Paṇ-chen* (New Delhi, 1968); Preface to Sonam T. Kazi (ed.), *The autobiographical reminiscences of Ngag-dbang-dpal-bzang, late abbot of Kaḥ-thog Monastery* (Ngagyur Nyingmay Sungrab, vol. 1, Gangtok, 1969); Introduction to Sonam T. Kazi (ed.), *The Brgal lan nyin byed snang ba by 'Jam-mgon Mi-pham-rgya-mtsho of 'Ju* [i.e. Mi-pham's *Rab lan* or retort to Blo bzaṅ rab gsal] (Ngagyur Nyingmay Sungrab, vol. 5, Gangtok, 1969); and Introduction to Lokesh Chandra (ed.), *Kongtrul's encyclopaedia of Indo-Tibetan culture* (New Delhi, 1970), p. 2 ff. On Mi pham, see D. Schuh, *Tibetische Handschriften und Blockdrucke*, Teil 5 (Wiesbaden, 1973); and on Koṅ sprul, see *op. cit.*, Teil 6 (Wiesbaden, 1976). On the history of the *gžan stoṅ*, see below, p. 79 note 176.

[8] Sustained attempts in this direction were inaugurated in the 1920s by T. Stcherbatsky (F. I. Ščerbatskoj) and S. Schayer, and in the time that has passed since then not inconsiderable progress has been made. The earliest extensive scholarly treatment in a Western language of the Tibetan *Grub mtha' (Siddhānta)* literature inclusive of the Madhyamaka was by V. Vasil'ev (see his *Buddizm* [St. Petersburg, 1857]; German translation: W. Was-
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In the following pages materials relating to the history until the early fifteenth century of the Tibetan Madhyamaka will be assembled from various sources with a view to sketching, if only very briefly, the historical background and philosophical context within which Tsoṅ kha pa was to study and write. No claim to comprehensiveness, much less to a full critical sifting of all the materials, can of course be made for such an outline at this stage. The relevant historical materials are often fragmentary and found scattered either in the colophons to the translations or in a very large number of Tibetan historical and doctrinal works of various origins and belonging to different periods and to currents of thought whose authors had differing philosophical presuppositions, hermeneutical frames and practical aims. Because of their great number and extent, and because in any case of their being unavailable in their entirety, it has not been possible exhaustively to survey and assess all these documents here. Many of the sources on which this outline draws are, moreover, considerably later than the persons and doctrines on which they report. Much of the information in them has been presented only episodically and anecdotally, and it has often proved difficult if not impossible to reconcile different pieces of evidence with each other. What is offered here is, then, in part what might be called diadochic doxography, that is, an account of the transmission and succession of the Madhyamaka in Tibet as it has very frequently been presented in our sources. A full critical history of Tibetan thought, and in particular of the Madhyamaka, will naturally entail a more detailed study of both authors and themes than it has yet been possible to carry out (the fulfilment of this requirement depending in its

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siljew, *Der Buddhismus, seine Dogmen, Geschichte und Literatur* [St. Petersburg, 1860]). Already in the early eighteenth century the Jesuit missionary Ippolito Desideri had turned his attention to aspects of the Madhyamaka in his apologetic and polemic tracts; see G. Toscano, *'Byuṅ khuṅs (Origine degli esseri viventi e di tutte le cose*, Rome, 1984) and *Il Ṅes legs (Il Sommo Bene e Ultimo Fine*, Rome, 1989). In the best tradition of *haute vulgarisation*, R. Grousset published an extended account of the Madhyamaka in his *Les philosophies indiennes* (Paris, 1931), i, pp. 200-348, making explicit use of the philological and historical work of L. de La Vallée Poussin, M. Walleser, Stcherbatsky, G. Tucci, and S. Yamaguchi. Amongst modern philosophers, K. Jaspers already included Nāgārjuna among his 'great philosophers' (*Die großen Philosophen* [1959]).

turn on a more adequate organization of Indo-Tibetan and Tibetan studies than has hitherto existed).

2. THE TRANSMISSION TO TIBET OF THE MAIN INDIAN SOURCES OF THE MADHYAMAKA

By the first quarter of the ninth century CE, the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās* of Nāgārjuna – the fundamental Śāstra source for the Madhyamaka school – were rendered into Tibetan at the command of the Tibetan ruler (*lha btsan po*) by the translator (*lo tsā ba*) Cog ro Klu'i rgyal mtshan in association with the Indian Paṇḍit Jñānagarbha.[9] Then, towards the end of the eleventh century, this translation was revised by the Indian Paṇḍits Kanakavarman and Mahāsumati (also known as Hasumati) and by their disciple, the Tibetan Lotsāba (s)Pa tshab Ñi ma grags.[10]

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[9] Here and below, information on the Indian Paṇḍits and Tibetan translators (*lo tsā ba*) who rendered Indian texts into Tibetan is taken mainly from the relevant colophons in the bsTan 'gyur and from Tibetan historical and doxographical sources. – On the question whether the translator Paṇḍit Jñānagarbha is different from Jñānagarbha, the author of the *Satyadvayavibhaṅga* and Śāntarakṣita's predecesor in an ordination lineage, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, *The literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India* (Wiesbaden, 1981), p. 69 note 234; and E. Steinkellner, *BIS* 4/5 (1989), p. 232 f.

[10] Pa tshab is stated to have been born in 1055. His collaborator Kanakavarman had earlier worked with Rin chen bzaṅ po (958-1055). On these scholars see J. Naudou, *Les bouddhistes kaśmīriens au Moyen Age* (Paris, 1968), p. 184 f. On the translations by Klu'i rgyal mtshan and Pa tshab see A. Saito, 'Problems in translating the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* as cited in its commentaries', in: Doboom Tulku (ed.), *Buddhist translations* (New Delhi, 1995), pp. 87-96.

According to the *gSan yig* of Tsoṅ kha pa (gSuṅ 'bum, vol. ka, f. 27b) and the *gSan yig* of mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzaṅ (gSuṅ 'bum, ka, f. 4a), Pa tshab's Indian mentors Kanakavarman and Hasumati were disciples of a →

By the early ninth century too several other works by Nāgārjuna on Madhyamaka philosophy from the 'Corpus of Reasoning' (*rigs tshogs*) had also been translated into Tibetan. His *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* was translated together with Candrakīrti's comment by Jinamitra, Dānaśīla and Śīlendrabodhi in association with Žaṅ Ye šes sde.[11] Jinamitra and Ye šes sde are

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certain Indian master known in the Tibetan tradition as Rig pa'i khu byug (*Vidyākokila ?). Two masters bearing this name – the Elder and the Younger (*che chuṅ*) – are listed in mKhas grub rje's *gSan yig*, which in addition places a certain E ra ba ti between the Younger *Vidyākokila and Kanakavarman. And in Tsoṅ kha pa's *gSan yig* Hasumati is listed before Kanakavarman, but after the latter in mKhas grub rje's *gSan yig*. In this *gSan yig*, f. 27b, Saraha is furthermore mentioned as the disciple of (a) Candrakīrti and is placed between *Vidyākokila (who is there unspecified as the elder or the younger) and Hasumati (Mahāsumati). The later Indian masters of the Madhyamaka are in fact often linked by the Tibetan historians and doxographers with Candrakīrti through the two little-known Mādhyamikas named *Vidyākokila the Elder and *Vidyākokila the Younger, the first of whom at least is reported in a number of sources to have been a direct disciple of Candrakīrti, the seventh-century author of the *Madhyamakāvatāra* and *Prasannapadā*. A *Vidyākokila is said to have been a teacher of Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna (Atiša, 982-1054) (see *Deb ther sṅon po*, ca, f. 2a). Neither the elder nor the younger *Vidyākokila is, however, known to have composed a Madhyamaka treatise, and their precise status in the lineage of the Madhyamaka is far from clear. They may have been adepts and gurus who did not write books; they might even be so to speak notional figures inserted in the lineages in order to maintain the idea of the continuous and unbroken transmission of a tradition the actual history of which had become shrouded in the mists of time. (A Rig pa'i khu byug is known as the translator of P 4872, a *Tārāstotra*.)

[11] Some of these translators have been named in the first part of the *sGra sbyor bam po gñis pa*, p. 1, and in Bu ston's *Chos 'byuṅ*, f. 130a.

The existing bsTan 'gyur translation of the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* alone is ascribed to Muditāśrī and to Pa tshab. On the Dunhuang fragments (Mss BN Pelliot tibétain 795 and 796) of a Tibetan translation of the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā*, see C. Scherrer-Schaub, *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti* (Brussels, 1991), pp. xxv, 4, who notes that the bsTan 'gyur version of the Kārikās accompanied by Candrakīrti's →

further credited with the translation of Nāgārjuna's *Śūnyatāsaptati* together with the comment ascribed to Nāgārjuna himself.[12] About this time also Nāgārjuna's *Vigrahavyāvartanī* was rendered into Tibetan for the first time by the Paṇḍit Jñānagarbha and the Lotsāba (s)Ka ba dPal brtsegs (revised in the *phyi dar* by Jayānanda and Khu mDo sde 'bar); and Jinamitra and dPal brtsegs rakṣita are credited with a translation of Nāgārjuna's autocommentary on this work. Nāgārjuna's *Ratnāvalī* was translated at that time by Klu'i rgyal mtshan with Jñānagarbha (in the bsTan 'gyur as revised in the *phyi dar* by (s)Pa tshab with Kanakavarman), and also by ([s]Ka ba) dPal brtsegs with Vidyākaraprabha (in the paracanonical Žol par khaṅ edition as revised by Pa tshab with Kanakavarman; the still unrevised version of this translation may perhaps be the one listed in the *lDan/lHan dkar ma* catalogue [Lalou no. 660] together with an unattributed commentary [no. 661], the bsTan 'gyur translation of Ajitamitra's *Ratnāvalīṭīkā* being in fact ascribed to dPal brtsegs with Vidyākaraprabhā).

A little more than a century after the beginning of the Later Propagation of the Dharma (*phyi dar*, dated to the 970s) several further works ascribed to Nāgārjuna were either translated for the first time (e.g. the *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa*) or retranslated by the Paṇḍits Kanakavarman, Mahāsumati, Muditāśrī and Jayānanda with the Tibetans Khu mDo sde 'bar, Pa tshab Ñi ma grags, gŽon nu mchog, gÑan D(h)arma grags and Grags

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Vṛtti is related to the Dunhuang version of the verses, whilst the bsTan 'gyur version of the Kārikās alone and the paracanonical version of the Žol par khaṅ represent a second translation into Tibetan. The first of these two Tibetan versions is presumably the one listed in the *lDan/lHan dkar ma* catalogue consisting of the verses and a commentary (Lalou nos. 591-592; see p. 15 note 23 below).

12 The existing bsTan 'gyur translation of the *Śūnyatāsaptati* alone is ascribed to gŽon nu mchog, gÑan D(h)ar ma grags and Khu (mDo sde 'bar). On the various Tibetan versions of the *Śūnyatāsaptati* (including the Dunhuang fragments Ms BN Pelliot tibétain 799 and Ms BL/IOL Stein 643), see F. Erb, *Die Śūnyatāsaptati des Nāgārjuna und die Śūnyatāsaptativṛtti [Verse 1-32]* (Diss. Hamburg, 1990), p. xxxiii ff. (cf. F. Erb, *Śūnyatāsaptativṛtti, Candrakīrtis Kommentar zu den "Siebzig Versen über die Leerheit" des Nāgārjuna [Kārikās 1-14]* [Stuttgart, 1997], p. 27 ff.). Cf. p. 14 note 20 below.

'byor šes rab.[13] It was at this later time also that the *Catuḥśataka* by Ārya-Deva, the other principal master of the early undivided Madhyamaka school, was rendered into Tibetan by Sūkṣmajana and Pa tshab Ñi ma grags together with Candrakīrti's very extensive comment on it.

Of the several currents that developed in Indian Madhyamaka thought, as early as the second half of the eighth century the synthesizing Yogācāra-(Svātantrika-)Madhyamaka was introduced into Tibet by Śāntarakṣita, the first abbot of the great monastic centre of bSam yas who appears to have arrived in Tibet for the first time in the 760s and to have resided there once again for over a decade until his death (*c.* 788), and by his disciple Kamalaśīla, who arrived in Tibet as his master's successor immediately after the latter's death, led the Gradualist (*rim gyis pa*) party at the 'Great Debate' of bSam yas and died soon after it in Tibet (*c.* 795). Texts belonging to this school composed by Jñānagarbha and the other two Indian masters just mentioned were translated into Tibetan by (for instance) the Paṇḍit Jñānagarbha, Prajñāvarman, Śīlendrabodhi and Surendrabodhi in association with dPal brtsegs rakṣita and Ye šes sde.[14]

An older current in the Madhyamaka goes back to Bhavya/Bhā(va)viveka, who flourished in the sixth century.[15] In the early ninth century this

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[13] On these Paṇḍits and translators, cf. J. Naudou, *op. cit.*; and F. Erb, *Die Śūnyatatāsaptati des Nāgārjuna*, pp. xlviii, lxxiii-lxxv; id., *Śūnyatāsaptativṛtti*, pp. 29-30. – Incomplete translations of the *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* and its commentary are already listed in the *lDan/lHan dkar ma* Catalogue (Lalou no. 731).

For further details on *phyi dar* translations and their translators see below.

[14] Sometimes Jñānagarbha has, however, been counted as a Svātantrika-Mādhyamika. Jñānagarbha's *Satyadvayavibhaṅga*, Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* and Kamalaśīla's *Madhyamakāloka* are, moreover, known as the *raṅ rgyud šar gsum*.

[15] On the various Sanskrit (and Tibetan) names of this sixth-century master whose name has been written as Bhāvaviveka in Sanskrit manuscripts used by La Vallée Poussin for his edition of the *Prasannapadā*, but who appears to have been named Bhāviveka (cf. Tib. sNaṅ bral), see the present writer's 'On the authorship of some works ascribed to Bhāvaviveka/Bhavya', in D. →

master's comment on Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamakakārikās*, the *Prajñāpradīpa*, was translated by the Paṇḍit Jñānagarbha together with Klu'i rgyal mtshan. These translators are credited also with the Tibetan rendering of the very extensive commentary on the *Prajñāpradīpa* by Avalokitavrata. Bhavya's other main work, the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikās*, was, however, finally translated in its entirety only at the beginning of the Later Propagation of Buddhism in Tibet by Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna (Atiśa, 982-1054) and Nag tsho Tshul khrims rgyal ba (b. 1011) together with its highly important commentary, the *Tarkajvālā*; this translation, executed at the Ra sa (lHa sa) 'Phrul snaṅ temple, is stated to have been made at the request of rṄog Legs pa'i šes rab.[16] From the end of the eleventh or the beginning of the twelfth century this Madhyamaka current came to be known in Tibet as the Raṅ rgyud pa (Svātantrika) branch of the pure Madhyamaka.[17]

Seyfort Ruegg and L. Schmithausen (ed.), *Earliest Buddhism and Madhyamaka* (Leiden, 1990), note 1; and Y. Ejima, *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* 38/2 (1990), pp. 846-838. The common Tibetan equivalent is Legs ldan 'byed. (The expression *kalpitabhāvaviveka* has been used in Prajñākaramati's *BCAP* ix.140 as a noun denoting the analytical exclusion of constructed entities; the Mādhyamika master might have received the appellation Bhāvaviveka from such a usage.) In Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakaśāstrastuti* 11, the form Bhāvin (Tib. Legs ldan [']byed) is found. A further common Sanskrit form is Bhavya (Tib. sKal ldan or, in transcription, Bha bya); this name may also refer to later masters (e.g. Bhavyarāja).

[16] See 'Gos lo tsā ba gŽon nu dpal, *Deb ther sṅon po*, ca, f. 37a.

Incomplete translations of the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikās* and the *Tarkajvālā* are, however, already listed in the *lDan/lHan dkar ma* Catalogue (Lalou no. 732). C. Lindtner has collected, in *SCEAR* 8 (1995), pp. 96-97, a few examples of a variant translation of the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikās*, which he has termed paracanonical; actually they may come from the unrevised, 'precanonical' translation not included in the 'canonical' bsTan 'gyur.

[17] On the name Svātantrika 'Autonomist' reconstructed from the Tibetan term Raṅ rgyud pa, but not actually attested in an extant Sanskrit text as the name of a branch of the Madhyamaka; see below, p. 20 note 38 and § 4.1 of this Section; and *KNZB* § 4.2 in Part II. For our use here of this nomenclature, see p. 3 note 3 above.

As for the other main current of Madhyamaka thought linked in particular with Buddhapālita (*c.* 500 CE) and Candrakīrti (seventh century), which in the eleventh/twelfth century came to be known in Tibet as the Thal 'gyur ba (*Prāsaṅgika) branch of the Madhyamaka,[18] already by the early ninth century Buddhapālita's commentary on the *Madhyamakakārikā*s was translated by the Paṇḍit Jñānagarbha and Klu'i rgyal mtshan. Candrakīrti's commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* was also translated in that period by Jinamitra, Dānaśīla and Śīlendrabodhi with Ye šes sde.[19] The two chief treatises of the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka current – Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra* and his *Prasannapadā Mūlamadhyamakavṛttiḥ* – were, however, translated only in the eleventh century by Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna, Tilakakalaśa, Kanakavarman, Sūkṣmajana and Jayānanda in association with the Lo tsā bas Nag tsho Tshul khrims rgyal ba, Khu mDo sde 'bar and Pa tshab Ñi ma grags. The translation by Abhayākaragupta and sNur D(h)ar ma grags of Candrakīrti's *Vṛtti* on the *Śūnyatāsaptati* as well that of Parahitabhadra's *Vivṛti* on the same text due to gŽon nu mchog in association with the author himself also belong to the *phyi dar* period.[20]

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[18] On the name Prāsangika 'Apagogist' reconstructed from the Tibetan term Thal 'gyur ba, but not actually attested in Sanskrit as the name of a branch of the Madhyamaka, see below, p. 20 note 38, § 4.2 of this Section, and *KNZB* §§ 4.1-2. For the use of *prasaṅga*-type reasoning, see p. 95 note 201 below.

[19] See above, p. 10 note 11. The bsTan 'gyur translation of Nāgārjuna's *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* alone is ascribed to Muditāśrī and to Pa tshab. Concerning a *sṅa dar* translation of (unattributed) commentaries on the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā*, see nos. 592 and 594 of the *lDan dkar ma* Catalogue. There no. 592 is stated to comprise 760 *śloka*s in two *bam po*s + 160 *śloka*s. (A text of the indicated length might perhaps be expected to fill approximately 30 folios in the sDe dge edition, where Candrakīrti's *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti* in fact occupies folios 1b-30b of vol. ya. See C. Scherrer-Schaub, *op. cit.*)

[20] The translation of the *Śūnyatāsaptati* alone is ascribed to gŽon nu mchog and gÑan D(h)ar ma grags. Concerning the identification of the commentary on the *Śūnyatāsaptati* already listed in the *lHan (d)kar ma/lDan dkar ma* Catalogue (no. 594), see F. Erb, *Śūnyatāsaptativṛtti*, note 86. On p. 29, Erb has argued against the identity of gÑan and sNur D(h)ar ma grags. – On the →

Mention is also to be made here of translations in the *sṅa dar* period of two works by Śāntideva/Śāntadeva who is often reckoned by Tibetan doxographers to belong to the Prāsaṅgika current of the Madhyamaka, namely the *Bodhi(sattva)caryāvatāra* by dPal brtsegs in association with Sarvajñadeva (revised in the *phyi dar* period first by Rin chen bzaṅ po and then by rṄog Blo ldan šes rab) and the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* by Ye šes sde in association with Jinamitra and Dānaśīla (later revised by Tilakakalaśa and rṄog).[21]

Concerning the early period around 800 of the Tibetan Madhyamaka, the *Pho braṅ stoṅ thaṅ ldan dkar gyi bka' daṅ bstan bcos 'gyur ro cog gi dkar chag* – commonly known as the *lHan (d)kar ma/lDan dkar ma* catalogue – includes (Lalou nos. 573-605), as already noted with respect to several texts mentioned above, an old and very valuable list of Madhyamaka texts kept in the *pho braṅ* of lDan dkar (lHan [d]kar in the old orthography[22]).[23] Contained in the bsTan 'gyur where it is ascribed to dPal brtsegs and Nam mkha'i sñiṅ po,[24] this catalogue is dated to a

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question of the translations of the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, see p. 17 note 28.

[21] This author's name has usually been written Śāntideva by modern scholars, but there exists evidence in Tibetan sources that the variant form Śāntadeva has also been current. On him see J. W. de Jong, 'La légende de Śāntideva', *IIJ* 16 (1975), p. 161 ff., where part of a Sanskrit Ṭippanī is edited from Haraprasad Shāstri's *Descriptive catalogue of Sanskrit manuscripts in the Government Collection*, vol. 1 (Calcutta, 1917, p. 53), and where the name is written Śāntideva (p. 170); and A. Saito, 'Śāntideva in the history of Mādhyamika philosophy', in: *Buddhism in India and abroad* (Mumbai-New Delhi, 1996), pp. 257-63. On a variant old Tibetan translation of the *Bodhi(sattva)caryāvatāra*, see A. Saito, *A study of Akṣayamati(= Śāntideva)'s Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra as found in the Tibetan manuscripts from Tunhuang* (Miye, 1993). See further A. Saito, 'Bu ston on the *sPyod 'jug*', in: H. Eimer (ed.), *Transmission of the Tibetan canon* (Vienna, 1997), pp. 79-85.

[22] See Mss BN Pelliot tibétain 1085 and 1088.

[23] Edited by M. Lalou, 'Les textes bouddhiques au temps du roi Khri-sroṅ-lde-bcan', *JA* 1953, pp. 313-53.

[24] P 5831 and D 4364. Bu ston, *Chos 'byuṅ*, f. 127b, however gives dPal →

dragon-year (*'brug lo*) in an unspecified twelve-year cycle.[25] It agrees with the information mentioned above taken from the bsTan 'gyur colophon concerning the existence of a *sṅa dar* translation of a major work connected with the Prāsaṅgika tradition, namely Buddhapālita's commentary on the *Madhyamakakārikās*.[26] Śāntideva's *Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra* is also listed in the *lDan dkar ma* (no. 659), as is the same author's *Śikṣāsamuccaya* (no. 658).

In the subsequest period of the Tibetan Madhyamaka, the Bengali master Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna (Atiśa, 982-1054), the author of the *Madhyamakopadeśa* and the *Satyadvayāvatāra*, may be said to be linked with what was to come to be known in Tibet as the Prāsaṅgika school since, in his *Satyadvayāvatāra*, he has stated that *śūnyatā* or *dharmatā* is to be known in the way explained by Candrakīrti in his *Madhyamakāvatāra*.[27]

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brtsegs and Klu'i dbaṅ po as the authors. These two masters are in fact mentioned in the *lDan dkar ma* catalogue itself.

[25] E. Frauwallner, *WZKSO* 1 (1957), p. 103, suggested the conversion *lcag 'brug* = 800; and G. Tucci, *Minor Buddhist texts*, ii (Rome, 1958), p. 48 note, suggested 812 (see also N. Simonsson, *Indo-tibetische Studien*, i [Uppsala, 1957], pp. 216-19). The *lDan dkar ma* has, however, been dated to 824 by Tshe tan žabs druṅ, *bsTan rtsis kun las btus pa* (mTsho sṅon mi rigs dpe skrun khaṅ, 1982), p. 134; see also Z. Yamaguchi, *Journal of the Naritasan Institute for Buddhist Studies*, No. 9 (1985), pp. 1-61. Bu ston's mention of the *lDan dkar ma* in his *Chos 'byuṅ* (f. 127b) before his account of the Great Debate of bSam yas might suggest an earlier date (perhaps 788?) under Khri Sroṅ lde btsan (cf. also Sum pa mkhan po, *dPag bsam ljon bzaṅ* [ed. S. Ch. Das], p. 173); but the inclusion in the *lDan dkar ma* catalogue (no. 606) of Kamalaśīla's *Bhāvanākrama*s speaks against so early a date for its final redaction as found in the bsTan 'gyur.

[26] *lDan dkar ma* no. 576. Concerning the translation of unattributed commentaries on the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* (Lalou nos. 592 and 594), see p. 14 note 19 above; and on the unattributed commentary (no. 594) on the *Śūnyatāsaptati* see p. 14 note 20 above.

[27] *Satyadvayāvatāra*, P, vol. ha, f. 70b = vol. gi, f. 7b. Cf. Tsoṅ kha pa, *LRChM*, f. 343a = p. 573.

He is also credited with a *Bodhisattvacaryāvatārabhāṣya*. This renowned scholar and apostle of Tibet arrived in mṄa' ris in 1042 and later proceeded to Central Tibet. With Rin chen bzaṅ po he translated the *Triśaraṇasaptati* ascribed to (a) Candrakīrti. And with his disciple Nag tsho Tshul khrims rgyal ba Atiša translated Candrakīrti's *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa*. To the same Nag tsho in collaboration with Kṛṣṇapaṇḍita is ascribed the first Tibetan translation of the verses of Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra*, the main source for the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka alongside the *Prasannapadā*.[28] As already noted, the team made up of Nag tsho and Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna was responsible also for the Tibetan translations of such important Svātantrika texts as Bhavya's *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikās* with their commentary known as the *Tarkajvālā* (reportedly at the request of rṄog Legs pa'i šes rab) and the *Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha*. In Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna's time and circle, Bhavya's and Candrakīrti's schools of the Madhyamaka were apparently not clearly differentiated by distinct designations and they were evidently being studied side by side.[29]

Abhayākaragupta, a master at the Vajrāsana (Bodh Gayā), Vikramaśīla and Nālandā monasteries who flourished around 1100, in the time of

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[28] A translation of the *Madhyamakāvatārakārikās* ascribed to Kṛṣṇapaṇḍita and Nag tsho as slightly revised (*cuṅ zad bcos pa*) in accordance with the later translation by Tilakakalaśa and Pa tshab is included in the Beijing edition (5261), but not in the sDe dge edition, of the bsTan 'gyur. In both the Beijing edition (5262) and the sDe dge edition (3861) is found a translation of the *Kārikās* ascribed to Pa tshab in collaboration with Tilakakalaśa as revised by Pa tshab himself in collaboration with Kanakavarman (which is also found embedded in the *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya*: P 5263 and D 3862); see § 4.2 below. (In Žu chen Tshul khrims rin chen's *dKar chag* of the sDe dge bsTan 'gyur [p. 785 of the Lhasa reprint of 1985], the information on no. 3861 strangely conflates the names of Kṛṣṇapaṇḍita and Tilaka, and those of Nag tsho and Pa tshab, as if reflecting awareness of a problem which was, however, not resolved.)

[29] As particular authorities after Nāgārjuna and Ārya-Deva, Candrakīrti, Bhavya, Śāntideva and Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna's own teacher Bodhibhadra have all been cited in the *Bodhipathadīpapañjikā*, D, f. 280a-b: *'phags pa klu sgrub žal gyi bdud rtsi des/ /ā rya de ba zla grags bha bya daṅ/ /ži ba'i lha daṅ byaṅ chub bzaṅ po'i bar/ /tshim par gyur pa bdag la'aṅ cuṅ žig 'thor//*

the Pāla king Rāmapāla, is also to be mentioned here because he had a number of Tibetan disciples who greatly influenced the development of Buddhist thought in Tibet. One of these was the Pa tshab lotsāba Tshul khrims rgyal mtshan. Another was sNur D(h)ar ma grags, who was associated with Abhayākaragupta in translating at Nālandā Candrakīrti's *Vṛtti* on Nāgārjuna's *Śūnyatāsaptati*. By Tibetan doxographers Abhayākara has often been counted as a representative of the Yogācāra-(Svātantrika-)Madhyamaka school, perhaps for reasons of doctrinal systematics and hermeneutics connected with his having commented in his *Marmakaumudī* on the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* in connexion with the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, a work which has been classified as belonging to the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka current. Abhayākaragupta's *Munimatālaṃkāra* – a large compendium of Mahāyānist thought based on the Prajñāpāramitā, Madhyamaka and Yogācāra traditions which also relates to the content of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* – is included in the Madhyamaka section of the bsTan 'gyur.[30]

Reference is next to be made to Ratnavajra, his son Mahājana and his grandson Sajjana, the latter two masters being teachers of rṄog Blo ldan šes rab (1059-1109) who translated the *Ratnagotravibhāga-Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra* with Sajjana.[31] Ratnavajra's great-grandson Sūkṣmajana[32] collaborated with (s)Pa tshab Ñi ma grags (b. 1055) in translating

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[30] The birth of Abhayākara has been placed in 1004 and his death in 1125 by Tshe tan žabs druṅ in his *bsTan rtsis kun las btus pa*. On him cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India*, pp. 114-15; F. Erb, *Śūnyatāsaptativṛtti*, pp. 27-29.

[31] As the son of Ratnavajra and the father of Sajjana, a certain Sugata appears instead of Mahājana in the lineage of the *gžan stoṅ* tradition given by Koṅ sprul and other authorities. On this family of scholars, see the colophon to the bsTan 'gyur translation of Candrakīrti's *Ṭīkā* on the *Catuḥśataka*; and Tāranātha, *rGya gar chos 'byuṅ* (ed. Schiefner), pp. 182-3. Cf. J. Naudou, *op. cit.*; S. Dietz, *Die buddhistische Briefliteratur Indiens* (Wiesbaden, 1984), p. 61.

[32] This name, the spelling of which seems uncertain, has also been given as Sukṣamajana. Cf. P. Cordier, *Catalogue du fonds tibétain de la Bibliothèque Nationale*, iii (Paris, 1915), mDo 'grel, xxiv.2.

Ārya-Deva's *Catuḥśataka* and Candrakīrti's *Ṭīkā* on this text. Members of this family thus transmitted Madhyamaka works and texts reckoned as Teachings of Maitreya (*byams chos*), as well as treatises of the Pramāṇa-tradition. Being closely connected with both rṄog Blo ldan šes rab and Pa tshab as teachers and in the work of translation into Tibetan, this family stands in lineages of both the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika branches of the Madhyamaka.[33] But amongst the members of this family it was evidently only Sūkṣmajana who was actually involved, with Pa tshab, in translating Madhyamaka texts in the strict sense (viz. the *Catuḥśataka* with Candrakīrti's comment on it). In short, this line of Kaśmīrian teachers, about whom little is known to us with precision, appears to have specialized in several Śāstras and evidently represented a tendency in Buddhist thought that not only brought together Madhyamaka and Pramāṇavidyā (as had indeed already been done much earlier by Bhavya) but also sought to harmonize Madhyamaka and Vijñānavāda. A harmonizing tendency, represented by what has sometimes been termed 'Vijñapti-Madhyamaka' (*rnam rig dbu ma*), is also found in Tibet in the *gžan stoṅ* tradition depending on the *Ratnagotravibhāga* and going back to bTsan Kha bo che (b. 1021?) among early Tibetan masters. As for the current of thought bringing together Madhyamaka and Pramāṇavidyā as supporting ways of thought (*rgyab chos*), it was represented in Tibet by rṄog Blo ldan šes rab and his successors in the gSaṅ phu tradition.

Parahita(bhadra), another Kaśmīrian master of the eleventh century, composed a comment (*Vivṛti*/*Vṛtti*) on the *Śūnyatāsaptati*, at the end of which the author states that he wrote it following the excellent Ācārya Zla dpal žabs (Somaśrīpāda?). This work was translated into Tibetan by its author in association with gŽon nu mchog at Tho liṅ. Parahita is reported also to have been the disciple of Ratnavajra;[34] and he is stated to have been the teacher of Mahāsumati, rṄog Blo ldan šes rab and, perhaps, Pa tshab Ñi ma grags.[35]

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33 See the lineage given in the *Deb ther sṅon po*, cha, f. 8b: Ratnavajra > Parahita > Hasumati (Mahāsumati) > sPa tshab lo tsā ba.

34 See the lineage given in the *Deb ther sṅon po*, cha, f. 8b.

35 For Parahita as the successor of Ratnavajra and predecessor of Hasumati, see the lineage of the Thaṅ sag pas in *Deb ther sṅon po*, cha, f. 8b. On Para- →

The names of Kanakavarman, Mahāsumati (also referred to as Hasumati), Tilakakalaśa and Muditāśrī have again to be recalled in the present context.[36] They all collaborated with Pa tshab (b. 1055), and the first of them worked already earlier with Rin chen bzaṅ po (958-1055, on the translation of the *Śrī-Sarvadurgatipariśodhanapretahomavidhi*).

Jayānanda, the author of a very extensive commentary on Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra*, is assigned to the Prāsaṅgika school.[37] According to its colophon, this *Ṭīkā* was composed by this Kaśmīrian master near the rMa chu (Huang ho) and the Ri bo rtse lṅa (Wu t'ai shan) in Mi ñag (i.e. the Hsi-hsia or Tangut country to the east of Tibet). It was translated into Tibetan by its author with the help of Kun dga' grags. The earliest recorded use of the appellation Raṅ rgyud pa (Svātantrika) to refer to a branch of the Madhyamaka is found in this work.[38] With Khu mDo sde

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hita cf. J. Naudou, *op. cit.*, pp. 182-3, and F. Erb, *Die Śūnyatāsaptati des Nāgārjuna*, pp. li-liv (Parahita does not cite Candrakīrti's *Vṛtti*), lxxxi f.

[36] cf. note 10 above.

[37] Concerning Jayānanda's *floruit* (late eleventh or early twelfth century), Khu mDo sde 'bar and rMya bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus (d. *c.* 1185) are both said to have been disciples of his; and Phya pa Chos kyi seṅ ge (1109-1169) is reported to have debated with him. Khu mDo sde 'bar, however, also collaborated in the translation of the *Śūnyatāsaptatikārikā*s with gŽon nu mchog, who in his turn worked with Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna in the middle of the eleventh century. – On Jayānanda see J. Naudou, *Les bouddhistes kaśmīriens au Moyen Age*, pp. 169, 188 (who places him in the eleventh century); and D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India*, p. 113 (on the difference between him and the Paṇḍit Jayānanda connected with the translation of the *Yuddhajaya[-arṇava]-nāmatantrarāja Svarodaya-nāma* and with Chag lo tsā ba Chos rje dpal [1197-1264]).

[38] Thus, in Jayānanda's *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā* are found the terms *dbu ma raṅ rgyud pa* (D, ff. 281a6, 281b6), *raṅ rgyud pa* (D, f. 282a2-3) and *raṅ rgyud du smra ba* (*svatantravādin*, D, f. 282b3). Jayānanda does not seem to use *thal 'gyur ba* as a term to designate the *Prāsaṅgika school. Cf. 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa'i rdo rje Ṅag dbaṅ brtson 'grus, *Grub mtha'i rnam bšad raṅ gžan grub mtha' kun daṅ zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzaṅ žiṅ gi ñi ma* →

'bar Jayānanda revised the *sṅa dar* translation of the verses of Nāgārjuna's *Vigrahavyāvartanī* and translated the entire *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa*. As for the so-called *Vaidalya-sūtra*, its translation is attributed to Ananta/Ānanda in association with Grags 'byor šes rab. And to this team consisting of Ānanda and Grags 'byor šes rab are further ascribed translations or revisions of three further works attributed in the bsTan 'gyur to Nāgārjuna: the *Akṣaraśataka* with its *Vṛtti*, the *Pratītyasamutpādahṛdaya-Vyākhyāna* and the **Abudhabodhaka*. Jayānanda also translated his own *Tarkamudgara*, a short metrical treatise on dialectics, with Khu mDo sde 'bar, and Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna's *Mahāsūtrasamuccaya* with both Pa tshab Ñi ma grags and Khu mDo sde 'bar.[39] The fact that Jayānanda was

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Luṅ rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu'i re ba kun skoṅ (Grub mtha' chen mo), ii, ff. 102b-103a. Cf. K. Mimaki, *Blo gsal grub mtha'* (Kyōto, 1982), note 110.

In his *LRChM*, f. 343a = p. 573, Tsoṅ kha pa has observed that the designations Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika for two branches of the Madhyamaka school appeared only in the Later Propagation of Buddhism (*phyi dar*) in Tibet. But he observes that since they are in accord with Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* he does not consider them to be mere arbitrary inventions (*raṅ bzo*). It needs to be noted that the term Raṅ rgyud pa (as well as Thal 'gyur ba) has sometimes been used by Tibetan doxographers not as the name of an immutable and monolithic school corresponding to an essentialist definition of the term; for 'Svātantrika' appears to cover works, and masters, linked as much by certain common features, or 'family resemblances', as by an immutably fixed and uniform content, the name in question having been on occasion employed to refer to what might perhaps be described as new, or updated, contents placed in containers that carry old and familiar labels.

In some places Jayānanda seems to be referred to also as Ānanda/Ananta (see below). This Ānanda/Ananta = Jayānanda has of course to be distinguished from (Bram ze or Kha che) Ānanda/Ananta, one of the early Paṇḍits working in Tibet in the eighth century; on the latter, see e.g. the first part of the *sGra sbyor bam po gñis pa*, p. 1; Nel pa, *Me tog phreṅ ba*, f. 10b/21b; Bu ston, *Chos 'byuṅ*, f. 130a; dPa' bo gTsug lag phreṅ ba, *mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, ja, f. 125a (who counts Kha che Ā nanta as one of the *lo tsā ba rgan gsum*). Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India*, p. 113.

39 Jayānanda, Pa tshab and Khu mDo sde 'bar are said in the *Deb ther sṅon* →

closely connected with the Prāsaṅgika tradition has not, however, prevented Tibetan Prāsaṅgikas such as Tsoṅ kha pa from occasionally criticizing his interpretations.[40]

In sum, it appears that by early in the ninth century major works of all three main lines of the Madhyamaka school – Bhavya's Svātantrika, Buddhapālita's and Candrakīrti's Prāsaṅgika and Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalaśīla's Yogācāra-(Svātantrika-)Madhyamaka – were being translated and studied by Tibetan scholars. At this early time in Tibet the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka seems to have occupied the most prominent place, probably in large part because of the presence in that country of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla who were leading representatives of this current of the Madhyamaka in the second half of the eighth century. Bhavya's Svātantrika branch was well represented in Tibet in both the *sṅa dar* and the early part of the *phyi dar* periods, even though the first reference to it by the term Raṅ rgyud pa is found in Jayānanda's commentary on the *Madhyamakāvatāra*. On the other hand, even though a couple of its main sources were already translated into Tibetan in the *sṅa dar* period, Candrakīrti's current of Madhyamaka thought does not figure at this time as a clearly distinguished branch of the Madhyamaka separate from Bhavya's; the first Tibetan scholar to distinguish it clearly and explicitly from the Svātantrika school by means of the appellation Prāsaṅgika was reportedly Pa tshab Ñi ma grags.[41]

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po (ca, f. 15a) to have translated, at Šar ba pa's expense, the copy of the *Sūtrasamuccaya* found by the latter among Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna's books at Rva sgreṅ. If this indeed refers to Nāgārjuna's work rather than to Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna's own *Mahāsūtrasamuccaya*, this would be a revision of the *sṅa dar* translation by Ye šes sde.

[40] See e.g. *LRChM*, f. 404b f. = p. 673 f. and f. 408a f. = p. 678 f. (on *tshad mas grub pa* in regard to the difference between *raṅ rgyud* and *thal 'gyur*; cf. *KNZB* § 6); and *LSÑP*, f. 92a = p. 490 (on the relation between the teaching of the *tathāgatagarbha* and *ālayavijñāna*).

[41] dPal maṅ dKon mchog rgyal mtshan (1764-1853) has ventured the opinion that already in the eighth century, when Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla were introducing and upholding the Svātantrika tradition in Tibet, the great Ācārya Padmasambhava was 'without doubt' maintaing there the theory (*lta* →

3. EARLY TIBETAN DOXOGRAPHICAL DIVISIONS OF THE MADHYAMAKA

The exegetical identification and systematic explication of the characteristic features of the above-mentioned currents in the history of the Madhyamaka and the classification of their respective masters and texts have been carried out by a long line of Tibetan scholars, in particular by the writers of the religious-historical (*Chos 'byuṅ*) and the doxographical (*Grub mtha' = Siddhānta*) literature.

The latter genre begins in Tibet with Ye šes sde, the author of the *lTa ba'i khyad par*, and dPal brtsegs, the author of the *lTa ba'i rim pa'i man ṅag*. In the first of these two works composed already by the early ninth century, the schools of Bhavya and Śāntarakṣita are referred to respectively as mDo sde <spyod pa'i> dbu ma and rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma.[42] And in the latter work they are referred to respectively as the mDo sde dbu ma pa and the rNal 'byor dbu ma.[43] A comparable distinction be-

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ba) of the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka. See his *bDen gtam sñiṅ rje'i rol mtsho las zur du phyuṅ ba Bya gtoṅ sñan sgron*, f. 2a. Such a classification we no doubt have to regard as an example of doxographical and philosophical-systematic categorization.

[42] See *lTa ba'i khyad par*, P, f. 252b1 and f. 252b7, with Ms BN Pelliot tibétain 814, f. 5a-b. (Fragments of this text are also found in the Mss BN Pelliot tibétain 94, 815, 820 and 2101 and BL/IOL Stein 692 and 694.) This work, which is listed by Bu ston in his Catalogue of the bsTan 'gyur (ed. S. Nishioka, no. 2916), has been edited by D. Ueyama, 'Eseide no bukkyō kōyō-sho', *Bukkyōgaku kenkyū* 32-33 (1977), pp. 19-45, and 37 (1981), pp. 54-84. On this work, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, *JA* 1981, pp. 207-29.

For further relevant sources, see Ms BN Pelliot tibétain 817 which lists the *rnal 'byor gyi dbu ma* and the *mdo sde'i dbu ma pa*; and Ms BL/IOL Stein 693 which lists the *mdo sde pa'i dbu ma'i lta ba* and the *rnal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma'i lta ba*.

[43] *lTa ba'i rim pa'i man ṅag* (or *lTa ba'i rim pa bšad pa*), P 5843, f. 140a-b (and cf. Ms BN Pelliot tibétain 817). The text is also found in the bsTan 'gyur rGyud 'grel, P 4728, where it is subtitled *sNaṅ ba bcu bdun*. It is listed in the Catalogue included in Bu ston's *Chos 'byuṅ* (f. 207a, Nishioka, no. →

tween the 'external' Madhyamaka (*phyi'i dbu ma* or *phyi rol pa'i dbu ma par 'dod pa*) – which accepts an outer object on the surface-level of *saṃvṛti* – and the 'internal' Yoga-Madhyamaka (*naṅ gi rnal 'byor gyi/pa'i dbu ma*) – i.e. the synthesizing Yogācāra-Madhyamaka of Śāntarakṣita's school which follows the Vijñānavāda in accepting only the mind as real (*sems tsam*) – is made in a Dunhuang manuscript beginning with the words *Saṅs rgyas pa'i theg pa che chuṅ gsum daṅ/ mu stegs la stsogs pa'i lta ba mdor bsdus te khyad par du phye ba.* Both these Madhyamaka currents are stated there (f. ca a1) to go back to Nāgārjuna and Ārya-Deva.[44]

As for the *lTa ba'i bye brag* listed already in the *lDan dkar ma* Catalogue (Lalou no. 679) where it is ascribed to Ñi ma'i 'od, it does not now appear to be extant under this particular title. It is perhaps to be identified

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2915) under the title *lTa ba'i rim pa bšad pa* (with the note *phyi ma 'di dpyad* referring to it and indicating dubiety). On this work cf. G. Tucci, *Minor Buddhist texts*, ii (Rome, 1958), pp. 137-9; S. Karmay, *The Great Perfection* (Leiden, 1988), p. 149; and F.-K. Ehrhard, *Flügelschläge des Garuḍa* (Stuttgart, 1990), p. 14. This work by dPal brtsegs also contains further doxographical designations the exact meanings of which are not now clear, including the rNam rig (dbu ma) branch in addition to the rNal 'byor pa branch of Madhyamaka. As already noted, neither Raṅ rgyud pa (Svātantrika) nor Thal 'gyur ba (*Prāsaṅgika) is mentioned in these early works as designations for branches of the Madhyamaka.

[44] Ms BN Pelliot tibétain 842, f. ṅa b7 ff. On this text cf. S. Karmay, *The Great Perfection*, pp. 150-1.

A (different) distinction between an 'outer' (and 'coarse') Madhyamaka and an 'inner' (and 'subtle') Madhyamaka is made in the rÑiṅ ma tradition, where it has been recently employed by bDud 'joms 'Jigs bral ye šes rdo rje in his *bsTan pa'i rnam bžag* (f. 72b ff., f. 106b ff.) to designate the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika on the one side and Yogācāra Madhyamaka (or the *dbu ma chen po*) on the other side. (On the use of the term 'Yoga-Madhyamaka' (*rnal 'byor dbu ma*) in the *Blon po bka'i thaṅ yig* (f. 28a), and for *dbu ma* used there to designate the 'Simultaneist' *ston mun cig gar 'jug pa*, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Buddha-nature, Mind and the problem of Gradualism*, p. 84.)

with the *lTa ba'i rim pa*, in a fragment of which the rNal 'byor pa'i dbu ma pa (Yogācāra-Mādhyamika) is mentioned.[45]

Following lists drawn up later by Bu ston (1290-1364) and dPa' bo gTsug lag phreṅ ba (1504-1566),[46] mention may additionally be made here of some early indigenous Tibetan Madhyamaka texts such as the *dBu ma'i gzer bu* evidently attributed to Khri Sroṅ lde btsan;[47] the Memorandum (*brjed byaṅ*) on Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* by a certain *slob dpon* bKra šis; the *Ṅes pa'i don dbu ma*, apparently by Cog ro Klu'i rgyal mtshan (?); a treatise rejecting the doctrine of the existence in the 'attention-stream' (*dran rgyud*) of an external object, apparently by Ka ba dPal brtsegs (?); the Compendium by Vairocana drawing on the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā*; and the *btsan po* dPal dun brtan's *dBu ma'i bkas bcad/dka' spyod bšad pa daṅ bcas pa* together with its *brJed byaṅ*.[48]

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45 Ms BL/IOL Stein 607.

46 Bu ston, *Chos 'byuṅ*, f. 206b-207b; dPa' bo gTsug lag phreṅ ba, *mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, ja, ff. 124a-125a.

47 A further early Tibetan treatise dealing with philosophy and attributed to Khri Sroṅ lde btsan is the extensive *bKa' yaṅ dag pa'i tshad ma'i mdo*. It is included in the bsTan 'gyur and has been summarized by G. Tucci, *Minor Tibetan texts*, ii, pp. 122-5. Concerned with Chapter x of the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*, it yields little for the early doxography of the Tibetan Madhyamaka. As for the '*Grel chen* on the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*, though ascribed to Asaṅga, it refers to the preceding work; by Bu ston, *bsTan 'gyur gyi dkar chag*, f. 117a-b, it is supposed to be by Klu'i rgyal mtshan. On the identification of Khri Sroṅ lde btsan with Byaṅ chub rdzu 'phrul, to whom is ascribed a commentary on this same Sūtra, see E. Steinkellner, *BIS* 4/5 (1989), p. 236 f.

48 See Bu ston Rin chen grub's Catalogue of the bsTan 'gyur in his *Chos 'byuṅ*, f. 207a-b (ed. S. Nishioka, nos. 2901, 2913, 2921, 2928, 2929, and 2933-4); and dPa' bo gTsug lag phreṅ ba, *mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, ja, ff. 124b-125a. If no such ancient Tibetan treatises are listed in the well-known *dPe rgyun dkon pa 'ga' žig gi tho yig* by A khu Šes rab rgya mtsho (1803-1875), this is likely to be because none of these works was (widely) available in his time; in fact they do not seem to have been available even to Bu ston, for in his Catalogue (f. 206b) he refers as his source only to lists of works (*mdzad* →

4. THE INDIGENOUS TIBETAN SOURCES OF THE MADHYAMAKA BEGINNING IN THE ELEVENTH CENTURY

The history of the Tibetan Madhyamaka during the roughly 575 years between *c.* 800 in Period I – the approximate time of composition of the *lTa ba'i khyad bar* by Ye šes sde, the *lTa ba'i rim pa'i man ṅag* by dPal brtsegs and of other works mentioned in the last section – and the time of Tsoṅ kha pa (1357-1419) in Period III is only very imperfectly known because few of the relevant sources are accessible to us and several are indeed likely to have been lost.[49]

The *bSam gtan mig sgron*, a work ascribed to gNubs chen Saṅs rgyas ye šes, has made mention of a number of masters and divisions of Buddhist schools of philosophy – and notably of Kamalaśīla as a 'Gradualist' (*rim gyis pa*, f. 12a f., in contradistinction to the 'Simultaneist' advocates of the *cig c[h]ar 'jug pa*) – but not of the above-mentioned terms mDo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma and rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma which were em-

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byaṅ) by the Tibetan Dharmarājas and Lotsābas, and names (f. 209b) earlier catalogues he used beginning with the *dKar chag* of sToṅ thaṅ ldan/lhan dkar.

[49] For a brief history of the Tibetan Madhyamaka in this period, see e.g. (gSer mdog paṇ chen) Šākya mchog ldan (1428-1507), *dBu ma'i byuṅ tshul rnam par bšad pa'i gtam Yid bžin lhun po* (gSuṅ 'bum, vol. ṅa), f. 12b ff.; and Karma Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507-1554), *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bšad dPal ldan dus gsum mkhyen pa'i žal luṅ dvags brgyud grub pa'i šiṅ rta* (Rum btegs, 1975), ff. 4b-33b, summarized by D. Seyfort Ruegg, 'A Karma bKa' brgyud work on the lineages and traditions of the Indo-Tibetan dBu ma (Madhyamaka)', in: G. Gnoli *et al.* (ed.), *Orientalia Iosephi Tucci memoriae dicata,* vol. iii (Rome, 1988), pp. 1254-1271. – A brief historical sketch is found in R. Thurman, *Tsong Kha pa's Speech of Gold in the Essence of True Eloquence* (Princeton, 1984), p. 49 ff. Cf. also J. Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness* (London, 1983), p. 406 ff., 531-8; and L. Dargyay, 'Tsong-khapa's understanding of Prāsaṅgika thought', *JIABS* 10/1 (1987), pp. 56-59. For the history of the Tibetan *Grub mtha'* literature covering this earlier period in Tibetan philosophical thought, see K. Mimaki, *Blo gsal grub mtha'* (Kyōto, 1982), p. 5 ff.

ployed at an early time to designate Bhavya's and Śāntarakṣita's branches of the Madhyamaka, nor of the terms Raṅ rgyud pa and Thal 'gyur ba later used to designate Bhavya's and Candrakīrti's branches of the Madhyamaka.[50]

4.1. THE ANTECEDENTS OF THE TIBETAN RAṄ RGYUD PA ('SVĀTANTRIKA') TRADITION IN THE EARLIER *phyi dar* PERIOD

Among the authors of Tibetan Madhyamaka works in the strict sense who are known to us – many of them by name only[51] – from the early

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[50] See *rNal 'byor mig gi bsam gtan* or *bSam gtan mig sgron* (Leh, 1974). – The date of this text is not certain. The death of its putative author gNubs/sNubs chen has been placed in 956 by Tshe tan žabs druṅ, *bsTan rtsis kun las btus pa*. rÑiṅ ma sources place his birth in 832 (or 772). If both the attribution of the *bSam gtan mig sgron* to gNubs chen and his early date are correct, this would place this text before the *phyi dar*, the beginning of which is usually placed in the 970s (or, occasionally, in 953). From the doctrinal point of view, however, this text seems rather to fit in with philosophical concerns prevalent in Tibet especially from the eleventh century onwards, mentioning as it does (f. 37a) the *med par dgag pa* (i.e. the *prasajyapratiṣedha*, discussed of course already by Bhavya in the Madhyamaka tradition). On this work see S. Karmay, *The Great Perfection*, who places it in the tenth century (p. 100); F.-K. Ehrhard, *Flügelschläge des Garuḍa*, p. 8 f.; and D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Buddha-nature, Mind and the problem of Gradualism in a comparative perspective*, p. 66, where the eleventh century has been tentatively suggested as the date of this work in the form in which it is now available to us.

[51] In addition to sources such as the *Chos 'byuṅ* and *Grub mtha'* literature, see in particular A khu chiṅ Šes rab rgya mysho, *dPe rgyun dkon pa 'ga' žig gi tho yig* (ed. Lokesh Chandra, in *Materials for a history of Tibetan literature*, Part 3, New Delhi, 1963), henceforth referred to by the abbreviation A khu, *Tho yig*. On the use of the conventional name Raṅ rgyud pa = Svātantrika, see above note 38.

part of Period II, mention is in the first place to be made of rṄog Blo ldan šes rab (1059-1109). Following on the Religious Council held by King rTse lde in 1076,[52] rṄog studied in Kaśmīr for 17 years under teachers such as Bhavyarāja and Parahitabhadra (the author of a *Vivṛti/Vṛtti* on Nāgārjuna's *Śūnyatāsaptati*); Ratnavajra also is said to have been a teacher of his, as well as Ratnavajra's son Mahājana and his grandson Sajjana (with whom rṄog translated the *Ratnagotravibhāga*). rṄog returned to Tibet in about 1092, finally becoming abbot of the gSaṅ phu (s)Ne'u thog monastery to the south of Lhasa which had been founded by his uncle rṄog Legs pa'i šes rab, a pupil of Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna and his disciple 'Brom ston.[53] In addition to the *Don bsdus/bsDus don* or Compendium

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[52] That is, after the mṄa' ris chos 'khor or Religious Council of 1076 (*me pho 'brug gi chos 'khor*) held at Tho (g)liṅ/mTho ldiṅ which rṄog attended as a young man in the company of Rva lo tsā ba, gÑan (D[h]ar ma grags), bTsan Kha bo che and others. See, e.g., *Deb ther sṅon po*, kha, f. 4b; ca, f. 37a-b; cha, f. 1b. Recent discussions on this matter are by Lobsang Shastri, 'The Fire Dragon *Chos 'khor* (1076 AD)', in: *Tibetan studies (Proceedings of the Seventh Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Graz 1995*), vol. ii (Vienna, 1997), pp. 873-82; and by R. Vitali, *The kingdoms of Gu.ge Pu.hrang according to mNga'.ris rgyal.rabs by Gu.ge mkhan.chen Ngag.dbang.grags.pa* (Dharamsala, 1996), pp. 319-22, and *Records of Tho.ling* (London, 1999), p. 32.

[53] On gSaṅ phu (s)Ne'u thog and its abbatial lineages see Tshal pa Kun dga' rdo rje, *Deb ther dmar po*, p. 66 ff.; Yar luṅ jo bo Šākya rin chen, *Chos 'byuṅ* (Sichuan ed. of 1988), p. 128; bSod nams lha'i dbaṅ po, *bKa' gdams rin po che'i chos 'byuṅ rnam thar ñin mor byed pa'i 'od stoṅ*, f. 78b; and 'Gos gŽon nu dpal, *Deb ther sṅon po*, vol. cha. Cf. L. van der Kuijp, 'The monastery of Gsang-phu ne'u-thog and its abbatial succession from ca. 1073 to 1250', *BIS* 3 (1987), pp. 103-27; and S. Onoda, 'The chronology of the abbatial successions of the gSaṅ phu Ne'u thog monastery', *WZKS* 33 (1989), pp. 203-13. – bSod nams lha'i dbaṅ po, *op. cit.*, f. 78b, Šākya mchog ldan, *rṄog lo tstsha ba chen pos bstan pa ji ltar bskyaṅs pa'i tshul*, f. 2a, and Padma dkar po, *Chos 'byuṅ*, f. 189b, have given a variant account which would seem to place the first foundation of gSaṅ phu somewhat earlier than 1073. Cf. also L. van der Kuijp, *loc. cit.*, p. 106; and S. Onoda, *Monastic debate in Tibet* (Vienna, 1992), p. 32 note 2.

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of the *Madhyamakakārikās*, rṄog Blo ldan šes rab is credited with a *Don bsdus/bsDus don* of Bhavya's *Prajñāpradīpa*, Śrīgupta's *Tattvāvatāra*, Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, Kamalaśīla's *Madhyamakāloka*, Śāntideva's *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, and Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna's *Satyadvayāvatāra* and *Madhyamakopadeśa*, as well as with both a *Don bsdus/bsDus don* and a *rNam bšad* of Jñānagarbha's *Satyadvayavibhaṅga* and Śāntideva's *Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra* and *Śikṣāsamuccaya*; and he also composed a General Synopsis of the Madhyamaka (*dBu ma spyi'i don bsdus*).[54] rṄog

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Mention can also be made of Madhyamaka treatises by Šes rab sbyin pa of the Ñi ma thaṅ college at gSaṅ phu Ne'u thog published in the Otani University Tibetan Works Series, vol. iii (Kyōto, 1990).

[54] See Gro luṅ pa's biography (cited by D. Jackson, 'An early biography of rNgog Lo-tsā-ba Blo-ldan-shes-rab', in: P. Kvaerne [ed.], *Tibetan studies, Proceedings of the 6th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies* [Oslo, 1994], i, p. 381); and A khu, *Tho yig*, nos. 11077 and 11315.

Two substantial treatises by rṄog Blo ldan šes rab are available at present: the *Theg chen rgyud bla'i don bsdus pa* (on the *Ratnagotravibhāga*) and the *Lo tsa ba chen po'i bsdus don* (or *Ṭīk chuṅ*, i.e. the *Šes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ṅag gi bstan bcos kyi don bsdus pa*); they have been reprinted by the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives (Dharamsala, 1993) with valuable introductions by D. Jackson. rṄog's *mDo sde rgyan gyi bsdus don* was reprinted by Don-grub-rgyal-mtshan, *Legs par bšad pa bka' gdams rin po chei'i gsuṅ gi gceś btus nor bu'i baṅ mdzod* (Delhi, 1985), p. 153 ff. On his works on the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, see H. Krasser, 'rNgog lotsāba on the *sahopalambhaniyama* proof in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya*', in: *Studia Indologiczne* 4 (1997 = *Aspects of Buddhism*), pp. 63-87. See also D. Jackson's article 'rNgog lo-tsā-ba's commentary on the *Ratnagotravibhāga*', in: *Tibetan studies (Proceedings of the Seventh Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Graz 1995)*, vol. i (Vienna, 1997), pp. 439-55. In addition, part of the text of his *sPriṅs yig bDud rtsi'i thig pa* has been reproduced by Šākya mchog ldan in his commentary on this text (gSuṅ 'bum, final work in vol. ya, ff. 85b-99b). For rṄog's *sPriṅs yig bDud rtsi'i thigs pa* commented on by Šākya mchog ldan see p. 33 note 60 below.

The biography of rṄog lo by his disciple Gro luṅ pa is entitled *'Jig rten mig gcig blo ldan šes rab kyi rnam thar*; see D. Jackson, 'An early biography of rNgog Lo-tsā-ba Blo-ldan-shes-rab', in: P. Kvaerne (ed.), *op. cit.*, i, pp. →

is stated to have adopted the Svātantrika ('Autonomist') position and to have interpreted even Candrakīrti and Śāntideva according to this position.[55] He is also said to have held that among the five Teachings of Maitreya only the *Ratnagotragotravibhāga* is of definitive meaning (*nītārtha*). His philosophical interpretations are stated to have relied on Asaṅga and Vasubandhu; and when Sthiramati and Haribhadra were in accord with them he upheld their views, but he rebutted them when they were in disagreement. In addition, he is said to have held that the ultimate intent (*mthar thug gi dgoṅs pa*) of Dharmakīrti's seven treatises accords with Nāgārjuna, and he accordingly recognized them to be of definitive meaning.[56] rṄog is indeed stated to have been the source of the

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372-92; and cf. D. Jackson, *The 'Miscellaneous Series' of Tibetan texts in the Bihar Research Society, Patna* (Stuttgart, 1989), nos. 1435-1/2 and 797. On rṄog see further, e.g., Ñaṅ ral Ñi ma 'od zer, *Chos 'byuṅ Me tog sñiṅ po* (ed. Meisezahl), f. 512a; 'lDe'u jo sras', *lDe'u chos 'byuṅ* (Lhasa, 1987), p. 148; Nel pa, *Me tog phreṅ ba*, f. 22a/47b; Bu ston, *Chos 'byuṅ*, f. 138a-b; 'Gos lo gŽon nu dpal, *Deb ther sṅon po*, kha, f. 4b; ca, f. 37a-b; cha, f. 1b; Yar luṅ jo bo Šākya rin chen, *Chos 'byuṅ*, p. 126 f.; Šākya mchog ldan, *rṄog lotstsha ba chen pos bstan pa ji ltar bskyaṅs pa'i tshul mdo tsam du bya ba Ṅo mtshar gtam gyi rol mo* (gSuṅ 'bum, vol. ma), who lists rṄog's works; dPa' bo gTsug lag phreṅ ba, *mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, da, f. 39b-41a; and Tshe mchog gliṅ yoṅs 'dzin Ye šes rgyal mtshan, *Byaṅ chub lam gyi rim pa'i bla ma brgyud pa'i rnam par thar pa*, i (Delhi, 1970), f. 190a-b. Cf. J. Naudou, *Les bouddhistes kaśmīriens au Moyen Age* (Paris, 1968); and L. van der Kuijp, *Contributions to the development of Tibetan Buddhist epistemology* (Hamburg, 1983), p. 29 ff. and passim.

[55] See sTag tshaṅ lo tsā ba Šes rab rin chen (b. 1405), *Grub mtha'*, f. 84b; and Ṅag dbaṅ chos grags (1572-1641), *Bod kyi mkhas pa sṅa phyi dag gi grub mtha'i šan 'byed mtha' dpyod daṅ bcas pa'i 'bel ba'i gtam (Grub mtha'i šan 'byed)*, f. 105b.

[56] rṄog Blo ldan šes rab is connected with the spread of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya* in Tibet, that of the *Pramāṇavārttika* being linked rather with Nor bzaṅ and Ña dbon at Sa skya; see Šākya mchog ldan, *rṄog lotstsha chen pos bstan pa ji ltar bskyaṅs tshul*, f. 6b. (But in his *dBu ma'i byuṅ tshul*, f. 14a, Šākya mchog ldan has noted that, according to rṄog, Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka has to be understood relying on the *[Pramāṇa-]Vārttika*: *Klu*

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exegetical tradition (*bšad srol*) for both the three basic treatises of the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka (*raṅ rgyud šar pa'i bstan bcos gsum*) – viz. Jñānagarbha's *Satyadvayavibhaṅga*, Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* and Kamalaśīla's *Madhyamakāloka* – and of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya*. Even though both the Vinaya and the Abhidharma had previously been subjects of teaching and study, rṄog is said to have established for them too the system of proof and refutation through logical reasoning (*rigs pa'i lam*); for before him nobody had been able to do this in accordance with Dharmakīrti's doctrine.[57] In rṄog's time Candrakīrti's treatises are said not to have been widely available, and his explanations followed the above-mentioned works of Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. He is reported to have interpreted Emptiness of duality (*gñis stoṅ*) as pure or absolute negation (*med dgag*, i.e. the non-implicative and non-presuppositional form of negation).[58] rṄog in addition held

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sgrub žabs kyi dbu ma rnam 'grel mdzad pa'i rig pa la rten nas šes dgos par 'chad do.) rṄog is considered the founder of the so-called 'New Pramāṇa School' (*tshad ma gsar ma*) in Tibet; see 'Gos gŽon nu dpal, *Deb ther sṅon po*, kha, f. 4b.

That the intent of Dharmakīrti and Nāgārjuna is the same was also the view of Jitāri (10th century?) in his *Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya* (P, f. 354a) and of Mokṣākaragupta in his *Tarkabhāṣā*. On this question cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, *The literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India*, p. 100; K. Shirasaki, *Bukkyō Ronsō* 30 (1986), pp. 110-14; E. Steinkellner, 'Was Dharmakīrti a Mādhyamika?', in: D. Seyfort Ruegg and L. Schmithausen (ed.), *Earliest Buddhism and Madhyamaka* (Leiden, 1990), pp. 72-90; and S. Moriyama, 'The later Mādhyamika and Dharmakīrti', in E. Steinkellner (ed.), *Studies in the Buddhist epistemological tradition* (Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, Denkschriften, 222. Band: Beiträge zur Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens Nr. 8, Vienna 1991), pp. 199-210.

57 See Šākya mchog ldan, *rṄog lotstsha ba chen pos bstan pa ji ltar bskyaṅs pa'i tshul*, f. 7a.

58 See Šākya mchog ldan, *op. cit.*, f. 4a-b, who gives a summary sketch of rṄog's doctrine (*grub mtha'*).

The form of negation known as *med (par) dgag (pa)* (Skt. *prasajyaprati-* →

that the *paramārthasatya* – with which the *tathāgatagarbha* is said to be identical – is not directly the object of verbalization (*sgra*) and conceptual thought (*rtog pa*), nor *a fortiori* even a conceptualizable object (*žen yul tsam*).[59] rṄog is also stated to have rejected the classification of

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ṣedha), which is non-presuppositional and non-implicative, is contrasted with the implicative and presuppositional *ma yin dgag* (Skt. *paryudāsa*). It can be associated with purely negative determination (*rnam par bcad pa* = *vyavaccheda*), as opposed to positive determination (*yoṅs su gcod pa* = *pari-ccheda*). – Moreover, the theory that *rnam par bcad pa* and the *med dgag* represent the *don dam bden pa* or *paramārtha* might correspond to the position of the Rab tu mi gnas pa type of Madhyamaka, which takes the *snaṅ la spros pa rnam par bcad pa tsam* as the *don dam bden pa*; whilst the sGyu ma rigs grub pa type of Madhyamaka, which takes the *gñis stoṅ tshogs pa (sgyu ma lta bu)* as the *don dam bden pa*, might be associated with *yoṅs gcod* and *ma yin dgag*. See Tsoṅ kha pa, *LRChM*, f. 342a-b = p. 572 (and f. 448b = p. 741 ff.), with A kya yoṅs 'dzin dByaṅs can dga' ba'i blo gros (1740-1827), *Byaṅ chub lam gyi rim pa chen po las byuṅ ba'i brda bkrol ñer mkho bsdus pa*, f. 44b-45b; and *LRChB*, f. 153a = p. 253. (On these two types of Madhyamaka see also below, p. 33 note 60; cf. Part II, notes 208 and 246 to the translation of the *KNZB*.)

59 See rṄog's *Theg chen rgyud bla'i don bsdus pa*, f. 6a-b; and also his *sPriṅs yig bDud rtsi'i thigs pa* as commented on by Śākya mchog ldan (in the last work in a series of opuscula in his gSuṅ 'bum, vol. ya [ff. 85b-99b = pp. 320-348], f. 95b ff.). There reference is made to the two questions whether the *don dam bden pa* = *paramārtha* – defined as absolute negation (*med par dgag pa* = *prasajyapratiṣedha*) and as free from all discursive proliferation (*spros bral* = *niṣprapañca*) – can be conceptually knowable (*šes bya*) and the object of conceptual cognition (*blo'i yul*), and whether a *buddha* can possess (discursive) knowledge (*šes pa/mkhyen pa*) and an object of right knowledge (*gžal bya*) – that is, whether with the *buddha* there exists a post-concentrative (*rjes thob* = *pṛṣṭhalabdha*) state apart from his state of *samā-patti* (*mñam gžag*) (and thus, by implication, whether a *buddha* can have knowledge in extension or *yāvadbhāvikatā-jñatā*, a topic that figures as the eighth Crucial Point in the *KNZB*). See also mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzaṅ, *sToṅ thun chen mo*, f. 72a; Śākya mchog ldan, *Theg pa chen po dbu ma rnam par ṅes pa'i mdzod luṅ daṅ rigs pa'i rgya mtsho las bDen gñis kyi spyi'i*

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Mādhyamikas into the sGyu ma rigs grub pa and Rab tu mi gnas par smra ba types (a division made earlier in respect to the *paramārtha*).[60]

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rnam par bžag pa (*dBu ma rnam ṅes*, Part iv, gSuṅ 'bum, vol. ba), f. 36b; Go rams pa, *Ṅes don rab gsal*, f. 72b (*kun rdzob bden pa daṅ/ don dam bden pa'i mtshan ñid rim pa ltar/ blo'i dmigs pa'am ji ltar snaṅ ba daṅ/ ci ltar yaṅ ma yin pa*); 'Gos lo gŽon nu dpal, *Deb ther sṅon po*, cha, f. 10a: *de bžin gšegs pa'i sñiṅ po žes bya ba don dam pa'i bden pa la zer mod kyi/ don dam pa'i bden pa ni sgra daṅ rtog[s] pa'i dṅos kyi yul ma yin pa lta žog/ žen pa'i yul tsam yaṅ ma yin žes gsuṅ*; and 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa'i rdo rje Ṅag dbaṅ brtson 'grus, *Grub mtha' chen mo*, ii, f. 173a: *don dam bden pa šes bya min pas snaṅ tsam 'di [*i.e. *bden gñis kyi] dbye gžir 'dod skad*; id. *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod*, f. 256b.

rṄog is moreover considered to have been one of the early Tibetan masters who defined the negandum for analytical reasoning in too broad a way (*dgag bya ṅo 'dzin ha caṅ khyab ches pa*). See e.g. A kya yoṅs 'dzin dByaṅs can dga' ba'i blo gros, *Byaṅ chub lam gyi rim pa chen po las byuṅ ba'i brda bkrol ñer mkho bsdus pa*, ff. 45b-46a. On this point of the drawing of the limits of the *rigs pas dgag bya* either too broadly or too narrowly, cf. E. Napper, *Dependent-arising and Emptiness* (Boston, 1989).

60 Tsoṅ kha pa, *LRChM*, f. 342a-b = p. 572, and *LRChB*, f. 153a = p. 253 (and f. 188a = p. 313), endorses rṄog's criticism of the applicability of this pair of terms to the level of the *paramārtha* (see below, p. 97). For the view of rṄog's disciple Gro luṅ pa, see his *bsTan rim*, f. 437b f. See also mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzaṅ, *Zab mo stoṅ pa ñid kyi de kho na ñid rab tu gsal bar byed pa'i bstan bcos sKal bzaṅ mig 'byed (sToṅ thun chen mo)*, f. 41b; and Go rams pa bSod nams seṅ ge, *rGyal ba thams cad kyi lugs kyi dgoṅs pa zab mo de kho na ñid spyi'i ṅag gis ston pa Ṅes don rab gsal* (gSuṅ 'bum, vol. ca), f. 25a-b and f. 28a-b.

rṄog's criticism is found in his *sPriṅs yig bDud rtsi'i thigs pa* as commented on by Šākya mchog ldan, the relevant passage being found on f. 92b (= p. 334) of the commentary where Šākya mchog ldan has ascribed the view criticized by rṄog to Jñānaśrī (cf. f. 90a). See also Go rams pa bSod nams seṅ ge, *rGyal ba thams cad kyi thugs kyi dgoṅs pa zab mo dbu ma'i de kho na ñid spyi'i ṅag gis ston pa Ṅes don rab gsal*, f. 24b-27b (using the term *sgyu ma lta bu* instead of *sgyu ma rigs grub pa*); sTag tshaṅ Lo tsā ba's autocommentary on his *Grub mtha' kun šes*, f. 84b; the note attributed to 'Jam →

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dbyaṅs bžad pa'i rdo rje Ṅag dbaṅ brtson 'grus on this passage of the *LRChM* (in: *mÑam med rje btsun Tsoṅ kha pa chen pos mdzad pa'i Byaṅ chub lam rim chen mo'i dka' ba'i gnad rnams mchan bu bži'i sgo nas legs par bšas pa* [also known as the *Lam rim mchan bži sbrags ma* or *mChan 'grel*, New Delhi, 1972], kha, f. 84b); and lCaṅ skya Rol pa'i rdo rje, *Grub mtha'i rnam bžag*, kha, ff. 11b-12a = p. 289-90.

lCaṅ skya however quotes mKhas grub Nor bzaṅ rgya mtsho, who held that Tsoṅ kha pa's agreement with rṄog's criticism does not imply that the designations sGyu ma rigs grub pa and Rab tu mi gnas pa *per se* are not justified in general (*spyir*), for they have been adopted by the master Śūra; but lCaṅ skya does not himself take up a position on this point. On this see also the annotations to the *LRChM* in the *Lam rim mchan bži sbrags ma* (kha, ff. 84b f.). To designate two types of Madhyamaka, the terms Māyopamādvayavādin and Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavādin are found in Advayavajra's *Tattvaratnāvalī* (ed. GOS, pp. 14, 19 f.; ed. Ui, p. 5). See also Śūra's *Paramārthabodhicittabhāvanākrama* (P, gi, f. 156b) and Candrahari's *Ratnamālā*, texts now available only in Tibetan translation. But the precise referents of this terminology are not entirely clear. (This terminology may perhaps be reflected to some extent in the *lTa ba'i rim pa bšad pa* of dPal brtsegs, f. 141a, which refers to both *sgyu ma'i skyes bu* and *mi gnas mi rtog[s].*)

The problem of whether the sGyu ma rigs grub pa type is to be identified with the Svātantrika and the Rab tu mi gnas pa type with the Prāsaṅgika (cf. 'Ba' ra ba rGyal mtshan dpal bzaṅ [1310-1391], *Grub mtha'i rnam bžag gi dka' 'grel*,, f. 56b f., and sTag tshaṅ lo tsā ba, *Grub mtha'*, f. 83b) has been the subject of much discussion. In addition to the *LRChM* and *LRChB* cited above, where Tsoṅ kha pa has alluded to this twofold division made by unspecified older scholars and, citing the criticism made by rṄog of the application of this terminology to two theories of the *paramārtha*, has repudiated it, see also 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa, *Grub mtha' chen mo*, ii, f. 142b, on the *thal 'gyur snaṅ ba tsam mi gnas dbu ma*, where Śūra's work is cited and *mi gnas pa* is further explained as not being fixed in any extreme of eternalism or annihilationism/nihilism (*rtag chad kyi mtha' gaṅ la'aṅ mi gnas pas na mi gnas dbu ma pa daṅ rab tu mi gnas dbu ma ma žes bya'o*); lCaṅ skya Rol pa'i rdo rje, *Grub mtha'i rnam bžag*, kha, ff. 11b-12a = pp. 289-90, and ga, f. 3a = p. 409; Ṅag dbaṅ dpal ldan (1797-), *Grub mtha' chen mo'i mchan 'grel dka' gnad mdud grol Blo gsal gces nor žes bya ba las dBu ma thal raṅ* →

Followers of rṄog in this early period were Gro luṅ pa Blo gros 'byuṅ gnas, Khyuṅ Rin chen grags, 'Bre Šes rab 'bar, and Gaṅs pa še'u Blo gros byaṅ chub.[61] rṄog's disciple and successor as abbot of gSaṅ phu

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gi skabs (Sarnath, 1964), f. 59b f. and f. 95a; A kya yoṅs 'dzin dByaṅs can dga' ba'i blo gros (1740-1827), *Byaṅ chub lam gyi rim pa chen po las byuṅ ba'i brda bkrol ñer mkho bsdus pa*, f. 44b; and Žva dmar dGe 'dun bstan 'dzin rgya mtsho (1852-1912), *lHag mthoṅ chen mo'i dka' gnas rnams brjed byaṅ du bkod pa dGoṅs zab snaṅ ba'i sgron ma*, f. 10a f. See below, p. 98 note 208.

On the sGyu ma rigs grub pa doctrine as the view that the *snaṅ stoṅ gñis tshogs* is *don dam bden pa*, see below, p. 98 note 208. And on the Rab tu mi gnas pa doctrine as the view that simple negative determination of all discursive proliferation in relation to *snaṅ ba* is the *don dam bden pa*, see above note 58. See also Šākya mchog ldan's comment on rṄog's criticism in his *sPriṅs yig bDud rtsi'i thigs pa*, f. 90a and f. 92b, where a correlation is indicated respectively with relative negation (*ma yin dgag pa*) and absolute negation (*med par dgag pa*), and with the views of Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla on the one side and Śāntideva on the other side. (On these terms see further D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India*, pp. 58-59; K. Mimaki, *Blo gsal grub mtha'*, p. 31 f.; E. Napper, *Dependent-arising and Emptiness*, pp. 270 f., 403 f.; H. Tauscher, *Die Lehre von den zwei Wirklichkeiten in Tsoṅ kha pas Madhyamaka-Werken* (Vienna, 1995), p. 6 f.) The division of Madhyamaka into the sGyu ma lta bu and the Rab tu mi gnas pa branches is also to be found with the early bKa' brgyud pa/bKa' gdams pa master sGam po pa bSod nams rin chen (1079-1153), who further subdivided the latter into the Zuṅ 'jug rab tu mi gnas pa and the rGyun chad rab tu mi gnas pa. See his *Tshogs chos legs mdzes ma*, in the *gSuṅ 'bum* (vol. i, published by Khasdub Gyatsho Shashin [Delhi, 1975]), ca, f. 85a.

61 See Saṅs rgyas phun tshogs, *Ṅor pa chos 'byuṅ*, f. 133b. According to Šākya mchog ldan, *dBu ma'i byuṅ tshul*, f. 12b, and *rṄog lotstsha ba chen pos bstan pa ji ltar bskyaṅs pa'i tshul*, f. 6b, Gaṅs pa še'u was a pupil of Khyuṅ Rin chen grags; cf. also *Deb ther sṅon po*, ca, f. 38a. But Koṅ sprul, *Šes bya kun khyab*, i, f. 150a, makes him a disciple of Pa tshab Ñi ma grags. See also dPa' bo gTsug lag phreṅ ba, *mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, da, f. 41b; and the *Myaṅ yul stod smad bar gsum gyi ṅo mtshar gtam gyi legs bšad mKhas* →

Ne'u thog was Žaṅ Tshe(s) spoṅ ba Chos kyi bla ma, who composed commentaries on the *Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra* and the *Ratnagotravibhāga*.[62] rGya dmar ba Byaṅ chub grags of sTod luṅ(s), a disciple of Khyuṅ and Gaṅs pa še'u and a teacher of Phya pa, is also listed in the relevant lineage.[63] Any specifically Madhyamaka treatises that these scholars composed do not appear to be extant.[64]

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pa'i 'jug ṅogs (lHa sa, 1983), p. 91.

On Khyuṅ Rin chen grags, see Go rams pa, *rGyal ba thams cad kyi thugs kyi dgoṅs pa zab mo dbu ma'i de kho na ñid spyi'i ṅag gis ston pa Ṅes don rab gsal*, f. 73b. And on the distinction between *saṃvṛti* and *paramārtha* according to Khyuṅ Rin chen grags, see Šākya mchog ldan, *dBu ma rnam ṅes*, Part iv, f. 36b, who indicates that his doctrine was the same as that of rṄog. See also Go rams pa, *Ṅes don rab gsal*, f. 73b: *kun rdzob bden pa'i mtshan ñid/ šes bya'am/ gžal bya'am/ brjod bya tsam yin la/ don dam bden pa'i mtshan ñid šes brjod gžal bya thams cad las 'das pa'o.*

62 See A khu, *Tho yig* no. 11333; and Padma dkar po, *Chos 'byuṅ*, f. 190b1.

63 On rGya dmar ba, see *Deb ther sṅon po*, ṅa, ff. 12a, 15a; cha, 3a-b (where he is credited with a commentary on the *Satyadvayavibhaṅga* as well as with many Compendia [*bsDus pa*]); ña, f. 32a-b; and Šākya mchog ldan, *dBu ma'i byuṅ tshul*, f. 12b, and *dBu ma rnam ṅes*, Part iv, f. 36b (on his distinction between *saṃvṛti* and *paramārtha* as *gnas tshul la sems pa'i rigs pas brtag bzod pa ma yin pa* and *des bzod pa*). He is briefly mentioned together with rMa bya brTson 'grus seṅ ge by 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa, *Grub mtha' chen mo*, ii, f. 30a, in the context of a discussion whether the Mādhyamika entertains a thesis (*dam bca'*). On rGya dmar ba see also 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa, *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod*, f. 257b.

64 Gro luṅ pa's very extensive *bDe bar gšegs pa'i bstan pa rin po che la 'jug pa'i lam gyi rim pa rnam par bšad pa (bsTan rim chen mo)* is however available. See D. Jackson, *The 'Miscellaneous Series' of Tibetan texts in the Bihar Research Society, Patna*, no. 1289, and 'The *bsTan rim* ("Stages of the Doctrine")' in J. Cabezón and R. Jackson (ed.), *Tibetan literature* (Ithaca, 1996), pp. 230-1; and rDo bum sprul sku, '*bsTan rim chen mo*'i ṅo sprod', *Za ma tog* 1 (1989), pp. 92-102. For Gro luṅ pa's Life and Eulogy of rṄog Blo ldan šes rab, see nos. 1435-1/2 and 797 in Jackson's list.

Phy(v)a/Cha pa Chos kyi seṅ ge (1109-1169), a disciple of Gro luṅ pa and rGya dmar ba, composed commentaries on the *Raṅ rgyud šar gsum* (i.e. on the *Satyadvaya(vibhaṅga)* of Jñānagarbha, the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* of Śāntarakṣita and the *Madhyamakāloka* of Kamalaśīla). He also composed a longer and shorter *dBu ma'i bsdus pa*, a commentary on Śāntideva's *Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra* and one on the *Ratnagotravibhāga*.[65] He occupied the abbatial throne of gSaṅ phu Ne'u thog for eighteen years.[66] Phya pa is known in Tibet for having refuted Candrakīrti's doctrines which were then gaining ground in Tibet, pointing out eight faults in this master's system;[67] and he is reported to have debated with Candrakīrti's follower Jayānanda.[68] Phya pa is then stated to have essentially followed rṄog Blo ldan šes rab even though he criticised him on a number of details.[69] He is said to have held (like rṄog) that pure absolute

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[65] See A khu, *Tho yig*, nos. 11076 and 11317-21. Cf. Šākya mchog ldan, *rṄog lo tstsha ba chen pos bstan pa ji ltar bskyaṅs pa'i tshul*, f. 4b-5a. The first work has been published under the title *dBu ma šar gsum gyi stoṅ thun* by H. Tauscher (Vienna, 1999). See further H. Tauscher, 'Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge's opinion on *prasaṅga* in his *dBu ma shar gsum gyi stong thun*', in: S. Katsura (ed.), *Dharmakīrti's thought and its impact on Indian and Tibetan philosophy* (Vienna, 1999), pp. 387-93. On the word *stoṅ thun* see below, p. 52 note 107; and on the expression *(raṅ rgyud) šar gsum* and the doxographical classification underlying it, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India*, note 223.

[66] See *Deb ther sṅon po*, cha, f. 2a. There exists an eulogy of Phya pa by the Sa skya *goṅ ma* bSod nams rtse mo (1142-1182) (in the Sa skya bka' 'bum, vol. ga).

[67] See *Deb ther sṅon po*, cha, f. 4a (Roerich, p. 334); Šākya mchog ldan, *dBu ma'i byuṅ tshul*, f. 13b, and *rṄog lo tstsha ba chen pos bstan pa ji ltar bskyaṅs pa'i tshul*, f. 5a: *grub mtha'i dbyiṅs Lo chen daṅ 'thun kyaṅ/ gnas skabs phran tshegs la dgag pa maṅ du mdzad/ slob dpon Zla ba grags pa'i lugs de dus su rgyas par dar bas/ lugs de la ñes chen brgyad la sogs pa'i dgag pa maṅ du mdzad.* Cf. L. van der Kuijp, *Contributions*, p. 59 ff.

[68] Šākya mchog ldan, *dBu ma'i byuṅ tshul*, f. 13b.

[69] See Šākya mchog ldan, *rṄog lo tstsha ba chen pos bstan pa ji ltar bskyaṅs pa'i tshul*, f. 5a.

negation Empty of hypostatic establishment (*bden pas stoṅ pa'i med par dgag pa*) is the *paramārthasatya*; and (unlike rṄog) he considered this to be the conceptualized object (*žen yul*) of words and mental construction.[70] He is even reported to have held Emptiness to be hypostatically established (*bden grub*).[71]

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[70] *Deb ther sṅon po*, cha, f. 10a: *dṅos po rnams bden pas stoṅ pa'i med par dgag pa ni don dam pa'i bden pa yin žiṅ/ de yaṅ sgra rtog gi žen pa'i yul du yaṅ bžed.*

[71] Šākya mchog ldan, *rṄog lo tstsha ba chen pos bstan pa ji ltar bskyaṅs pa'i tshul*, f. 5a: *stoṅ ñid bden grub tu žal gyis bžes.* For this reason, Šākya mchog ldan adds (*loc. cit.*), Phya pa was known to others – including his disciple gTsaṅ nag pa – as the Mādhyamika who holds the Empty to be a mark or characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*): *stoṅ pa la mtshan mar lta ba'i dbu ma pa.* (On this last concept, cf. Šākya mchog ldan's comment on rṄog's *sPriṅs yig bDud rtsi'i thigs pa* [gSuṅ 'bum, vol. ya], f. 90a, where a correlation is made with the type of Madhyamaka that corresponds to the Rab tu mi gnas pa.) (It is not clear how this report is to be reconciled with what is stated in the *Deb ther sṅon po* (cited in the last note) about the *paramārthasatya* being *med dgag* and *bden stoṅ* according to Phya pa.) On Phya pa see also mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzaṅ, *sToṅ thun chen mo*, f. 72a (*bden med bden grub tu smra ba*); Go rams pa bSod nams seṅ ge, *rGyal ba thams cad kyi thugs kyi dgoṅs pa zab mo dbu ma'i de kho na ñid spyi'i ṅag gis ston pa Ṅes don rab gsal* (gSuṅ 'bum, vol. ca), f. 97b ff., where the denial of a *dam bca'* is discussed among other topics (f. 98a), and ff. 103b-104a. See further G. Dreyfus, 'Getting oriented in the Tibetan tradition', in: S. Katsura (ed.), *Dharmakīrti's thought and its impact on Indian and Tibetan philosophy* (Vienna, 1999), pp.37-46.

Although for the term *svabhāvaśūnya* = *raṅ bžin gyis stoṅ pa*/(*raṅ gi*) *ṅo bo ñid kyis stoṅ pa* scholars have sometimes distinguished between the meaning 'Empty in respect to own nature' and the meaning 'Empty of its own nature' (see recently H. Tauscher, *Die Lehre von den zwei Wirklichkeiten in Tsoṅ kha pa's Madhyamaka-Werken* [Vienna, 1995], p. 346, who has distinguished between 'leer der eigenen Natur nach' – or 'dem Eigenwesen nach' (p. 206) and 'bezüglich eines Eigenwesens' (p. 22 n. 43) – and 'leer von seiner eigenen Natur' or (p. 371) 'Leerheit des Eigenwesens'), preference is here given to the translation 'Empty of self-existence', taking
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Phya pa had eight great disciples each of whose names ended in Seṅ ge, and who were therefore known as the Eight Seṅ chen. Other disciples of Phya pa were known as the Jo sras and still others as the Šes rab can.[72] With the exception of two of these Seṅ chen – gTsaṅ nag pa brTson 'grus seṅ ge and rMa bya rTsod pa'i seṅ ge (on whom see below) – Phya pa's pupils have been regarded as proponents of the Svātantrika tradition.[73]

Phya pa's disciple gTsaṅ nag pa brTson 'grus seṅ ge composed the *dBu ma'i rnam bšad* along with a longer and shorter *dBu ma'i bsdus pa*, as well as commentaries on Śāntideva's *Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra* and *Śikṣāsamuccaya* and a *Ṭīkā* on the *Ratnagotravibhāga*.[74] He is said to have

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Skt. *śūnya* and Tib. *stoṅ pa* as governing the third ('instrumental') case when expressing the thing of which there is emptiness; compare *śūnya* as *niḥsvabhāva* = *raṅ bžin med pa* 'without self-nature/self-existence' as well as *svabhāvarahita* (applied to the *tathāgata* in *PPMV* xvii. 31, p. 330.7). (Nevertheless, for instance in *GR* ff. 432b-435a = pp. 423-28 when discussing the *adhyātmaśūnyatā*, Tsoṅ kha pa does indeed discuss the method of accepting own nature, i.e, what he terms the *raṅ bžin khas len tshul*.)

As for the term *bden (pas) stoṅ (pa)*, it is here rendered by 'Empty of hypostatization (hypostatic reality, reification)', rather than by 'really Empty' (Tauscher, *op. cit.*, pp. 47, 69, 135: 'wirklich leer'; pp. 193, 212, 282, 317 note: 'als wirklich [erwiesen] leer/Leersein'), or even by 'Empty of reality'; in the Madhyamaka a thing can indeed be 'real' on the *saṃvṛti/vyavahāra* level without being *bden (par) grub (pa)* 'hypostatically established (reified)', and without of course possessing ultimate reality on the *paramārtha* level.

72 The *Deb ther sṅon po* (cha, f. 3b) enumerates four disciples in each of the last two groups, whereas Koṅ sprul Blo gros mtha' yas enumerates only three in each group in his *Šes bya kun khyab*, i, f. 150a. Šākya mchog ldan gives another list in his *rŇog lo tstsha chen pos bstan pa ji ltar bskyaṅs pa'i tshul*, f. 4b.

73 See Koṅ sprul, *Šes bya kun khyab*, i, f. 149b.

74 See A khu, *Tho yig*, nos. 11065, 11329-31. So far, only gTsaṅ nag pa's *Tshad ma rnam par ṅes pa'i ṭika Legs bšad bsdus pa* (A khu, no. 11807) has been made available in a facsimile reprint in the Otani University Tibetan Works Series, Vol. ii, with an introduction by L. van der Kuijp (Kyōto, →

become a disciple of Pa tshab, and (unlike Phya pa) he thus became a follower of Candrakīrti.[75] Also (unlike Phya pa but like rṄog) he is said to have held the *paramārthasatya* to be the object of neither verbalization nor conceptualization, identifying it with the *tathāgatagarbha*.[76]

1989). Cf. also L. van der Kuijp, *Contributions*, pp. 85-91, 96, 275.

[75] See *Deb ther sṅon po*, cha, f. 4a; Šākya mchog ldan, *rṄog lo tstsha ba chen pos bstan pa ji ltar bskyaṅs pa'i tshul*, f. 5a; dPa' bo gTsug lag phreṅ ba, *mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, da, f. 42b; and Koṅ sprul Blo gros mtha' yas, *Šes bya kun khyab*, i, f. 149b.

Koṅ sprul, *Šes bya kun khyab*, i, f. 151a, has nevertheless made gTsaṅ nag pa – together with Karma pa III Raṅ byuṅ rdo rje, Jo naṅ kun mkhyen Dol po pa together with his disciple (i.e. Phyogs las rnam rgyal), Dri med 'od zer, and others – a proponent of the *dbu ma chen po*. This classification would seem to make gTsaṅ nag pa a proponent of the *gžan stoṅ* doctrine (on which see below, § 5), for Koṅ sprul has employed the term *dbu ma chen po* to refer to the *gžan stoṅ* theory of the Vijñapti-Madhyamaka (*rnam rig dbu ma*). But the inclusion here as proponents of this Madhyamaka not only of gTsaṅ nag pa, whom Koṅ sprul had shortly before described as a proponent of Candrakīrti's school (f. 149b), but also of the rDzogs chen master Dri med 'od zer (i.e. Kloṅ chen rab 'byams pa, 1308-1363) could perhaps suggest that he may here be using the term *dbu ma chen po* in a wider sense to cover the Madhyamaka as a great and broad tradition. This wider use of the expression *dbu ma chen po* is frequent in treatises belonging to other traditions.

[76] *Deb ther sṅon po*, cha, f. 10a (cited above, p. 32 note 59). According to Šākya mchog ldan, *rṄog lo tstsha ba chen pos bstan pa ji ltar bskyaṅs pa'i tshul*, f. 5a, gTsaṅ nag pa referred to Phya pa as *stoṅ pa la mtshan mar lta ba'i dbu ma pa* 'a Mādhyamika who regards the *śūnya* as a *lakṣaṇa*'. On gTsaṅ nag pa's Madhyamaka doctrine, see Go rams pa bSod nams seṅ ge, *rGyal ba thams cad kyi thugs kyi dgoṅs pa zab mo dbu ma'i de kho na ñid spyi'i ṅag gis ston ba Ṅes don rab gsal*, ff. 72b, 101a, 103b-104a; and Šākya mchog ldan, *dBu ma rnam ṅes*, Part iv, f. 37a, on his distinction between *saṃvṛti* and *paramārtha* as *tha sñad pa'i blo ṅor rñed pa* and *raṅ bžin khyad par gsum ldan*.

rṄog Blo ldan šes rab, Phya pa Chos kyi seṅ ge and gTsaṅ nag pa brTson 'grus seṅ ge were all connected with the gSaṅ phu (s)Ne'u thog.[77] Phya pa's successor as abbot of gSaṅ phu Ne'u thog was brTsegs dBaṅ phyug seṅ ge, a teacher of Sa skya paṇḍi ta (1182-1251).[78]

For further Tibetan representatives of the earlier Tibetan Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school see § 4.3 below.

4.2. THE ANTECEDENTS OF THE TIBETAN THAL 'GYUR BA ('PRĀSAṄGIKA') TRADITION IN THE EARLIER *phyi dar* PERIOD

Concerning the antecedents of the Prāsaṅgika ('Apagogist') tradition in Tibet, 'Brom ston rGyal ba'i 'byuṅ gnas (1004/5-1063/4) – a disciple of Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna and, though a layman, the Tibetan founder of the bKa' gdams pa school and of the great monastic centre of Rva sgreṅ – is represented in some sources as one of the earliest Tibetan followers of Candrakīrti's school.[79] The basic texts of the bKa' gdams pas include the *Bodhi(sattva)caryāvatāra* and the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, two works by Śānti-deva who is, as already noted, often reckoned by Tibetan doxographers to belong to the Prāsaṅgika branch of the Madhyamaka. And the great masters of the bKa' gdams pa are often considered to have been Prā-saṅgikas inasmuch as they followed Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna in adopting Can-drakīrti's system.[80]

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[77] See above, p. 28 note 53.

[78] See below, p. 65.

[79] See the *rNam thar rgyas pa* written by Bya 'Dul 'dzin pa on the basis of materials going back, through Phyag sor pa, to Nag tsho Tshul khrims rgyal ba; and the *rNam thar yoṅs grags* included in the Pha chos section of the *bKa' gdams glegs bam*. (Cf. H. Eimer, *rNam thar rgyas pa*, ii [Wiesbaden, 1979], sections 360 and 277.) See also lCaṅ skya Rol pa'i rdo rje, *Grub mtha'i rnam bžag*, kha, f. 15a = p. 293.

[80] See *LRChM*, f. 343a = p. 573. The master Po to ba (1031-1105) is named in the note to this passage in: *mÑam med rje btsun Tsoṅ kha pa chen pos* →

In the colophon of the Tibetan translation of Śāntideva's *Bodhisattva-caryāvatāra* (P 5272 and D 3871), Rin chen bzaṅ po (958-1055) together with Dharmaśrībhadra and Šākya Blo gros is stated to have retranslated and edited (*bcos šiṅ bsgyur te gtan la phab pa*), on the basis of a text and commentary from Madhyadeśa, the original translation of this famous work executed in the *sṅa dar* period by dPal brtsegs on the basis of a text from Kaśmīr. (This text was then once again translated with corrections and thoroughly edited [*dag par bcos šiṅ bsgyur te legs par gtan la phab pa*] by rṄog Blo ldan šes rab in collaboration with Sumatikīrti.) Rin chen bzaṅ po is stated to have followed the Rab tu mi gnas pa type of Madhyamaka.[81]

Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna's disciple Nag tsho Tshul khrims rgyal ba (b. 1011) made the first Tibetan translation of Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra* with Kṛṣṇa Paṇḍita. This early translation, which is found in the Beijing edition but not in the sDe dge edition of the bsTan 'gyur, evidently did not have the impact that the later translation by Pa tshab was to have; but it should be noted that Tsoṅ kha pa has often quoted Nag tsho's translation, sometimes expressing a preference for it over that of Pa tshab. Moreover, Tsoṅ kha pa has even cited a variant reading which he considers preferable from a translation of the *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya* he ascribes to Nag tsho (see *dGoṅs pa rab gsal* on *MABh* vi.28, f. 103a = p. 186).

Another important figure in the earlier history of the Tibetan Madhyamaka was Khu mDo sde 'bar, a follower of Rva Lo tsā ba.[82] He was a disciple and collaborator of Jayānanda and a pupil of Pa tshab Ñi ma

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mdzad pa'i Byaṅ chub lam rim chen mo'i dka' ba'i gnad rnams mchan bu bži'i sgo nas legs par bšad pa Theg chen lam gyi gsal sgron (New Delhi, 1972), kha, f. 87b.

On *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅga*-type reasoning, see the references given below, p. 95 note 201.

[81] lCaṅ skya Rol pa'i rdo rje, *Grub mtha'i rnam bžag*, kha, f. 14b = p. 293. For the Rab tu mi gnas pa type, see above, p. 33 note 60.

[82] *Deb ther sṅon po*, ja, f. 12a. Rva lo tsā ba is said to have been born in 1016. Khu lo tsā ba mDo sde 'bar is thus not to be confused with Khu ston brTson 'grus g-yuṅ druṅ (1011-1075).

grags.[83] With Jayānanda he translated Nāgārjuna's *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa*, the *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* (a work also translated by Kanakavarman and Pa tshab) and Jayānanda's own *Tarkamudgara*; and together they revised the *sṅa dar* translation of Nāgārjuna's *Vigrahavyāvartanīkārikā*s. Khu mDo sde 'bar also collaborated with gŽon nu mchog and gÑan D(h)ar ma grags in translating the *Śūnyatāsaptatikārikā*s.[84] And he collaborated with Jayānanda and Pa tshab in translating Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna's *Mahāsūtrasamuccaya*. A doctrine ascribed to Khu concerning the non-existence of a thesis (*dam bca'* = *pratijñā*) in the Madhyamaka has been cited and criticized by Tsoṅ kha pa.[85] A teaching on this topic of fundamental importance for the history of Madhyamaka thought is even datable to about a century earlier, the master Klu mes (tenth century) whose activity preceded Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna's arrival in Tibet having taught that it is not correct to say that the Prāsaṅgika has no *pratijñā* and that, regarding the subject of the proposition (*chos can* = *dharmin*), there is no commonly acknowledged epistemological ground (*mthun snaṅ*) in a debate between the Substantialist and the non-Substantialist.[86]

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[83] See *Deb ther sṅon po*, ca, f. 15a; and mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzaṅ, *gSan yig*, f. 4a, who makes Khu, rMa bya Byaṅ chub ye šes, gTsaṅ pa Sa sbos and Žaṅ Thag sag pa all disciples of Pa tshab.

[84] cf. P. Cordier, *Catalogue du fonds tibétain*, iii, p. 291; F. Erb, *Die Śūnyatāsaptati des Nāgārjuna*, pp. xxxiii f. and lxxiii f. Concerning this gÑan D(h)ar ma grags and sNur D(h)ar ma grags, the translator of Candrakīrti's *Vṛtti* on the *Śūnyatāsaptati* in association with Abhayākara (cf. Cordier, p. 305), see p. 14 note 20.

[85] *LRChM*, f. 406a ff. (= pp. 675-6, 679-81). See below, Section II, § 10.

[86] See Go rams pa, *rGyal ba thams cad kyi thugs kyi dgoṅs pa zab mo dbu ma'i de kho na ñid spyi'i ṅag gis ston pa Ṅes don gsal ba*, f. 95b: *sṅon gyi mkhas pa klu mes la sogs pa'i gsuṅ nas de thal 'gyur ba'i lugs yin kyaṅ raṅ la dam bca' med pa daṅ/ chos can la mthun snaṅ med par 'dod pa de mi rigs las* ...; see also f. 102b-103a.

Klu mes Tshul khrims šes rab of dBus, a disciple of dGe ba rab gsal = dGoṅs pa rab gsal and/or Grum Ye šes rgyal mtshan, is counted as one of the so-called Ten (or Six or Eight) Men of dBus and gTsaṅ (*dbus gtsaṅ mi bcu*), who reintroduced Buddhism in those provinces from the east after its eclipse →

The Tibetan master usually considered to have implanted the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka in Tibet is, however, (s)Pa tshab Ñi ma grags (b. 1055?). Born in 'Phan yul north of lHa sa, he studied for about 23 years in India and especially in Kaśmīr under teachers such as Sajjana's son Sūkṣmajana, Parahitabhadra, Mahāsumati and Bhavyarāja (with whom he translated Dharmottara's *Paralokasiddhi*). Pa tshab thus belonged to the same milieu in Kaśmīr as his almost exact contemporary rṄog Blo ldan šes rab.[87] On his return to Tibet, and before he became well known in 'Phan yul, Pa tshab experienced much difficulty in propagating the doctrines he had received; and it was then that the renowned bKa' gdams pa *dge bšes* Ša ra ba/Šar ba pa Yon tan grags (1070-1141), a disciple of Po

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at the time of Glaṅ dar ma. See Bu ston, *Chos 'byuṅ*, f. 132b ff., and 'Gos gŽon nu dpal, *Deb ther sṅon po*, ba, f. 10b-11a, together with books ka and kha; compare Ñaṅ ral Ñi ma 'od zer, *Chos 'byuṅ Me tog sñiṅ po'i sbraṅ rtsi'i bcud*, f. 437a-b, and Nel pa Grags pa smon lam blo gros, *Chos 'byuṅ Me tog phreṅ ba*, f. 17b and f. 21b.

[87] 'Gos gŽon nu dpal, *Deb ther sṅon po*, cha, f. 8b, gives the lineage: Ratnavajra > Parahita > Hasumati > sPa tshab Lotsāba. The date of Pa tshab's death is unclear. But it is recorded in the *Deb ther sṅon po*, ca, f. 26a, that he acted as *mkhan po* for Glaṅ luṅ pa brTson 'grus gžon nu (b. 1123) when the latter became a *śramaṇera* in his eighteenth year. And Khyuṅ tshaṅ pa (b. 1115) was unable to complete his study of Madhyamaka under Pa tshab because of the latter's death according to the *Deb ther sṅon po*, ña, f. 18b.

On (s)Pa tshab Ñi ma grags see e.g. Ñaṅ ral Ñi ma 'od zer, *Chos 'byuṅ Me tog sñiṅ po* (ed. Meisezahl), f. 512a; Bu ston, *Chos 'byuṅ*, f. 138b; 'Gos gŽon nu dpal, *Deb ther sṅon po*, cha, f. 7b-8a; Padma dkar po, *Chos 'byuṅ*, f. 192b. Cf. J. Naudou, *op. cit.*, pp. 172-3; D. Jackson, 'Madhyamaka studies among the early Sa-skya-pas', *Tibet Journal* 10/2 (1985), p. 20 ff; L. van der Kuijp, 'Notes on the transmission of Nāgārjuna's *Ratnāvalī* in Tibet', *Tibet Journal* 10/2 (1985), p. 10 ff; M. Hahn, 'On the "paracanonical" tradition of the Tibetan version of Nāgārjuna's *Ratnāvalī*', *Annual Memoirs of the Otani University Shin Buddhist Comprehensive Research Institute* 6 (1988), pp. 93-108; K. Lang, 'sPa tshab Nyi-ma-grags and the introduction of Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka into Tibet', in L. Epstein and R. Sherburne (eds.), *Reflections on Tibetan culture: Essays in Memory of Turrell V. Wylie* (Lewiston, 1990), pp. 127-141; and F. Erb, *Śūnyatāsaptativṛtti*, pp. 29-30.

to ba (1031-1105), took interest in his activity, came to his assistance and sent him many of his own disciples.[88] He is known as 'Phan yul rGyal lha khaṅ pa Žaṅ Pa tshab Ñi ma grags after the name of his monastery.[89] As the disciple and collaborator of Sūkṣmajana, Kanakavarman, Mahāsumati, Tilakakalaśa, Muditāśrī and Jayānanda (with whom he translated Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna's *Mahāsūtrasamuccaya*), he was the translator or reviser of several important Madhyamaka texts. Thus Pa tshab translated Ārya-Deva's *Catuḥśataka* together with Candrakīrti's *Ṭīkā* on it in collaboration with Sūkṣmajana in the Rin chen sbas pa Temple in Groṅ khyer dPe med in Kaśmīr. Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* he translated with Hasumati/Mahāsumati in Kaśmīr, also in the Rin chen sbas pa Temple, on the basis of a manuscript from Kaśmīr; and then in the Ra sa (lHa sa) Ra mo che Temple he definitively revised this translation in collaboration with Kanakavarman while consulting a manuscript from the eastern borderland (Ñi 'og šar phyogs).[90] And Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra* with its *Bhāṣya* he translated a first time in collaboration with Tilakakalaśa in the Rin chen sbas pa temple on the basis of a text from Kaśmīr; and he then thoroughly revised and edited (*legs par bcos te*

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[88] *Deb ther sṅon po*, cha, f. 7b; Šākya mchog ldan, *dBu ma'i byuṅ tshul*, f. 13a; and dPa' bo gTsug lag phreṅ ba, *mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, da, f. 34b. In his *dPe rgyun dkon pa 'ga' žig gi tho yig* (ed. Lokesh Chandra, no. 11298), A khu Šes rab rgya mtsho lists Pa tshab's *dBu ma'i dris lan* to Ša ra ba.

[89] See Kloṅ rdol Ṅag dbaṅ blo bzaṅ, *bsTan 'dzin gyi skyes bu rgya bod du byon pa'i miṅ gi rnam graṅs* (gSuṅ 'bum, za, f. 3b-4a). The rGyal lha khaṅ in 'Phan yul north of lHa sa was connected with the bKa' gdams pas. It was founded in 1012 by Žaṅ sNa nam rDo rje dbaṅ phyug (976-1060) (*Deb ther sṅon po*, kha, f. 11b) and was burnt down by the Mongol army under Dorta in 1240 (*Deb sṅon*, kha, f. 13a; cf. Sum pa mkan po's *Re'u mig*). The question arises whether this fact may explain, at least in part, the uncetainty surrounding details about Pa tshab's life and works and, even more, those of his disciples.

[90] Tib. Ñi 'og is usually identified with Skt. Aparāntaka (on which cf. H. Uebach, *Nel-pa Paṇḍitas Chronik Me-tog phreṅ-ba* [Munich, 1987], note 424). In the bsTan 'gyur colophons in question here the name Ñi ma 'og is modified by *šar phyogs (pa)*.

gtan la phab pa) this work in collaboration with Kanakavarman at the Ra mo che temple while consulting a manuscript from the eastern borderland (Ñi 'og šar phyogs pa).[91] Pa tshab also revised (*bcos pa*) the *sṅa dar* translation of the *Madhyamakakārikās* in accordance with the *Prasannapadā* in collaboration with Hasumati/Mahāsumati at the Rin chen sbas pa Temple during the reign of a local ruler referred to only by the titles *Mi'i dbaṅ po 'phags pa lha*;[92] and he revised (*žu chen bgyis pa*) it once again in collaboration with Kanaka(varman) at the Ra sa (lHa sa) 'Phrul snaṅ Temple. With Kanakavarman also he thoroughly revised (*legs par bcos pa*) the *sṅa* dar translation of the *Ratnāvalī* on the basis of three Indian manuscripts; and with Muditāśrī Pa tshab retranslated Nāgārjuna's *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā*.[93] According to the *Deb ther sṅon po*,[94] he also revised (*bcos pa*) the first portion of the earlier translation by Abhayākara and sNur

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[91] On Pa tshab's translation of the *Madhyamakāvatāra* in relation to the earlier version by Kṛṣṇapaṇḍita and Nag tsho, see H. Tauscher, 'Some problems of textual history in connection with the Tibetan translation of the *Madhyamakāvatāraḥ* and its commentary', in: E. Steinkellner and H. Tauscher (eds.), *Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist religion and philosophy*, pp. 292-303. Tsoṅ kha pa has used Nag tso's translation in addition to Pa tshab's, preferring sometimes the one and sometimes the other.

[92] This king's name is unfortunately not clearly indicated in the colophon. Naudou, *op. cit.*, p. 168, identifies him as King Harṣa.

[93] On Tibetan translations of the *Ratnāvalī* attributed to Jñānagarbha with Klu'i rgyal mtshan (in the bsTan 'gyur) and also to Vidyākaraprabha with (s)Ka ba dPal brtsegs (in the paraconical Žol par khaṅ edition), and on revisions by Pa tshab in association with Kanakavarman, see M. Hahn, 'On the "paracanonical" tradition of the Tibetan version of Nāgārjuna's *Ratnāvalī*', *Annual Memoirs of the Otani University Shin Buddhist Comprehensive Research Institute* 6 (1988), pp. 93-108 (on p. 107 line 9, read Pa tshab Ñi ma grags instead of dPal brtsegs). Cf. p. 17 note 28 above.

According to the *Deb ther sṅon po*, cha, f. 7b, Pa tshab also translated Candrakīrti's *Vṛtti* on the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā*. The bsTan 'gyur colophons, which ascribe to Pa tshab only a translation of the verses of the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā*, do not seem to record this information (cf. p. 14 note 19 above).

[94] Cha, f. 7b.

Dharma grags of Candrakīrti's commentary on the *Śūnyatāsaptati* in collaboration with the Paṇḍit Muditā(śrī).[95] Pa tshab's work of translating thus took place chiefly in Kaśmīr and in two ancient temples of lHa sa. No Madhyamaka treatise by Pa tshab seems to be extant. He is stated to have defined the *saṃvṛti* as what is reached by a false perception (*mthoṅ ba brdzun pas rñed pa*), and the *paramārtha* as what is reached correctly (*yaṅ dag pas rñed pa*).[96] According to report it was Pa tshab who introduced in Tibet (together with Jayānanda) the appellations Raṅ rgyud pa (Svātantrika 'Autonomist') and Thal 'gyur ba (Prāsaṅgika 'Apagogist') in order to distinguish between the two branches of the pure Madhyamaka based on the criterion of whether a *pramāṇa* that is objectively gained (*vastubalapravṛtta*, in contradistinction to one that is just consensually acknowledged, *lokaprasiddha*) is admitted by the philosopher. Thus, according to Pa tshab, Bhavya with his Svātantrika followers advocated a *pramāṇa* that is *vastubalapravṛtta*, whereas the Prāsaṅgikas Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti accepted only one that is *lokaprasiddha*.[97]

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95 cf. F. Erb, *Die Śūnyatāsaptati des Nāgārjuna*, pp. xlvii, lxxx.

96 See Šākya mchog ldan, *dBu ma rnam ṅes*, Part iv, f. 36b.

Pa tshab's *dGe bšes Šar ba'i dris lan* is cited by 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa, *Grub mtha' chen mo*, ii, f. 30a; see p. 45 n. 88 above.

97 See 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa'i rdo rje Ṅag dbaṅ brtson 'grus, *Grub mtha' chen mo*, ii, ff. 102b-103a: *raṅ rgyud kyi don daṅ thal raṅ gi khyad par la Dza ya a nanda sogs rgya gar ba re gñis kyis yaṅ sna tshogs smras pa daṅ/ Pa tshab rin po che'i gsuṅ las slob dpon klu sgrub kyi rjes su 'jug pa la 'thad sbyor gyi gaṅ zag gsum daṅ phyogs gñis daṅ rnam bžag chen po bži byuṅ ba yin gsuṅ/ daṅ po ni/ daṅ po byon pa Saṅs rgyas bskyaṅs/ bar du Legs ldan daṅ/ mthar Zla ba gsum mo/ /gñis pa ni/ Legs ldan daṅ raṅ rgyud phyogs daṅ/ Saṅs rgyas bskyaṅs daṅ Zla ba'i žabs thal 'gyur gyi phyogs 'dzin pas thal raṅ gñis po gsuṅ/ dbu ma thal raṅ gi khyad gaṅ yin že na/ Pa tshab dṅos po stobs žugs kyi tshad ma khas len pa dbu ma raṅ rgyud pa daṅ de mi len pa thal 'gyur ba zer skad de/ de ltar na dṅos stobs smra thams cad dbu ma raṅ rgyud pa daṅ/ rgyaṅ 'phan pa daṅ 'dzem med pa [sic] thal 'gyur bar 'gyur ro//.* 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa thus criticizes the criterion ascribed to Pa tshab by pointing out that, technically, it would make all Substantialists Svātantrikas, and the Lokāyatas/Cārvākas Prāsaṅgikas. – For a brief discus-

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Furthermore, if in his *Vigrahavyāvartanī* (verse 29) Nāgārjuna has stated that the Mādhyamika has no thesis (*pratijñā*), in Pa tshab's opinion there in fact exists no contradiction in his procedure; for even though the Mādhyamika has no *pratijñā* consisting in affirmation/proof (*vidhi*) by positive determination (*pariccheda*), he still has a *pratijñā* that consists in negation/refutation (*pratiṣedha* or *niṣedha*) by negative determination (*vyavaccheda*) which constitutes a thesis asserting the negation of production (*skye ba dgag pa'i dam bca'*, as stated in the *Madhyamakakārikā* i.1).[98]

Pa tshab's chief disciples, the so-called *bu bži*, were four in number: Žaṅ Thaṅ sag pa Ye šes 'byuṅ gnas, rMa bya Byaṅ chub ye šes, gTsaṅ pa Sar spos/Sa rbos, and Dar Yon tan grags.[99] Still another disciple of Pa tshab was the *slob dpon* sTon pa – the son of sTon pa dBaṅ phyug rgyal po and the nephew of the *slob dpon* 'Phags pa of the bKa' gdams pa lineage – who died in 1158; he studied the Doctrines of Maitreya and the Madhyamaka with Ša ra ba, all the books of Nāgārjuna's Corpus of Reasoning with Pa tshab, the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* and *Vigrahavyāvartanī* with gTsaṅ ma (sic) Sar spos, gTsaṅ nag pa and rMa bya Byaṅ chub ye šes, the

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sion of the problem raised by the question whether the Prāsaṅgika does not in fact accept the *vastubala-nyāya (dṅos po'i stobs šugs kyi rigs pa)*, see e.g. A lag ša Ṅag dbaṅ bstan dar (1759-1840), *rTags rigs kyi dka' ba'i gnas la phan pa'i zin bris* (gSuṅ 'bum, vol. ka/ga), ff. 2b-3a. On the use of *prasaṅga*-type reasoning, see below p. 95 note 201.

[98] See below, Section II, § 9.

[99] See *Deb ther sṅon po*, cha, f. 8a; and Padma dkar po, *Chos 'byuṅ*, f. 192b-193a. Šākya mchog ldan, *dBu ma'i byuṅ tshul*, f. 13a-b, gives the names rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus, gTsaṅ pa Sar sbos, Dar yul ba Rin chen grags, and Žaṅ 'Byuṅ gnas ye śes (sic!). Kloṅ rdol Ṅag dbaṅ blo bzaṅ, *bsTan 'dzin gyi skyes bu rgya bod du byon pa'i miṅ gi rnam graṅs*, f. 4a, gives the names Še'u gaṅ pa, gTsaṅ pa 'Gre bsgur, rMa bya Byaṅ brtson, and Žaṅ Thaṅ sag pa. And Koṅ sprul, *Šes bya kun khyab*, i, f. 150a, gives the names Gaṅs pa Še'u, gTsaṅ pa 'Bre sgur, rMa bya Byaṅ rtson, and Žaṅ Thaṅ sag pa Ye šes 'byuṅ gnas. There is thus disagreement in the sources about the names of Pa tshab's disciples. On rMa bya Byaṅ chub ye šes see below, pp. 50-54.

Prasannapadā and *Madhyamakāvatāra* with Žaṅ and Dar Yon tan grags, and the Prajñāpāramitā with rGya dmar ba.[100]

Žaṅ Thaṅ sag pa Ye šes 'byuṅ gnas, is credited with having commented on Nāgārjuna's *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* and *Ratnāvalī*, Ārya-Deva's *Catuḥśataka*, and Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra*. He reportedly considered (like rṄog) that the *paramārtha* is not something conceptualy knowable (*jñeya*); and he regarded as ultimate reality the non-assertion (*anabhyupagama*) of the twin extremes of existence and non-existence of all *dharma*s, this being described as 'neither existence nor non-existence' (*chos thams cad yod pa yaṅ ma yin la med pa yaṅ ma yin pa'i yod med kyi mtha' gñis su khas blaṅ daṅ bral de gnas lugs mthar thug yin*).[101]

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[100] See *Deb ther sṅon po*, ṅa, ff. 14b-15a.

[101] dKon mchog 'jigs med dbaṅ po, *lTa mgur gyi 'grel pa Tshig gi sgron me* (ed. lHa mkhar yoṅs 'dzin bsTan pa rgyal mtshan, Madhyamaka Text Series, vol. i [New Delhi, 1972]), f. 12a. See also 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa'i rdo rje Ṅag dbaṅ brtson 'grus, *Grub mtha' chen mo*, ii, ff. 29a-30a (distinguishing the doctrine of Thaṅ sag pa from that of Pa tshab), 31b, 173a; dKon mchog 'jigs med dbaṅ po, *op. cit.*, ff. 11a-13b; and Roṅ ston, *dBu ma rigs pa'i tshogs kyi dka' ba'i gnad bstan pa Rigs lam kun gsal*, f. 11b. – This theory of 'neither existence nor non-existence' (*yod min med min*) is said to have been maintained by Thaṅ sag pa along with several other early Tibetan scholars such as the Sa skya masters, Karma pas, 'Brug pas and others; see dKon mchog 'Jigs med dbaṅ po, *op. cit.*, f. 11b. (See also Go rams pa, *lTa ba'i šan 'byed*, f. 8a-b, who adds Mar pa, Mi la and rṄog to his list of masters who regarded freedom from extremes – *mtha' bral*, i.e. from *yod med* and *yin min* – as constituting the Madhyamaka. Cf. below, Section II, §§ 5 and 17.) Together with rṄog Blo ldan šes rab and his followers, Thaṅ sag pa is thus regarded as one of the Tibetan teachers who had demarcated in too broad a way the negandum for reasoned knowledge (*rigs šes*) analysing the *paramārtha* (*dgag bya ṅos 'dzin ha caṅ khyab ches pa*), i.e. non-substantiality (*niḥsvabhāvatā*). See *LRChM*, ff. 347a-386a = pp. 580-643; 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa, *Grub mtha' chen mo*, ii, f. 29a; and A kya yoṅs 'dzin dByaṅs can dga' ba'i blo gros, *Byaṅ chub lam gyi rim pa chen po las byuṅ ba'i brda bkrol ñer mkho bsdus pa*, f. 45b-46a; below, p. 82 note 184.

According to Šākya mchog ldan, *dBu ma rnam ṅes*, Part iv, f. 37a, Thaṅ →

The seminary of Thaṅ sag (in 'Phan yul north of lHa sa, the area where Pa tshab had earlier taught) was founded by Žaṅ Thaṅ sag pa, and there the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka was particularly cultivated in earlier times in Tibet.[102] 'Gos lo gŽon nu dpal and Padma dkar po both state that an exegetical tradition (*bšad rgyun*) of the Madhyamaka current in their times went back to Thaṅ sag.[103]

As another early centre of Madhyamaka studies mention is made of the monastery of Gro sa (in 'Phan yul), a foundation connected with the lineage of Šar ba pa.[104]

rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus (d. *c.* 1185) is the author of the earliest of the Tibetan Prāsaṅgika commentaries now available to us.[105] A

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sag pa distinguished between *saṃvṛti* and *paramārtha* as *snaṅ lugs la 'jug pa'i blos rñed pa* and *gnas tshul la 'jug pa'i blos ma [sic] rñed pa*.

On the significance of the *yod min med min* formula see also below, Section II, §§ 5, 17 (p. 203 note 150), 19. And on Thaṅ sag pa see H. Tauscher, *Die Lehre von den zwei Wirklichkeiten in Tsoṅ kha pas Madhyamaka-Werken*, especially p. 165 f.

102 See *Deb ther dmar po*, cha, ff. 7b-8a; Šākya mchog ldan, *dBu ma'i byuṅ tshul*, f. 13a-b (where Thaṅ sag pa's name is given as Žaṅ 'Byuṅ gnas ye šes); and Padma dkar po, *Chos 'byuṅ*, f. 193a.

103 See *Deb ther sṅon po*, cha, f. 8a; and Padma dkar po's *Chos 'byuṅ*, f. 193a2. This statement is in general agreement with what has been stated by Roṅ ston (see below, p. 66 note 149). But it may not tally entirely with what is reported about the Madhyamaka having all but died out in Thaṅ sag by the time of Red mda' ba (see below, p. 62 note 139). – On the doctrine of the Thaṅ sag school, see 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa, *Grub mtha' chen mo*, ii, f. 29a.

104 See sDe srid Saṅs rgyas rgya mtsho, *bsTan bcos vai ḍūrya dkar po las dris lan 'khrul snaṅ g-ya' sel don gyi bžin ras ston byed*, ii, f. 167a. On the monastery of Gro sa, see e.g. *Deb ther sṅon po*, ca, f. 17a.

105 The *Deb ther sṅon po*, cha, f. 1a6, places the death of rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus seventeen years after the death of Phya pa. The date of rMa bya's death is thus placed in 1185 by Tshe tan žabs druṅ, *bsTan rtsis kun las btus pa*, p. 177.

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In lineages of the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka in Tibet, rMa bya Byaṅ chub ye šes has sometimes been listed as one of the *bu bži* of Pa tshab (see above) and as a teacher of rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus. In his *Chos 'byuṅ Me tog sñiṅ po* (ed. Meisezahl), f. 512a-b, Ñaṅ ral Ñi ma 'od zer has given Pa tshab's lineage down to rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus as: Pa tshab > Dar ma Yon tan grags > Pha voṅ kha ba > rMa bya Byaṅ brtson. In the *gSan yig* of mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzaṅ po (gSuṅ 'bum, vol. ka, f. 4a), rMa bya Byaṅ brtson is listed as the disciple of rMa Byaṅ ye, gTsaṅ pa Sa sbos, Thaṅ sag pa and Khu mDo sde 'bar; cf. the *gSan yig* of Tsoṅ kha pa (gSuṅ 'bum, vol. ka, f. 27b). Padma dkar po, *Chos 'byuṅ*, ff. 192b-193a, describes rMa bya Byaṅ (chub) ye (šes) as the paternal uncle (*khu bo*) of rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus, whom he further characterizes as one of the *seṅ chen* of Phya pa and as a disciple of both Pa tshab and rMa bya Byaṅ yes; 'Gos lo gŽon nu dpal, *Deb ther sṅon po*, cha f. 8a, too describes rMa bya Byaṅ brtson as one of the *seṅ chen* of Phya pa, while on f. 4a the same source describes rMa bya rTsod pa'i seṅ ge as one of these *seṅ chen*. In his *dBu ma'i byuṅ tshul*, f. 13a, Šākya mchog ldan reports the view that rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus and rMa bya rTsod pa'i seṅ ge are the same, but without himself expressing an opinion. dPa' bo gTsug lag phreṅ ba, *mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, da, f. 42a-b, attaches the name rTsod pa'i seṅ ge to rMa bya Byaṅ brtson and describes rMa bya rTsod pa'i seṅ ge as one of Phya pa's *seṅ chen*. Šākya mchog ldan (*op. cit.*, f. 13a7) further describes Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus as one of the 'four sons' (*bu bži*) of Pa tshab; but rMa bya Byaṅ chub ye šes is so described in the *Deb ther sṅon po*, cha, f. 8a2. Go rams pa has distinguished between rMa bya Byaṅ chub ye šes and rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus, ascribing to them quite distinct theories on the question as to whether the Mādhyamika entertains a *pratijñā*; see his *dBu ma rtsa ba'i šes rab kyi rnam par bšad pa Yaṅ dag lta ba'i 'od zer*, f. 14b (cf. below, pp. 53-54; and Section II, § 11).

On rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus, and on other scholars bearing the name rMa bya, see below, Section II, note 128; L. van der Kuijp, *Contributions*, pp. 38, 69; P. Williams, 'rMa bya pa Byang chub brtson 'grus on Madhyamaka method', *JIP* 13 (1985), pp. 205-25; and D. Jackson, *The entrance gate for the wise* (Vienna, 1987), p. 435 f. (note 158). The problem of the different scholars who bore the name rMa bya has not yet been fully clarified.

comment on Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamakakārikās*, this work is entitled *dBu ma rtsa ba šes rab kyi 'grel pa 'Thad pa'i rgyan.*[106] To this same author are further ascribed a work based on Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* (the *Tshig gsal stoṅ thun gyi ṭīkka*), the *dBu ma'i stoṅ thun*, the *dBu ma'i bsdus pa*, and a *bsDus don* and notes on the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, as well as a comment on Jayānanda's *Tarkamudgara.*[107] A pupil of both Jayā-

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106 See *Deb ther sṅon po*, cha, ff. 4a, 8a; A khu, *Tho yig*, no. 11322. This work was reprinted in Rumteg (Sikkim) in 1975.

107 See *Deb ther sṅon po*, cha, ff. 4a, 8a; 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa, *Grub mtha' chen mo*, ii, f. 30a; and A khu, *Tho yig* nos. 11323-28. Cf. P. Williams, *JIP* 13 (1985), p. 207.

The title *stoṅ thun* requires clarification. In the *Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo* it is explained as 'general meaning condensing many myriads of points' (*gnad don stoṅ phrag du ma thun thun du bsdus pa ste spyi don*). In his *Yi ge'i mtha' dpyod ma dag pa'i dri ma 'khrud pa'i chab gtsaṅ* (gSuṅ 'bum, vol. kha/a, f. 5a), A lag ša Ṅag dbaṅ bstan dar has given three meanings for *thun*, viz. (1) part, as in *mtshan thun*; (2) portion, as in *sman thun* 'dose of medicine'; and (3) summary, as in *stoṅ thun* (*spyir thun žes pa cha šas la 'jug ste mtshan thun žes pa lta bu/ yaṅ dum bur bcad pa la yaṅ 'jug ste sman thun žes pa lta bu/ maṅ po las ñuṅ ṅur bsdus pa la 'jug ste stoṅ thun žes pa lta bu*). As the meaning of *stoṅ thun*, a summary of myriads of difficult points (*gžuṅ lugs kyi dka' gnad stoṅ phrag du ma thun thun te dum dum du bsdus pa'i don*) has also been indicated in the medical lexicon *Bod gaṅs can pa'i gso ba rig pa'i dpal ldan rgyud sogs kyi brda daṅ dka' gnad 'ga' žig bkrol ba* by dBaṅ 'dus (Beijing, 1982), p. 210. To these three meanings, 'period' or 'session' may be added, as in *chos thun* and *thun mtshams*. The third meaning of *thun* given above – i.e. summary, digest or compendium – is apparently the appropriate one in the present context, where the expression *stoṅ thun* evidently refers to topics or difficult points and where as a title it denotes a text summarizing these topics.

In the history of the Tibetan Madhyamaka, the expression *Tshig gsal stoṅ thun* appears to refer in particular to Candrakīrti's *PPMV* i.1, which serves in large part as a sort of prolegomenon to Madhyamaka philosophy. On the term *tshig gsal stoṅ thun* see C. Yoshimizu, *Die Erkenntnislehre des Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka* (Vienna, 1996), p. 6 ff. Since they are not presently

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nanda and the latter's disciple Khu mDo sde 'bar,[108] rMa bya is said to have preferred the doctrine of Jayānanda to that of Phya pa.[109] He is also stated to have been a pupil of Pa tshab Ñi ma grags.[110] rMa bya held that an objectively gained correct cognition (*dṅos po stobs žugs kyi tshad ma = vastubalapravṛttapramāṇa*) has no warrant or justification (*'thad pa = upapatti*) even on the surface-level of the *saṃvṛti*; and no logical-philosophical system of negation/refutation (*pratiṣedha/niṣedha*) and affirmation/proof (*vidhi, dgag sgrub kyi rnam gžag*) is established even in *saṃvṛti* except through accepting a *pramāṇa* that is merely acknowledged consensually in pragmatic usage (*'jig rten grags pa = lokaprasiddha*) or by an opponent (*prativādin*) in a debate.[111] Concerning the specific ques-

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available, it is, however, not certain whether the *sToṅ thun* treatises mentioned above actually relate only to *PPMV* i.1; at all events, it is clear that Phya pa Chos kyi seṅ ge's *dBu ma šar gsum gyi stoṅ thun* (which is available) does not relate to it.

[108] See *Deb ther sṅon po*, cha, f. 8a; and above, p. 50 note 105.

[109] See *Deb ther sṅon po*, cha, ff. 4a-b, 8a. dPa' bo gTsug lag phreṅ ba, *mKhas pa'i dga' ston*, da, f. 42b, explicitly states that he followed Candrakīrti's system.

[110] *Deb ther sṅon po*, cha, f. 8a; and Padma dkar po, *Chos 'byuṅ*, ff. 192b-193a, who specifies that rMa bya Byaṅ brtson attended on both Pa tshab and his uncle rMa bya Byaṅ yes, himself a disciple of Pa tshab. As already mentioned above (p. 50 note 105), in lineages of the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka rMa bya Byaṅ (chub) ye (šes) is counted as a disciple of Pa tshab and a teacher of rMa bya Byaṅ brtson. On rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus as one of the *seṅ chen* of Phyva pa see p. 50 note 105.

[111] See rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus, *'Thad pa'i rgyan*, f. 21a f. Here rMa bya recognizes the four *pramāṇa*s of *pratyakṣa, anumāna, āgama*, and *upamāna* on which is grounded knowledge of the twin categories of *pratiṣedha/niṣedha* and *vidhi* (*phyogs gñis dgag sgrub kyi don rtogs pa*) on the *vyavahāra*-level. On the view of rMa bya, see further e.g. Go rams pa bSod nams seṅ ge, *dBu ma rtsa ba'i šes rab kyi rnam par bšad pa Yaṅ dag lta ba'i 'od zer* (gSuṅ 'bum, vol. ṅa), f. 14b: *don dam par dgag sgrub kyi dam bca' gaṅ yaṅ med la/ kun rdzob tsam du 'dir skabs su bab pa rnam bcad dgag pa'i dam bca' tsam daṅ/ spyir yoṅs gcod sgrub pa'i dam bca' yaṅ yod pa mi* →

tion as to whether the Mādhyamika holds a thesis (*dam bca'* = *pratijñā*), rMa bya held that, from the point of view of the *paramārtha*, the Mādhyamika not only has no *pratijñā* that consists in affirmation (*vidhi*) through positive determination (*yoṅs gcod bsgrub pa: pariccheda*) but also no *pratijñā* that consists in negation (*pratiṣedha/niṣedha*) through negative determination (*rnam bcad dgag pa: vyavaccheda*). Still, on the surface level of the *saṃvṛti*, the Mādhyamika may formulate even an affirmative thesis (*yoṅs gcod bsgrub pa'i dam bca'*), for he accepts what originates in dependence (*rten 'brel*); and the thesis the Mādhyamika formulates in a desire to remove the misapprehension of an opponent (*prativādin*) is a *pratijñā* which, in the opponent's sight, consists in negation by *vyavaccheda* on the *saṃvṛti*-level.[112]

The Madhyamaka tradition of rMa bya rTsod pa'i seṅ ge and rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus is said to have been cultivated in the 'om phug gnas rñiṅ temple in gTsaṅ province.[113]

Among the disciples of rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus who spread the Madhyamaka teaching, mention has been made of bTsan thaṅ pa

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'gal lo ...; and Šākya mchog ldan, *dBu ma rnam ṅes*, Chap. viii (gSuṅ 'bum, vol. ba), f. 30b f.; and Chap. x (*ibid.*), f. 9b f. (referring to Pa tshab). – Cf. below, Section II, § 11; P. Williams, *JIP* 13 (1985), p. 205 ff.; and C. Yoshimizu, *WZKS* 37 (1993), p. 212 f.

112 See *'Thad pa'i rgyan*, ff. 24b-25a, and below, Section II, § 11; cf. 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa, *Grub mtha' chen mo*, ii, f. 30a.

rMa bya Byaṅ chub ye šes (the predecessor of rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus) is on the other hand reported to have held that even though – in his desire to negate the Substantialist opponent's misapprehension – the Mādhyamika formulates, in the sight of that opponent (i.e. taking account of that opponent's standpoint), a negative *pratijñā* consisting in negative determination, the Mādhyamika nevertheless does not for himself entertain even a negative *pratijñā*. (This view thus differs from that of rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus.) See below, Section II, § 11. – For rMa bya's distinction between *saṃvṛti* and *paramārtha*, see Šākya mchog ldan, *dBu ma rnam ṅes*, iv, ff. 36b-37a.

113 See sDe srid Saṅs rgyas rgya mtsho, *Vai ḍūrya g-ya' sel*, ii, f. 167a.

rGyal ba dpal.[114] Reference is made also to bSod nams rdo rje – a disciple of rMa Byaṅ[115] – whose definition of the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika has been criticized.[116]

gTsaṅ nag pa brTson 'grus seṅ ge, the pupil of Phya pa who became a disciple of Pa tshab and a follower of Candrakīrti, has already been mentioned above (p. 39).

For futher representatives of the earlier Tibetan Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka school see § 4.3 below.

4.3. DOXOGRAPHICAL DIVISIONS OF THE MADHYAMAKA IN THE EARLIER *phyi dar* PERIOD AND THEIR TIBETAN REPRESENTATIVES

Of importance for the early history of Tibetan thought in Period II are the works of three rDzogs chen pa/rÑiṅ ma pa authorities. In his *lTa ba'i brjed byaṅ* (f.11b-12a), *Grub mtha'i brjed byaṅ* (f. 5a-6a) and *Man ṅag lta ba'i phreṅ ba žes bya ba'i 'grel pa* (f. 28b) – a comment on the *Man ṅag lta ba'i phreṅ ba* ascribed to Padmasambhava[117] – Roṅ zom Chos kyi

[114] See *Deb ther sṅon po*, cha, f. 8a.

[115] It is not clear whether the reference is to a disciple of rMa bya Byaṅ chub ye šes or his disciple rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus.

[116] See 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa, *Grub mtha' chen mo*, ii, f. 103a: *rma byaṅ gi slob ma mkhas pa bsod nams rdo rje na re/ 'phags pa'i lta ba khas len ciṅ/ phyogs gñis la dgag sgrub raṅ rgyud kyis byed pa raṅ rgyud pa daṅ phyogs gñis la dgag sgrub gžan grags sam thal 'gyur gyis byed pa thal 'gyur ba zer ba'aṅ mi 'thad de/ thal raṅ gi don des mi šes pa'i phyir daṅ/ thal raṅ gñis kas kyaṅ phyogs gñis ka la thal 'gyur gyis kyaṅ dgag sgrub byed pa tsam 'dra ba'i phyir/* In his criticism of this view, 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa thus points out that just like the Prāsaṅgikas the Svātantrikas also may use a *prasaṅga*-type argument in formulating their assertions and negations relating respectively to their own positions and their opponents' positions.

[117] On Padmasambhava's *Man ṅag lta ba'i phreṅ ba* as a treatise belonging to the so-called 'Mantra-Madhyamaka' (*sṅags kyi dbu ma*), see Šākya mchog →

bzaṅ po (11th c.) has (like Ye śes sde in his *lTa ba'i khyad par*) mentioned both the mDo sde dbu ma and the rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma but neither the Raṅ rgyud pa nor the Thal 'gyur ba. In his *Chos 'byuṅ*, Ñaṅ Ñi ma 'od zer (1124/1136-1192/1204) has mentioned Pa tshab Ñi ma grags as well as Candrakīrti, but without naming the Thal 'gyur ba branch of the Madhyamaka school.[118] Similarly, in his *Grub mtha'*, Rog bande has subdivided the 'Divided Madhyamaka' (*phyogs 'dzin pa'i dbu ma*) into the mDo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma (with Jñānagarbha cited and described as being in agreement with the Śrāvakayānist Sautrāntikas), the rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma (with Śāntarakṣita cited and described as being in agreement with the Cittamātra) and the dBu ma spyi gžuṅ gi žal mchu ba (*sic*, with Kamalaśīla cited).[119] On the other hand, in addition to the mDo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma and the rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma, the rDzogs chen pa Kloṅ chen pa Dri med 'od zer (1308-1363) has listed the Raṅ rgyud pa and Thal 'gyur ba.[120]

The Sa skya hierarch bSod nams rtse mo (1142-1182) has already mentioned the Raṅ rgyud pa and Thal 'gyur ba in his commentary on the *Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra*.[121] And his younger brother Grags pa rgyal mtshan (1147-1216) adopted a classification of the Madhyamaka in five divisions in respect to the *saṃvṛtisatya*: the 'Jig rten grags sde pa, Bye brag smra ba daṅ tshul mtshuṅs pa, sGyu ma pa, mDo sde spyod pa, and rNal 'byor spyod pa.[122]

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ldan, *dBu ma'i byuṅ tshul*, f. 17a.

118 Ñaṅ bdag Ñi ma 'od zer, *Chos 'byuṅ Me tog sñiṅ po*, f. 512a. – On a somewhat obscure reference by Ñaṅ to varieties of the Madhyamaka, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Buddha-nature, Mind and the problem of gradualism in a comparative perspective*, pp. 80-81.

119 Rog bande Śes rab 'od, *Grub mtha' so so'i bžed tshul gžuṅ gsal bar ston pa Chos 'byuṅ grub mtha' chen po bstan pa'i sgron me* (Leh, 1977), f. 83b f.

120 Kloṅ chen pa, *Grub mtha' mdzod*, f. 54b f. = f. 40a f. On Kloṅ chen and the Madhyamaka, cf. L. van der Kuijp, *BIS* 1 (1985), pp. 57-58.

121 bSod nams rtse mo, *Byaṅ chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa'i 'grel pa*, f. 296a-b; cf. f. 327a.

122 Grags pa rgyal mtshan, *rGyud kyi mṅon par rtogs pa Rin po che'i ljon* →

sGam po pa bSod nams rin chen (1079-1153), who transmitted combined bKa' brgyud pa and bKa' gdams pa traditions, has referred to Madhyamaka sources including Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra* in his *Dam chos yid bžin gyi nor bu thar pa rin po che'i rgyan* without, however, discussing the divisions of this school.

In the second half of the thirteenth century bCom ldan Rig pa'i ral gri composed commentaries (called *rGyan gyi me tog*) on Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamakakārikās* and Ārya-Deva's *Catuḥśataka*.[122a]

A valuable document attesting to the understanding of Indian Madhyamaka thought among the bKa' gdams pas about a century before Tsoṅ kha pa's time is the chapter devoted to this school's doctrines in the *Grub pa'i mtha' rnam par bšad pa* by dBus pa Blo gsal (*c.* 1300).[123] This

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šiṅ, f. 30a. For this fivefold classification with respect to the *saṃvṛti (kun rdzob khas len tshul)*, see, e.g., Go rams pa bSod nams seṅ ge, *rGyal ba thams cad kyi thugs kyi dgoṅs pa zab mo dbu ma'i de kho na ñid spyi'i ṅag gis ston pa Ṅes don rab gsal*, f. 26a-28a, who links the first view with Candrakīrti, the third with Bhavya, the fourth with Śūra, and the fifth with Jñānagarbha and Śāntarakṣita. Then (f. 28a) Go rams pa mentions the division between Raṅ rgyud pa and Thal 'gyur ba, the differentiation between which is made with respect to the generation of the theory of the *paramārtha (don dam gyi lta ba rgyud la bskyed tshul gyi sgo nas)*.

On the term 'Jig rten grags sde pa see below, p. 58 note 124. And with the term sGyu ma pa compare the designation sGyu ma lta bu and sGyu ma rigs grub pa discussed above, p. 33 note 60.

In a Grub mtha' type work ascribed (wrongly: see D. Jackson, 'Two Grub mtha' treatises of Sa skya paṇḍi ta – one lost and one forged', *Tibet Journal* 10/1 [1985], pp. 3-13) to Sa skya paṇḍi ta Kun dga' rgyal mtshan, the *gŽuṅ lugs legs par bšad pa*, f. 24b-25a, Raṅ rgyud pa and Thal 'gyur ba have been mentioned as two subdivisions of the Rab tu mi gnas pa'i lugs of the Madhyamaka, the latter together with the sGyu ma lta bu constituting the two main divisions of the Madhyamaka in respect to the *paramārtha* (see above, note 58 and note 60. On all these classifications, cf. K. Mimaki, *Blo gsal grub mtha'*, p. 31 f.

122a This information I owe to the kindness of L. van der Kuijp.

123 cf. K. Mimaki, *Blo gsal grub mtha'*. As to the date of dBus pa Blo gsal, →

important doxographical work lists three branches of Mādhyamikas: the mDo sde spyod pa (Bhavya) who is in agreement with the Sautrāntikas on the *saṃvṛti* level, the rNal 'byor spyod pa (Śāntarakṣita and Haribhadra) who is in agreement with the advocates of the Cittamātra, and the 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa (Jñānagarbha and Candrakīrti) who is in agreement with ordinary people in the world (*'jig rten* = *loka*).[124] In

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it may be noted that he is reported to have made in 1280 a calculation of the date of the Buddha's birth; cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, 'Notes on some Indian and Tibetan reckonings of the Buddha's Nirvāṇa and the duration of his teaching', in : H. Bechert (ed.). *The dating of the historical Buddha/Die Datierung des historischen Buddha* (Symposien zur Buddhismusforschung, IV,2, Abhandlungen der Akademe der Wissenschaften, Göttingen, 1992), vol. 2, p. 273.

124 The expression 'Jig rten grags sde pa is, as already mentioned, to be found with the Sa skya pa Grags pa rgyal mtshan (1147-1216), *rGyud kyi mṅon par rtogs pa Rin po che'i ljon śiṅ*, f. 30a. This name, which Bu ston later identified as the Prāsaṅgikas (see below), has very frequently not been retained for the latter by many authorities, including those of of Tsoṅ kha pa's school; see e.g. mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzaṅ, *sToṅ thun chen mo*, ff. 41b-42b. But see Go rams pa bSod nams seṅ ge, *dBu ma Ṅes don rab gsal*, f. 26a-b; and 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa, *Grub mtha' chen mo*, ii, f. 142b on the virtual equivalence of *gžan grags bkod pa* and *thal 'gyur ba*. On the use of the name 'Jig rten grags sde pa and its variants, cf. K. Mimaki, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-39. The collocation of Jñānagarbha and Candrakīrti as 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pa found with dBus pa Blo gsal (f. 100b) is unusual (it was already repudiated e.g. by sTag tshaṅ lo tsā ba, *Grub mtha'*, f. 88a).

As for the term *'jig rten (du/la) grags pa (tsam)* '(merely) acknowledged (i.e. recognized) in the every-day (transactional) usage (of ordinary people)', it translates Skt. *lokaprasiddhi(mātra)* in Candrakīrti's *PPMV* pp. 68 and 177, or *lokaprasiddha* in the *PPMV* pp. 72 and 105. Elsewhere it is connected with the logical-philosophical technique of the *thal 'gyur ba* = *prasaṅga*, whereby only the *parapratijñā* or *parapakṣa* of an opponent is rejected (see *PPMV*, pp. 24 and 34), no *pratijñā* of one's own being asserted (*PPMV*, p. 23 and p. 15). This technique is then opposed to the procedure adopted by Bhavya, who on the contrary employed autonomous inferences (*svatantrānumāna*) to prove his assertions. On the sense of *loka/laukika* in →

parallel, dBus pa Blo gsal additionally lists the Raṅ rgyud pa (Svātantrika: Bhavya *et al.*) – who accepts a *vastubalapravṛtta* inferential reason (*rtags*) and *pramāṇa* on the *saṃvṛti* level, and on the *paramārtha* level the *māyopama (sgyu ma lta bu)*[125] – and the Thal 'gyur ba (Prāsaṅgika: Buddhapālita *et al.*) – who on the contrary has neither an own thesis to be established for the Mādhyamika (*raṅ phyogs bsgrub tu med pa*) nor an opposed thesis to be refuted (*gžan phyogs dgag tu yaṅ med pa*) for the Mādhyamika, all negation and affirmation (*dgag sgrub*) being then resorted to exclusively from the standpoint of an opponent's cognition (*pha rol po'i blo ṅor*). For the Prāsaṅgika, moreover, all presented cognitive objects are false (*snaṅ bcas kyi yul thams cad rdzun pa*) and all cognitions erroneous (*blo thams cad 'khrul pa*); he has no theory to assert (*khas len gyi lta ba*), and the *paramārtha* is free of all discursive proliferation (*niṣprapañca*).[126] dBus pa Blo gsal's doxographical work is not concerned in particular with the history of the Tibetan Madhyamaka as such.

Bu ston Rin chen grub (1290-1364), the master of the Ža lu pa school closely linked with the Sa skya tradition, has listed the mDo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma of Bhavya, the rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma of Śrīgupta, Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, and the Thal 'gyur 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma of Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti.[127] Bu ston has himself been described sometimes as a Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamika and sometimes as a Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika.[128] The only specifically Madhyamaka work he composed was a commentary on the

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the case of the Prāsaṅgika, see for example mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzaṅ, *sToṅ thun chen mo*, f. 42a-b and f. 85b f.

[125] See above, note 60.

[126] See *Blo gsal grub mtha'*, ff. 9b-10b and f. 100a f. On this see Section II, § 13 below.

[127] Bu ston, *Chos 'byuṅ*, f. 103a.

[128] cf. Ṅag dbaṅ chos grags, *Grub mtha'i šan 'byed*, f. 105b, who states that Bu ston belonged to the tradition of Pa tshab transmitted by rMa bya. On the question of Bu ston's doctrinal affiliation see D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Life of Bu ston Rin po che* (Rome, 1966), pp. 11-12; and *Le traité du tathāgatagarbha de Bu ston Rin chen grub* (Paris, 1973), p. 56.

Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra, a text which it is difficult to assign specially to either the Svātantrika or Prāsaṅgika but which has, nevertheless, often been connected with the latter school.

'Ba' ra ba rGyal mtshan dpal bzaṅ (1310-1391) has listed, for the 'Divided Madhyamaka' (*phyogs 'dzin dbu ma*), the mDo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma described as being in agreement with the Śrāvakayānist Sautrāntikas, the rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma described as being in agreement with the Cittamātra, and the sNaṅ ba mi spyod dbu ma or 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma along with its two subdivisions of sGyu ma lta bu and Rab tu mi gnas pa.[129]

Red mda' ba/pa gŽon nu blo gros (1349-1412), Tsoṅ kha pa's elder contemporary, sometime teacher and partner in philosophical investigation, composed works which are of special importance for tracing the development of the Tibetan Madhyamaka in the second half of the fourteenth century.[130] He appears to have been the foremost master of the Prāsaṅgika tradition at this important point of transition from the preclassical to the classical period of Tibetan philosophical thought. And it is to him that is indeed ascribed the re-establishment and explication of the Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka after a period of relative eclipse, this school

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[129] 'Ba' ra ba, *Thar pa 'jug pa'i gru bo zab don chos kyi gter mdzod las Grub mtha'i rnam bžag*, f. 18b f., and its *dKa' 'grel*, f. 56b f. Cf. K. Mimaki, *Blo gsal grub mtha'*, pp. 34-35. For the twofold division of sGyu ma lta bu and Rab tu mi gnas pa see above, note 60.

Padma dkar po (1527-1592) continued using the division sGyu ma lta bu(r smra ba) and Rab tu mi gnas pa('i lugs) beside Raṅ rgyud pa and Thal 'gyur ba in his *dBu ma'i gžuṅ lugs gsum gsal bar byed pa Ṅes don grub pa'i śiṅ rta*, f. 20b f.

[130] On Red mda' ba as Tsoṅ kha pa's teacher in Madhyamaka, in addition to the biographies of the latter see mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzaṅ po's *gSan yig*, f. 4b f. (Cf. below, p. 88 note 192, on Red mda' ba's appearance for the first time in mKhas grub rje's *gSan yig* rather than in Tsoṅ kha pa's own *gSan yig*.) – At f. 4a, mKhas grub rje has in addition listed sNar thaṅ mkhan chen Kun dga' rgyal mtshan as Tsoṅ kha pa's teacher in a Madhyamaka lineage going back to Pa tshab (see below, p. 88 note 192). See in addition Tsoṅ kha pa's *gSan yig*, f. 27b.

being stated to have all but died out before him.[131] Especially noteworthy are Red mda' ba's commentaries on the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*s, Ārya-Deva's *Catuḥśataka* and Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra*, and the *sToṅ thun* of the *Prasannapadā*.[132] In addition, he composed a guide to meditative realization of the theory (*lta khrid*) of the Madhyamaka.[133] Red mda' ba was a disciple of Sa bzaṅ Mati paṇ chen[134] and also of Ña

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131 See Thu'u bkvan Blo bzaṅ Chos kyi ñi ma's *Grub mtha' šel gyi me loṅ* cited below, p. 62 note 139.

The spellings Red mda' ba/pa are both attested in our sources. A biography of Red mda' ba by mṄa' ris pa Saṅs rgyas rtse mo entitled *dPal ldan red mda' pa chen po'i rnam thar ṅo mtshar rmad 'byuṅ* is cited by L. van der Kuijp, *Journal of Buddhist and Tibetan studies* 1 (1994), pp. 15, 30. On this master see M. Sato, 'Die Madhyamaka-Philosophie der Sa skya pa-Schule – Red mda' ba gŽon nu blo gros', in : E. Steinkellner and H. Tauscher (eds.), *Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist religion and philosophy*, pp. 243-57; and L. van der Kuijp, 'Apropos of a recent contribution to the history of Central Way philosophy in Tibet', *BIS* 1 (1985), p. 50 f., and 'Studies in mKhas-grub-rje I', *ibid.*, p. 75 f.

For questions investigated jointly by Red mda' ba and Tsoṅ kha pa, see the latter's epistolary exchanges with the former entitled *rJe Red mda' ba'i gsuṅ lan* (in vol. kha, f. 62a-68a, of Tsoṅ kha pa's gSuṅ 'bum), *rJe btsun Red mda' pa'i gsuṅ ṅag dris lan* (in vol. kha, f. 253a-259b), *rJe btsun Red mda' ba'i žu lan* (in vol. kha, f. 261a-262a), and *rJe btsun 'Jam pa'i dbyaṅs kyi lam gyi gnad, rJe Red mda' pa la šog dril du phul ba* (in vol. pha, which is a text parallel to the one in vol. kha, f. 62b f.). Tsoṅ kha pa also composed eulogies of Red mda' ba (contained in the bKa' 'bum thor bu in vol. kha, f. 4b ff., of his gSuṅ 'bum).

132 Here *stoṅ thun* may refer to a comment on the first chapter of the *PPMV* (on the meaning of *stoṅ thun* see p. 52 note 107 above). A list of Red mda' ba's works is provided by A khu, *Tho yig* nos. 11349-50.

133 See Šākya mchog ldan, *dBu ma'i byuṅ tshul*, f. 13b. On Red mda' ba's *dBu ma'i rnal 'byor sgom pa'i man ṅag*, see Ṅag dbaṅ chos grags, *Grub mtha'i šan 'byed*, f. 110a.

134 See Saṅs rgyas phun tshogs, *Ṅor chos 'byuṅ*, f. 172b. The dates 1294-1376 are given for him in 'Dzam thaṅ Ṅag dbaṅ blo gros grags pa's *Jo naṅ* →

dbon Kun dga' dpal,[135] who was himself a pupil of both Bu ston Rin chen grub (1290-1364, who has sometimes been also considered a Prāsaṅgika) and of the Jo naṅ pa Dol po pa (1292-1361).[136] By one source he is stated to have studied the Prāsaṅgika system with a certain mDog ldog pa chen po.[137] According to another source, having addressed a prayer to the Ratna, Red mda' ba succeeded in the ascertainment of the essential point of the Prāsaṅgika through his own investigation (*dpyod pa* = *vicāra*).[138] And according to still another source he heard the Madhyamaka from the *mkhan chen* Byaṅ (chub) seṅ (ge) and then, through investigation (*vicāra*) by means of his own discriminative knowledge (*prajñā*), he comprehended the subtle essential point of the theory of the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka and transmitted it.[139] By our sources he is thus regarded as

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pa'i chos 'byuṅ, ff. 33b-34a.

[135] In the *Jo naṅ pa'i chos 'byuṅ* by Ṅag dbaṅ blo gros grags pa, ff. 38b-39b, Ña dbon is stated to have been born in a bird-year (apparently 1285) and to have died in the earth-sheep year (1379) in his ninety-fifth year.

[136] Padma dkar po, *Chos 'byuṅ*, f. 191b.

[137] Śākya mchog ldan, *dBu ma'i byuṅ tshul*, f. 13b, who adds that he does not know from whom this mDog ldog pa had received the Prāsaṅgika teaching.

As Red mda' ba's teacher, a certain Lo chen sKyabs mchog dpal bzaṅ, described as a manifestation of Atiśa, is mentioned by sTag tshaṅ Śes rab rin chen, *Grub mtha' kun śes*, ff. 97b, 104a (cf. L. van der Kuijp, *BIS* 1 [1985], pp. 72-73). Lo chen sKyabs mchog dpal bzaṅ is also named alongside Red mda' ba as belonging to the line of Candrakīrti, Atiśa and Pa tshab by Karma Mi bskyod rdo rje, *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bśad*, f. 75b. A khu Śes rab rgya mtsho's *Tho yig* lists sKyabs mchog dpal bzaṅ as the author of commentaries on the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* (no. 11366) and the *Uttaratantra* (no. 11367).

[138] Saṅs rgyas phun tshogs, *Ṅor chos 'byuṅ*, ii, f. 172b: *dkon mchog la gsol ba btab te/ raṅ ñid kyi rnam dpyod kyis dbu ma thal 'gyur ba'i gnad la ṅes pa rñed.*

[139] Thu'u bkvan Blo bzaṅ Chos kyi ñi ma, *Grub mtha' śel gyi me loṅ*, Sa skya chapter, f. 8a-b = p. 188: *mkhan chen Byaṅ seṅ las dbu ma gsan ciṅ raṅ* →

a Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika.[140] He is stated to have held that there is no difference in the understanding in absorption (*samāpatti*) attained by the Āryas of all three Vehicles (*yāna*).[141] Red mda' ba is reported to have

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gis mkhyen rab kyis dpyad pas dbu ma thal 'gyur ba'i lta ba'i gnad phra mo rnams mkhyen nas 'dom par mdzad pas ... A few lines later, expanding slightly the account given in the *Ṅor chos 'byuṅ* (f. 172b), Thu'u bkvan quotes a saying to the effect that in Red mda' ba's time even at the monastery of Thaṅ sag the Madhyamaka was all but extinguished (*Karma dKon gžon na re| deṅ saṅ mkhas rmoṅs kun kha dbu ma sna dbu ma zer ba 'di Red mda' ba'i drin yin| de'i goṅ Thaṅ sag na dbu ma śi ro gcig las gžan med zer|*). This would seem to agree with what is said in the *Ṅor chos 'byuṅ* about Red mda' ba's having come to his understanding of the Prāsaṅgika through his own effort of philosophical analysis. (This statement about the Madhyamaka having all but died out in Thaṅ sag does not appear to tally with what was said by 'Gos lo gŽon nu dpal and Padma dkar po about the Madhyamaka tradition in their time going back to Thaṅ sag [see p. 50 note 103 above], and with what was said by Roṅ ston about his being in the line of Thaṅ sag pa [see p. 66 note 149 below].)

140 See e.g. Ṅag dbaṅ chos grags, *Grub mtha'i śan 'byed*, f. 106a-b. For Red mda' ba's Prāsaṅgika lineage, see D. Jackson, 'Madhyamaka studies among the early Sa skya pas', *Tibet Journal* 10/2 (1985), pp. 25-26, 31.

141 See Ṅag dbaṅ chos grags, *Grub mtha'i śan 'byed*, f. 108b: *'phags pa Klu sgrub lugs la 'phags pa gsum gyi mñam gžag gi rtogs pa la bye brag med de| thams cad kyi chos thams cad raṅ bžin med par rtogs pa'i phyir ro| |žes pa 'bris 'dug pas khoṅ dpon slob* [= Red mda' ba and Tsoṅ kha pa] *gñis bžed pa mthun par snaṅ mod| 'Jug par| de ni riṅ du soṅ bar blo yaṅ lhag par 'gyur|| [MA* i.8*] žes pa'i 'grel par| mdo sde Sa bcu pa'i luṅ 'dren par mdzad rjes su| luṅ 'di las ni ñan thos daṅ raṅ saṅs rgyas rnams la chos thams cad raṅ bžin med par śes pa yod do žes bya bar ṅes te| žes gsuṅs pa'i chos thams cad ni spyir btaṅ gi 'dus byas daṅ 'dus ma byas kyi chos thams cad ga la yin| ...* While accepting a partial agreement between Red mda' ba and Tsoṅ kha pa, the authoritative Sa skya pa scholar and doxographer Ṅag dbaṅ chos grags seeks in this section of his *Grub mtha'i śan 'byed* (starting on f. 106b) to show also how the Sa skya pa master differed from Tsoṅ kha pa on the question as to whether the Ārya-Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas have an understanding of *dharmanairātmya* (cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, *La théorie du tathāga-* →

connected the *Ratnagotravibhāga* with the Cittamātra system (though it is implied that he may have later changed his opinion).[142] He is also said to have even rejected the Kālacakra.[143]

Red mda' ba was linked with the Sa skya pa tradition centred at the Sa skya monastery said to have been established by 'Khon dKon mchog

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tagarbha et du gotra, p. 171 note 5).

Ṅag dbaṅ chos grags has also stated (f. 110a) that Red mda' ba did not hold that the cognition conceptualizing the non-hypostatization of things is to be retained, for no such view appears in his treatises such as the *dBu ma'i rnal 'byor sgom pa'i man ṅag*. And he has concluded that Red mda' ba thus differed also from Tsoṅ kha pa's view according to which, when understanding that a sprout (for instance) is not a hypostatized real, the cognition conceptualizing this non-hypostatization is not itself also to be negated because this is the ultimate theory of the Madhyamaka (see ff. 106b-107a on Tsoṅ kha pa's view: *myu gu lta bu žig bden med du rtog pa'i tshe bden med du mṅon par žen pa'i blo de 'gog tu mi ruṅ ste/ de dbu ma'i lta ba mthar thug yin pa'i phyir/...*).

[142] See *Deb ther sṅon po*, cha, f. 10a-b; and mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzaṅ, *rGyud sde spyi'i rnam par bžag pa rgyas par bšad pa (rGyud sde spyi rnam)*, f. 28a. Cf. 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa, *Grub mtha' chen mo*, ii, f. 27a, who refers to Red mda' ba's comment on the *Ratnagotravibhāga* and his refutation of Dol po pa's doctrine.

[143] See e.g. dPal maṅ dKon mchog rgyal mtshan, *Bya gtoṅ sñan sgron*, f. 3b (cf. the note to G. N. Roerich's translation of the *Blue Annals* [Calcutta, 1949], p. 336). However, according to Ṅag dbaṅ chos grags, Red mda' ba's criticism of what he calls modernist, or 'latter-day', followers of Upadeśa (*deṅ saṅ gi man ṅag pa*) was directed not against the Ṣaḍaṅgayoga or the Kālacakra but against certain non-authentic meditative practices of some 'Moderns', that is, of those persons who had already been criticized by Sa skya paṇḍi ta in his *sDom gsum rab dbye* where Neo-Mahāmudrā and Chinese-style rDzogs chen are linked with the Chinese Hva šaṅ. Ṅag dbaṅ chos grags adds that Bu ston and Ṅor chen dKon mchog lhun grub (1497/8-1557) also repudiated the 'Modernist (or: latter-day) Mahāmudrists' (*da lta'i phyag chen po* or *phyis kyi phyag chen po*); see his *Grub mtha'i šan 'byed*, f. 114a ff.

rgyal po in 1073 (the same year in which the gSaṅ phu Ne'u thog seminary also was founded according to some of our sources). In the Sa skya pa school, Red mda' ba's Prāsaṅgika interpretation of the Madhyamaka coexisted with Roṅ ston's (allegedly) Svātantrika theory, and also to a degree with Šākya mchog ldan's Madhyamaka doctrine that was partly combined with the *gžan stoṅ* theory.[144]

brTsegs dBaṅ phyug seṅ ge, Phya pa's immediate successor for five years on the abbatial throne of gSaṅ phu Ne'u thog and a teacher of Sa skya paṇḍi ta Kun dga' rgyal mtshan (1182-1251), is said to have belonged to the Svātantrika lineage; no work by him is now accessible. But by the time (at the latest) of Sa skya paṇḍi ta himself there also existed in the Sa skya tradition a link with the Prāsaṅgika school of Pa tshab Ñi ma grags and rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus.[145] In the following century

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[144] See Thu'u bkvan Blo bzaṅ Chos kyi ñi ma, *Grub mtha' šel gyi me lon*, Sa skya pa chapter, f. 13b = p. 199, where Šākya mchog ldan is described as having been first a Mādhyamika, next an advocate of the Cittamātra and finally an adherent of the Jo naṅ pa theory. See also Ṅag dbaṅ chos grags, *Grub mtha'i šan 'byed*, f. 123a-124a.

[145] Thu'u bkvan Blo bzaṅ Chos kyi ñi ma, *Grub mtha' šel gyi me loṅ*, Sa skya chapter, f. 13b = p. 199, has counted Sa skya paṇḍi ta and Roṅ ston as chiefly (*gtso bor*) Svātantrikas. But Ṅag dbaṅ chos grags, *Grub mtha'i šan 'byed*, f. 105b, has linked the Sa skya *goṅ ma*s with the tradition of Pa tshab transmitted by rMa bya. And Thu'u bkvan, f. 4a = p. 180, has himself stated that Sa paṇ learnt the Pramāṇaśāstra from rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus (but the latter is said to have died in 1185!). rMa bya rTsod pa'i seṅ ge has also been mentioned as an early teacher of Sa paṇ; cf. L. van der Kuijp, *Contributions*, p. 99 (quoting the *Ṅor pa chos 'byuṅ*, f. 57a), who identifies him with Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus. lCaṅ skya Rol pa'i rdo rje, *Grub mtha'i rnam bžag*, kha, f. 17b = p. 296, has stated that Sa paṇ evidently extolled greatly the Rab tu mi gnas pa'i dbu ma pa.

As already noted above (p. 56), the Sa skya hierarch bSod nams rtse mo composed a large commentary on the *Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra* where (f. 296a-b) mention is made of both the Raṅ rgyud pa and the Thal 'gyur ba. On the Sa skya traditions of Madhyamaka studies, see D. Jackson, 'Madhyamaka studies among the early Sa-skya-pas', *Tibet Journal* 10/2 (1985), pp. 3-
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the important Sa skya hierarch Bla ma dam pa bSod nams rgyal mtshan (1312-1375) is credited with commentaries on Nāgārjuna's *Śūnyatāsaptati, Vaidalyaprakaraṇa, Vigrahavyāvartanī* and *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā.*[146] As already noted, among the Sa skya pas Red mda' ba is regarded as a Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika, as is sometimes also the Ža lu pa Bu ston Rin chen grub.[147]

The Sa skya tradition of Madhyamaka and other scholastic studies was later maintained by (Šar rgyal mo roṅ pa) Roṅ ston Šes bya kun rig (known also as Šākya rgyal mtshan, 1367-1449), originally a Bon po who in his youth studied at gSaṅ phu Ne'u thog – the Tibetan stronghold of the Svātantrika tradition of the Madhyamaka – and founded the monastery of Nālendra/Nālandā north of lHa sa in 'Phan yul in 1435/6.[148] Several of Roṅ ston's Madhyamaka works are accessible to us.[149] One of his

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13, and *The entrance gate for the wise* (Vienna, 1987).

[146] A khu, *Tho yig* nos. 11351-4.

[147] See above, pp. 59-60.

[148] A biography of Roṅ ston by Šākya mchog ldan is found in the latter's gSuṅ 'bum, vol. ma. For an account of his life, see D. Jackson, Introduction to *Rong-ston on the Prajñāpāramitā philosophy of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra* (Biblia Tibetica Series, ed. by M. Tachikawa and S. Onoda, Kyōto, 1988); and *The early abbots of 'Phan po Na-lendra* (Vienna, 1989). Cf. also L. van der Kuijp, *BIS* 1 (1985), pp. 57, 70-72.

[149] Concerning Roṅ ston's works, in his *Grub mtha'i šan 'byed*, f. 106a, Ṅag dbaṅ chos grags has mentioned a *rNam bšad* on Nāgārjuna's Corpus of Reasoning (*rigs tshogs*) including the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*s, as well as a general work entitled *dBu ma'i spyi don rigs tshogs gnad kyi zla zer.* A khu Šes rab rgya mtsho has listed (nos. 11355-7) commentaries on the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, the *Satyadvayavibhaṅga* and the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra.*

In the author's colophon to his *dBu ma rigs pa'i tshogs kyi dka' ba'i gnad bsTan pa rigs lam kun gsal*, f. 68b, Roṅ ston describes himself as following the teaching of Žaṅ Thaṅ sag pa Ye šes 'byuṅ gnas 'od. In the colophon to his comment on the *Madhyamakakārikā*s – the *dBu ma rtsa ba'i rnam bšad zab mo'i de kho na ñid snaṅ ba* (Varanasi, 1975), p. 334 – Roṅ ston states that he founded his understanding on the nectar of Pa tshab's well-formed →

chief teachers was the great authority on the Prajñāpāramitā gYag phrug/ston Saṅs rgyas dpal (1348-1414), a follower of Bu ston and Ña dbon.[150] His teacher in Madhyamaka is said to have been dMar ston gŽon nu rgyal mtshan, who was in the line of Žaṅ Thaṅ sag pa.[151] Roṅ ston is stated to have continued the exegetical traditions (*bšad srol*) of both the Sa skya pas and rṄog, and the teaching of the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka.[152] But, although his statements are said to have largely demonstrated a predisposition toward the (Yogācāra-)Svātantrika position, it is at the same time asserted that Roṅ ston's treatises concerned with the purport of works by Nāgārjuna and his followers accorded rather

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explanations and followed the instruction (*man ṅag*) of Thaṅ sag pa which he had received in an unbroken tradition. And in the colophon to his his comment on the *Madhyamakāvatāra* – the *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bšad Ṅes don rnam ṅes* (in: Trayang and Jamyang Samten [ed.], *Two controversial Mādhyamika treatises*, New Delhi, 1974), f. 152a – Roṅ ston refers specially to rMa Byaṅ maṅ du thos pa.

While Roṅ ston's *dBu ma rigs pa'i tshogs kyi dka' ba'i gnad* is concerned with difficult points in the Madhyamaka, they do not correspond exactly to the eight *dka' gnad/gnas* in the *KNZB*.

On Roṅ ston see further Section II, § 17. For a bibliography of works belonging to the Sa skya tradition as a whole, including Madhyamaka treatises, see the *dKar chag mthoṅ bas yid 'phrog chos mdzod bye ba'i lde mig*, compiled by the mKhan po A pad Yon tan bzaṅ po *et al.* (New Delhi, 1987).

150 See *Deb ther sṅon po*, ba, f. 9a; Padma dkar po, *Chos 'byuṅ*, f. 191a-b; Saṅs rgyas phun tshogs, *Ṅor chos 'byuṅ*, ff. 172b-173b.

It was in reply to questions put to him by gYag that Tsoṅ kha pa is said to have composed his *Legs bšad sñin po*. See Se ra rje btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan, *mKhas grub thams cad mkhyen pa'i gsaṅ ba'i rnam thar* (gSuṅ 'bum of mKhas grub rje, vol. a), f. 8a.

151 Šākya mchog ldan, *dBu ma'i byuṅ tshul*, f. 13b. See also D. Jackson, *op. cit.* (p. 66 note 148), pp. ii-iii on Roṅ ston's study of Madhyamaka under rKoṅ ston and gŽon nu rgyal mtshan of Thaṅ sag pa monastery. See also below, p. 199 f.

152 Saṅs rgyas phun tshogs, *Ṅor chos 'byuṅ*, ff. 173b-174a.

with the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka.[153] Roṅ ston has in fact even been linked with a Prāsaṅgika lineage in Tibet.[154] Later Sa skya pa scholars such as Go ram(s) pa (1429-1489), Paṇ chen 'Bum phrag gsum pa Byams pa chos grub (1433-1504) and 'Jam dbyaṅs Kun dga' chos bzaṅ (1433-1503) are said by Ṅag dbaṅ chos grags to have mostly (*phal cher*) followed Roṅ ston in their interpretation of the Madhyamaka.[155]

Tsoṅ kha pa and his pupils were vigorously criticized for their views on Madhyamaka by later adherents of the Sa skya pa tradition such as sTag tshaṅ lo tsā ba Šes rab rin chen (b. 1405), Go ram(s) pa bSod nams seṅ ge (1429-1489, the founder of the monastery of Thub bstan rnam rgyal) and Zi luṅ pa Šākya mchog ldan (1428-1507, the founder of the gSer mdog can monastery).[156]

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153 See Ṅag dbaṅ chos grags, *Grub mtha'i šan 'byed*, f. 106a, who indeed adds that Roṅ ston was the rebirth of Kamalaśīla: *Ka ma la śī la'i skye ba raṅ re'i kun mkhyen Roṅ ston chen po ni bab raṅ rgyud pa'i phyogs la mṅa' ba'i sṅa ma'i bag chags che ba yod 'dug kyaṅ/ Klu sgrub yab sras kyi gžuṅ gi brjod bya'i babs la brten nas gžuṅ mdzad pa rnams thal 'gyur ba'i lugs ltar mdzad/* Similarly, Koṅ sprul Blo gros mtha' yas (1813-1899), *Šes bya kun khyab*, i, f. 150a, has stated that Roṅ ston revived the *vāsanā* of Kamalaśīla.

154 See D. Jackson, *Tibet journal* 10/2 (1985), pp. 26, 31.

155 *Grub mtha'i šan 'byed*, f. 125b. On Go rams pa see further Section II, § 17.

156 sTag tshaṅ lo tsā ba is stated to have been a follower of Thaṅ sag pa by 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa, *Grub mtha' chen mo*, ii, f. 31b4. His views are the object of sustained criticism (under the name of his eighteen '*gal ba'i khur chen*) in the *Grub mtha' chen mo*. Cf. H. Tauscher, 'Controversies in Tibetan Madhyamaka exegesis: sTag tshaṅ Lo tsāba's critique of Tsoṅ kha pa's assertion of validly established phenomena', *Asiatische Studien/Etudes Asiatiques* 46/1 (1992) (Festschrift J. May), pp. 411-36; and *Die Lehre von den zwei Wirklichkeiten in Tsoṅ kha pas Madhyamaka-Werken*, especially pp. 166-8. On sTag tshaṅ, see also L. van der Kuijp, *BIS* 1 (1985), p. 57 with note 18. Rebuttals of sTag tshaṅ's criticisms by rGyal roṅ Nam mkha' lhun grub and Li thaṅ mkhan chen Blo bzaṅ chos grags are listed by A khu, *Tho yig* nos. 11453-4; the rebuttal by Paṇ chen I Blo bzaṅ chos kyi rgyal mtshan →

Bo doṅ Phyogs las rnam rgyal (1375/6-1450/1), a contemporary of Tsoṅ kha pa, has also been attached to Candrakīrti's line teaching the Emptiness of self-nature (*raṅ stoṅ*). As a Prāsaṅgika, he is considered to have held that Madhyamaka theory (*lta ba*) consists in the destruction by the proponent (*sṅa rgol* = *vādin*) of the assertions of his opponent (*phyi rgol* = *prativādin*).[157] Bo doṅ divided the Madhyamaka into two main branches: the rTog ge spyod pa and the 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa. The first, the Madhyamaka cultivating *tarka*, he has subdivided into four branches: those who cultivate the Vaibhāṣika doctrine (e.g. Ārya-Vimuktisena and his followers), those who cultivate the Sautrāntika (Bhavya, whose *Prajñāpradīpa* is concerned with profound theory [*zab mo lta ba*] whilst his *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikās* deal with practical realization [*ñams len mṅon rtogs*] and his *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* is devoted to extensive practice [*rgya chen spyod pa*]), those who cultivate the Yogācāra (i.e. the the rNam bden pa or Satyākāravādins such as Śāntarakṣita whose *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* and *Tattvasaṃgraha* are concerned with profound theory whilst his commentary on the *Saṃvaraviṃśatikā*

(1570-1662), *sGra pa Šes rab rin chen pa'i rtsod lan* (bKa' 'bum, vol. na), has been studied by J. Cabezón, 'On the *sGra pa Shes rab rin chen pa'i rtsod lan*', *AS/EA* 49 (1995), pp. 643-69. – Go ram(s) pa (Go bo rab 'byams pa) has summed up some criticisms of Tsoṅ kha pa's teachings in his *lTa ba'i šan 'byed*, f. 13b ff.; cf. Ṅag dbaṅ chos grags, *Grub mtha'i šan 'byed*, f. 127a-b. 'Jam dbyaṅs dga' ba'i blo gros (1429-1503) replied to Go rams pa in his *lTa ba ṅan pa thams cad tshar gcod pa'i bstan bcos gNam lcags kyi 'khor lo*. And Se ra rje btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan (1469-1546) replied to both Šākya mchog ldan and Go rams pa in his *Zab mo stoṅ pa ñid kyi lta ba la log rtog 'gog par byed pa'i bstan bcos lTa ba ṅan pa'i mun sel* (A khu, nos. 11426-7). (On the evolution in Šākya mchog ldan's Madhyamaka views according to Thu'u bkvan Blo bzaṅ Chos kyi ñi ma, see above, p. 65 note 144; and T. Tillemans and T. Tomabechi, 'Le *dBu ma'i byuṅ tshul* de Śākya mchog ldan', *AS/EA* 49 [1995], pp. 891-918.)

[157] On Bo doṅ, see Ṅag dbaṅ chos grags, *Grub mtha'i šan 'byed*, f. 125a; cf. H. Tauscher, *Die Lehre von den zwei Wirklichkeiten*, pp. 167, 210. This Bo doṅ Phyogs las rnam rgyal has to be clearly distinguished from his namesake Phyogs las rnam rgyal (1306-1386) of Jo mo naṅ, a disciple of Dol po pa and a *gžan stoṅ pa*, and also a teacher of Tsoṅ kha pa in Kālacakra.

deals with extensive practice, Kamalaśīla whose *Bhāvanākramas* are devoted to practical realization, and Haribhadra; and the rNam brdzun pas or Alīkākāravādins such as Asaṅga in his commentary on the *Ratnagotravibhāga*), and those who in their practice are in accord with what is consensually acknowledged in the pragmatic usage of ordinary people (the 'Jig rten grags sde daṅ mthun par spyod pa, such as Jñānagarbha).[158] The second branch, the 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa or Mādhyamikas cultivating what is consensually acknowledged in the usage of ordinary people, includes Nāgārjuna and Ārya-Deva as well as Candrakīrti (whose *Prasannapadā* is concerned with profound theory, whilst his *Madhyamakāvatāra* deals with extensive practice and his commentary on the *Catuḥśataka* is devoted to practical realization) and Śāntideva.[159]

On the bKa' brgyud pa side, Tsoṅ kha pa's interpretation of the Madhyamaka was opposed by Karma Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507-1554).[160]

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[158] In one of his doxographical taxonomies of the Madhyamaka, dBus pa Blo gsal has counted Jñānagarbha (along with Candrakīrti) as a representative of those Mādhyamikas who follow what is consensually acknowledged in the transactional-pragmatic usage of ordinary people in the every-day world (*Grub mtha'*, f. 100b). – Concerning these works by (a) Bhavya, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, 'On the authorship of some works ascribed to Bhāvaviveka/Bhavya', in: D. Seyfort Ruegg and L. Schmithausen (ed.), *Earliest Buddhism and Madhyamaka* (Leiden, 1990), pp. 59-71.

[159] See Bo doṅ's *dBu ma'i lugs la gnas skabs kyi sdu ba daṅ/ bkral tshul/ bstan pa'i gnas tshad sogs bšad pa* (*Encyclopaedia tibetica*, New Delhi, 1970, vol. 11), f. 321a-328b. See also Bo doṅ's *dBu ma'i lugs slob dpon zla ba grags pas ji ltar bstan pa bžin 'chad rig pa bstan pa* (*Encyclopaedia tibetica*, vol. 18), f. 1-182a. The distinction made by Bo doṅ between the 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pa, as the second of the two main branches of the Madhyamaka, and the 'Jig rten grags sde daṅ mthun par spyod pa'i lugs, as a subdivision of the first main branch, is to be noted. Cf. K. Mimaki, *Blo gsal grub mtha'*, pp. 35-36.

[160] cf. P. Williams, 'A note on some aspects of Mi bskyod rdo rje's critique of dGe lugs pa Madhyamaka', *Journal of Indian philosophy* 11 (1983), pp. 125-45; and D. Seyfort Ruegg, 'A Karma bKa' brgyud work on the lineages and traditions of the Indo-Tibetan dBu ma (Madhyamaka)', in: G. Gnoli *et* →

And an important 'Brug pa critic of his was Padma dkar po (1527-1592).[161] Both have been counted as Prāsaṅgikas.[162]

The fact that texts (and masters) that may differ significantly in their doctrines have sometimes been assigned by authors of philosophical and doxographical works to a single division or category, such as the Svātantrika or Prāsaṅgika branches of the Madhyamaka, appears to indicate that such taxonomies current in Tibet (and on occasion adopted for convenience by modern scholars) have often to do with lines of magisterial transmission and pupillary succession – in other words with a *diadoché* – rather than with immutable and altogether discrete philosophical positions and with standardized and uniform school doctrines.[163] Still, as templates – or *grilles de lecture* – these categorizations and taxonomies might be thought to have their uses for descriptive, interpretative or heuristic purposes in historical and philosophical discussion and analysis.

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al. (ed.), *Orientalia Iosephi Tucci memoriae dicata*, iii (Rome, 1988), especially pp. 1270-1. – Se ra rje btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan replied to Mi bskyod rdo rje in his *gSuṅ lan Klu sgrub dgoṅs rgyan* (A khu, *Tho yig* no. 11428), and Paṇ chen bSod nams grags pa (1478-1554) did so in his *gSuṅ lan* (A khu, *Tho yig* no. 11433).

161 cf. M. Broido, 'Padma dkar po on the two *satyas*', *JIABS* 8/2 (1985), pp. 7-59. – sGom sde Nam mkha' rgyal mtshan dpal bzaṅ po (1532-1592) replied to Padma dkar po in his *(Byaṅ chub sems 'grel gyi rnam par bšad pa'i žar byuṅ) 'Brug pa mi pham padma dkar pos phyag chen gyi bšad sbyar rgyal ba'i gan mdzod ces par rje Tsoṅ kha pa la dgag pa mdzad pa'i gsuṅ lan* (A khu, *Tho yig* no. 11424). For other works by the sGom sde, cf. Grags pa, *Bod kyi bstan bcos kha cig gi mchan byaṅ Dri med šel dkar phreṅ ba* (mTsho sṅon mi rigs dpe skrun khaṅ, 1985), p. 590 ff. His *dBu ma'i spyi don Zla ba'i dgoṅs rgyan* has been reprinted by the dGa' ldan Byaṅ rtse Library (Mundgod, Karnataka, 1994).

162 See e.g. Koṅ sprul Blo gros mtha' yas, *Šes bya kun khyab*, i, f. 150b.

163 On the significance of transmission lineages and pupillary succesion in the Madhyamaka, cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, 'A Karma bKa' brgyud work on the lineages of the Indo-Tibetan dBu ma (Madhyamaka)', p. 1249 ff., especially pp. 1278-80.

With respect to both the Indian and the earlier Tibetan Madhyamaka authors they can, however, hardly be expected to provide a comprehensive and definitive frame or norm for analysing and classifying the totality of the doctrines and philosophemes that have been subsumed by doxographers under a given taxonomic category; nor can it be supposed that the elaborate nomenclature for doctrinal divisions and subdivisions used in the doxographical taxonomies would always have been familiar to these masters themselves. (For Tsoṅ kha pa's view of such matters, see pp. 93-102 below.)

5. THE *Ratnagotravibhāga-Mahāyānottaratantra-śāstra*, THE *gŽan stoṅ* AND THE 'THEORY OF THE HVA ŠAṄ' IN RELATION TO MADHYAMAKA SCHOOL TRADITIONS

Alongside treatises belonging to the Madhyamaka in the strict sense of a specific school of philosophy, there are enumerated in Tibetan works on the history and sources of the Madhyamaka a number of earlier Tibetan works devoted to the *Ratnagotravibhāga-Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra* and composed by rṄog Blo ldan šes rab, Phya pa and gTsaṅ nag pa.[164]

After having been unavailable to scholars in India for a long time, the *Ratnagotravibhāga* is stated to have been rediscovered in an old *stūpa* by Maitrīpāda.[165] The extant Tibetan translation of this text and its commen-

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164 See A khu, *Tho yig*, nos. 11316, 11320 and 11331.

165 See e.g. *Deb ther sṅon po*, cha, f. 9b. For the story of the rediscovery of the *RGV*, *c.* 1000, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, *La théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra*, p. 35 f.

Maitrīpāda (early eleventh century) – apparently also known as Advayavajra or Avadhūtipāda – as the author of the *Tattvadaśaka* is considered a follower of the Madhyamaka, and of Candrakīrti in particular, by lCaṅ skya Rol pa'i rdo rje, *Grub mtha'i rnam bžag*, kha, f. 19a = pp. 297-8, on the basis of what is stated in verse 2 of this text and by its commentator Sahajavajra, the author of the *Tattvadaśakaṭīkā*, who mentions Candrakīrti. Cf. D. Sey- →

tary was then made by rṄog in collaboration with his Kaśmīri teacher Sajjana. An earlier translation of this text and its commentary is said to have been made by Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna (Atiśa) and Nag tsho Tshul khrims rgyal ba; and other translations are ascribed to Pa tshab Ñi ma grags (a pupil of Sajjana's son Sūkṣmajana) and to Yar kluṅs lo tsā ba, while the basic text alone is said to have been translated by Jo naṅ lo tsā ba and by Mar pa Do pa.[166]

In his commentary on the *Madhyamakakārikās*, rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus has placed the *Ratnagotravibhāga* ascribed to Ārya Maitreya alongside Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra* among works in which the intent (*abhiprāya*) of the last of the three teaching traditions is explained as being the Madhyamaka.[167] And the *Ratnagotravibhāga* being regularly regarded by Tibetan scholars as very closely linked to the Madhyamaka, it may be that this connexion was already accepted in the exegetical tradition maintained by Ratnavajra's and Sajjana's family, with members of which rṄog and Pa tshab had indeed studied in Kaśmīr. However this may be, Bu ston placed this text in the Cittamātra section of the bsTan 'gyur alongside other so-called 'Dharmas of Maitreya' (with the

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fort Ruegg, 'A Karma bKa' brgyud work on the lineages and traditions of the Indo-Tibetan dBu ma (Madhyamaka)', pp. 1255-6. On Maitrīpāda see also M. Tatz, 'The life of the Siddha-philosopher Maitrīgupta', *JAOS* 107 (1987), pp. 695-711; and 'Maitrī-pa and Atiśa', in H. Uebach and J. L. Panglung (ed.), *Tibetan studies: Proceedings of the 4th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies* (Munich, 1988), pp. 473-81.

166 See *Deb ther sṅon po*, cha, f. 10b.

167 *'Thad pa'i rgyan*, ff. 4b-5a: *bka' tha ma'i dgoṅs pa dbu mar 'chad pa 'phags pa byams pa'i rgyud bla ma daṅ/ slob dpon zla ba grags pa'i dbu ma la 'jug pa la sogs pa'o*. The *RGV* thus differs, according to rMa bya, from other texts attributed to Maitreya like the *Madhyāntavibhāga*, the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* and the *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga* which interpret this same teaching tradition on the basis of the Cittamātra. As for Nāgārjuna's 'Corpus of Reasoning' (*rigs tshogs*), rMa bya (f. 4b) has classified it as explaining the meaning of the middle set of Sūtras which teach the absence of characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*), that is, the Emptiness of self-nature or sef-existence (*svabhāvaśūnyatā*) for all *dharmas*. rMa bya has also stated that Maitreya's *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* does the same in an indirect way.

exception of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*).[168] And Tsoṅ kha pa's teacher Red mda' ba for a time also linked this text with the Cittamātra or Vijñānavāda.[169] In Tsoṅ kha pa's school, the hermeneutics of the *Ratnagotravibhāga* and the *tathāgatagarbha*-doctrine was, however, developed in harmony with Nāgārjuna's and Candrakīrti's *raṅ stoṅ* theory by rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen (1364-1432), mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzaṅ (po) (1385-1438) and later writers.[170] But Tsoṅ kha pa did not himself build the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine into the very extensive expositions of Buddhist theory and practice to be found in his *Lam rim* treatises. His treatment of the subject in his major compositions is likely to have been determined by the fact that Candrakīrti – Tsoṅ kha pa's main source and

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[168] For discussions of this classification of the *RGV*, cf. mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzaṅ, *rGyud sde spyi rnam*, f. 28a-b; and Ṅag dbaṅ chos grags, *Grub mtha'i šan 'byed*, ff. 20b-23a.

[169] See above, pp. 63-64.

[170] For rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen's exegesis of the *tathāgatagarbha* of the *Ratnagotravibhāga* and its Sūtra sources in relation to the *prakṛtisthagotra* and *ekayāna* theories of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, and on this author's *rNam bšad sñin po'i rgyan* and *Theg pa chen po'i rgyud bla ma'i ṭīkā (= rGyud bla'i Dar ṭīk)*, cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, *La théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra* (Paris, 1969), pp. 155 ff., 219 ff., 305 ff., 446. For a discussion by mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzaṅ, see his *sToṅ thun chen mo*, f. 195a ff. On the brief discussion of the matter in mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzaṅ's *rGyud sde spyi rnam*, ff. 10b-12b, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, 'On the dGe lugs pa theory of the *tathāgatagarbha*', in: *Pratidānam* (F. B. J. Kuiper Felicitation Volume, The Hague, 1968), pp. 500-507. On mKhas grub rje see also L. van der Kuijp, 'Studies in mKhas-grub-rje I', *BIS* 1 (1985), p. 75 ff., and J. Cabezón, *A dose of Emptiness* (Albany, 1992). Another earlier commentator on the *Ratnagotravibhāga* from this school was Paṇ chen bSod nams grags pa (1478-1554), the author of the *Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma'i bstan bcos 'grel pa daṅ bcas pa'i dka' 'grel gNad kyi zla 'od* (gSuṅ 'bum, vol. ca). An early Tibetan commentary on the *RGV*, the *Theg chen rgyud bla'i don bsdus pa*, was composed by rṄog Blo ldan šes rab (see p. 29 note 54 above).

model in Madhyamaka studies – also did not incorporate the *tathāgata-garbha* theory into his Madhyamaka doctrine.[171]

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[171] See Tsoṅ kha pa's *LŠÑP*, f. 92a-95b = pp. 490-5. In his *GR* (f. 178b ff. = p. 325 ff.) Tsoṅ kha pa has also touched on the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine in connexion with Candrakīrti's reference to it in *Madhyamakāvatāra* vi.95. There, however, the allusion was to the version of the doctrine found in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (ii, pp. 77-78) according to which the *tathāgatagarbha* bears the thirty-two Marks of a *buddha* (*dvātriṃśallakṣaṇadhara*) and is contained in the bodies of all sentient beings (*sarvasattvadehāntargata*). This Sūtra then characterizes this version of the doctrine as having been taught by the Buddha so that the childish (*bāla*) among his auditors might eliminate their fear of non-substantiality (*nairātmyasaṃtrāsapadavarjitār-tham*); it is said, however, not to be equivalent to the *ātmavāda* of the Tīrthikas but, rather, to refer allusively, or 'intentionally', to *śūnyatā, bhūtakoṭi, nirvāṇa*, etc. In connexion with his reference to this version only of the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine in the context of his critical discussion of the *ālayavijñāna*, Candrakīrti has mentioned teachings that are of intentional (*ābhiprāyika*) and provisional meaning (*neyārtha*), rather than of definitive meaning (*nītārtha*).

In his *GR*, f. 179b = p. 326, Tsoṅ kha pa seeks to demonstrate that the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine mentioned in the *MA* vi.95 following the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* is not to be taken as literal (*sgra ji bžin pa : yathārutam*). According to him, this doctrine being *ābhiprāyika* and *neyārtha*, its intended ground (*dgoṅs gži : *abhipreta-vastu?*) is *śūnyatā*, etc.; the motive (*dgos pa = prayojana*) for the Buddha's having taught it is his wish both to eliminate the terror that the childish feel for *nairātmya* and to attract (*ākarṣaṇa*) by means of a graded teaching (*rim gyis = krameṇa*) those persons attached to the Tīrthikas' *ātmavāda*; and the incompatibility of (i.e. the need to cancel) the literally explicit or surface meaning (*sgra ji bžin pa/dṅos la gnod byed = mukhyārthabādha*) of this doctrine lies in the consideration that, if the teaching in question were taken as *nītārtha*, there would be no difference between it and the Tīrthikas' *ātmavāda*. (The presence of [1] an allusively expressed *dgoṅs gži*, [2] a *dgos pa* and [3] a *dṅos la gnod byed* indeed constitutes the three conditions for holding a given teaching to be *neyārtha* and *ābhiprāyika* 'intentional'.)

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A later authority in Tsoṅ kha pa's school, Guṅ thaṅ dKon mchog bstan pa'i sgron me (1762-1823), has set out systematic hermeneutical arguments to show that the 'standard' *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine, as found in many Sūtras and in the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, should be taken to be of definitive meaning (*nītārtha*) because it has *śūnyatā* as its intended purport. Indeed, following the definition in the *Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra* of a *nītārtha* statement (a definition which is accepted by the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika), provided only that *śūnyatā* is understood to be its intended meaning on the content-level a teaching will be classified as *nītārtha* whether or not its wording is literally explicit on the expression-level. (On the contrary, for a Vijñānavādin who follows the definitions of the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*, if the wording of a Sūtra can not be taken 'literally' [*yathārutam*], it will be classified as *neyārtha* irrespective of what its ultimately intended meaning is.) See the materials assembled in D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Théorie*, pp. 393-408; and *Le traité du tathāgatagarbha de Bu ston Rin chen grub*, pp. 51, 57 ff. Cf. *KNZB* § [9.]1.

Notwithstanding the exegetical work that has been done on the Indo-Tibetan Madhyamaka tradition relating to the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine, the fact that Tsoṅ kha pa did not integrally build it into his philosophy as a major component has (together with other considerations) nevertheless led some scholars to advance the thesis that this doctrine as a whole (and not just one or the other version of it criticized in a number of canonical and commentarial sources) is in some sense aberrant in the frame of Buddhist thought and that it was rejected by Tsoṅ kha pa. See Hakamaya Noriaki, 'A critique of the structure of faith in the *Ratnagotravibhāga*', *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko*, 46 (1988), pp. 27-49; and Matsumoto Shirō, *Engi to kū – Nyoraizō shisō hihan* (Tōkyō, 1989), and 'The Mādhyamika philosophy of Tsong-kha-pa', *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko*, 48 (1990), pp. 17-47. However, in view of the considerations adduced above, this conclusion is neither necessary nor justified. Indeed, in the *Legs bšad gser phreṅ*, his commentary on the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, Tsoṅ kha pa has dealt with the *raṅ bžin gnas rigs* = *prakṛtisthagotra*, a concept usually linked closely with not only the *dharmadhātu* but also the *tathāgatagarbha*. Moreover, in his *GR*, f. 232b-235a = pp. 423-8, he has alluded to the *tathāgatadhātu* (*de bžin gšegs pa'i khams*, p. 428), and quoted Nāgārjuna's *Dharmadhātustava* (p. 427), in connexion with his discussion of the question how a *raṅ bžin* = *svabhāva/prakṛti* may be accepted (in the context

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The *Ratnagotravibhāga* has furthermore been connected with the theory in which ultimate reality is described as Empty of all heterogeneous factors (*gžan stoṅ*), but not Empty of its unconditioned and constitutive (i.e. informing) properties.[172] This *gžan stoṅ (*para[bhāva]śūnya)* doctrine is then contrasted with the *raṅ stoṅ (svabhāvaśūnya)* theory where for all factors (*dharma*) without exception – the unconditioned as well as the conditioned – the Emptiness (*śūnyatā*) of self-existence (*svabhāva* 'aseity') is maintained. While the latter doctrine, which is basically apophatic, has been set out in Nāgārjuna's Corpus of Reasoning (*rigs tshogs*) and in Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra* and *Prasannapadā*, the cataphatic *gžan stoṅ* doctrine is derived by its advocates from sources such as Nāgārjuna's Hymnic Corpus (*bstod tshogs*) and the Maitreya-Chapter of the Prajñāpāramitā as interpreted in particular by the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā (Yum gsum gnod 'joms*, attributed to Daṃṣṭrāsena), as well as from the *Ratnagotravibhāga* and, eventually, a number of Tantric sources. The *gžan stoṅ* schools have represented a movement that seeks, *inter alia*, to harmonize the Madhyamaka with Vijñaptimātra (*rnam par rig pa tsam*) philosophy (a synthesis sometimes referred to as the *rnam rig dbu ma*) as well as with the Vajrayāna.

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of *dharmatā* and *adhyātmaśūnyatā*).

172 See *RGV* i.154-5

nâpaneyam ataḥ kiṃcid upaneyam na kiṃcana|
draṣṭavyaṃ bhūtato bhūtaṃ bhūtadarśī vimucyate||
śūnya āgantukair dhātuḥ savinirbhāgalakṣaṇaiḥ|
aśūnyo 'nuttarair dharmair avinirbhāgalakṣaṇaiḥ||

concerning the ultimate Element (*dhātu* = *khams*) as Empty of all adventitious (*āgantuka*) factors having the character of being separable (*savinirbhāgalakṣaṇa*) from it, but not Empty (*aśūnya*) of the supreme (*anuttara*) *dharmas* having the character of being inseparable from it. The last *dharmas*, of which the *dhātu* is *not* Empty, are inseparable from it because they constitute or inform it; this corresponds to the notion of *prabhāvitatva*. Conversely, that which is adventitious in relation to the *dhātu* does not constitute or inform it and is accordingly described as separable from it. Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, *La théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra*, pp. 313 ff., 319 ff.

In Tibet, the *gžan stoṅ* theory has been linked in our sources with a meditative tradition going back to gZu dGa' ba'i rdo rje (early eleventh century) and his pupil bTsan Kha bo che (b. 1021), an elder contemporary of rṄog blo ldan šes rab and a disciple of Gra pa mṄon šes (b. 1012); in his 56th year bTsan went to Kaśmīr where he met Sajjana, who entrusted him to the care of gZu dGa' ba'i rdo rje, requesting the latter to bestow precepts on his countryman.[173] The *gžan stoṅ* theory then was developed by the Jo naṅ pa school beginning with the Yogin Yu mo Mi bskyod rdo rje (eleventh century),[174] and explicated in particular by its great expositor Dol po pa/Dol bu pa Šes rab rgyal mtshan (1292-1361). Blo gros mtshuṅs med of gSaṅ phu, the author of the *Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma'i bstan bcos kyi ṅes don gsal bar byed pa Rin po che'i sgron me*, was another important master concerned in the fourteenth century with the exegesis of the *Ratnagotravibhāga*; Bu ston was in contact with him, and he was a teacher of Karma Raṅ byuṅ rdo rje (1284-1339).[175] Tsoṅ kha pa's teachers Phyogs las rnam rgyal (1306-1386) and Ña dbon Kun dga' dpal (1285-1379, a master of the Prajñāpāramitā and the disciple of Dol po pa as well as of Bu ston), and several masters of the bKa' brgyud pa, rÑiṅ ma pa and even Sa skya pa schools were also advocates of the *gžan stoṅ*.

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[173] bTsan Kha bo che returned to Tibet before the much younger rṄog. He is said to have been renowned for his teaching of the Dharmas of Maitreya, the *Ratnagotravibhāga* and the *Mahāyānasutrālaṃkāra* in particular. It is not certain whether he actually composed treatises, but a commentary, apparently anonymous, on the *Ratnagotravibhāga* is thought to belong to his school; in it explanation (*bšad pa*) is stated to have been closely linked with practice of the precepts (*man ṅag ñams len*). (See *Deb ther sṅon po*, ca, f. 24a; cha, f. 10a; and A khu, *Tho yig* no. 11339.) – gZu dGa ba'i rdo rje is credited with a comment on the *Ratnagotravibhāga* (*Deb sṅon*, cha, f. 10a), and we are told that it was a summary of Sajjana's teaching on it (see A khu, *Tho yig* no. 11338).

[174] Yu mo is credited with a treatise entitled *'od gsal sgron me* in A khu, *Tho yig* no. 11242.

[175] See *Deb ther sṅon po*, ña, f. 54b. On him see also note 176 below.

In its Jo naṅ pa version as presented in Dol po pa's *Ri chos Ṅes don rgya mtsho*, the *gžan stoṅ* has been criticized by Tsoṅ kha pa and his followers.[176] According to Dol po pa's view, the *raṅ stoṅ* interpretation of Emptiness as expounded by Candrakīrti and his followers verges on being a doctrine of mere nihilistic voidness (*chad stoṅ*) that is destined for the age of discord (the *kaliyuga*), whereas the correct *gžan stoṅ* teaching is suitable for the golden age (*kṛtayuga, satyayuga*) of the Dharma and

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[176] On Bu ston's *bDe gšegs sñiṅ po'i mdzes rgyan* – a critique of the doctrine of the existence, in the *nītārtha* sense, of the actualized *(mtshan ñid pa = lākṣaṇika) tathāgatagarbha* in all sentient beings –, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Le traité du tathāgatagarbha de Bu ston Rin chen grub*. Bu ston's pupil sGra tshad pa Rin chen rnal rgyal has stated in his *Bu ston rnam thar* (f. 34b) that this work by his teacher represented the 'karmic residue' (*mdzad 'phro = karmāvaśeṣa*) of Bu ston's early discussions as a student with Blo gros mtshuṅs med of gSaṅ phu Ne'u thog, the commentator on the *Ratnagotravibhāga* and a teacher of Karma pa III Raṅ byuṅ rdo rje; see D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Life of Bu ston Rin po che*, p. 152, and *Le traité du tathāgatagarbha de Bu ston Rin chen grub*, p. 4 note 3. On Blo gros mtshuṅs med see *Deb ther sṅon po*, ña, f. 54b and f. 57b; and Koṅ sprul Yon tan rgya mtsho, *Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma'i bstan bcos sñiṅ po'i don mṅon sum lam gyi bšad srol daṅ sbyar ba'i rnam par 'grel pa*, f. 6a.

For the history of the Jo naṅ pa school, see 'Dzam thaṅ pa Ṅag dbaṅ blos gros grags pa (1920-1975), *dPal ldan jo naṅ pa'i chos 'byuṅ rGyal ba'i chos tshul gsal byed zla ba'i sgron me*. A brief account of the history of the *gžan stoṅ* doctrine of the Jo naṅ pa's is provided by Koṅ sprul, *Šes bya kun khyab*, i, f. 150b-152a; and *Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma'i bstan bcos sñiṅ po'i don mṅon sum lam gyi bšad pa srol daṅ sbyar ba'i rnam par 'grel pa*, f. 4b ff. And an interesting sketch of the history of the Jo naṅ pa school is to be found in the Jo naṅ pa chapter of Thu'u bkvan Blo bzaṅ Chos kyi ñi ma's *Grub mtha' šel gyi me loṅ* (translated by D. Seyfort Ruegg, 'The Jo naṅ pas, a school of Buddhist ontologists according to the *Grub mtha' šel gyi me loṅ*', *JAOS* 83 (1963), pp. 73-91). Cf. S. Hookham, *The Buddha within* (Albany, 1991); K.-D. Mathes, *Unterscheidung der Gegebenheiten von ihrem Wesen (Dharmadharmatāvibhāga)* (Swisttal-Odendorf, 1996); and C. Stearns, *The Buddha from Dolpo* (Albany,1999).

for the inhabitants of Sambhala and is in harmony with the Kālacakra.[177] This Emptiness is describable in terms of the *sarvākāravaropeta-śūnyatā (rnam kun mchog ldan gyi stoṅ pa ñid*, a concept that has played a part also in Kālacakra exegesis, in contradistinction to *śūnyatā* as *med [par] dgag [pa]* or *prasajyapratiṣedha*). In India until the eighth century the Mādhyamika sources appear to have seldom concerned themselves in any detail with the *tathāgatagarbha* theory which is so closely linked with the development of the *gžan stoṅ* theory;[178] and the *Ratnagotravibhāga* may have been little known to all but perhaps the latest among the Indian Mādhyamikas.[179] But in Tibet the interpretation of the *Ratnagotravibhāga* and its *tathāgatagarbha* theory acquired major significance for most exegetes whether they belonged to the *gžan stoṅ* line of thought or to the *raṅ stoṅ* tradition of the Madhyamaka in both its Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika branches (like rṄog, Red mda' ba and rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen). In *KNZB* § 2, however, it is not to such a developed form of the *gžan stoṅ* theory that reference is made but rather to a kind of proto-form of it linked mainly with the exegesis of the Vijñānavāda.[180]

In the history of the philosophical interpretation of Nāgārjuna's doctrine and of the Madhyamaka school, the *svabhāvaśūnyatā* or *raṅ stoṅ* theory expounded in his Corpus of Reasoning and Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra* and *Prasannapadā* thus stood juxtaposed – and in philosophical and hermeneutical tension – with the *gžan stoṅ* of Nāgārjuna's Hymnic Corpus and the doctrine set out in the *Ratnagotravibhāga* as well as in other sources of the *tathāgatagarbha* teaching. In these circumstances one could assume an incompatibility, at one and the same level of reference, between two philosophical propositions, both of which

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177 See, e.g., Dol po pa, *bKa' bsdu bži pa'i don gtan tshigs chen po* (gSuṅ 'bum, vol. ka). Cf. Šākya mchog ldan, *dBu ma'i byuṅ tshul*, f. 14a.

178 But see Kamalaśīla's treatment of the *tathāgatagarbha* and *gotra* in his *Madhyamakāloka*. There are only passing references to the *tathāgatagarbha* in Bhavya's *Tarkajvālā* (P, f. 169a) and Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya* (vi.95). Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India*, Index s.v. *tathāgatagarbha*.

179 See above, p. 72 with note 165.

180 See Tsoṅ kha pa, *LŠÑP*, ff. 107b-108a = p. 516.

cannot be true in accordance with the principle of contradiction. Alternatively, one might perhaps suppose a complementarity – perhaps even an incommensurability – between two doctrines that relate to different levels of reference or discourse, and which are accordingly not mutually exclusive and contradictory. The discussions and hermeneutical techniques developed to deal with this philosophical tension between two sets of theories make up a substantial part of the history of later Indo-Tibetan thought. One hermeneutical method has consisted in taking the *raṅ stoṅ* doctrine to be of final and definitive meaning (*ṅes don* = *nītārtha*), corresponding to the ultimate meaning (*don dam pa* = *paramārtha*), while considering the *tathāgatagarbha* and *gžan stoṅ* doctrines to be on the contrary provisional and surface-level teachings which, being intentional (*dgoṅs pa can* = *ābhiprāyika*, i.e. context- or *vineya*-bound), require to be 'extracted' or 'elicited' and further interpreted in another meaning (*draṅ don* = *neyārtha*) because they do not correspond to the *paramārtha* as defined in the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras and Nāgārjuna's Corpus of Reasoning. This was roughly the view taken by Bu ston and several of his predecessors and contemporaries. And the Jo naṅ pa school took the reverse view. As for the dGe lugs pa school, in it there was developed a very remarkable systematic hermeneutics which sought to reconcile the doctrine of *svabhāvaśūnyatā* taught in the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras and Nāgārjuna's *rigs tshogs* with the teachings of the *tathāgatagarbha* and the *Ratnagotravibhāga*.[181]

Mention must finally be made of what is termed the method (*lugs*) or theory (*lta ba*) of the Hva šaṅ. It may be described as a 'spontaneist' teaching on the innate immediacy of Awakening which has been associated by its Tibetan critics with the Chinese *ho-shang* Mo-ho-yen/Mahāyāna, the Simultaneist (*cig c[h]ar ba* < *cig c[h]ar* = *yugapad* 'simultaneous, all-at-once') opponent of the Gradualists (*rim gyis pa*) led

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[181] Attention may be called in particular to the very interesting later systematic exegesis of the *Ratnagotravibhāga* in relation to the doctrine of Prajñāpāramitā as set out by Guṅ thaṅ dKon mchog bstan pa'i sgron me (1762-1823); see note 171 above. – Tsoṅ kha pa's own discussion of the problem of the *tathāgatagarbha* and the *gžan stoṅ* is to be found for instance at the end of his *LŠÑP*.

by Kamalaśīla in the 'Great Debate' of bSam yas towards the end of the eighth century.[182] This doctrine has been represented as a type of radically non-conceptal and virtually cataleptic Fixation-Meditation (*'jog sgom* or *tsom 'jog/had 'jog*, i.e. *had sgom*, etc.). It is one in which Quietude (*ži gnas* = *śamatha*) may be cultivated at the expense or to the exclusion of (analytical) Insight (*lhag mthoṅ* = *vipaśyanā*); and it is therefore contrasted with properly conducted analytical Inspection-Meditation (*dpyad sgom*). According to it, mentation (*yid la byed pa* = *manasikāra*) and analytical philosophical investigation (*dpyad pa*), considered to be obstacles to Awakening, are both to be eliminated in realizing Buddhahood.[183] Thus non-mentation (*yid la mi byed pa* = *amanas[i]kāra*) is regarded as a basic concomitant of non-concepualization (*cir yaṅ mi rtog pa, ci yaṅ mi sems*) and actionlessness (*ci yaṅ mi byed pa*) in the 'system/theory of the Hva šaṅ'. At the same time, according to its critics, the 'method of the Hva šaṅ' involves a one-sided concern with mere theory or vision (*lta ba*), negativistically conceived, to the exclusion of spiritual practice (*spyod pa*). This Hva šaṅ has then been linked with a form of the 'theory of neither existence or non-existence' (*yod min med min gyi lta ba*) where, according to Tsoṅ kha pa, the boundaries of the negandum for philosophical reasoning (*rigs pas dgag bya*) applied to analysing and understanding non-substantiality and the *paramārtha* are drawn too widely.[184] The radical 'ideoclasm' – the total rejection of conceptual thinking

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182 cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Buddha-nature, Mind and the problem of Gradualism in a comparative perspective.*

183 On the elimination of not only 'bad conceptualization' (*ṅan rtog*) but also 'good conceptualization' (*bzaṅ rtog*) in the 'Hva šaṅ's Method', and on *'jog sgom* in relation to *dpyad sgom*, see *LRChM*, f. 326a-330a = pp. 543-50 (on *manasikāra* and *smṛti*); f. 386a = p. 643; ff. 424b-425a = pp. 704-05; and ff. 466b-473b = pp. 773-83 (on *tsom 'jog*, explained as *blos kyaṅ cir yaṅ ma bzuṅ ba'i tsom 'jog* or *tsom 'jog gi mi rtog par 'jog pa*). On this Hva šaṅ, see further *LRChM* f. 6a = p. 9; ff. 206a-207a = pp. 342-3.

184 On the correct sense of *yod pa ma yin med pa ma yin* and *spros bral* – and also on its links, under a certain incorrect interpretation, with the 'Hva šaṅ's Theory' –, see, e.g., 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa, *Grub mtha' chen mo*, ii, f. 54b ff. In other schools of Tibetan thought, the *yod min med min gyi lta ba*

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(*vikalpa*), investigation (*vicāra*) and any notion (*saṃjñā*) whatsoever – in question here, verging as it does on nihilism (*ucchedadṛṣṭi* 'annihilationism'), is the very reverse of Madhyamaka theory as set out in the works of Tsoṅ kha pa and his school, including the *KNZB*.[185]

It is noteworthy that in some sources both the *tathāgatagarbha* teaching of the *Ratnagotravibhāga* and a tradition of *amanasikāra* have been linked with Maitrīpāda, the rediscoverer of the first and the transmitter of the second. The bKa' brgyud pa tradition upheld by Karma Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507-1554) has moreover made Maitrīpāda along with Saraha/Rāhulabhadra a major link in the chain of one of the traditions of the Madhyamaka that it recognized. According to Mi bskyod rdo rje, it was Maitrīpāda's doctrine that was rejected by Gro luṅ pa as well as by Sa skya paṇḍi ta.[186] Two further Madhyamaka traditions identified by Mi

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has, however, been entirely dissociated from the *hva šaṅ gi lta ba*; see, e.g., the discussion by Go rams pa bSod nams seṅ ge, *lTa ba'i šan 'byed*, ff. 4a-5b and f. 17a, where the 'Hva šaṅ's Theory' is rejected but the *yod min med min* theory, understood purely in terms of the Mahāyānist *spros bral* = *niṣprapañca*, is defended and accepted. See also above, p. 49 note 101; and below, Section II, § 14.

Whether the philosophical-meditative theory with which the *ho-shang* Mo-ho-yen has been eponymously, and somewhat emblematically, associated actually corresponds *historically* with this Ch'an master's teaching is of course a quite distinct question. At all events, in later Tibetan doxography and philosophical discussion, the expression *hva šaṅ gi lugs/lta ba* has been regularly used to designate a *type* of quietistic, spontaneist and 'ideoclastic' theory, one which moreover overlaps with nihilism (*chad lta* 'annihilationism').

185 Apart from Sa skya paṇḍi ta in the thirteenth century, critiques of the Hva šaṅ's teachings are ascribed to earlier Tibetan masters such as Bla chen dGe ba (rab) gsal (or dGoṅs pa [rab] gsal, died 975 ?) (see *Deb ther sṅon po*, kha, f. 2b; cf. Sum pa mkhan po, *dPag bsam ljon bzaṅ*, p. 178), and to rṄog Blo ldan šes rab's disciple Gro luṅ pa (in his *bDe bar gšegs pa'i bstan pa rin po che la 'jug pa'i lam gyi rim pa rnam par bšad pa [bsTan rim]*).

186 Karma Mi bskyod rdo rje, *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bšad dPal ldan Dus gsum mkhyen pa'i žal luṅ, Dvags brgyud grub pa'i šiṅ rta*, f. 5a f. (cf. above, →

bskyod rdo rje are the one passing through Candrakīrti and Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna (*c.* 982-1054) to the bKa' gdams pas 'Brom ston (1004/5-1064/5), sPyan sṅa ba Tshul khrims 'bar (1038-1103), Po to ba Rin chen gsal (1031-1105), Ša ra ba (1070-1141) and sGam po pa (1079-1153), and the one passing through Candrakīrti, the Kaśmīrian Ratnavajra and Hasumati (Mahāsumati) to Pa tshab and then on to Thaṅ sag pa and Karma Dus gsum mkhyen pa (1110-1193).[187]

The rejection of the 'ideoclasm' of what has been termed the Hva šaṅ's Theory as well as the critique of the philosophically over-wide 'neither existence nor non-existence theory' (*yod min med min gyi lta ba*) and of the idea of freedom from all extremes (*mtha' bral*) were undertaken by Tsoṅ kha pa and his school in the frame of their investigation and refutation of the extreme view of nihilism (*chad lta* = *ucchedadṛṣṭi*) involving the rejection of all practice (*spyod pa* = *caryā*) grounded in conventional transactional usage and of analysis (*dpyad pa* = *vicāra*) and all conceptual construction (*rnam rtog* = *vikalpa, rtog pa* = *kalpanā*) of any kind even if conducive to the cultivation of the Path. Their position on these points was no doubt also governed by their rejection of an over-wide demarcation of the negandum for reasoning (*rigs pas dgag bya*) analysing non-substantiality and the *paramārtha*. On the other hand, their rejection of the theory of the Jo naṅ pas was undertaken in the frame of an investigation and refutation of the extreme views of both eternalism

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p. 72 note 165). For Gro luṅ pa's view on the *yid la (mi) byed pa* = *(a)manasikāra*, see his *bDe bar gšegs pa'i bstan pa rin po che la 'jug pa'i lam gyi rim pa rnam par bšad pa* (e.g. f. 377a ff.).

In mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzaṅ's *sToṅ thun chen mo*, ff. 4b-6a, doctrines similar to the Jo naṅ pas' and the so-called 'Hva šaṅ's Theory' have been criticized alongside each other. However, between the 'Hva šaṅ's Theory' and the 'substantialist' version of the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine there exist, according to the critics of both, very significant differences; see immediately below.

[187] According to the *Deb ther sṅon po*, ña, f. 32a-b, Dus gsum mkhyen pa studied Madhyamaka under Pa tshab and rGya dmar ba.

(*rtag lta* = *śāśvatadṛṣṭi*) and nihilism (*chad lta*).[188] And this critique is underpinned by showing that the opponent has incorrectly demarcated the negandum – i.e. hypostatized existence – by making this demarcation (*ṅos 'dzin pa*) over-narrow (*khyab chuṅ ba/chuṅs pa*, namely in respect of the *paramārtha*-level since the Jo naṅ pas' *gžan stoṅ* theory is considered to ascribe substantial existence to the absolute) in the first place and, additionally, over-wide (*[ha caṅ] khyab ches pa*, namely in respect of the *saṃvṛti/vyavahāra*-level since the Jo naṅ pa theory is thought to tend simply to negate the existence of the relative, much like the 'theory of the Hva šaṅ').[189]

These discussions by Tsoṅ kha pa and his followers are grounded in major issues that have arisen in the history of Madhyamaka thought in the domains of epistemology and logic (*pramāṇa*) and gnoseology (i.e. the theory of *jñāna* that cognizes reality) as well as of buddhology.[190] And

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[188] It has been stated that the Jo naṅ pa doctrine tends to fall not only into the eternalist extreme (*rtag mtha'*) because of its theory of the absolute and a permanent and stable *garbha* (*rtag brtan sñiṅ po*), but also into the nihilistic extreme (*chad mtha'*) because of its *gžan stoṅ* theory that issues in abolishing the relative. Cf. Don grub rgyal mtshan, *Draṅ ṅes legs bšad sñiṅ po'i 'grel pa bži 'dril*, f. 294b.

[189] See in particular *LRChM*, ff. 347a-386a = pp. 580-643 (*ha caṅ khyab ches pa*) and ff. 386a-391a = pp. 643-651 (*khyab chuṅ ba*). – For Dol po pa's description of *saṃvṛti* as *parikalpita* as comprised under *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* and as *paratantra* as comprised under *svalakṣaṇa*, see his *bDen gñis gsal ba'i ñi ma*, f. 18b (in *The collected works (gSuṅ 'bum) of Kun mkhyen Dol po pa Šes rab rgyal mtshan (1291-1361)*, vol. i [Paro, 1984]): *kun rdzob spyi'i mtshan gyis bsdus pa kun brtags daṅ/ raṅ mtshan gyis bsdus pa'i gžan dbaṅ gñis so.*

[190] For a later critique of (both ethical and gnoseological) nihilism (*ci yaṅ med pa*), non-analysis and non-investigation (*mi dpyad pa, mi dpyod*) and non-mentation (*yid la mi byed pa*) or 'ideoclasm' (*ci yaṅ yid la mi bya ba, bsam rgyu med pa*) – taking in the typologically and eponymously named 'Theory of the Hva šaṅ', the 'Neo-Mahāmudrā' (*da lta'i phyag rgya chen po*) and 'Chinese style rDzogs chen' (*rgya nag lugs kyi rdzogs chen*) following Sa skya paṇḍi ta – and of the *gžan stoṅ* and of eternalism – taking in →

although ideological biases and personal rivalries between individual masters, the philosophical schools they represented and the religious orders to which they belonged may have played some part in these debates, they cannot be dismissed as mere vain polemics against rival scholars or opposed orders and schools (*chos lugs*).[191]

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the Jo naṅ pa doctrine of Dol po pa –, see, e.g., 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa, *Grub mtha' chen mo*, ii, ff. 18a-29a. Following on this (ff. 29a-31a), 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa discusses the views of Thaṅ sag pa – who was mistaken in his negating of a negandum that he demarcated too broadly (*dgag bya khyab ches pa bkag pa*) – and of rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus (!?), rGya dmar ba and other early Tibetan masters – who were mistaken in supposing that the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika has no thesis (*dam bca'*) at all, no position (*phyogs*) and no philosophical theory to be asserted (*khas blaṅs rgyu'i lta ba ci yaṅ med pa*) and that there exists for him no probative *pramāṇa* (*sgrub par byed pa'i tshad ma*), so that the Prāsaṅgika would simply be negating as contradictory all extreme positions relating to unilateral existence and non-existence by means of *prasaṅga*-type reasoning (*gcig tu yod med kyi mtha' thams cad naṅ 'gal thal 'gyur gyis 'gog pa yin*). (On rMa bya's true doctrine see, however, above, pp. 50-54; below, Section II, § 11) At ff. 54b-64a, 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa returns to the problem of the meditative realization of *śūnyatā* which has been wrongly understood as non-realization of anything at all (*ci yaṅ ma bsgom stoṅ ñid bsgom pa*), to cataleptic fixation (*sems dmigs pa med pa'i had 'jog*), nihilistic voidness (*chad stoṅ*) and the so-called Theory of the Hva šaṅ, and to the correct understanding of the theory of neither existence nor non-existence (*yod min med min*) and of absence of discursive proliferation (*spros bral = niṣprapañca*). At f. 102a-b, 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa sums up the senses of *spros bral, snaṅ med, dmigs med, yid la mi byed pa, mtshan mar mi spyod pa*, and *mi rtog pa*.

191 It is, then, not easy to accept the assessment of Sa skya paṇḍita's critique of the 'Theory of the Hva šaṅ' (and of the 'Chinese-style *rdzogs chen*' and 'Latter-day *phyag chen*') that has been advanced by R. Jackson, 'Sa skya Paṇḍita's account of the bSam yas Debate: History as polemic', *JIABS* 5/1 (1982), pp. 89-99, partly followed by M. Broido, 'Sa-skya Paṇḍita, the White Panacea and the Hva-shang doctrine', *JIABS* 10/2 (1987), pp. 27-68. For a discussion of some of the complex issues involved, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Buddha-nature, Mind and the problem of Gradualism in a comparative per-*

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spective; and D. P. Jackson, 'Sa-skya Paṇḍita the "polemicist": Ancient debates and modern interpretations', *JIABS* 13/2 [1990], pp. 17-116; id., *Enlightenment by a single means* (Vienna, 1994).

In her study on the *gžan stoṅ* theory, *The Buddha within* (Albany, 1991), S. Hookham – while seeking, as she puts it, not to be 'sectarian' and 'to redress a balance' – has spoken of Tibetan *raṅ stoṅ pa*s such as Bu ston, rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen and mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzaṅ misrepresenting and trivializing the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine (p. 99); and she has described (p. 17) the very important and lively disagreement between Jo naṅ pa *gžan stoṅ pa*s and dGe lugs pa *raṅ stoṅ pa*s as being one over orthodoxy. But 'orthodoxy' has very little to do with the difficult issues in question, which are rather ones of considerable hermeneutical and philosophical significance because they concern both the role of reasoning (*rigs pa*), or reasoned knowledge (*rigs šes*), investigating or analysing the *paramārtha* in the negation (annulment or deconstruction) of the *dgag bya* (i.e. *raṅ bžin yod pa*) and the exegetical problem of consistently and systematically interpreting a large body of often disparate scriptural statements. Hookham has rightly gone on to observe that the importance of the *raṅ stoṅ/gžan stoṅ* distinction 'can only be properly understood and evaluated in the light of a far deeper knowledge than we have at present concerning the full range of the older commentarial traditions' (p. 17), concluding that this discussion 'is important not so much for establishing who is right as for refining one's understanding' (p. 18).

S. Matsumoto, in his article 'The Mādhyamika philosophy of Tsong-kha-pa' (*Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko*, 48 [1990], pp. 17-47), has described Tsoṅ kha pa's Madhyamaka thought as embodying 'a fundamental criticism of the popular understanding of Buddhism that would regard all judgements, assertions and verbal expressions as something to be negated, and also of the monistic realist interpretation of Buddhism that completely envelops Buddhist academia in Japan today' (p. 43). The first current alluded to by Matsumoto comprises the 'theory of *yod min med min*' and the 'theory of *mtha' bral*', and it could include also the 'theory of the Hva šaṅ' (see above, p. 49 n. 101, p. 82 n. 184 and p. 85 n. 190); whilst the second current alluded to by Matsumoto comprises the *tathāgatagarbha* school to which Matsumoto refers as 'Dhātuvāda' on p. 17, where he writes that Tsoṅ kha pa contended against it all his life. This has certainly not been the opinion of Tsoṅ kha pa's followers beginning with his disciple rGyal →

6. TSOṄ KHA PA'S ARRIVAL AT HIS MADHYAMAKA THEORY

We learn from both his own statements and his biographers that Tsoṅ kha pa Blo bzaṅ grags pa'i dpal came to understand Nāgārjuna's and Candrakīrti's Madhyamaka thought only after prolonged study with several teachers, much reading and some disappointed searching for the true meaning that were accompanied by hesitation and doubt, and as the final result of deep study (*thos pa* = *śravaṇa, śruta*), reflection (*bsam pa* = *cintā*) and meditation (*sgom pa* = *bhāvanā*).[192] His reflections and

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tshab Dar ma rin chen in his commentary on the *Ratnagotravibhāga*. Matsumoto has further written that 'the fatal defect in Tsong-kha-pa's understanding of Buddhism is, however, to be sought in the fact that, for him, the assertion made by Buddhism was always that of own-nature-lessness or emptiness and not that of dependent co-arising... Furthermore, according to Tsong-kha-pa, the "truth" (*de kho na ñid*) of dependent co-arising is own-nature-lessness... In this respect Tsong-kha-pa's understanding of Buddhism was still not completely freed of Mādhyamika-like traditions, and his Mādhyamika thought would clearly appear to involve a logical contradiction' (pp. 43-44). It is indeed astonishing to find it asserted that Tsoṅ kha pa neglected, or undervalued, the *pratītyasamutpāda*; for it is usually thought that in the whole of his philosophy, including in his special *snaṅ stoṅ* theory, he placed the greatest emphasis on it, as is clear too from such a well-known work of his as the *rTen 'brel stod pa* (see § 6 below). Cf. the final section of the *KNZB* dealing with the *pratītyasamutpāda* and *śūnyatā*, and the sources quoted in the notes to the translation of that section. (For a discussion of Matsumoto's views from another point of view, see C. Yoshimizu, 'The Madhyamaka theories regarded as false by the dGe lugs pas', *WZKS* 37 [1993], p. 217 f.)

192 See for example Tsoṅ kha pa's brief account of his intellectual efforts and spiritual struggles in his *sTon pa bla na med pa la zab mo rten ciṅ 'brel bar 'byuṅ ba gsuṅ ba'i sgo nas bstod pa'i sñiṅ po* (the *rTen 'brel bstod pa Legs bšad sñiṅ po* in vol.kha, ff. 13a-16a, of the gSuṅ 'bum, on which cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, 'La pensée tibétaine', in A. Jacob [ed.], *Encyclopédie philosophique universelle*, Vol. 1: *L'univers philosophique* [Paris, 1989], pp. 1586 ff., especially pp. 1590-91).

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meditations were sometimes marked, we are told, by the intervention in a vision of no less a personage than the Bodhisattva Mañjughoṣa himself as his *kalyāṇamitra*.[193] Because of such visionary experiences, and in view

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An influential teacher and co-investigator with Tsoṅ kha pa in the study of the Madhyamaka is said to have been Bla ma dBu ma pa brTson 'grus seṅ ge (also known as dPa' bo rdo rje), to whom no known writings are, however, ascribed. See e.g. Tsoṅ kha pa's *Bla ma dbu ma pa la mdo khams su phul ba* (gSuṅ 'bum, vol kha, ff. 68b-70a). He is stated in biographies of Tsoṅ kha pa to have been a student of Pāramitā at gSaṅ phu, and of Madhyamaka at Sa skya under Red mda' ba. See, e.g., Blo bzaṅ tshul khrims (1740-1810), *bDe legs kun kyi 'byuṅ khuṅs*, iv, f. 14b ff.; and sKu bcar dar han mkhan sprul Blo bzaṅ 'phrin las rnam rgyal (19th c.), *Thub bstan mdzes pa'i rgyan gcig ṅo mtshar nor bu'i phreṅ ba (rNam thar chen mo)* (mTsho sṅon ed., 1981), p. 172 ff. (Bla ma dBu ma pa has been unfavourably adverted to by Go rams pa, *lTa ba'i šan 'byed*, ff. 17b, 35a.)

As the direct teacher of Tsoṅ kha pa in a Madhyamaka line passing through Pa tshab Ñi ma grags, rMa (bya) Byaṅ (chub) ye (šes), rMa (bya) Byaṅ (chub) brtson ('grus), mTshur gŽon (nu) seṅ (ge), rMa bya Śāk(ya) seṅ (ge), mKhan chen Žaṅ pa, mChims thams cad mkhyen pa Nam mkha' grags, sKyo ston sMon lam tshul khrims, Slob dpon dGe 'bar, dBu tshad pa 'od zer grub, and Mi g-yo bzaṅ po, the master sNar thaṅ mkhan chen Kun dga' rgyal mtshan is listed in the *gSan yig*s of both Tsoṅ kha pa, f. 27b, and mKhas grub rje, f. 4a (where rGyaṅ ro paṇ chen and mChims Blo bzaṅ grags pa are instead listed after sKyo ston).

At f. 4b of mKhas grub rje's *gSan yig*, Red mda' pa is given as the source for Tsoṅ kha pa's reception of the explanation of the *Madhyamakakārikās* with the *Prasannapadā*, the *Catuḥśataka* and its commentary, the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, the *Dharmadhātustava*, and the *Suhṛllekha*. On sNar thaṅ mkhan po Kun dga' rgyal mtshan and Red mda' ba see also Saṅs rgyas rgya mtsho (1653-1705), *Vaiḍūrya ser po* (ed. Lokesh Chandra), p. 55; and Blo bzaṅ tshul khrims, *bDe legs kun gyi 'byuṅ gnas*, iii, ff. 17b-18a (and above, p. 60 f. on Red mda' ba).

On Tsoṅ kha pa and his philosophy, see recently H. Tauscher, *Die Lehre von den zwei Wirklichkeiten in Tsoṅ kha pas Madhyamaka-Werken*.

193 See Tsoṅ kha pa's own heart-felt and poignant remarks in his *rTen 'brel* →

also of his profound philosophical concern with the problem of understanding the *paramārtha*, which in the Mahāyāna is defined as inexpressible (*anabhilāpya, avācya*), Tsoṅ kha pa was no doubt a mystic in a particular sense of this word. But at the same time he fully recognized the importance of both scriptural tradition (*luṅ* = *āgama*) and philosophical analysis (*dpyad pa* = *vicāra*) and reasoning (*rigs pa* = *yukti*).

Tsoṅ kha pa's thought in fact constitutes not only an interpretation and religious hermeneutics – a *lectio* – of a sacred canon of scriptural and major exegetical texts regarded as authoritative, but a genuine reasoned enquiry – a *quaestio* –, so that it may be properly designated a philosophy. In this philosophy he has moreover acknowledged the significance of Appearance (*snaṅ ba*) on the surface level (*saṃvṛti*), the 'phenomenal' which can be neither neglected nor simply set aside in the search for ultimate reality (*paramārtha*) and *śūnyatā* and which must therefore be so to say 'saved' by the true philosopher. For Tsoṅ kha pa the integrative co-ordination – the 'syzygy' – of Presentation/Appearance and the Empty (*snaṅ stoṅ*) is indeed central to the theory and correct understanding of reality in the Madhyamaka (see below).

Among his Mādhyamika predecessors, beside Nāgārjuna, his commentator Buddhapālita and Ārya-Deva, Tsoṅ kha pa's main source was Candrakīrti. He then developed his understanding of the Madhyamaka taking account of the achievements of Dignāga's and (above all) Dharmakīrti's logical-epistemological school; and this confluence in his thought of what have represented distinct traditions in Buddhist philosophy – expressed terminologically by means of the copulative compound *dbu tshad* 'Madhyamaka and Pramāṇa(vāda)' – thus went somewhat fur-

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bstod pa cited in the last note.

On the rôle of the Bodhisattva Mañjughoṣa as inspirer and resolver of doubts, a comparison might be made with the well-known account of the part played by Maitreya at a critical moment in the life of Asaṅga; this account may have served as a kind of model for the rôle ascribed to Mañjughoṣa in Tsoṅ kha pa's life. The above-mentioned Bla ma dBu ma pa also occupied an important place in this stage in Tsoṅ kha pa's development. See, e.g., the *gSaṅ ba'i rnam thar* of Tsoṅ kha pa by mKhas grub rje; and Blo bzaṅ 'phrin las rnam rgyal, *rNam thar chen mo*, p. 180 ff.

ther than what we find expressed in Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra* and *Prasannapadā*.[194]

In perfecting his understanding of the Vehicle of Pāramitā (*phar phyin*) or Lakṣaṇa (*mtshan ñid*) – i.e. of Buddhist philosophy – and in expounding its theory and practice, Tsoṅ kha pa has sometimes taken account in addition of the Mantra Vehicle – i.e. the *sṅags lugs* – of the Vajrayāna, occasionally making use of techniques of the latter even in his exposition of the Madhyamaka which he regarded as the supreme expression of the Lakṣaṇayāna.[195]

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194 For this interaction and confluence, as mutually supporting systems of thought (*rgyab chos*), of Pramāṇa-theory and Madhyamaka in the case of Tsoṅ kha pa, see below Section III. In Tibet this interaction is clearly documented from the time of rṄog Blo ldan šes rab. And although it can be traced back to Indian sources (see above, note 56), the confluence between these two distinct traditions in Buddhist thought assumed special importance in Tibetan philosophy. This confluence has recently been discussed by G. Dreyfus, *Recognizing reality* (Albany, 1997), pp. 21ff., 193 ff., 451 ff.

195 The relationship between Tsoṅ kha pa's understanding of the Madhyamaka as a department of the Pāramitāyāna (or Lakṣaṇayāna) and of the Mantrayāna – deriving as they did in part from his association in his 30s with Bla ma dBu ma pa, during which time Tsoṅ kha pa received his visionary instruction from Mañjughoṣa – as well as his demarcation of the Pāramitāyāna and Mantrayāna will require further investigatation and can only be briefly noted here. In his *dBu ma'i lta khrid* (gSuṅ 'bum, vol. ba), ff. 5b-9b, for example, Mantrayāna techniques have been introduced (on the level of *śamatha*, the Mantra-version of which is said to be more rapid). For his demarcation between the methods of Mantra (i.e. the *sṅags kyi rdzogs rim*) and Lakṣaṇa (*mtshan ñid*), see also Tsoṅ kha pa's communication to Red mda' ba (contained in his gSuṅ 'bum, vol. kha, f. 65a f., with a smaller parallel text in vol. pha, f. 5a f.), where both *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* are evoked. (Concerning the last two titles see above, p. 61 note 131.) In this work Tsoṅ kha pa has concluded that the adept of the Mantrayāna proceeds more rapidly (*myur ba*) than, and is superior (*khyad par du 'phags pa*) to, the trainee of the plain Lakṣaṇayāna (*mtshan ñid theg pa rkyaṅ pa'i gdul bya*, i.e. provided that there is co-ordination between the two methods). But a Vineya of Mantra alone who entirely lacks the essential principles of the Lakṣaṇamārga →

When developing his understanding of the Vehicle of Pāramitā or Lakṣaṇa, Tsoṅ kha pa has moreover devoted considerable attention to Vijñānavāda or Cittamātra thought. As seen above, in Tibet the synthesiz-

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(*mtshan ñid kyi lam gyi gnad med pa'i sṅags kyi thun moṅ ma yin pa'i gdul bya*) is inferior to the Vineya of the Lakṣaṇa method (*mtshan ñid kyi gdul bya*); for whereas the Lakṣaṇa method suffices for (eventually) attaining buddhahood, the former type of Vineya does not reach buddhahood. The correlation between Pāramitāyāna/naya and Mantrayāna/naya was determined also by the fact that Nāgārjuna, Ārya-Deva, Candrakīrti and other Mādhyamikas are traditionally regarded as major authorities in both domains. And Tsoṅ kha pa states (*op. cit.*, kha, f. 65b, and pha, f. 6a) that the essential instructions of the *upāyamārga* of Mantra are in accord with Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti. For the relation between Pāramitāyāna and Mantrayāna, see in addition Tsoṅ kha pa's *Byaṅ chub lam gyi rim pa'i ñams len gyi rnam bžag mdor bsdus te brjed byaṅ du bya ba* (gSuṅ thor bu, f. 57b f.), and *LŠÑP*, f. 112a-b = p. 523. – According to mKhas grub rje, the theory of all the Tantras in Mantra is that of the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka; and the Vineya in particular of the highest class of Tantra having even sharper faculties than the very intelligent Vineya of the Pāramitāyāna, he is a recipient who is fit to be directly taught the Prāsaṅgika theory. See mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzaṅ po, *rGyud sde spyi rnam*, ff. 26b-27a, 94a, and *sToṅ thun chen mo*, ff. 4b-6a. See further Thu'u bkvan Blo bzaṅ Chos kyi ñi ma, *Grub mtha' šel gyi me loṅ*, dGe lugs pa Chapter, f. 68a = p. 366 f.

The question of the relation between the two Yānas/Nayas has been broached in Dalai Lama XIV and J. Hopkins, *Tantra in Tibet* (London, 1977), pp. 55 f., 212-214 (cf. pp. 110 f. and 134); and *The Yoga of Tibet* (London, 1981), pp. 32, 41, 233. See also R. Thurman, 'Tsoṅ-kha-pa's integration of Sūtra and Tantra', in: B. Aziz and M. Kapstein (ed.), *Soundings in Tibetan civilization* (New Delhi, 1985), pp. 373-82; L. van der Kuijp, 'A propos of a recent contribution to the history of Central Way philosophy in Tibet', *BIS* 1 (1985), pp. 50-51; M. Broido, 'Veridical and delusive cognition: Tsong-kha-pa on the two *satyas*', *JIP* 16 (1988), p. 31 and pp. 49-52; and H. Tauscher, *Die Lehre von den zwei Wirklichkeiten in Tsoṅ kha pas Madhyamaka-Werken*, p. 55. – Concerning the question of Madhyamaka and Vajrayāna, compare, however, the discussion cited in D. Seyfort Ruegg, 'A Karma bKa' brgyud work on the lineages and traditions of the Indo-Tibetan dBu ma (Madhyamaka)', pp. 1277-8.

ing Yogācāra-Madhyamaka occupied a very important place in Buddhist thought beginning already in the time of the Earlier Propagation (*sṅa dar*) of the Dharma. And in the Later Propagation (*phyi dar*), much attention was devoted to the 'Five Dharmas of Maitreya', and to the works of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu and their followers, beginning with rṄog Blo ldan šes rab (who in this matter evidently continued an Indo-Kaśmīri tradition). It would therefore be wrong to suppose that the Vijñānavāda has been either altogether overlooked or partisanly devalued by the Tibetan Mādhyamikas in general and by Tsoṅ kha pa in particular. The philosophical position represented by him and his followers indeed combines (like most Tibetan schools) the tradition of philosophical Theory as profundity (*zab mo lta ba*), which goes back to Nāgārjuna and is presided over by the Bodhisattva Mañjuśrī/Mañjughoṣa, and the tradition of Practice in great extension (*rgya chen spyod pa*), which is traced back to Asaṅga and is presided over by the Bodhisattva Maitreya(nātha).

Tsoṅ kha pa has adopted a classification that divides the pure Mādhyamikas, after the early undivided school of Nāgārjuna and Ārya-Deva, into two branches, the Raṅ rgyud pa (Svātantrika) going back to Bhavya and the Thal 'gyur ba (*Prāsaṅgika) going back ultimately to Buddhapālita and represented specially by Candrakīrti. Alongside these two branches of pure Madhyamaka, he has also recognized the synthesizing school of the Yogācāra-(Svātantrika-)Madhyamaka represented by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla in particular.[196] In his discussion of the

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196 See *LŠÑP*, f. 49a ff. = p. 419 ff. On Tsoṅ kha pa's recognition of Bhavya as a Mādhyamika despite the fact that (as a Svātantrika and advocate of what Tsoṅ kha pa has termed the thesis of the *raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*) he might in one respect be regarded as a *dṅos por smra ba*, see below, p. 94 note 197. For the classification of Śrīgupta and Jñānagarbha as Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas or as (Sautrāntika-)Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas, and for Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla as authors of the the *raṅ rgyud šar gsum*, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India*, p. 67 f.

On Tsoṅ kha pa's very important and characteristic concept of *raṅ gi mtshan ñid* = **svalakṣaṇa* 'self-characteristic', a notion he connects with Bhavya and the Svātantrikas, see below, Section III, p. 236 note 6; and →

classifications of the Madhyamaka at the beginning of the lHag mthoṅ section of the *Lam rim chen mo*, Tsoṅ kha pa observes that Candrakīrti considered that Nāgārjuna's real intent had been perfectly explained by Buddhapālita and so took his stand on this master's interpretation. But, he adds, Candrakīrti nonetheless also took over a number of Bhavya's explanations where he found them to be correct while refuting those that were seen to be somewhat unjustified.[197] At the end of his *dGoṅs pa rab gsal* too Tsoṅ kha pa has stated both that Candrakīrti explicated faultlessly the intent of Nāgārjuna and that he took Buddhapālita's commentary as the standard (*tshad ma*) without expressing any criticism of it. And he observes that the system of Śānti/Śāntadeva and that of these masters reveal themselves to be in agreement.[198] Tsoṅ kha pa concludes that this system is not held in common (*thun moṅ ma yin pa*) either with the Cittamātra or with the Svātantrika and other systems that do not ac-

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KNZB § 2.

[197] *LRChM*, f. 343a-b = pp. 573-4: *slob dpon zla ba grags pas ni rtsa še'i 'grel byed rnams kyi naṅ nas slob dpon saṅs rgyas bskyaṅs kyis 'phags pa'i dgoṅs pa yoṅs su rdzogs par bkral bar gzigs nas/ lugs de gžir 'jog ciṅ slob dpon legs ldan 'byed kyi'aṅ legs bśad maṅ po žig blaṅs la cun zad mi 'thad par snaṅ ba rnams sun phyuṅ nas 'phags pa'i dgoṅs pa 'grel bar mdzad do//* ... It is to be noted that Tsoṅ kha pa does not here consider that Candrakīrti rejected the whole of Bhavya's interpretation of Nāgārjuna, but only those parts which proved to be 'somewhat unjustified', adding that Candrakīrti adopted what had been correctly explained by Bhavya. (On Bhavya as a true Mādhyamika, see *LŠÑP*, f. 91a = p. 488; and 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa, *Grub mtha' chen mo*, ii, ff. 4a-b, 104b.) – It may be recalled that in the *Madhyamakaśāstrastuti* (verse 11) Candrakīrti referred (in the Sanskrit text) to the 'subtle [explanation] by Bhāvin (= Bhā[va]viveka, Bhavya)' (*sūkṣmaṃ ... yad bhāvinā*) or (in the Tibetan translation) to his 'well-formed [explanation]' (*legs ldan byed kyis legs bšad*). Cf. 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa, *Grub mtha' chen mo*, ii, f. 144a-b.

[198] *GR*, f. 264b = p. 482. In *GR*, f. 33a = p. 59, Tsoṅ kha pa shows how, in his comment on the *BCA*, Prajñākaramati differs from the Svātantrika school and agrees with Candrakīrti's school on the question whether the Arhats among the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas have an understanding of *dharmanairātmya*.

cept the *ālaya(vijñāna)*, as was explained by him in the *Draṅ ṅes legs bšad sñiṅ po.*[199]

Tsoṅ kha pa further observes that although the appellations Raṅ rgyud pa and Thal 'gyur ba first became current in Tibet with the Later Propagation of the Dharma (*phyi dar*), they nonetheless conform with Candrakīrti's own practice in his *Prasannapadā*; they are therefore no mere arbitrary inventions.[200] This nomenclature, which relates to the level of understanding of ultimate reality (*paramārtha*), has been established for two branches of Mādhyamikas with respect to their respective methods of generating in the conscious stream the theory that ascertains ultimate reality, Emptiness (*śūnyatā*) (*don dam pa stoṅ pa ñid ṅes pa'i lta ba rgyud la skyed tshul*), i.e. by means respectively of the Svātantrika's (or Autonomist's) autonomous inference based on a *svatantra-hetu* used to prove his own position and of the Prāsaṅgika's (or Apagogist's) *prasaṅga*-type reasoning serving to dissolve or deconstruct others' doctrinal positions.[201]

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199 *GR*, ff. 264a-265a = pp. 481-3. Cf. mKhas grub rje, *sToṅ thun chen mo*, f. 41b f. On the only apparent similarity of Mādhyamikas with 'realist' Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas, see below, p. 102.

200 *raṅ bzo: LRChM*, f. 343a = p. 573.

201 On the fundamental significance of ascertainment (*ṅes pa = niścaya*) in Tsoṅ kha pa's thought, see below Section III, § 10.

Tsoṅ kha pa's understanding of the *prasaṅga*-type reasoning of the Prāsaṅgika or 'Apagogist' school of the Madhyamaka will be discussed below in Section III, § 5. See also above, note 38; Section II below; and §§ 4.1 and 4.2 of the *KNZB*. – On the use of the *prasaṅga* in the Buddhist logico-epistemological school, see recently T. Tani, 'The problem of interpretation on *Pramāṇaviniścaya* III vv. 1-3', *Bulletin of the Kochi National College of Technology* 26 (1987), pp. 1-16, and 'Logic and time-ness in Dharmakīrti's philosophy', in: *Studies in the Buddhist epistemological tradition*, pp. 325-401; and T. Iwata, *Prasaṅga and prasaṅgaviparyaya bei Dharmakīrti und seinen Kommentatoren* (Vienna, 1993). And on the *prasaṅga* in the usage of the Tibetan schools, see S. Onoda, 'Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge's classification of the *thal 'gyur*', *BIS* 2 (1986), pp. 65-85; id., *Monastic debate in Tibet* (Vienna, 1992), p. 71 ff.

Tsoṅ kha pa recalls also the division made by older authorities (*sṅa rabs pa*) between 'Mādhyamikas of the Matrix Texts' (*gžuṅ phyi mo'i dbu ma pa*) – a term referring to Nāgārjuna and Ārya-Deva whom Buddhapālita, Bhavya, Candrakīrti and Śāntarakṣita were all to regard as authorities – and 'Divided Mādhyamikas' (*phyogs 'dzin pa'i dbu ma pa*) beginning with Buddhapālita (the ultimate source of the Prāsaṅgika) and Bhavya (the master of the Svātantrika).[202]

With respect to a further division made by earlier *kalyāṇamitra*s into mDo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pas (Sautrāntika-Mādhyamikas), who maintain the existence of external objects (*phyi don* = *bāhyārtha*), and rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma pas (Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas), who on the contrary maintain that there exist no objects external to the mind, Tsoṅ kha pa emphasizes that this classification was based on their respective methods of setting out transactional-pragmatic usage (*tha sñad 'jog tshul*, on the surface level of *saṃvṛti*). This established division relating to the *vyavahāra* level is thus additional to the aforementioned established nomenclature relating to understanding the *paramārtha* that classified the Madhyamaka as Svātantrika or Prāsaṅgika, and in his treatises Tsoṅ kha pa has made use of both.[203]

Tsoṅ kha pa next mentions a classification also set up by earlier masters, but claiming in this case to be based on two theories of ultimate reality (*don dam 'dod tshul*, i.e. the *paramārtha* level), that contrasts the sGyu ma rigs grub pa type of Mādhyamika – who holds the illusion-like (*māyopama*) pair of Presentation/Appearance and the Empty (*snaṅ stoṅ gñis tshogs*) to be the *paramārtha* – and the Rab tu mi gnas pa type – who holds simple cessation of discursive development in Appearance (*snaṅ la spros pa rnam par bcad pa tsam*) to be the *paramārtha*.[204] While the for-

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[202] *LRChM*, f. 342a = p. 571. See also *LŠÑP*, f. 49a = p. 419.

[203] *LRChM*, ff. 342a-343a = pp. 571-3; *LRChB*, f. 153a = p. 253.

[204] *LRChM*, f. 342a = p. 572; *LRChB*, f. 153a = p. 253. See also mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzaṅ, *sToṅ thun chen mo*, f. 41a-b.

In the Notes to this passage of the *LRChM* ascribed to 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa (in: *mÑam med rje btsun Tsoṅ kha pa chen pos mdzad pa'i Byaṅ chub lam rim chen mo'i dka' ba'i gnad rnams mchan bu bži'i sgo nas legs par bšad pa*, kha, f. 84a), Tsoṅ kha pa's remarks on the sGyu ma rigs grub pa are ex- →

mer term is connected with the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, the referent of the latter term has not been indicated in this passage. It is noted that this nomenclature has been employed also by certain Indian masters.[205] But Tsoṅ kha pa considers that even if certain Indian and Tibetan masters did hold this view in respect to the presentation of the *paramārtha* level, nobody would be in a position to explain in this way all the very minute details of how the systems of the Mādhyamikas are to be explicated; and he cites with approval the opinion of rṄog Blo ldan šes rab, who declared that such a twofold division in relation to the *paramārtha* could only arouse admiration among those who are confused.[206] This stricture was justified, Tsoṅ kha pa adds, because according to such a doctrine it is held that the simple fact of cognition through inference consisting in principled reasoned knowledge (*rigs šes*) is the *paramārtha*; but in fact, according to Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, the object of cognition through such *rigs šes* has been only figuratively termed '*paramārtha*' because of its conformity with the *paramārthasatya (don dam bden pa daṅ mthun pas don dam žes btags pa).*[207]

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plained as follows (the notes being enclosed in round brackets): *(chos can) snaṅ (ba la rigs pas bden grub bkag pa'i snaṅ) stoṅ gñis tshogs (sgyu ma lta bu'i don de ñid) don dam bden par 'dod pa sgyu ma rigs grub pa('i dbu ma pa).* And Tsoṅ kha pa's remarks on the Rab tu mi gnas pa doctrine are explained as follows: *(gñis tshogs de 'dra ma yin par) snaṅ ba la (bden pa'i) spros pa rnam par bcad pa tsam (gyi med dgag) don dam bden par 'dod pa rab tu mi gnas par smra ba('i dbu ma pa)*; the reference here is to absolute non-presuppositional and non-implicative negation, i.e. the *prasajyapratiṣedha* as opposed to the *paryudāsa*-type of negation. Cf. above, note 60, and below, p. 98 note 208; and E. Napper, *Dependent-arising and Emptiness*, p. 403 ff.

205 The reference is to Śūra and Advayavajra in particular; see note 60 above. The Note on this passage of the *LRChM* (kha, f. 84a) adds the Kaśmīrian Lakṣmī, a reference to Lakṣmīkara's *Pañcakramaṭīkā* (cf. 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa, *Grub mtha' chen mo*, ii, f. 106b).

206 *rmoṅs pa ṅo mtshar skyed pa'i rnam bžag: LRChM*, f. 342b = p. 572, and *LRChB*, f. 153a = p. 253. See also p. 33 note 60 above.

207 That is, it is not the *paramārthasatya* as such (*dṅos*), but rather a so- →

Furthermore, he states, the classification under discussion is also incorrect because other Mādhyamikas did not hold the simple fact of the stoppage of discursive proliferation (*spros pa bcad pa'i don de tsam*, i.e. *rnam par bcad pa tsam* which is *med dgag* or *prasajyapratiṣedha*), achieved through principled reasoned knowledge (*rigs šes*), to be the *paramārthasatya*.[208]

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called 'notional' (*rnam graṅs daṅ bcas pa: saparyāya*) ultimate reality that is involved in such a case of inferential knowledge. According to 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa's Note on this passage of the *LRChM* (kha, f. 85b), because inferential construction is involved here, there is freedom from neither the discursive proliferation of conceptual construction (*rtog pa'i spros pa*) nor that of dual appearance (*gñis snaṅ gi spros pa*); hence, the *prasajyapratiṣedha* of the *prameya* of inferential principled and reasoned knowledge (*rigs šes rjes dpag*) *conforms* with the *paramārthasatya* and with the *pāramārthika* absence of *prapañca*. (The *gžal ba'i don* is here the *māyā*-like pair of the *snaṅ stoṅ*, which is made up of a *dharmin* [*chos can*, e.g. pot] corresponding to the appearance-aspect and of a *dharma* [*chos*, i.e. non-hypostatization or *bden med*] corresponding to the empty-aspect.)

On the *mthun pa'i don dam*, see *LRChB*, f. 187b f. = p. 312 f., where Tsoṅ kha pa refers, *inter alia*, to the third explanation of *paramārtha* in the *Tarkajvālā* (D, f. 59b1 f. on *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* iii.26) – the one that takes the word as a *bahuvrīhi* compound – and links it with conceptual reasoned knowledge cognizing reality (*de kho na ñid 'jal ba'i rigs šes rtog bcas*). See further Ṅag dbaṅ dpal ldan, *Grub mtha' bži'i lugs kyi kun rdzob daṅ don dam pa'i don rnam par bšad pa Legs bšad dpyid kyi dpal mo'i glu dbyaṅs*, f. 76b (discussed by H. Tauscher, '*Paramārtha* as an object of cognition: *paryāya*- and *aparyāyaparamārtha* in Svātantrika-Madhyamaka', in: H. Uebach and J. L. Panglung (ed.), *Tibetan studies* [Munich, 1988], p. 484-5). Cf. H. Tauscher, *Die Lehre von den zwei Wirklichkeiten in Tsoṅ kha pas Madhyamaka-Werken*, p. 316 ff.; and *KNZB* § 2.2 (note 56).

208 *LRChM*, f. 342b = p. 572, and (on the sGyu ma rigs grub pa) *LRChB*, f. 188a6 = p. 313. According to 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa's note on the *LRChM* (kha, f. 85b), in the simple fact of the stoppage of discursive proliferation through analytical reasoning (*rigs pa*), being referred to here as the conjoining of Presentation/Appearance and the Empty (*spros pa bcad pa'i don snaṅ stoṅ gñis tshogs de tsam*), there are two aspects: stoppage as negative deter- →

mination (*rnam par bcad pa* = *vyavaccheda*) – i.e. non-presuppositional and non-implicative negation (*med dgag* = *prasajyapratiṣedha*) – and positive determination or restriction (*yoṅs su gcod pa* = *pariccheda*) – i.e. presuppositional and implicative negation (*ma yin dgag* = *paryudāsa*). Now, the *pariccheda* aspect being *paryudāsa*, it is not held to be the *paramārthasatya* by these other Mādhyamikas beside Śāntarakṣita. But no great Mādhyamika holds either that the object as such of correct knowledge through *anumāna* (*gžal ba'i don tsam*) – the *vyavaccheda* aspect – is the *paramārthasatya*. Hence, the *māyā*-like emptiness of hypostatic reality (*bden stoṅ sgyu ma lta bu*) to which reference is being made here is *saṃvṛtisatya*.

Concerning the important concept of *snaṅ stoṅ*, the integrative co-ordination of Presentation/Appearance and the Empty, referred to earlier, in *LRChM*, f. 448b = p. 741 ff. – a section dealing with errors as to *vipaśyanā* relating to the post-concentrative stage (*pṛṣṭhalabdha-ābhāsa*) –, Tsoṅ kha pa has criticized a mistaken version of the *snaṅ stoṅ (gñis tshogs)* which is nihilistically structured because it is not properly based on true *māyā*-like Emptiness, and in it entities (*bhāva*) are wrongly taken to be non-existent like a hare's horn (*śaśaśṛṅga*) or a barren woman's son (*vandhyāsuta*) – rather than, correctly, like an illusion or magical projection (*māyā*) – and because it is thus incompatible with origination in dependence (*pratītyasamutpāda*). In this section, the *snaṅ stoṅ* has been discussed in the context of the appearance of a *pudgala* in *māyā*-like mode. And it is shown that, in addition to *ākāśa*-like Emptiness (*nam mkha' lta bu'i stoṅ pa ñid*), *māyā*-like Emptiness (*sgyu ma lta bu'i stoṅ pa ñid*) must also be taken into account. Then, in *LRChM* f. 483a-b = p. 800, Tsoṅ kha pa has again examined an inadequate notion of the *snaṅ stoṅ* mistakenly identified with the *māyopama* taught in the Madhyamaka even though it can be shown to be merely a *gñis tshogs* or 'conjoining' of (i) absence of the tangible (*spraṣṭavya*) of resistance-and-striking and (ii) absence of variegated appearance (*thogs rdugs kyi reg bya daṅ bral ba daṅ thogs rdugs can du med kyaṅ snaṅ ba lam me ba'i gñis tshogs tsam*, this *thogs pa'i reg bya* being confused with a *svabhāva* as the *dgag bya* 'negandum'), such absence being then mistakenly called *niḥsvabhāva*. But, according to the true meaning of the *māyopama* in the Madhyamaka, genuine *snaṅ stoṅ* must combine (i) ascertainment by reasoned knowledge that determines non-establishment through self-existence with (ii) establishment through a purely transactional-pragmatic *pramāṇa* that appearance is not deniable (*raṅ gi ṅo bos grub pa med par thag gcod* →

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pa'i rigs šes kyi ṅes pa daṅ snaṅ ba bsñon du med par tha sñad pa'i tshad mas grub pa gñis). – See further *LRChB*, f. 166a ff. (cf. R. Thurman, *Life and teachings of Tsong Kha pa* [Dharamsala, 1982], p. 135 ff.); f. 186a6. In his discussion of the Madhyamaka, lCaṅ skya Rol pa'i rdo rje, *Dag yig mkhas pa'i 'byuṅ gnas*, ii, f. 9b, has distinguished between two forms of Emptiness: the *paryudāsa-śūnyatā* conjoining Appearance and the Empty, and the *prasajyapratiṣedha-śūnyatā* which is pure negative determination (i.e. exclusion) of the hypostatically real (i.e. the *snaṅ stoṅ gñis tshogs ma yin dgag gi stoṅ ñid* contrasted with the *bden pa rnam par bcad tsam kyi med dgag gi stoṅ ñid*). Cf. Ṅag dbaṅ dpal ldan, *Grub mtha' bži'i lugs kyi kun rdzob daṅ don dam pa'i don rnam par bšad pa*, f. 133a f., on the *bden stoṅ daṅ sgyu ma lta bu'i snaṅ ba gñis kyi tshogs* (where it is further noted that in the *mñam bžag* stage there is the *rnam par bcad tsam gyi nam mkha' lta bu'i stoṅ ñid bsgom pa'i zab mo'i lam gyi rim pa*, and in the *rjes thob* stage there is the *sgyu ma lta bu'i stoṅ ñid šar ba'i rgya che ba'i lam gyi rim pa*). A lag ša Ṅag dbaṅ bstan dar has described the *snaṅ stoṅ* theory as the most difficult to understand of the eight characteristic features of the Madhyamaka; see his *rTen 'brel bstod pa'i dka' gnas las brtsams pa'i don 'grel*, f. 16a.

According to *LRChM*, f. 342a-b = p. 572, in the *snaṅ stoṅ gñis tshogs* theory of the sGyu ma rigs grub pa school (connected with Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla) Presentation/Appearance and the Empty had been conjoined as representing the *paramārtha*. Cf., e.g., mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzaṅ, *sToṅ thun chen mo*, f. 41b; A kya yoṅs 'dzin dByaṅs can dga' ba'i blo gros [1740-1827], *Byaṅ chub lam gyi rim pa chen po las byuṅ ba'i brda bkrol ñer mkho bsdus pa*, f. 45a, where, in a discussion of the sGyu ma rigs grub pa branch of the Madhyamaka, the *snaṅ stoṅ tshogs pa* is said to be the object of *paryudāsa*-negation (*ma yin dgag*) in the case of positive determination (*yoṅs gcod = pariccheda*), and to be *kun rdzob bden pa dṅos* and *dom dam bden pa btags pa pa*, but never *don dam bden pa dṅos* according to all Mādhyamikas; and Žva dmar dGe 'dun bstan 'dzin rgya mtsho, *lHag mthoṅ chen mo'i dka' gnas rnams brjed byaṅ du bkod pa dGoṅs zab snaṅ ba'i sgron ma*. ff. 10a f., 103 b f. Cf. E. Napper, *Dependent-arising and Emptiness*, pp. 407-09, 435-7.

At the end of his *Lam gyi gtso bo rnam gsum*, Tsoṅ kha pa has written:

snaṅ ba rten 'brel (b)slu ba med pa daṅ/ /stoṅ pa khas len bral ba'i go ba gñis//

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Next Tsoṅ kha pa cites Ye šes sde according to whom neither Nāgārjuna nor Ārya-Deva has clearly stated in their respective treatises whether external objects exist. So Bhavya rebutted the Vijñaptimātra-system, setting out a doctrinal system in which external objects are said to exist on the level of transactional-pragmatic usage (*tha sñad* = *vyavahāra*). Then Śāntarakṣita later defended a different system according to which, in accordance with the Yogācāra, there are no external objects in

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ji srid so sor snaṅ ba de srid du/ /da duṅ thub pa'i dgoṅs pa rtogs pa med//
nam žig res 'jog med par cig car du/ /rten 'brel mi slur mthoṅ ba tsam ñid nas//
ṅes šes yul gyi 'dzin staṅs kun 'jig na/ /de tshe lta ba'i dpyad pa rdzogs pa lags//
gžan yaṅ snaṅ bas yod mtha' sel ba daṅ/ /stoṅ pas med mtha' sel žiṅ stoṅ pa ñid//
rgyu daṅ 'bras bur 'char ba'i tshul šes na/ /mthar 'dzin lta bas 'phrog par mi 'gyur ro//

'So long as the understanding of the two – Presentation/Appearance [or] origination in dependence which is non-delusive/unfailing and the Empty free from assertion [postulating a hypostatized entity] – are presented/appear separately, just so long is the intent (*abhiprāya*) of the Muni still not understood. [Cf. *Pañcakrama*, Yuganaddhakrama 13.] Once the [Empty] has been simply seen as unfailing origination in dependence, simultaneously (*yugapad, sakṛt*) and without any [alternating] occasionality [between the two], the entire mode of apprehending relating to objects [of hypostatic grasping] ceases in the knowledge of ascertainment; then analytical investigation pertaining to [correct] theory [*yaṅ dag pa'i lta ba*, the last of the three *lam gyi gtso bo*] is indeed complete. Moreover – Presentation/Appearance removing the extreme of existence and the Empty removing the extreme of non-existence – by knowing the way Emptiness is perceived as [the system of] cause and effect, one will not be enticed away by a view that posits extremes.'

This correlation of *snaṅ ba* with the elimination of the extreme position of existence and of *stoṅ pa* with the elimination of the extreme of nihilism is a special feature of Tsoṅ kha pa's theory of the *snaṅ stoṅ*. – On the *snaṅ stoṅ* compare further Tsoṅ kha pa's *rJe btsun 'jam pa'i dbyaṅs kyi lam gyi gnad, rJe Red mda' ba la šog dril du phul ba* (and lCaṅ skya, *Grub mtha'*, ga, ff. 33b-35b = pp. 450-2).

transactional-pragmatic usage, but in ultimate reality mind is without self-nature. It was these two schools of the Madhyamaka that Ye šes sde termed respectively the mDo de spyod pa'i dbu ma pa and the rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma pa.[209]

Finally, although it is true that Candrakīrti accepted the existence of external objects in transactional-pragmatic usage, since he does not agree with any other Siddhānta (in his systematic presentation of the two levels of reality) he could not be described as a Sautrāntika; and it is also altogether impossible to hold that he agrees with the Vaibhāṣikas.[210]

Concerning the question as to which Mādhyamika masters are to be followed when searching for the intent (*dgoṅs pa* = *abhiprāya*) of Nāgārjuna and Ārya-Deva, Tsoṅ kha pa states that following Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna, who is seen to have taken Candrakīrti's system to be supreme, the great masters of the *Lam rim* tradition (*gdams ṅag*, i.e. Po to ba *et al.*) themselves held his system to be supreme.[211] Tsoṅ kha pa concludes by

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[209] See the *lTa ba'i khyad par* by Ye šes sde. In the notes to this passage of the *LRChM* (kha, ff. 85b-86a), restrictions have been set for this periodization of the Indian Mādhyamikas. See also 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa, *Grub mtha' chen mo*, ii, ff. 106a-107a.

[210] *LRChM*, f. 343a = p. 573; see also f. 372b-373a = p. 622, *LŠÑP*, ff. 63b-64a = pp. 443-4, and *GR*, f. 264a-b = p. 481. That is, Candrakīrti cannot be classified, e.g., as a Bye brag smra ba daṅ tshul mtshuṅs pa (on this classification see above, p. 56). According to the note on this passage of the *LRChM* by 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa (kha, f. 86b), Candrakīrti cannot be said to agree with the Vaibhāṣikas because, even if he admits an external object on the *vyavahāra* level, he does not accept it as established substantively (*rdzas su grub pa*). And if he does not admit self-cognition (*svasaṃvedana*), his reason for not doing so is connected with his rejection of anything established by self-characteristic (**svalakṣaṇa*) (cf. *KNZB* § 5.2).

On Candrakīrti's apparently 'realist' idea of the *pramāṇa*s – *pratyakṣa, anumāna* plus *āgama* and *upamāna* – see *PPMV* i, p. 69 ff., especially p. 75. On his theory of *pratyakṣa* in particular, see T. Tillemans, *Materials for the study of Āryadeva, Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti* (Vienna, 1990), i, p. 37 ff.; and on the concept of *āgama*, see *ibid.*, i, p. 29 ff.

[211] *LRChM*, ff. 342b-343a = p. 573. On Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna view, see p. 16 →

stating that he considers the commentaries of Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti to be entirely accurate philosophical explications of the intent of Nāgārjuna and Ārya-Deva, and that he has therefore systematically set out this intent following these two commentators.[212]

above.

[212] *LRChM*, f. 343b = pp. 573-4.

II

THESES, PHILOSOPHICAL POSITIONS AND CONTENTION IN MADHYAMAKA THOUGHT

> Wollte man *Thesen* in der Philosophie aufstellen, es könnte nie über sie zur Diskussion kommen, weil Alle mit ihnen einverstanden wären.
> (L. Wittgenstein,
> *Philosophische Untersuchungen*, I, § 128)

1. THE PROBLEM

When the Philosophy of the Middle (Skt. Madhyamaka = Tib. dBu ma) was adopted in Tibet as what was to be that country's predominant school of thought, its Tibetan followers were confronted with a number of difficult, and highly interesting and challenging, philosophical problems several of which had not been fully and unambiguously clarified by their Indian sources. This adoption of the Madhyamaka in Tibet is reported to have occurred by royal command immediately following the 'Great Debate of bSam yas' that evidently took place in the 790s during the earlier progagation (*sṅa dar*) of the Dharma in Tibet.[1] By the beginning of the ninth century indigenous Tibetan scholarship had begun to grapple with some of these questions. The deeper and more systematic philosophical penetration of the many problems posed by the traditions of the Madhyamaka appears, however, to have become firmly rooted in Tibet only with the later propagation (*phyi dar*) of the Dharma. Initiated by scholars and translators such as the Tibetan Rin chen bzaṅ po (958-1055) and the Indian Atiša (Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna, 982-1054), this penetration was further pursued in the eleventh century by rṄog Blo ldan šes rab (1059-

[1] On the 'Great Debate of bSam yas' see below, §§ 14 and 19; and Section I, §§ 1 and 5 above.

1109) and (s)Pa tshab Ñi ma grags (b. 1055). Together with their immediate disciples these last two masters are regarded as the leading early Tibetan proponents of the Madhyamaka in its two branches known in Tibet as the Raṅ rgyud pa (Svātantrika) and Thal 'gyur ba (*Prāsaṅgika), a pair of designations which appears to have become current only towards the start of the later propagation of the Dharma in that country.

This critical exegetical and hermeneutical endeavour of the Tibetan Mādhyamikas called for both painstakingly acquired and rigorously cultivated receptivity to their Indian sources and sustained intellectual effort directed towards textual exegesis and internal philosophical reconstruction. This involved the establishment of the intention (*abhiprāya* = *dgoṅs pa*) of works ascribed to Nāgārjuna, Ārya-Deva, Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti. And it also included the internalization – a hermeneutical integration or appropriation – of Madhyamaka thought comprising a significant component of critical philosophical synthesis and systematization, as well as a creative but still faithful 'reading' eventually allowing for continued intellectual renewal.[2]

One of the most philosophically difficult and controversial of the problems encountered in the Madhyamaka was the question whether followers of this school may legitimately, within the frame of their school's philosophical principles, advocate a propositional thesis (*pratijñā* = *dam bca'*) and maintain an assertion/asserted tenet (*abhyupagama* = *khas len pa*)[3] or assertoric philosophical proposition/position (*pakṣa* = *phyogs*).

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[2] For further details on some of these points, see Section I above. For the concepts of *abhiprāya* and *nītārtha*, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, 'Purport, implicature and presupposition: Sanskrit *abhiprāya* and Tibetan *dgoṅs pa/dgoṅs gži*', *JIP* 13 (1985), pp. 309-25; 'An Indian source for the hermeneutical term *dgoṅs gži* "intentional ground"', *JIP* 16 (1988), p. 1-4; 'Allusiveness and obliqueness in Buddhist texts', in: C. Caillat (ed.), *Dialectes dans les littératures indo-aryennes* (Paris, 1989), pp. 295-328; and *Buddha-nature, Mind and the problem of Gradualism* (London, 1989), p. 26 ff. And on the creative relation of Tibetan culture to its Indian sources, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Ordre spirituel et ordre temporel dans la pensée bouddhique de l'Inde et du Tibet* (Paris, 1995), Part II.

[3] Skt. *abhyupagam-* (verb) and *abhyupagama* (noun), both rendered in Ti- →

The problem is, in other words, whether there is any place at all in Madhyamaka thought for a doctrine of one's own (*svamata* = *raṅ gi lugs*) in the form of an established philosophical system (*siddhānta* = *grub mtha'*).[4]

This problem raises in its turn the further question as to whether the Madhyamaka (and with it a major part of Mahāyānist thought) embraces a truly philosophical component, or whether it is rather (as some modern writers have opined) what is sometimes called a Wisdom Literature and a form of discursively – and therefore philosophically – inexpressible mysticism concerned solely with the ineffable. Furthermore, the question arises whether this mysticism borders on philosophical relativism or indifferentism where no theory, whatever its nature, is maintained, and where no analytical thought is admitted. In Tibet this topic was already a vexed issue at the 'Great Debate of bSam yas' towards the end of the eighth century.

This set of problems then poses the question as to the relation of certain theories in Mahāyānist, and in particular Madhyamaka, thought to multi-valued logics as opposed to two-valued logic. For, by definition, the Middle Way is a form of thought that steers clear of the doctrines of eternalism (*śāśvatānta*) and nihilism (*ucchedānta* 'annihilationism'). Within the history of Indian philosophy, there is the further matter of its historical and formal relation to the Non-Absolutism or Relativism (*anekāntavāda*), the Aspectualism or Perspectivism (*nayavāda*) and the Conditionalism or 'Quodammodo Doctrine' (*syādvāda*) of Jainism, a view that has been severely criticized by Buddhist thinkers.

From the following it will be seen that these important historical and philosophical issues are all linked in some way, indirectly or implicitly if not directly and explicitly, with the question whether the Mādhyamika maintains a philosophical proposition or thesis.

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betan by *khas len (pa)*, mean, in a general and weaker sense, to accept/acceptance (in regard to a view, doctrine etc.) and, in a strong sense, to assert/tenet. The context determines whether the weaker or stronger meaning is more appropriate.

[4] See also above, Section I.

A *pratijñā* (Tib. *dam bca'*) is basically an (assertoric philosophical) proposition, and then a thesis giving expression to such a proposition. In the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* ascribed to Nāgārjuna, the word refers in particular to a proposition or thesis positing – or at least presupposing and implying – a hypostatized (i.e. reified) entity (*bhāva* = *dṅos po*) possessing self-existence (*svabhāva* = *raṅ bžin, raṅ gi ṅo bo* 'aseitas'). It is the real existence of such entities that Nāgārjuna's opponent maintains. But of such entities Nāgārjuna has stated that nowhere do they in fact ever originate either from self, from an other, from both (i.e. itself and an other), or from no cause (*MK* i.1):

> *na svato nâpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nâpy ahetutaḥ/*
> *utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kva cana ke cana//*

In Madhyamaka thought, then, Emptiness (*śūnyatā*) of self-existence (*svabhāva*) of *bhāva*s – i.e. the non-substantiality of *dharma*s (*dharmaniḥsvabhāvatā, dharmanairātmya*) – is inseparably linked with the fact that all conditioned things (*saṃskṛtadharma*) originate in dependence on their (non-hypostatic) causes and conditions (*pratītyasamutpāda*), this fact being held to exclude their self-existence.

As for the philosopher's *vacana* (or *vacas, vākya*; Tib. *tshig*) often mentioned in the *VV(V)*, it is an utterance or statement lending verbal expression to a proposition. For the Mādhyamika, it may be a philosophically justified statement – such as *śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ* 'All entities are Empty' (*VVV* 1), *niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ* 'All entities are without self-existence' (*VVV* 17, 20) or *pratītyasamutpannatvān niḥsvabhāvaṃ niḥsvabhāvatvāc chūnyam* 'Without self-existence because of originating in dependence, empty becase of not having self-existence' (*VVV* 22) – or it may not be justified. Nāgārjuna considers that the Mādhyamika's own statement is just as much without self-existence (*na svābhāvikam*) and just as empty (*śūnya*) as others' statements, and that in this respect it does not differ from other things (*VV* 24). In other words, it possesses no privileged ontic-epistemic and logical status peculiar to itself.

The question of the place of the thesis and proposition in Buddhist thought – a problem which appears not to be unconnected with some of the topics already under discussion between Indian, Chinese and Tibetan thinkers towards the end of the eighth century at the time of the 'Great Debate of bSam yas' – has often been raised in Tibetan philosophical lit-

erature over the centuries. Although linked in the final analysis with the Mahāyānist axiom that ultimate reality (*paramārtha, tattva*) is discursively inexpressible (*anabhilāpya = brjod du med pa*) and that it is free from all four positions of the 'tetralemma' (*catuṣkoṭivinirmukta*) characterizing conceptual and reifying thinking, this problem has to be kept distinct and treated separately.[5] For whereas there is virtually universal

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[5] The idea that ultimate reality – the *paramārtha* – as such is inexpressible (or ineffable, *anabhilāpya, nirabhilāpya*; cf. also *avyavahāra* and *acintya*) is to be distinguished in the history of Buddhist thought from the concept of the indeterminable or undecidable (*avācya, avaktavya = brjod par bya ba ma yin pa*, etc., as in the case of the relation between the *skandha*s and the *pudgala* according to the Vātsīputrīyas). As something admitted in Buddhist thought, inexpressibility has also to be kept apart from the 'neither *x* nor not *x*' position represented by the fourth member of the 'tetralemma' (*catuṣkoṭi*), all of whose positions have in fact been repudiated by Buddhist thinkers. The idea is moreover distinguishable from the concept of the unexplicated (*avyākṛta = luṅ du ma bstan pa*, e.g. the *avyākṛtavastu*s or points left unanswered by the Buddha, on which see below, § 7); yet freedom from the four positions of the *catuṣkoṭi* is historically linked with the set of *avyākṛtavastu*s that concern the question whether a *tathāgata* (Tib. *de bžin gšegs pa* or *de bžin 'oṅs pa*: see below, § 7) exists after death. – This is not the place to enter into the question whether it would be self-falsifying (self-refuting) to predicate the property of inexpressibility of the inexpressible (namely the *paramārtha*); at all events, the Grelling-Nelson paradox (concerning whether, e.g. 'unpredicatable' has the autological, i.e. self-applicable, property of being itself unpredicatable, or whether on the contrary 'unpredicatable' is heterological, i.e. not self-applicable) does not appear to be relevant here.

Even though in Madhyamaka thought the *paramārtha* as such is inexpressible, philosophical discourse and thinking do none the less relate to it. On right knowledge (*pramāṇa*) operating on the level of transactional usage (*vyavahāra*) and of the surface-level (*saṃvṛti*) – the *tha sñad pa'i tshad ma = vyāvahārika-pramāṇa* – but not on the ultimate level of the *paramārtha*, see Section III below.

To designate a 'tetralemma', there are found in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* the forms *catuṣkoṭikā* (chap. ii, ed. Nanjō, p. 122), *cātuṣkoṭika°* (ii, pp. 124-125 etc.) and *cātuṣkoṭikā* (iii, p. 152; and Sagāthaka 250 and 474). In the *prabhi-*

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dyasaṃdarśana[vi]niścaya section of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (ed. Pradhan [Santiniketan, 1950], p. 103) and in the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* (ed. N. Tatia [Patna, 1976], p. 149), *catuṣkoṭika (mu bži pa)* is found alongside *dvikoṭika (mu gñis pa)* and *trikoṭika (mu gsum pa)*, all these words being terms for techniques employed in discussion and exposition in connexion with a question (*praśna*) or explanation (*vyākaraṇa*). The form *cātuṣkoṭika* is found in the Śrutamayī Bhūmiḥ of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. For details see L. Schmithausen, *Der Nirvāṇa-Abschnitt in der Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* [Vienna, 1969], note 290; see also S. Katsura, 'Tetralemma (*catuṣkoṭi*) explained by Venn diagrams', in E. Mayeda (ed.), *Original Buddhism and Mahāyāna Buddhism* (F. Watanabe Festschrift, Kyoto, 1993), p. 91 ff. On these three terms see also G. Oberhammer, *Terminologie der frühen philosophischen Scholastik in Indien*, ii, s. vv. A *ṣaṭkoṭiko vādaḥ* has been referred to in *VVV* 2. It may be noted that while in the Madhyamaka all four *koṭi*s are normally negated, in the Abhidharma literature *koṭi*s may be used positively as sets of (two, three or four) possible alternative positions. In Madhyamaka texts, where the reference is, then, to four positions that are negated – and from which freedom is sought –, the form usually found is *catuṣkoṭi*. Interestingly, given that in this last usage the four positions of the 'tetralemma' can all be regarded as empty or null, the Madhyamaka use of the term *catuṣkoṭi* turns out to approach in meaning the *nirvastuka* and *prātikṣepika*, two terms appearing along with *dvikoṭika, trikoṭika*, etc., in the last sources cited.

In Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* (iii, Sambandhasamuddeśa 20-21), the problem of describing something as *avācya* 'indescribable' turns up as a paradox. (For a recent discussion, see J. Houben, *The Saṃbandha-Samuddeśa* (Groningen, 1995), p. 213 f. Houben has investigated what he calls 'Bhartṛhari's perspectivism' in: E. Franco and K. Preisendanz (ed.), *Beyond Orientalism* [Amsterdam, 1997], pp. 317-58.). But in relation to Bhartṛhari this concept has been criticized by G. Cardona, 'Approaching the *Vākyapadīya*', *JAOS* 119 [1999], p. 88 ff.)

A rejection of *anākhyeyatva* 'ineffability' as a description applicable to something hard to describe is also found in Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka* iii. 47, where it is observed that, in the final analysis, something supposedly ineffable is still susceptible of expression by the epithet *anākhyeya* 'ineffable' (*antato 'nākhyeyaśabdena tasyâbhidhānasambhavāt*). The same passage alludes to the Buddhist epistemologists' definition of the unconceptual-

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izable *pratyakṣa*; and in his *Locana* Abhinavagupta refers to its critique by Ānandavardhana in his Vivṛti on the *Dharmottarī*, Dharmottara's commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya*.

On the question in Buddhism of the expressibility of the *paramārtha*, and on the related one of its knowability, see above, Section I, pp. 32, 40, 49, 59, 97; below, § 5; D. Seyfort Ruegg, *La théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra* (Paris, 1969), pp. 297 ff., 323, 388; and 'The uses of the four positions of the *catuṣkoṭi* and the problem of the description of reality in Mahāyāna Buddhism', *JIP* 5 (1977), pp. 1-71, especially p. 34 ff.

It may be noted, finally, that the 'both *x* and not *x*' position – such as the third of the four *koṭi*s of the 'tetralemma' repudiated in Buddhist thought as an excluded middle (*tṛtīya-rāśi* = *phuṅ gsum*) – may be compared with the Perspectivism or Aspectualism (*nayavāda*), the Non-Absolutism or Relativism (*anekāntavāda*) and Conditional Assertion in the 'Quodammodo Doctrine' (*syādvāda*) of the Jain philosophers, and with their theory of sevenfold qualified predication (*saptabhaṅgī*). These Jaina views have, however, been severely criticized by Buddhist thinkers as philosophically relativist and indifferentist, and as radically unphilosophical. For philosophical analyses of these Jaina concepts see, e.g., S. Mookerjee, *The Jaina philosophy of Non-Absolutism* (Calcutta, 1944); Y. J. Padmarajiah, *A comparative study of the Jaina theories of reality and knowledge* (Bombay, 1963), p. 269 ff.; K. N. Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist theory of knowledge* (London, 1963); and B. K. Matilal, *The central philosophy of Jainism (Anekānta-vāda)* (Ahmedabad, 1981). On the 'both *x* and not *x*' and the 'neither *x* nor not *x*' positions, see our 'The uses of the four positions of the *catuṣkoṭi* and the problem of the description of reality in Mahāyāna Buddhism' (cited above). And on the logical principles of bivalence and the excluded middle in Madhyamaka thought, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, *The literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India* (Wiesbaden, 1981), Index s. u. *tṛtīya(-rāśi)*. It should be recalled that in its arguments the Madhyamaka school makes use of the principle of the *tertium non datur*, and that logical bivalence applies to things considered real (on the surface level, as opposed to empty terms or non-referring expressions like *vandhyāputra* 'son of a barren woman' which cannot be qualified as being, e.g., either pale or dark).

It is, nevertheless, to be noted that, within the Buddhist tradition, a Śramaṇa or Brāhmaṇa described as *ekāntadarśin* (Tib. *mtha' gcig la lta ba*) →

agreement concerning the latter idea, the masters of the Madhyamaka – and in particular those connected with the Prāsaṅgika school who accept no autonomous inference (*svatantrānumāna*) or formal probative argument (*svatantraprayoga*), etc. – have none the less expressed differing views on the status of the thesis and philosophical position in their school.

The problem could arise for several reasons. According to a canonical source cited by Candrakīrti, the Buddha himself expressed his refusal to take up any contentious position, saying:

> 'People in the world dispute with me, but I do not dispute with people in the world. What is acknowledged in the world is also acknowledged by me. What is not acknowledged in the world is also not acknowledged by me.'[6]

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is criticized as one holding a one-sided (and thus 'extreme') view who engages in dispute (*vigraha*) and conflict (*vivāda*) (*Udānavarga* xxiii.4):

> *bhaveṣv eva hi sajyanta eke śramaṇabrāhmaṇāḥ/*
> *vigṛhya vivadantîme bālā hy ekāntadarśinaḥ//*

(This verse corresponds to *Udānavagga* vi.4, which reads *janā ekaṅgadassino.*)

On the general question of the philosophical component in Buddhism, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, 'Some reflections on the place of philosophy in the study of Buddhism', *JIABS* 18 (1995), p. 145 ff.

[6] See *PPMV* on *MK* xviii.8 (*sarvaṃ tathyam* ..., cited below, § 2): *tathā ca bhagavatôktam/ loko mayā sārdhaṃ vivadati nâhaṃ lokena sārdhaṃ vivadāmi/ yal loke 'sti sammataṃ tan mamâpi asti sammatam/ yal loke nâsti sammatam mamâpi tan nâsti sammatam ity āgamāc ca//* Cf. *MABh* vi.81. See Saṃyuttanikāya III, p. 138; *Trisaṃvaranirdeśa* (in the Ratnakūṭa collection), f. 10b. Cf. E. Lamotte, *Le traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse*, i (Louvain, 1944), p. 42.

In this connexion Candrakīrti cites two verses the second of which is *CŚ* viii.19:

> *yad yad asya priyaṃ pūrvaṃ tat tat tasya samācaret/*
> *na hi pratihataḥ pātram saddharmasya kathaṃcana//*
> *nânyayā bhāṣayā mlecchaḥ śakyo grāhayitum yathā/*
> *na laukikam ṛte lokaḥ śakyo grāhayitum tathā//*

→

Moreover, according to another well-known canonical passage, beginning with the night of his Awakening to Supreme Awakening up to his complete Nirvāṇa the Tathāgata utters no syllable whatever.[7] The same basic idea is evidently represented also by the idea of the Āryan silence (*āryas tūṣṇībhāvaḥ*; see below, § 7).

For the Mādhyamikas the problem has, however, proved to be especially acute because Nāgārjuna – the common source for all branches of the Madhyamaka school – himself explicitly stated that he has no *pratijñā*, and because this point has been repeated by Ārya-Deva, the second common source of all branches of the Madhyamaka, as well as by Candrakīrti, the principal master of the Prāsaṅgika branch of the Madhyamaka.[8] Moreover, the not taking up of contentious positions and strife-

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> 'One should first perform whatever is dear to a person; for no one who is repelled is a fit receptacle for the good Dharma.' – 'Just as a barbarian cannot be made to understand by means of a language other [than his own], just so people in the world cannot be made to understand save with the worldly [i.e. the transactional and pragmatic].'

The following verse of the *CŚ* dealing with the positions of existence, non-existence, etc., is quoted below, § 5.

For further Sūtra and Śāstra sources on the eschewing of *vivāda*, see below, § 6.

[7] See the *Tathāgataguhyasūtra* (P, tshi, f. 151b) quoted in *PPMV* xviii.7 (p. 366) ~ xxv.24 (p. 539): *yāṃ ca śāntamate rātriṃ tathāgato 'nuttarām samyaksambodhim abhisambuddho yāṃ ca rātrim anupādāya parinirvāsyati asminn antare tathāgatenâikam apy akṣaram nôdāhṛtaṃ nâpi pravyāharati nâpi pravyāhariṣyati*/...

[8] That the statement 'all entities/*dharma*s are unoriginated' should not be made a thesis (*pratijñā*) because the destruction of the thesis thus ensues (*pratijñāhāniḥ prasajyate*) has been explained in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (ed. Nanjō), iii, p. 166-7: *yadi mahāmate tayā pratijñayânutpannayânutpannāḥ sarvabhāvā iti pratijñāṃ kurvanti evam api pratijñāhāniḥ prasajyate*/ *pratijñāyāḥ sadasator anutpattibhāvalakṣaṇatvāt pratijñā na karaṇīyā*/ *anutpannasvabhāvalakṣaṇā hi mahāmate teṣāṃ pratijñā bhavati*/ *atas te mahāmate pratijñā na karaṇīyā bahudoṣaduṣṭatvād avayavānāṃ parasparahetuvila-*

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lessness have not seldom been referred to in major sources of the Madhyamaka. Yet Nāgārjuna, Ārya-Deva, Candrakīrti and the other Mādhyamikas who have all disowned a *pratijñā* in some sense were, nevertheless, thinkers engaged in expounding philosophical theory (*darśana* = *lta ba*) and doctrine (*vāda* = *smra ba*) – as distinct from speculative views or dogmas (*dṛṣṭi* = *lta ba*) – and in explaining a philosophical content that they held to be well-grounded and true – viz. the teaching or Dharma of the Buddha.

Confronted in this way with the question as to how Nāgārjuna's statement that the Mādhyamika has no *pratijñā*, etc., is to be related to the actual philosophical practice of the great masters of the Madhyamaka (and of Buddhism) both as exegetes and as philosophers, the Tibetan dBu ma pas have found it necessary to investigate in detail the disowning of a thesis by the Indian masters of their school along with its philosophical meaning and motivation. The need to do this was especially keenly felt

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kṣaṇakṛtakatvāc câvayavānāṃ pratijñā na karaṇīyā yad utânutpannā sarvadharmā evaṃ śūnyā asvabhāvāḥ sarvadharmāḥ iti mahāmate bodhisattvena mahāsattvena pratijñā na karaṇīyā/... Cf. also ii, p. 41.8; ii, p. 122.12 (in the discussion of a *catuṣkoṭikā*); v, p. 219.8 (verse 3, in connexion with the avoidance of disputes, *vivāda*, cited below, p. 149 note 59). This Sūtra in addition rejects the *pakṣa* that postulates existence/non-existence (*sad-asat*) in ii, p. 23.5 (verse 7); cf. also ii, pp. 72-73.

Unlike the case of, e.g., *MMK* i.1, however, there does not appear to be any compelling need to interpret the negation in *VV* 29 as being of the *prasajya* rather than *paryudāsa* type. But see below, §§ 8, 12, 14, 16 and 18-19.

That the rejection of a *pratijñā* must not, however, be equated with Position IV of the *catuṣkoṭi(kā)* can be seen from *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* ii, p. 122. The *Samādhirājasūtra* (ix.27, cited below, p. 145) indeed states that the wise person will not take his stand even in a middle position – a *metaxú* – located between the two extreme positions of existence and non-existence (i.e. Positions I and II of the *catuṣkoṭi*) – an important point that has sometimes been overlooked in discussions of the Madhyamaka as a Philosophy of the Middle. Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, 'The uses of the four positions of the *catuṣkoṭi* and the problem of the description of reality in Mahāyāna Buddhism', *JIP* 5 (1977), pp. 1-71.

since the problem had not been completely elucidated in the Indian sources.[9]

2. THE THESIS AND ASSERTION WITH NĀGĀRJUNA, ĀRYA-DEVA AND CANDRAKĪRTI

In the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* ('Dispeller of dispute') ascribed to Nāgārjuna we read (29-30):

> *yadi kācana pratijñā syān me tata eṣa me bhaved doṣaḥ/*
> *nâsti ca mama pratijñā tasmān nâivâsti me doṣaḥ//*
> *yadi kiṃcid upalabheyaṃ pravartayeyaṃ nivartayeyaṃ vā/*
> *pratyakṣādibhir arthais tadabhāvān me 'nupālambhaḥ//*
>
> 'If I had some *pratijñā*, this fallacy [alleged by the opponent in *VV* 4] would, as a consequence, be mine. But for me there is no thesis, so that this fallacy is not mine. Were I to apprehend something [reified] by means of direct perception and the other things [that are valid means of right knowledge], I would engage in affirmation or denial [of it]; [but] because of their absence no [such] charge [is to be levelled] against me.'[10]

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[9] Interpretations of certain aspects of this complex of problems by Jayānanda (in his *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā*) and by certain of his immediate Tibetan disciples (see below, § 8 ff.) have been criticized by several Tibetan scholars. See e.g. Tsoṅ kha pa Blo bzaṅ grags pa, *Lam rim chen mo*, cited below, § 15.

[10] Skt. *upālambha* = Tib. *klan ka* 'charge'; so also in *VV* 59 and 67, and in the *CŚ* (see below § 2). In Mātṛceṭa's *Varṇārhavarṇastotra* iv.20 (below, § 6), *klan ka* enters into the translation of *acodya* 'unchallengeable, unattackable'; but cf. ii.51 where *acodya* is rendered by *brgal bar 'os min*. This meaning differs slightly from the one given for *upālambha* in Oberhammer's *Terminologie der frühen philosophischen Scholastik in Indien* ii, p. 52b ('Widerlegung, Zurückweisung', but it approaches the meaning 'Aufzeigen von Fehlern in der gegnerischen Argumentation' identified *ibid.*, p. 53a, from the *Carakasaṃhitā*). In *MK* iv.9 quoted below (p. 123), *upālambha* has →

The first of this pair of verses contains the author's reply to his unnamed opponent's objection (expressed in *VV* 4) that the Mādhyamika's *pratijñā*

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on the other hand been translated by Tib. *skyon 'dogs (pa)*, and *upālabdha* by *skyon btags (pa)* (a rendering that thus corresponds more closely to the gloss *dūṣaṇa*, and *pratiṣedha*, found for *upālambha* in the Nyāya tradition quoted by Oberhammer).

VV 30 is the reply to an opponent's objection cited in *VV* 5-6:

> *pratyakṣeṇa hi tāvad yady upalabhya vinivartayasi bhāvān/*
> *tan nâsti pratyakṣaṃ bhāvā yenôpalabhyante//*
> *anumānaṃ pratyuktaṃ pratyakṣeṇâgamopamāne ca/*
> *anumānāgamasādhyā ye 'rthā dṛṣṭāntasādhyāś ca//*
>
> 'If to begin with you reject entities which you have perceived by direct perception, then no direct perception exists [as a means of right knowledge] whereby entities are perceived. [Now, if you suppose that entities are still rejected after having been perceived through inference, verbal testimony and analogical identification, I reply:] Inference is set aside by direct perception [only], as are verbal testimony and analogical identification as well as things establishable through inference and those establishable through comparison.'

In a recent article 'Against the attribution of the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* to Nāgārjuna', *WZKS* 42 (1998), pp. 151-66, F. Tola and C. Dragonetti have advanced arguments against the traditionally accepted authorship of the *VV(V)* (and also against that of the *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa*; see the same scholars' *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* [Delhi, 1995]) Individually, the arguments of these two scholars against the traditional authorship of the *VV(V)* are of varying cogency, and none seems to be conclusive by itself; cumulatively they might be thought to cast 'reasonable doubt' on the identity of authorship of the *VV(V)* and the *MK*. However, even if the *VV(V)* did not have the same author as the *MK*, it could still have been composed by a Deutero-Nāgārjuna (a possibility not investigated by Tola and Dragonetti). More importantly from the point of view of the present study, the *VV* has formed part of the recognized Nāgārjunian corpus since (at the latest) the time of Candrakīrti, who quotes it in the *PPMV*, and Bhavya (Bhā[va]viveka), the author of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* (D, f. 264b6). Its testimony is therefore entirely relevant to the problems under discussion here.

– viz. his statement (*vacana*) 'All entities are empty (*śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ*)' – is defective.[11] There this opponent is shown supposing the Mādhyamika to maintain that the former's denial of the Mādhyamika's rejection of self-existence (*svabhāva*) of all entities is invalid, in much the same way as this opponent had refuted (in *VV* 3) the idea that the Mādhyamika's denial of *svabhāva* might be comparable to saying 'do not make a noise' (*mā śabdaṃ kārṣīḥ*). And the opponent argues that it is not *his* denial of the Mādhyamika's denial that is invalid but, rather, the Mādhyamika's *pratijñā* negating the self-existence of all entities. This is so, he insists, because the proposition (*pakṣa*) is the Mādhyamika's. Hence – according to the opponent – the Mādhyamika's attempted rejection of his opponent's objection must itself be invalid. (There does not appear to be any need to interpret the negation here as being of the *prasajya* rather than the *paryudāsa* kind.)[12]

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[11] *VV* 4:

> *pratiṣedhapratiṣedho 'py evam iti mataṃ bhavet tad asad eva/*
> *evaṃ tava pratijñā lakṣaṇato dūṣyate na mama//*
>
> '[Opponent:] Should you think that [my] denial of [your] denial [of self-existence] is similar [to the objection that I expressed in verse 3: *mā śabdavad ity etat syāt te buddhir nâitad upapannam/ śabdena hy atra satā bhaviṣyato vāraṇaṃ tasya//*], this is not true. Thus it is your proposition that is defective with respect to its specific character, not mine.'

For the background to the inter-school debate in the *VV* and other works ascribed to Nāgārjuna, see K. Bhattacharya, 'On the relationship between the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* and the *Nyāyasūtra*-s', *Journal of Indo-European studies* 5 (1977), pp. 265-73; D. Seyfort Ruegg, 'Towards a chronology of the Madhyamaka school', in: L. Hercus *et al.* (ed.), *Indological and Buddhist studies* (J. W. de Jong Felicitation Volume, Canberra, 1982), p. 516 f.; J. Bronkhorst, 'Nāgārjuna and the Naiyāyikas', *JIP* 13 (1985), pp. 107-32.

[12] *VVV* 4: *syāt te buddhiḥ: pratiṣedhapratiṣedho 'py anenâiva kalpenânupapannaḥ tatra yad bhavān sarvabhāvasvabhāvapratiṣedhavacanaṃ pratiṣedhayati tad anupapannam iti/ – atra vayaṃ brūmaḥ/ etad apy asad eva/ kasmāt/ tava hi pratijñālakṣaṇaprāptaṃ, na mama/ bhavān bravīti śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti, nâham/ pūrvakaḥ pakṣo na mama/ tatra yad uktaṃ pratiṣe-* →

The opponent has moreover argued (as cited in *VV* 1):

> *sarveṣāṃ bhāvānāṃ sarvatra na vidyate svabhāvaś cet/*
> *tvadvacanam asvabhāvaṃ na nivartayituṃ svabhāvaṃ alam//*
>
> 'If [as you maintain] there is no self-existence for all entities, then your [own] statement [which is therefore itself] without self-existence, cannot controvert self-existence.'

That is, the Mādhyamika's philosophical statement has no capacity to annul the self-existence of entities if, as the Mādhyamika holds, all entities (thus including the Mādhyamika's own statement) have no self-existence. But, as already observed above (p. 108), Nāgārjuna was in fact perfectly prepared to accept that, like everything else, his statements are themselves empty of self-existence. But this fact in no way impairs the communicative efficiency of the Mādhyamika's philosophical statements, which are in any case not considered by Nāgārjuna to *make* things empty of self-existence.[13]

Now, according to the comment ascribed to Nāgārjuna himself (*VVV* 29), all entities (*sarvabhāva*) being empty (*śūnya*, viz. of self-existence), entirely quiet (*atyantopaśānta*) and 'isolated' in nature (*prakṛtivivikta*), the Mādhyamika can have no *pratijñā* concerning entities of the sort supposed by the opponent, viz. entities possessing self-existence. Hence no character (*lakṣaṇa*) of a *pratijñā* positing such entities applies (contrary to what the opponent has been shown arguing in *VV* 4). And the fallacy resulting from such an application of the character of a *pratijñā*, as al-

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dhapratiṣedho 'py evaṃ saty anupapanna iti, tan na//

On the question as to whether *prasajyapratiṣedha* is in operation here, see above, note 8; and below, §§ 8, 12, 14, 16 and 18-19.

13 For Nāgārjuna's reply, see *VV* 21 ff. On the informative (*jñāpaka*) – rather than factitive (*kāraka*) or probative (*sādhaka*) – function of Nāgārjuna's philosophical statements, see below, p. 120 and § 18. The principle according to which it is not the statement that entities are *niḥsvabhāva* that *makes* them so, but that they *are* simply *niḥsvabhāva*, is found in *VVV* 64 (quoted below, p. 208 note 161).

On the translation of the term *svabhāvaśūnya* by 'Empty of self-existence/nature', see the observation above, Section I, p. 38 note 71.

leged by the opponent, does not therefore impair Nāgārjuna's statement at all.[14]

Concerning the nature of his negative statement – and in reply to the opponent's objection that negation can apply only to something real that happens to be absent in a particular case (*VV* 11)[15] – Nāgārjuna has further stated (*VV* 63):

> *pratiṣedhayāmi nâhaṃ kiṃcit pratiṣedhyam asti na ca kiṃcit/*
> *tasmāt pratiṣedhayasîty adhilaya eṣa tvayā kriyate//*
>
> 'I negate nothing [existing by self-existence] and there exists nothing to be negated [by me]. Therefore, by alleging "you negate" you make a [false] imputation.'[16]

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[14] *VVV* on 29: *yadi ca kācin mama pratijñā syāt tato mama pratijñālakṣaṇaprāptatvāt pūrvako doṣo yathā tvayôktas tathā mama syāt/ na mama kācid asti pratijñā/ tasmāt sarvabhāveṣu śūnyeṣv atyantopaśānteṣu prakṛtivivivteṣu kutaḥ pratijñā/ kutaḥ pratijñālakṣaṇaprāptikṛto doṣaḥ/ tatra yad bhavatôktaṃ tava pratijñālakṣaṇaprāptatvāt tavâiva doṣa iti tan na/*

This line of argument has been developed by Ārya-Deva with regard to the reason (*hetu*) and example (*dṛṣṭānta*) in a *pratijñā* in *CŚ* xvi.21-23. See also Candrakīrti, *MA* vi.171-8.

[15] e.g., *nâsti ghaṭo gehe* 'there is no pot in [this] house'. See *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* IX.i.10 (cf. also *Nyāyasūtra* II.i.12 with commentaries). In the terminology of later times, the existent thing the absence of which is conveyed in a negation is known as a *pratiyogin* 'counterpositive'.

[16] In the Tibetan translation of the Kārikās only of the *VV* by Jñānagarbha and (s)Ka ba dPal brtsegs as revised by Jayānanda and Khu mDo sde 'bar, *adhilaya* has been translated by *yaṅ dag min (khyod kyis smras)*. And in the translation of the Kārikās together with the *Vṛtti* made by Jñānagarbha and dPal brtsegs (?), the word is rendered by *bkur pa* (Beijing ed.) ~ *skur pa* (sDe dge ed.) 'denial, rejection'. The *Vṛtti* speaks here of an irrelevant *(aprastuta) adhilaya (skur pa thog tu ma bab pa)*. Compare below, note 19.

According to a widely accepted principle in Indian philosophy (see note 15 above), negation is applicable only to something that is existent, the counterpositive (see e.g. the opponent's view reported in *VVV* 11: *sato 'rthasya pratiṣedhaḥ kriyate, nâsataḥ* ...). This is a question also treated in later →

In the following verse Nāgārjuna proceeds to explain how his negation does not *make* things empty but, rather, reveals (*jñāpayati* 'makes known') that they *are* empty (*VV* 64cd):

atra jñāpayate vāg asad iti tan na pratinihanti||

(see below, pp. 187 and 208).

VV 23 describes the nature of the negation in question as follows:

nirmitako nirmitakaṃ māyāpuruṣaḥ svamāyayā sṛṣṭam||
pratiṣedhayeta yadvat pratiṣedho 'yaṃ tathâiva syāt||

'Let the negation [employed by us] be like [the case where one] projected [illusion] might stop [another] projected [illusion, or where, in a magic show put on by a clever illusionist, one] man-of-*māyā* [might stop another] created by [the illusionist's] own illusory power (*māyā*).'[17]

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discussions of *nañartha*, it being presupposed that negation is not properly attachable when there is no object. See e.g. Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇavārttika* iv (Parārthānumānapariccheda) 225-6 = *Pramāṇaviniścaya* ii.16-17; and Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* 72:

niṣedhyābhāvataḥ spaṣṭaṃ na niṣedho 'sti tattvataḥ||
na ca nirviṣayaḥ sādhuḥ prayogo vidyate nañaḥ||

discussed by Haribhadra, *AAĀ* i.27 (ed. Wogihara, p. 45) and v.8-9 (p. 838); cf. also Jñānagarbha, *Satyadvayavibhaṅga* 9cd. (For the *pratiyogin* 'counter-positive' in later Indian philosophy, see B. K. Matilal, *The Navya-nyāya doctrine of negation* [Cambridge, Mass., 1968].)

[17] See also *VV* 27. – According to one theory of negation, there can properly speaking be negation (*pratiṣedha*) only of an existent, e.g. a pot; this axiom has been enunciated by Nāgārjuna's opponent in *VV* 11 (see note 16 above). In *VV* 30, Nāgārjuna argues that there would be affirmation/negation if some thing were really apprehended as existent by a valid means of right cognition (*pramāṇa*) – i.e. by direct perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), analogical identification (*upamāna*) and reliable testimony (*āgama*). But all entities (*sarvabhāva*) being empty of self-existence, there really exists no thing for the Mādhyamika to negate; and the opponent's criticism of Nāgārjuna for negating everything is therefore without relevance (*aprastuta*). (The question whether negation can be applied to a real thing has been discussed →

The idea that no charge (*upālambha* = *klan ka*) of the sort made by the opponent can actually be levelled against one who understands all entities to be empty of self-existence (*svabhāvaśūnya*), and who therefore entertains no thesis postulating a reified positive or negative self-nature for entities – that is, the principle that no imputation (*adhilaya*) of the kind envisaged can be made against this philosopher – has been further mentioned in other passages of the *VV*.[18]

In his *MK* (xxiv.13) Nāgārjuna has observed:

śūnyatāyām adhilayaṃ yaṃ punaḥ kurute bhavān//
doṣaprasaṅgo nâsmākāṃ sa śūnye nôpapadyate//

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in the sources cited in note 15 above.)

When the Mādhyamika makes use of negation, then, it is as if, in a magic show, one illusory thing puts an end to another (*VV* 23, 27). Neither is real, both being products of the illusionist's cleverness and dexterity. Use of negation does not therefore imply, for the Mādhyamika, the existence of a self-existent real negandum (*pratiṣedhya, pratiṣeddhavya* = *dgag byȧ*). (See also *YṢ* 8cd and 46, quoted by mKhas grub rje, *TThCh*, f. 148a.)

For the example in *VV* 23, compare *MK* xvii.32, where the *dṛṣṭānta* is applied to an agent and an action.

18 See *VV* 59:

sarveṣāṃ bhāvānāṃ śūnyatvaṃ côpapāditaṃ pūrvam/
sa upālambhas tasmād bhavaty ayaṃ apratijñāyāḥ//

'The fact that all entities are empty having been previously established, this criticism [of yours] therefore relates to what is [in fact] no *pratijñā* [of mine]';

and *VV* 67:

yadi ca svabhāvataḥ syād grāhaḥ kas taṃ nivartayed grāham/
śeṣesv api esa vidhis tasmād eṣo 'nupālambhaḥ//

'If the perception [of a mirage, *mṛgatṛṣṇā*, *VV* 65] existed by self-existence, what would cancel this perception? This same rule applies to the other [*dharma*s] also, so that this [criticism, raised in *VV* 13-14] is [in fact] no criticism.'

> 'The [false] imputation[19] you moreover make concerning Emptiness does not arise as an error of ours: it is not appropriate for the Empty.'

That is, according to Candrakīrti's *PPMV*, it does not apply in the case of the doctrine of Emptiness (*śūnyatāvāda*), which has the sense not of negativism or nihilism (*abhāva*) but, rather, of origination in dependence (*pratītyasamutpāda*).

A related point has been made by Ārya-Deva in his *Catuḥśataka* (xvi.25):

> *sad asat sadasac cêti yasya pakṣo na vidyate/*
> *upālambhaś cireṇâpi tasya vaktuṃ na śakyate//*
>
> 'It is not even remotely possible to level a charge[20] against somebody who has no proposition/position [positing some entity] as existent, non-existent and both existent and non-existent.'[21]

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[19] In Candrakīrti's *PPMV ad loc.*, *adhilaya* is glossed as *adhikṣepa* 'abuse, dismissal', and as *nirākaraṇa* 'refutation' and *pratikṣepa* 'rejection'. The Tibetan translation here has *spoṅ ba(r byed pa)*; but in *PPMV* vii.15 (p. 159. 15) *adhilaya* is rendered by *smod pa(r byed pa)* 'blame'. Cf. above, p. 119 note 16.

The reference is to the opponent's objection cited in *MK* xxiv.1:

> *yadi śūnyam idaṃ sarvam udayo nâsti na vyayaḥ/*
> *catūrṇām āryasatyānām abhāvas te prasajyate//*

[20] Here, just as in the *VV*, *upālambha* has been translated by *klan ka*.

[21] The Tibetan translation of this verse in the bsTan 'gyur is

> *yod daṅ med daṅ yod med ces/ /gaṅ la phyogs ni yod min pa//*
> *de la yun ni riṅ po na'aṅ/ /klan ka brjod par nus ma yin//*

(The no-thesis concept as presented in the Chinese version of Ārya-Deva's *Śataśāstra* is rather different; see the relevant part of G. Tucci, *Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist lexts on logic from Chinese sources* [Baroda, 1929], p. 85.)

A variant, where *khas mi len pa (= anabhyupagama)* replaces *phyogs ni yod min pa*, is in the Tibetan version of Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* 68:

→

In a theoretically and methodologically crucial passage in the *MK* we moreover read (iv.8-9):

vigrahe yaḥ parīhāraṃ kṛte śūnyatayā vadet/
sarvaṃ tasyâparihṛtaṃ samaṃ sādhyena jāyate//
vyākhyāne ya upālambhaṃ kṛte śūnyatayā vadet/
sarvam tasyânupālabdhaṃ samaṃ sādhyena jāyate//

'If someone made a rebuttal when a debate[22] is being conducted in terms of Emptiness, nothing at all [would serve him as] a rebuttal: there [merely] arises an equivalent of that which

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yod daṅ med daṅ yod med ces/ /khas mi len pa gaṅ yin pa//
de la nan tan ldan pas kyaṅ/ /cir yaṅ klan ka bya mi nus//

Here Ārya-Deva's *cireṇâpi* appears to be understood as *nan tan ldan pas kyaṅ* 'even with effort' (see also Bodhibhadra, *Jñānasārasamuccayanibandhana* [ed. Mimaki, *La réfutation bouddhique des choses* (Paris, 1976)], p. 206). In his own *Vṛtti*, Śāntarakṣita refers to all four *koṭis*, rather than just to the first three. He also cites *CŚ* xvi.25, the Tibetan version of which reads

gaṅ gi phyogs la yod pa daṅ/ /med daṅ yod med yod min pa//
de la klan ka bya bar ni/ /yun riṅ du yaṅ brjod mi nus//

The preceding verse (67) of the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* is

dṅos po kun gyi raṅ bžin ni/ /rigs pa'i lam gyi rjes 'braṅ ba//

gžan dag 'dod pa sel bar byed/ /de phyir rgol ba'i gnas med do//

For the four extreme positions of the *catuṣkoṭi*, only three of which have actually been mentioned in *CŚ* xvi.25, see e.g. *CŚ* viii.20 (below, p. 128) and xiv.21 (below, p. 139).

See also *CŚ* xvi.10:

dṅos po mthoṅ nas dṅos po ni/ /med pa žes bya bzlog 'gyur na//
de ltar phyogs ni bži char la/ /ñes pa spaṅs pa gaṅ žig mthoṅ//

'The non-existence of an entity being excluded when an entity is seen, in the case of the four *pakṣas* [corresponding to the four positions of a *catuṣkoṭi*] what is seen to be without a defect?'

22 The word *parihāra* is understood as the reply to an *upālambha* (see Oberhammer's *Terminologie* ii, p. 161). Candrakīrti glosses *vigraha* by *parapakṣadūṣaṇa* 'refutation of an opponent's thesis (or: a counter-thesis)'.

> is to be established. If someone made a charge when an explanation is being given in terms of Emptiness, nothing at all [would serve him as] a charge[23]: there [merely] arises an equivalent of that which is to be established.'

That is, whatever might be advanced as a reply in debate, or as an objection, against what is within the scope of *śūnyatā* (expressed in the statement 'All entities are Empty of self-existence') itself falls within the domain of this same *śūnyatā* and cannot therefore found any argument against it.[24] Candrakīrti explains that the existence of feeling (*vedanā*) and the following three Groups (*skandha*) cannot be adduced to counter the non-substantiality and Emptiness of the material (*rūpa*, the first *skandha*); for existence (*sadbhāva* = *yod pa*, as hypostatized entities) of the last four *skandhas* proves on examination to be equivalent (*sama*) to, and hence just as moot as, what the substantialist wished at first to establish as his conclusion (*sādhya*), namely the existence of the material (*rūpasadbhāva* = *gzugs kyi yod pa*), the first *skandha*. Hence any argument and any objection (*upālambha* = *codya*) of the substantialist against Emptiness (*śūnyatā*) and non-substantiality (*niḥsvabhāvatā*) are said by Candrakīrti to be *sādhyasama*. In the preceding verse it was said (*MK* iv.7):

> *vedanācittasaṃjñānāṃ saṃskārāṇāṃ ca sarvaśaḥ*
> *sarveṣāṃ eva bhāvānāṃ rūpenâiva samaḥ kramaḥ//*
>
> 'For feeling, consciousness, concepts and conditioning factors in their entirety – in fact for all [putative hypostatized] entities – the procedure is the same as with the material itself.'[25]

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[23] Skt. *upālambha* has here been translated by *skyon 'dogs (pa)*, and *anupālabdha* by *skyon btags min*; cf. p. 115 note 10.

[24] See also *CŚ* viii.16 (quoted in *PPMV* iv.9):

> *bhāvasyâikasya yo draṣṭā draṣṭā sarvasya sa smṛtaḥ/*
> *ekasya śūnyatā yâiva sâiva sarvasya śūnyatā//*
>
> 'The seer of one thing is considered the seer of [anything at] all: Emptiness of one thing is [tantamount to] Emptiness of [anything at] all.'

[25] The defect mentioned here in *MK* iv.8-9 appears to concern the rule →

(*vidhi, PPMV*, p. 127.15) that precludes the regress or circularity inherent in arguments which opponents direct against Emptiness (*śūnyatā*) and non-substantiality (*niḥsvabhāvatā*). Compare the term *sādhyasama (bsgrub par bya ba daṅ mtshuṅs pa)* in *VV* 28 and *VVV* 69 and in *Vaidalyasūtra* 36-37 (in *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* 40, a form of *petitio principii* has been addressed under the label of *sādhyasama*). J. May, *Candrakīrti: Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti* (Paris, 1959), pp. 93-94, 532, translated *samaṃ sādhyena* in *MK* iv.8-9 by 'pétition de principe'. The translation 'begging the question' was, however, criticized by K. Bhattacharya, *JIP* 2 (1974), pp. 225-30; and B. K. Matilal, *JIP* 2, p. 221 f., who sought to show that Nāgārjuna's *sādhyasama* does not correspond to Aristotle's definition of *petitio principii*, preferred to render it by 'same predicament'. The matter is complicated (as has been pointed out by K. Mimaki in a lecture and private communication).

In logic, *petitio principii* is normally understood technically as a fallacy that consists in assuming as part of the premisses the conclusion to be proved, that is, as an argument where one of the premisses depends on, or is equivalent to, the conclusion. But the idea here in the *MK* – where (as in Ārya-Deva's *CŚ* viii. 16) *śūnyatā* is the theme – evidently has a wider scope than does a criticism directed just against the logical fallacy of the vicious circle, and it extends beyond argument and proof (though such are evoked by references here to *parihāra* in *vigraha* and to *upālambha* in *vyākhyāna*). A certain form of circularity does, nevertheless, appear to be alluded to in *MK* iv.7-9; Candrakīrti concludes his comment by saying that any argument directed against *śūnyatā* will be *sādhyasama* (*sarvaṃ vacanam asya sādhyasamaṃ bhavati*), as will be any *upālambha* = *codya*. (Cf. *MA* vi. 174-5.) For the Mādhyamika, such circularity is regularly 'vicious', never 'virtuous'. The whole issue addressed in *MK* iv.8-9 does not appear to be reducible to that of *parasparāpekṣikī siddhiḥ (phan tshun [b]ltos pa'i sgrub pa)*, where one of two correlative factors is used to establish the second and *vice versa*; nor is it identical with *anyonyāpekṣatva (phan tsun [b]ltos pa, gcig la gcig [b]ltos pa) : anyonyāśraya (phan tshun [b]rten pa) : itaretarāśraya (phan tshun [b]rten pa)*, i.e. a fallacious mutual dependency between the logical reason and the conclusion in a reasoning. There may, however, exist a certain (more or less distant) conceptual link with circular regress (*cakraka*), and with the case where there exists no firm foundation for final determination thus leading to fallacious regressive (or circular) reasoning (*anavasthā* = *avyavasthā* = *aniṣṭhā*, i.e. regressus in (in)finitum). Later in Madhyamaka →

Concerning a *pakṣa* and its correlative counter-proposition/position (*pratipakṣa*), in the *Ratnāvalī* also ascribed to Nāgārjuna we read (ii.4):

> *dṛṣṭaśrutādyaṃ muninā na satyaṃ na mṛṣôditam/*
> *pakṣād dhi pratipakṣaḥ syād ubhayaṃ tac ca nârthataḥ//*
>
> 'What is seen, heard and so forth is said by the Sage to be neither true nor false: from a proposition/position a counter-proposition/position (*mi mthun phyogs*) may proceed, but neither [holds] in fact.'[26]

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philosophy, non-establishment (*asiddhatā*) due to the defect of *sādhyasama (sgrub byed bsgrub bya daṅ mthsuṅs pa['i thal 'gyur])* underpins one of the apagogic reasonings (*thal 'gyur* = *prasaṅga*) employed by the Prāsaṅgika to controvert and deconstruct substantialist thinking. The rendering 'same predicament' is perhaps after all the most suitable, and it avoids confusion with *petitio principii* as defined by Aristotle. – It is to be noted that in his *Prajñāpradīpa* iv.7 (D, f. 88a) Bhavya has referred to the eventuality of the non-establishment of the logical reason (*hetor asiddhārthatā*, due to the unavailability of a *dṛṣṭānta* for the universal statement 'All *bhāva*s are *śūnya*/*niḥsvabhāva*'), as well as of the contradictoriness of the logical reason (*hetor viruddhārthatā*, because what is encompassed by the *skandha*s is recognized to exist *vyavahāratas* 'in transactional-pragmatic usage'). In his comment on iv.8 (D, f. 179b) Buddhapālita already mentioned the problem of finding a *dṛṣṭānta* for the universal statement 'All *bhāva*s are *śūnya*/*niḥsvabhāva*'. (On the terms *samaprasaṅgitā* and *tulyaprasaṅgatva*, see below, p. 270, note 55.)

[26] cf. *Ratnāvalī* i.72:

> *vināśāt pratipakṣād vā syād astitvasya nāstitā/*
> *vināśaḥ pratipakṣo vā kathaṃ syād astyasambhavāt//*
>
> 'Because of [its] destruction, or because of a counter-position (*gñen po*), for existence [by self-existence of a thing supposedly having a *svabhāva*] there would [then] be [its] non-existence. [But] because of the non-existence (or: impossibility) of [such] existence [presupposing *svabhāva*] how would there be destruction, or a counter-position?'

On the meanings of *pakṣa*, cf. below, p. 130 note 35. And on the uses of bi- →

This verse follows one stating that neither *ātman* nor *anātman* is apprehended in reality, and that the two correspond to two speculative views (*dṛṣṭi*) equally excluded by the great Sage (ii.3):

> *nâivam ātmā na cânātmā yāthābhūtyena labhyate/*
> *ātmānātmakṛte dṛṣṭī vavārâsmān mahāmuniḥ//*

These two verses from the *Ratnāvalī* have been quoted by Candrakīrti in the *PPMV* on *MK* xviii.6 where Nāgārjuna has stated that, while the designation *ātman* has been used and *anātman* has been taught, the Buddhas have in fact taught neither *ātman* nor *anātman*:

> *ātmêty api prajñapitam anātmêty api deśitam/*
> *buddhair nâtmā na cânātmā kaścid ity api deśitam//*[27]

In *MK* xviii.8 Nāgārjuna has specified that teachings that all is 'so' (*tathya*, i.e. true), 'not so' (*atathya*, i.e. *mṛṣā* 'false'), 'both so and not so' (i.e. the conjunction of contraries) and 'neither so nor not so' (i.e. the bi-negation of contraries) represent the Buddhas' progressive instruction (*anuśāsana*):

> *sarvaṃ tathyaṃ na vā tathyaṃ tathyaṃ câtathyam eva ca/*
> *nâivâtathyam nâiva tathyam etad buddhānuśāsanam//*

According to Candrakīrti, because the *buddha*s, employing great compassion, introduce their various disciples to the ambrosial essence of reality (*tattvāmṛtāvatāra*), their teaching is a progressive one (*anupūryvā śāsanam*), or one that conforms to their disciples (*vineyajanānurūpyeṇa śāsanam*).[28] Here Candrakīrti quotes Ārya-Deva's *Catuḥśataka* (viii.20):

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negation ('neither *x* nor not *x*'), see D. Seyfort Ruegg, 'The uses of the four positions of the *catuṣkoṭi* and the problem of the description of reality in Mahāyāna Buddhism', *JIP* 5 (1971), pp. 1-71. (P. Balcerowicz, 'Formal analysis of the *Catuṣkoṭi*', in: P. Piekarski *et al.* [ed.], *International Conference on Sanskrit and Related Studies* [Cracow, 1995], pp. 29-30, has objected to this use of the word bi-negation for the 'neither ... nor' construction, the functor of bi-negation being, for him, *p*/*q* 'neither *p* nor *q*'.)

[27] On the interpretation of this verse, see 'The uses of the four positions of the *catuṣkoṭi*...', *JIP* 5 (1977), pp. 7-9.

[28] See *JIP* 5, pp. 5-6, 37-39. Compare the Buddhas' *śāsanāmṛta* that goes beyond existence and non-existence (*nāstyastitva*) in *Ratnāvalī* i.62.

sad asat sadasac cêti nôbhayaṃ cêti kathyate|
nanu vyādhivaśāt sarvam auṣadhaṃ nāma jāyate||

'Mention is made [in the Buddha's teachings] of the existent, the non-existent, the existent and non-existent, and what is neither. [Indeed,] does not everything become what is called medicine depending on [the various] illnesses [to be treated]?'[29]

Reality is then defined as without discursive proliferation (*prapañcair aprapañcitam*) and as free of dichotomizing conceptual construction (*nir-vikalpa, MK* xviii.9). Hence, for the Mādhyamika, it cannot be hypostatized in terms of the four positions of the 'tetralemma' (*catuṣkoṭi*).[30]

In this connexion reference may be made to *MK* xxii.11, where four positions have been considered in relation to a *tathāgata*:

śūnyam iti na vaktavyam aśūnyam iti vā bhavet|
ubhayam nobhayaṃ cêti prajñaptyarthaṃ tu kathyate||

'One must not say "empty", or else there would be "not empty", both ["empty and not empty"] and neither. Yet, for the sake of designation, [such] is declared.'[31]

Exactly how, then, are the Sanskrit term *pratijñā* and its Tibetan equivalent *dam bca'* – together with the corresponding verbal forms Skt. *pratijānīte* and Tib. *dam bca' ba* – to be understood?

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[29] *PPMV* xviii.8 (p. 372). Cf. *JIP* 5, p. 7. – Instead of *sarvam (thams cad)*, part of the textual tradition reads *pathyam ('phrod pa)* 'salutary'.

[30] cf. above, p. 109 note 5 and p. 113 note 8; below, § 5; and *JIP* 5, p. 10 f. – On another use of bi-negation (the 'neither *x* nor not *x*' formula) in the Madhyamaka which does *not* correspond to Position IV of the *catuṣkoṭi*, see our remarks in *JIP* 5, pp. 16-18.

[31] The predicates here refer, according to the context, to the masculine noun *tathāgata*. La Vallée Poussin however read *aśūnyam* and restored *śūnyam* (cf. *PPMV* xv.2, p. 264); and de Jong has the same reading in his edition of the *MK*. See *JIP* 5 (1977), p. 13 f. Cf. *MK* xxii.12 quoted below, p. 140.

In a number of our sources the term *pratijñā* clearly refers to a propositional thesis postulating an entity (*bhāva* = *dṅos po*) possessing self-existence (*svabhāva* = *raṅ bžin, ran gi ṅo bo ñid*). And it is just such a thesis that Nāgārjuna and Ārya-Deva disown in the *VV* and the *CŚ*. This meaning is also attested in the Sanskrit text of Candrakīrti's *PPMV* i, p. 16.12 (*svatantrā pratijñā*), p. 23.3 (*svapratijñā*), p. 19.4 (*svapratijñā[tā]rtha*) and pp. 18.6, 24.5 and 34.5 (*parapratijñā*), in particular in the context of his critical examination of the employment of an autonomous inference (*svatantrānumāna*) and an autonomous formal probative argument (*svatantraprayogavākya*) by Bhavya (Bhā[va]viveka) in order to establish the understanding of the Madhyamaka in connexion with the problem of the origination of an entity supposedly endowed with self-existence from self, an other, both and causelessly (*MK* i.1; see above, p. 108).

In another passage of the *PPMV*, however, the meaning 'sentence' or 'statement' is no less securely attested for the word *pratijñā*. For example, the four (negative) statements enunciated by Nāgārjuna in *MK* i.1 – 'Never anywhere do any entities exist originated from self, nor from an other, nor from the two, nor from no cause [i.e. from neither self nor an other]', – are termed *pratijñā*s by Candrakīrti (*PPMV* on i.1, p. 13.3, and *MABh* vi.8, pp. 81-82).[32] Moreover, Nāgārjuna's two statements in *MK* viii.1:

> *sadbhūtaḥ kārakaḥ karma sadbhūtaṃ na karoty ayam/*
> *kārako nâpy asadbhūtaḥ karmâsadbhūtam īhate//*
>
> 'A real agent does not effect a real action, nor does an unreal agent bring about an unreal action'

are referred to by Candrakīrti as *pratijñā*s (*PPMV*, p. 181.1-2; cf. *PPMV* on viii.7, p. 185.31); but of course such a thesis does not involve Nāgārjuna in asserting the self-existence of any kind of reified *bhāva*. Similarly, in commenting on *MK* xxi.2

> *bhaviṣyati kathaṃ nāma vibhavaḥ sambhavaṃ vinā/*
> *vinâiva janma maraṇaṃ vibhavo nôdbhavaṃ vinā//*
>
> 'How indeed without a coming into existence will there be a passing from existence (*vibhava* 'destruction'), [for then] with-

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[32] See also, e.g., Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāra-Ṭīkā* vi (D, f. 119b).

out birth precisely [there would be] death; there is [then] no passing from existence without a birth',

Candrakīrti identifies the *pratijñā* ('How indeed without a coming into existence will there be a passing from existence?'), the adduction of an apagogic argument pointing out a consequence undesired by the opponent (*prasaṅgāpādana*: '[for then] without birth precisely [there would be] no death'), and the conclusion (*nigamana:* 'there is no passing from existence without a birth').[33] Additionally, in the context of the Vinaya, Candrakīrti has employed the word *pratijñā* in the meaning of 'vow' (*PPMV* xvii.32, p. 334.21).

This second set of examples taken from Candrakīrti's *PPMV* demonstrates that the Mādhyamika can and in fact does use the word *pratijñā* in a positive or neutral context, without automatically having to reject it as a thesis that posits some kind of self-existent entity or relegating it to an opponent's *pūrvapakṣa*. And we accordingly have to distinguish between a *pratijñā/dam bca'* as a philosophical statement or thesis enunciated by, e.g., Nāgārjuna or another Mādhyamika, and a *pratijñā/dam bca'* as a propositional thesis positing (or presupposing and implying) the substantial self-existence of a *bhāva*, which the Mādhyamika firmly rejects. Though of course related etymologically, the meanings 'statement', 'vow' and 'propositional thesis (positing/presupposing/implying a self-existent entity)' that belong to Skt. *pratijñā* and Tib. *dam bca'* have therefore to be carefully distinguished in the philosophical usage of the Mādhyamikas.[34]

The word *pakṣa* = *phyogs* has been employed by the Mādhyamikas in much the same way as *pratijñā/dam bca'* 'thesis', as is seen when it denotes the kind of philosophical proposition or position disowned by the Mādhyamika.[35] It has, however, been used in addition by Candrakīrti in a

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[33] See also *PPMV* iv.2 (p. 123.11) for *pratijñā*; and v.5 (p. 131.17) for *nigamana* 'conclusion'. – For the *pratijñā* in an opponent's *pūrvapakṣa* (which is of course rejected), see *PPMV* xii.2 (p. 227.12), xx.20 (p. 403.15), and p. 9.1 where we find the expression *pratijñāmātra(ka)*.

[34] For some relevant Sūtra passages, see above, p. 113 note 8.

[35] See e.g. *MK* ii.10:

→

positive context in the *avataraṇikā* to *PPMV* xxiv.15 (p. 501.10: ... *āsmākīne pakṣe supariśuddhatare sarvavyavasthāsv aviruddhe vyavasthite* ...). Under the influence evidently of logicians like Dharmakīrti – and like some of this master's successors[36] who developed a synthesis of the Madhyamaka with the Pramāṇa school – the Tibetan Mādhyamikas have not hesitated to formulate *prasaṅga*-type arguments in which a *pakṣa* or *pratijñā* are found.[37] Indeed, as has just been seen, Candrakīrti has himself sanctioned this use of *pratijñā*.[38]

As for the term *vacana/vacas/vākya* = *tshig*, it has been noted above (§ 1) that it denotes in the *VV* a statement which gives verbal expression to a propositional thesis. This usage is attested also in the *PPMV* (e.g. ix.11, p. 198. 16: *tasya ca mayā svabhāvābhiniveśanivartakam eva vacanam uktam asadviparyāsapratipakṣeṇa*).

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pakṣo gantā gacchatîti yasya tasya prasajyate/
gamanena vinā gantā, gantur gamanam icchataḥ//

and *Ratnāvalī* ii.4 (quoted above, p. 126).

The function in an inference of the *pakṣa*, as the equivalent of *sādhya* or *anumeya*, has been studied by J. F. Staal, *JIP* 2 (1973), pp. 156-166. On the relation between *pakṣa* and *pratijñā*, see also M. Inami, 'On *pakṣābhāsa*', in: E. Steinkellner (ed.), *Studies in the Buddhist epistemological tradition*, p. 69 ff. But here we are concerned only with *pakṣa* 'position' as either the equivalent of *pratijñā*, or as the propositional content of a *pratijñā*.

36 An example is Jitāri. In his *Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya* 8 (ed. Shirasaki, p. 130), Jitāri has discussed the question whether the absence of ultimate self-existence is establishable if it is at the same time held that the Mādhyamika has neither a *sādhana* nor a *sādhya* on the *paramārtha* level, as well as the question of the acceptance (*abhyupagama*) of a *pramāṇa*.

37 See below, Section III.

38 See *PPMV* xxi.2, referred to above.

As for the term *abhyupagama*, it does not appear in the *MK*. In *MK* xxi.14 we do, however, find *abhyupapanna* = *khas blaṅs*:

bhāvam abhyupapannasya śāśvatocchedadarśanam/
prasajyate, sa bhāvo hi nityo 'nityo 'tha vā bhavet//

Given the two distinct uses of *pratijñā* and of *pakṣa*, then, there appears to be no paradox in a philosopher's stating 'I have no thesis (postulating a self-existent *bhāva*)', for this sentence is not automatically equivalent to 'I have no philosophical thesis (of any kind)' (i.e. no *darśana, vāda*, etc.). And no logical inconsistency need then exist between Nāgārjuna's statement in *VV* 29 to the effect that he has no *pratijñā* and the actual procedure of this philosopher, and of other Mādhyamikas, who in effect set forth a philosophy (*darśana, vāda, siddhānta*).

In the history of the Madhyamaka there does, however, appear to have existed a certain tension between the idea that the Mādhyamika can have no thesis or position of any kind at all and the quite different notion that he has no thesis or position positing/presupposing/implying the existence of an entity having self-existence. This is a problem that has been addressed in particular by the Tibetan exegetical traditions, some of whose masters have concluded that the Mādhyamika indeed has no philosophical proposition, thesis, tenet or position (*dam bca', khas len pa, phyogs*) of any sort, whilst others have on the contrary allowed that it is possible for the Mādhyamika to propound the propositions of Madhyamaka philosophy as their theses (*dam bca'*), and to utter verbalized formulations of the latter as their philosophical statements (*tshig*). The first view encounters two difficulties, namely that masters of the Madhyamaka have in fact set forth philosophical teachings, and that one of the chief authorities of the Prāsaṅgika branch, Candrakīrti, has indeed on occasion referred to such teachings as *pratijñā*s. Nor does the first view satisfactorily meet the objection that the statement 'I have no *pratijñā*' – itself a proposition – is, evidently, self-falsifying if understood as also being self-referential. As for the second view that the Mādhyamika does indeed have a philosophical position or thesis, it will need to explain what Nāgārjuna intended when he stated 'I have no *pratijñā*' by restricting the scope of the thesis he thus repudiates to one that posits/presupposes/implies self-existent entities – those negated for instance in *MK* i.1 – or by fully accounting for it in some other way that is satisfactory in terms of Madhyamaka thought.[39]

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[39] The question thus arises whether Nāgārjuna's statement 'I have no *pratijñā*' is self-referential or context-bound; see below, § 19 and § 18. On the question of the nature of this proposition by which the Mādhyamika makes →

Before pursuing these problems further, it will be useful first to consider some additional passages from Madhyamaka sources which bear on our problem of the absence of a thesis or position.

3. *Dṛṣṭi* AND *darśana* AND THE EXPRESSION *avācaka*

Attention needs to be called first to a passage in Nāgārjuna's *MK* which might be thought, at least at first sight, to exclude the holding of a philosophical position by the Mādhyamika.

In *MK* xiii.8 we read:

> *śūnyatā sarvadṛṣṭīnāṃ proktā niḥsaraṇaṃ jinaiḥ/*
> *yeṣāṃ tu śūnyatādṛṣṭis tān asādhyān babhāṣire//*
>
> 'Emptiness has been declared by the Victors to be the issue from all views. But those who have a view of Emptiness they have said to be untreatable (*asādhya* = *bsgrub tu med pa*, i.e. incurable)'.

In his comment on this passage in the *PPMV* Candrakīrti has written: 'Here Emptiness is the issue (*niḥsaraṇa* = *ṅes par 'byuṅ ba*), i.e. cessation (*apravṛtti* = *log pa*), in respect of conceptual attachments to all grasping, all that is a speculative view (*dṛṣṭikṛta-sarvagrāhābhiniveśa: lta bar gyur pa thams cad kyi mṅon par žen pa thams cad*). But simple cessation (*nivṛttimātra* = *log pa tsam*) of what are speculative views is no substantial entity (*bhāva* = *dṅos po*). Yet against those who are conceptually attached to Emptiness as to a substantial entity (*bhāvābhiniveśin* = *dṅos por mṅon par žen pa*) we propound nothing (*avācaka: mi smra ba*).

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known that what appears in his statements as a philosophical proposition or thesis is not to count as a *pratijñā* in a specific sense – namely as what are termed theses in opposed schools which posit/presuppose/imply hypopstatized entities (*bhāva*) to which self-existence (*svabhāva*) is ascribed – see below. On the possibly metalinguistic, or metaphilosophical (metatheoretical), character of the statement 'I have no *pratijñā*', see below § 19. If Nāgārjuna's use of *pratijñā* in *VV* 29 is found to be metalinguistic, Candrakīrti's above-mentioned use of the word for what he terms Nāgārjuna's theses will belong to a different level of language (i.e. to the first-order, referring level).

So how will liberation (*mokṣa*) arise because of the elimination of all thought-construction (*sakalakalpanāvyāvṛtti*) resulting from our instruction? Were anybody whom I told "I shall give you no goods (*paṇya* = *zoṅ*) whatever" to say [in reply] "Oh, give me that 'no-goods-whatever' (*na kiṃcin nāma paṇyam* = *ci yaṅ med pa žes bya ba'i zoṅ*)", by what means could he be made to apprehend the [simple] non-existence of goods (*paṇyābhāva* = *zoṅ med pa*) [intended by me]?[40] Just so, by what means is conceptual attachment to Emptiness as a substantial entity now to be ended (*ni-ṣidh-* = *'gog pa*) for those having this conceptual attachment to Emptiness as a substantial entity? The Tathāgatas – supreme healers and great physicians as they are – have therefore applied the remedy [as indicated in the *Kāśyapaparivarta*] conceiving of even the great medicine (*mahābhaiṣajya*) [of *śūnyatā*] as a fault/illness (*doṣa* = *ñes pa*) [itself in need of treatment].'

In the *Kāśyapaparivarta* of the Ratnakūṭa collection it has in fact been declared (ed. Staël-Holstein, §§ 64-65) that to have recourse even to the speculative view of the person (*pudgaladṛṣṭi*) as vast as Mount Meru were better than entertaining the speculative view of Emptiness (*śūnyatādṛṣṭi*) that is held by one who is conceptually attached to nihilism (*abhāvābhiniveśika* [La Vallée Poussin, *PPMV*, p. 248.9]/*adhimānika* [Staël-Holstein]/*abhimānika: mṅon pa'i ṅa rgyal can*). For, in reality, Emptiness is the issue from all speculative view, and he who holds a speculative view of Emptiness is incurable (*acikitsya*). That is, for such a person, the remedy cannot be absorbed and, instead, becomes the cause of disease. Indeed, as Nāgārjuna has stated, if wrongly perceived Emptiness destroys the unintelligent, just as a snake destroys him who has grasped it wrongly or a formula destroys him who has wrongly applied it (*MK* xxiv.11):

> *vināśayati durdṛṣṭā śūnyatā mandamedhasam/*
> *sarpo yathā durgṛhīto vidyā vā duṣprasādhitā//*

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[40] For Tsoṅ kha pa's exegesis of this passage, apart from his *NŚRG* on *MK* xiii.8, see his *LRChM*, ff. 384b-385b = pp. 640-2. (For a problem connected with this exegesis, see H. Tauscher, *Die Lehre von den zwei Wirklichkeiten in Tsoṅ kha pas Madhyamaka-Werken*, pp. 160-1, 170-1.)

The context in which this passage from the *Kāśyapaparivarta* appears in Candrakīrti's *PPMV* (p. 247) indicates that, when stating that the Mādhyamika propounds no counter-doctrine against those who have a conceptual attachment to *śūnyatā* as a hypostatized (i.e. reified) entity (*bhāva*), reference is being made not to the holding of a well-grounded philosophical theory but to making contrary doctrinal assertions that involve views based on thought-construction (*kalpanā*) presupposing either a positive or a negative thing (*bhāva, abhāva*) construed as an entity possessing self-existence (*svabhāva*).

The idea expressed in *MK* xiii.8 has been put in other words by Nāgārjuna in the closing verse of the last chapter of his *MK* entitled 'Dṛṣṭiparīkṣā' (xxvii.30):

> *sarvadṛṣṭiprahāṇāya yaḥ saddharmam adeśayat|*
> *anukampām upādāya taṃ namasyāmi gautamam||*
>
> 'I pay hommage to that Gautama [i.e. the Buddha] who, resorting to compassion, has taught the Good Teaching in order to eliminate all views'.

Elsewhere Nāgārjuna has even stated that the Buddha taught no *dharma* whatever anywhere to anybody (*MK* xxv. 24), in accord with the *Tathāgataguhyasūtra* (cf. *PPMV* xviii.7). The very character of reality (*tattvasya lakṣaṇam*) is indeed not to be dependent on, i.e. not to be learnt from, another (*aparapratyaya*), to be tranquil (*śānta*) and not to become proliferated through discursive proliferation (*prapañca*) (*MK* xviii.9).

What in Madhyamaka tradition is thus termed *śūnyatādṛṣṭi* is evidently not equivalent to what has been described in positive terms (i.e. not as something to be relinquished) by Candrakīrti (in his *PPMV*), and by other sources, as *śūnyatādarśana* 'seeing/theory of Emptiness' and *śūnyatāvāda* 'doctrine of Emptiness'. It is, however, true that the words *(śūnyatā)darśana* and *(śūnyatā)dṛṣṭi* have both been rendered in Tibetan by the single expression *(stoṅ pa ñid du) lta ba*, a fact that may on occasion have lead to misunderstanding as to the true position of the Mādhyamika.

It is to be noted furthermore that in the *PPMV* (and elsewhere) the Mādhyamika is described as a *śūnya(tā)vādin* (e.g. i, p. 30 and xxv.2, p. 521) and *niḥsvabhāvavādin* (i, p. 24), denominations that very clearly suggest that he has a philosophical theory and doctrine.

In sum, it does not appear to be the case that the Mādhyamika's elimination of all *dṛṣṭi*s or views entails that he has no philosophical *darśana* 'theory' or *vāda* 'doctrine' whatever, and that he cannot maintain a corresponding *pratijñā* 'thesis' and *pakṣa* 'philosophical position' within the frame of Madhyamaka thought.

What true *śūnyatādarśana* is remains of course to be determined. The fundamental point is at all events that Emptiness is no reified entity – that it is itself empty of essential and hypostatized self-existence – and that it is indissolubly connected with the theory of origination in dependence (*pratītyasamutpāda*; see *MK* xxiv.18, 36; *VV* 22; *VVV* 70).

4. THE PROCEDURE OF APAGOGIC AND MAIEUTICAL *prasaṅgāpādana* AND THE QUESTION OF *vitaṇḍā*

Candrakīrti's statement cited above (p. 135) saying that the Mādhyamika advances no counter-doctrine against an opponent who postulates *śūnyatā* as a hypostatized entity can no doubt be read in the light of his more general, and fundamental, explanation, in his extended comments on *MK* i.1, concerning the Mādhyamika's technique of *prasaṅga*-type apagogic reasoning by which a view is subjected to searching critical analysis that shows up its philosophical implications, and in particular those unacceptable to the opponent himself. This procedure then results in the simple negation of the opponent's thesis (*parapratijñāpratiṣedhamātraphalatva, PPMV*, p. 24). Candrakīrti has repeated this observation at *PPMV*, p. 34 (*parapratijñāniṣedha<mātra>phala*) which also forms part of his extended comment on *MK* i.1 even though it relates more particularly to the fault of uncertainty of the logical reason which he detects in an argument of Bhavya's.

As examples of *prasaṅgāpatti* Candrakīrti has cited (*PPMV*, p. 24) *MK* v.1:

> *nâkāśaṃ vidyate kiṃcit pūrvam ākāśalakṣaṇāt/*
> *alakṣaṇaṃ prasajyeta syāt pūrvaṃ yadi lakṣaṇāt//*
>
> 'No (empty) space exists [logically] prior to space's characteristic feature [viz. *anāvaraṇa* 'absence of obstruction']. Were [space] to exist [logically] prior to [this its] characteristic fea-

ture, there would occur space without [this] characteristic feature [of being non obstructive]',

and *MK* iv.2:

> *rūpakāraṇanirmukte rūpe rūpaṃ prasajyate/*
> *āhetukam na câsty arthaḥ kaścid āhetukaḥ kvacit//*
>
> '[Supposing] matter [to be] without a cause of matter, there occurs matter with no cause. But nowhere does there exist any thing with no cause.'

And in *MK* xxi.2 (quoted above, p. 129) *pāda* c is said by Candrakīrti to constitute a *prasaṅgāpādana* and to be placed between a *pratijñā* (represented by *pāda*s a-b) and a *nigamana* (constituted by *pāda* d). It is, then, in connexion with the this apagogic technique of adducing an undesired consequence (*prasaṅgāpādana/prasaṅgāpatti* = *thal ba bsgrub pa*) that Candrakīrti has explained that the Mādhyamika entertains no thesis of his own (*svapratijñā*, on which term see p. 129 above).

Being thus so to say a special form of maieutics, the apagogic process of reasoning and argument represented by the Mādhyamika's *prasaṅgāpādana* is to be distinguished from probative reasoning or proof (*sādhana*) as well as from refutation (*dūṣaṇa*) in the strict sense. (See below, Section III, §§ 6, 10, and 12-13.)

The *prasaṅgāpādana* has evidently to be carefully distinguished also from what is termed *vitaṇḍā* 'cavil', as well as from the kind of negative reasoning known in the Sāṃkhya school as *āvīta/avīta* which serves to reject a proposition, or several propositions, leaving as a remainder (*pariśeṣa*) only the proposition or thesis held by the proponent adducing it.[41]

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[41] The connexion between *āvīta* and *pariśeṣa* is attested at least since Vārṣagaṇya's *Ṣaṣṭitantra: 'pariśeṣād āvītasiddhiḥ'* (see E. Frauwallner, 'Die Erkenntnislehre des klassischen Sāṃkhyasystems', *WZKSO* 2 [1958], p. 44); see also the *Nyāyasūtra* III.ii.39, and the commentaries on I.i.5 (*śeśavat [anumānam]*). Reasoning by *pāriśeṣya*, i.e. the method of remainder, is a familiar procedure in the history of Indian philosophy (see, e.g., Uddyotakara and Vācaspatimiśra on *Nyāyasūtra* I.ii.3 concerning the question whether the *jalpa* that is *pratipakṣasthāpanāhīna* can constitute proof by remainder – *pāriśeṣyāt pakṣasiddhiḥ* – arrived at by excluding all opposed theses.) On the *āvīta/avīta* (Tib. *bsal te 'oṅs pa*) 'indirect proof', see G. Oberhammer et al., →

Terminologie der frühen philosophischen Scholastik in Indien, pp. 104, 123-4, as well as E. Frauwallner, *op. cit.*, p. 8 ff (for Dignāga's critique of it), and E. Franco, '*Avīta* and *āvīta*', *AS/EA* 53 (1999), pp. 563-78. And on *pariśeṣa* 'proof by exclusion', see *Terminologie*, pp. 157-9.

As for *vitaṇḍā*, in the *Nyāyasūtra*s it has been mentioned together with *jalpa* (II.ii.49), and also with *hetvābhāsa* and other fallacies in debate (I.i.1); it is there defined (I.ii.3) as a *jalpa* lacking the assertion of a counter-thesis (*pratipakṣasthāpanāhīna*). Compare the *Carakasaṃhitā* (Vimānasthāna viii) where *vitaṇḍā* is defined as *parapakṣe doṣavacanamātram eva*. But it is to be noted that the *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* ascribed to Nāgārjuna (ed. Kajiyama, § 56) rejects *vitaṇḍā* (together with the other fifteen topics listed in *Nyāyasūtra* I.i.1). And according to Vasubandhu a purpose of philosophical discussion is knowledge of truth (*tattvāvabodha*), so that *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* seem both to be excluded by him (see E. Frauwallner, 'Zu den Fragmenten buddhistischer Logiker im Nyāyavārttikam', *WZKM* 40 [1933], pp. 289, 300). *Vitaṇḍā* (*co 'dri ba*) is also rejected by Bhavya in his *Tarkajvālā* iii.26 (D, f. 60b), where it is explained that the Mādhyamika's *pakṣa* is constituted by Emptiness of self-existence (*ṅo bo ñid stoṅ pa ñid = svabhāvaśūnyatā*); and by Candrakīrti, *MA* vi.178. See also Dharmakīrti's rejection of *vitaṇḍā* in his *Vādanyāya* (ed. Much), p. 61.1 (and M. T. Much, *Dharmakīrti's Vādanyāya*, ii [Vienna, 1991], pp. xv-xvi); indeed, according to Dharmakīrti, true philosophical debate is not something to be undertaken by one who is merely desirous of victory (*vijigīṣu*; see *Vādanyāya*, pp. 22, 51). Thus, to the extent that the term *vitaṇḍā* can be understood in the sense of *jalpa* and of cavil, it will be inappropriate to describe the Mādhyamika as a *vaitaṇḍika*, contrary to what has sometimes been done. (But on the Vedāntin Śrīharṣa's distinct use of the expression *vitaṇḍā*, and on the two senses in which the words *vitaṇḍā* and *vaitaṇḍika* have been employed, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, 'Towards a chronology of the Madhyamaka school', in: L. Hercus et al. [ed.], *Indological and Buddhist studies* [J. W. de Jong Felicitation Volume, Canberra, 1982], p. 521 and notes 65-66.) It is noteworthy that neither Pakṣilasvāmin-Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya* nor Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārttika*, nor even Vācaspatimiśra's *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā*, on *Nyāyasūtra* I.i.1 has identified the *vaitaṇḍika* with the Mādhyamika. However, in his gloss on the word *nāstika* used by Vācaspati in his *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* (I.i.1), Udayana has explained it as the Mādhyamika (*Pariśuddhi*, ed. Thakur, p.135.4); this is of course quite in keeping with Udayana's attitude towards the Buddhists.

5. ASSERTION, DISCURSIVITY, FREEDOM FROM EXTREME POSITIONS AND THE 'TETRALEMMA' (*catuṣkoṭi*)

Two verses have been quoted above (§ 2) from Ārya-Deva, one of which (*CŚ* xvi.25) points out that he who does not adopt a doctrinal position predicated on existence, non-existence and both existence and non-existence cannot be the object of any charge (*upālambha* = *klan ka*) while the other (*CŚ* viii. 20) states that these three positions together with bi-negation ('neither *x* nor not *x*') have all been variously made use of as remedies depending on what 'illness' needs to be treated. Moreover, referring to these four positions another verse in the *CŚ* states (xiv.21):

> *sad asat sadasac cêti sad asan nêti ca kramaḥ/*
> *eṣa prayojyo vidvadbhir ekatvādiṣu nityaśaḥ//*
>
> 'In regard to oneness [i.e. identity], etc. [viz. otherness (i.e. difference), both oneness and otherness, and neither oneness nor otherness], the intelligent should constantly apply a progressive method [as represented by] existence, non-existence, and both existence and non-existence, as well as neither existence nor non-existence.'

The aforementioned sets correspond either to the first three *koṭis* of a 'tetralemma' (*catuṣkoṭi*) or to all four of them. As already seen above (p. 127), Nāgārjuna has applied *koṭis* I, II and IV to the question of an *ātman* in the *MK* xviii.6, while the binary *koṭis* I and II have been so applied in *Ratnāvalī* ii.3. And a complete set of four *koṭis* has been applied to the Buddha's graded teaching in *MK* xviii.8, and in discussing the question of the *tathāgata* in xxii.11 (cited above, pp. 127-128).

Now, in Nāgārjuna's *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* we read (1):

> *astināstivyatikrāntā buddhir yeṣāṃ nirāśrayā/*
> *gambhīras tair nirālambaḥ pratyayārtho vibhāvyate//*
>
> 'They whose intelligence passes beyond existence and non-existence and is [thus] without support have an understanding of the sense of conditions, which is deep and without an object-support.'

This reference may be compared with the binary pair of existence and non-existence in *Ratnāvalī* i.61-62. Similarly, in the *Acintyastava* ascribed to Nāgārjuna we read (22-23ab):

> *astîti śāśvatī dṛṣṭir nâstîty ucchedadarśanam|*
>
> *tenântadvayanirmukto dharmo 'yaṃ deśitas tvayā||*
>
> *catuṣkoṭivinirmuktā tena dharmās tvayôditāḥ|*
>
> '"It exists" is the eternalist view, and "It does not exist" is the annihilationist view. Thou [the Buddha] hast therefore taught this Dharma free from the pair of extremes. Hence the factors of existence have been said by thee to be free from the four positions.'

The Buddha's Dharma is thus described here as a teaching beyond the first two *koṭi*s consisting in the binary pair of existence and non-existence; and the factors of existence are then said to be in fact free of all four extreme positions of the *catuṣkoṭi*.

This basic idea is to be found also in *MK* xv.7 and in the Sūtra source to which it refers:

> *kātyāyanāvavāde câstîti nâstîti côbhayam|*
>
> *pratiṣiddhaṃ bhagavatā bhāvābhāvavibhāvinā||*
>
> 'In the *Instruction to Kātyāyana*, the Lord – who dissolves [the extreme doctrinal positions of] existence and non-existence – has denied "it exists", "it does not exist" and both ["it exists and does not exist"].'[42]

Reference can in addition be made to the chapter of the *MK* where Nāgārjuna speaks of the unexplicated points (*avyākṛtavastu*) and the *tathāgata* (xxii.12):

> *śāśvatāśāsvatādy atra kutaḥ śānte catuṣṭayam|*
>
> *antānantādi câpy atra kutaḥ śānte catuṣṭayam||*

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[42] See Saṃyuttanikāya II, pp. 16-17, and III, pp. 134-5; cf. *Kāśyapaparivarta* § 60; *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* iii.83 (= Sagāthaka 501). See also J. May's article 'Chūgan' in *Hōbōgirin*, vol. 5, p. 458.

> 'How, here in the Tranquil, could there be the tetrad of eternal, non-eternal, etc.? And how, here in the Tranquil, could there be also the tetrad of the endless, non-endless, etc.?'[43]

This concept is in agreement with Nāgārjuna's definition of reality (*tattva*) in *MK* xviii.9:

> *aparapratyayaṃ śāntaṃ prapañcair aprapañcitam/*
> *nirvikalpam anānārtham etat tattvasya lakṣaṇam//*

> 'The defining characteristic of reality is that it is not dependent on (i.e. not learnt from) another[44], tranquil, unproliferated through discursive proliferation, free from conceptual construction and undifferentiated in sense',[45]

and also with what the same author has said of *dharmatā* in *MK* xviii.7:

> *nivṛttam abhidhātavyaṃ nivṛttaś cittagocaraḥ*[46]*/*
> *anutpannāniruddhā hi nirvāṇam iva dharmatā//*

> 'What is to be designated has ceased and what is in the domain of thinking has ceased: for *dharma*-nature is without origination and destruction, like *nirvāṇa*.'

In his *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, Śāntideva – inspired probably by passages such as *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* 1 quoted above (p. 139) – has strikingly expressed the idea that absence of binary conceptual construction leads to freedom in the stillness of the no longer objectifying mind (ix.35):

> *yadā na bhāvo nâbhāvo mateḥ saṃtiṣṭhate puraḥ/*
> *tadânyagatyabhāvena nirālambā praśāmyati//*

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[43] According to Candrakīrti, the *śānta* 'tranquil' is the *niḥsvabhāva tathāgata*. – On *(an)anta*, cf. *MK* xxv.21-23. And concerning the expressions *(a)śāśvata* and *(an)anta*, see below, pp. 152-154.

[44] Tib. *gžan las šes min*; see *PPMV ad locum*, p. 373.1: *paropadeśāgamya*. Cf. *PPMV* xxiv.8, p. 493.10-11.

[45] *anānārthā = don tha mi dad pa*. Cf. the introductory verses to the *MK* (pp. 3-4) where the *pratītyasamutpāda* is so qualified.

[46] The reading in de Jong's edition is *nivṛttaś cittagocaraḥ*; La Vallée Poussin read *nivṛtte cittagocare*.

> 'When neither existence[47] nor non-existence presents itself before the mind, then, being without an objectified support because of the absence of any other recourse[48], [the mind] is still.'[49]

The idea that ultimate reality is beyond the extreme doctrinal positions (*anta*) and the *catuṣkoṭi* has been elaborated by other, later masters of the Madhyamaka and in the Vajrayāna. Thus, in a renowned 'floating verse' quoted by Prajñākaramati in his *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* (ix.2) we read:

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[47] Prajñākaramati glosses: *bhāvaḥ paramārthasatsvabhāvaḥ.*

[48] That is, according to Prajñākaramati, no other recourse in virtue of either affirmation (*vidhi*) or negation (*pratiṣedha*).

[49] Prajñākaramati has here added Positions III and IV of the *catuṣkoṭi*, i.e. *ubhaya* and *anubhaya.* He speaks of the quieting of all *vikalpa*s, which is compared to the extinction of a fire without fuel (*sadasator ālambanayor ayogāt buddhiḥ praśāmyati upaśāmyati/ sarvavikalpopaśamān nirindhanavahnivan nirvṛtim upayāti*).

See also *Śūnyatāsaptati* 72 (translation by Ye šes sde):

> *dad ldan yaṅ dag tshol lhur len/ /chos bstan gaṅ la'aṅ mi brten gaṅ//*
> *sgrub 'di rigs pas rjes gñer te/ /dṅos daṅ dṅos med spaṅs nas ži//*

For *chos bstan gaṅ la'aṅ mi brten gaṅ* in this translation, Khu lo tsā ba's translation reads *rten med chos 'ga' bstan pa yi*; and the translation by Dharma grags that includes Candrakīrti's commentary reads *rten med chos 'ga' brten pa yis.* In pāda d, both of the latter translations read *srid daṅ srid min* instead of *dṅos daṅ dṅos med.*

Reference can be made further to *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* iii.287

> *na san nâsan na sadasan nânyas tebhyo na cânyathā/*
> *nâṇīyān na mahān nâiko na dūre nâpi cântike//*

in Bhavya's (Bhā[va]viveka's) description of the ultimate inexpressible even as *tattva* 'reality' (but still referred to as *satya* and even as *brahman*), from which words turn away, which is not within the scope of thinking, and which is not accessible to speculative thinkers (*tārkika*) (iii.282 ff.)

> *na san nâsan na sadasan na câpy anubhayātmakam/*
> *catuṣkoṭivinirmuktaṃ tattvaṃ mādhyamikā viduḥ//*
>
> 'The Mādhyamikas know reality free from the four positions of the tetralemma: neither is it existent, nor non-existent, nor both existent and non-existent, nor is it neither.'[50]

This same verse has been connected with the *karuṇāśūnyatādvaitavādin* who maintains the indivisibility of Compassion and Emptiness – and thus with *sarvākāravaropetā śūnyatā* – in the *Vimalaprabhā*-commentary's exegesis of *Kālacakratantra* ii.173, where this type of thinker – in effect a Mādhyamika – is described as 'one for whom positions are destroyed' (*naṣṭapakṣa* = *phyogs ñams*) while he himself remains unimpaired (*anaṣṭa*).[51]

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[50] This verse is found also in the *Jñānasārasamuccaya* ascribed to Ārya-Deva (ed. Mimaki, *La réfutation bouddhique de la permanence des choses*, p. 188); in Bhavya, *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* (P, f. 342b, 345b); in Jitāri, *Sugatamatavibhaṅgakārikā(bhāṣya)* 8 (ed. Shirasaki, p. 128); in Advayavajra, *Tattvaratnāvalī* 25 (ed. GOS, p. 19; ed. Ui, p. 5), describing the Māyopamādvayavāda; and in the *Subhāṣitasaṃgraha* (Part I, ed. Bendall, *Muśeon* 4 [1903], p. 389 = p. 17; ascription to Sarahapāda).

The verse has been commented on in Bodhibhadra's *Jñānasārasamuccayanibandhana* (ed. Mimaki, p. 204), where, in its Tibetan version, it is introduced by the remark: *ci yaṅ khas len pa ma yin te.* A variant, with the reading *na côbhayābhyāṃ vilakṣaṇam*, is found in the *Sarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha* iii.7 (ed. La Vallée Poussin, *Le Muséon* 1902). The exact doctrinal exegesis of this verse, and the text of its Tibetan translation, have proved problematic; see below, p. 203 note 150.

For *na san nâsan na sadasat* ... in *pāda* a, see further *MK* i.7 (*na san nâsan na sad asan dharmo nirvartate yadā, kathaṃ nirvartako hetur evaṃ sati hi yujyate*); *Śūnyatāsaptati* 32c; and *Acintyastava* 9 (*svasmān na jāyate bhāvaḥ parasmān nôbhayād api, na san nâsan na sadasan kutaḥ kasyôdayas tadā*) (cf. also *Acintyastava* 22-23b quoted above, p. 140).

[51] See Śrī Puṇḍarīka, *Vimalaprabhāṭīkā* ii.7.173 (ed. Jagannātha Upādhyāya, pp. 266-7). The verse is found also in the **Pra[Sva?]darśanānumatoddeśaparīkṣā* (P), ff. 41b-42a.

The *Laghu-Kālacakratantra* ii.173cd reads:

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In Advayavajra/Maitrīpāda's *Tattvaprakāśa* (ed. Haraprasad Shastri, p. 46), moreover, it is said:

> *yogācāramatād anyo madhyamārthaḥ kathaṃ bhavet/*
> *catuṣkoṭiprahāṇyā cet madhyamārtho viśiṣyate//*
> *vijñāne 'pi prasaṅgaḥ syāt tāsāṃ atrâpi hānitaḥ/*
> *catuṣkoṭivinirmuktaṃ jñānaṃ vastusamucchrayam//*
>
> 'How would the Middle-Sense be different from Yogācāra-doctrine? The Middle-Sense is distinguished if it is held [to be marked] by elimination of the four positions (of the 'tetra-lemma'). [But] in consciousness also this would apply, these [*koṭi*s] being eliminated also there [in the Yogācāra]. [It is, then,] Gnosis free of the four positions of the 'tetralemma' [that] is [truly] the acme of reality (?).'[52]

> *yo 'naṣṭo naṣṭapakṣaḥ sa bhavati karuṇāśūnyatāvādī//*
> *(gaṅ žig sñiṅ rje stoṅ ñid gñis su med pa smra bo phyogs ñams de ni ma ñams par 'gyur ro//)*

(This passage has been understood differently by G. Grönbold, *IIJ* 35 [1992], p. 292, where *naṣṭapakṣa* is rendered by 'besiegte Partei'.) The lexeme *pakṣa* is multivalent; and in the *Vimalaprabhā* on *Kālacakratantra* v.89 (ed. Dwivedi and Bahulkar, p. 45) *pakṣa* has been used to refer to the two lunar fortnights even in a context where *sad, asad, sadasad* and *anubhaya* as well as the *catuṣkoṭi* are alluded to. Such semantic polyvalence and transformation of symbolic systems are of course characteristic of the Mantrayāna.

In Naḍapāda's *Sekoddeśaṭīkā* (ed. Carelli), p. 48, *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* 1 (cited above, p. 139) has been cited together with other similar texts. On the change of meaning in this Vajrayānist context of *pratyaya* in *pāda* d of *YṢ* 1 from 'condition' to 'experience', see R. Gnoli and G. Orofino, *Nāropā – Iniziazione* (n.p., 1994), p. 256.

[52] For *catuṣkoṭivinirmuktaṃ jñānavastu (?)*, see Advayavajra/Maitrīpāda, *Madhyamaṣaṭka* 1 (on the Sākāravāda) (ed. Haraprasad Shastri, *Advayavajrasaṃgraha*, p. 57, and S. K. Pathak, *ALB* 25 [1961], p. 542). This text lists various forms of the *catuṣkoṭivinirmukta* idea, the final one of which is the *catuṣkoṭivinirmuktaḥ prakāśo devatātmakaḥ*. – On Maitrīpada, see above, Section I, p. 72 note 165.

The texts cited above are of course only a selection of comparable pas-

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Many of the above-mentioned statements find support in Sūtra sources used by the Mādhyamikas such as the *Samādhirājasūtra* where we read (ix.27):

> *astîti nâstîti ubhe 'pi antā śuddhī aśuddhîti ime 'pi antā/*
> *tasmād ubhe anta vivarjayitvā madhye 'pi sthānaṃ na karoti paṇḍitaḥ//*
>
> '"It exists"/"It does not exist" form a pair of extremes; "purity"/"impurity" are also extremes. Therefore, keeping clear of the pair of extremes, the intelligent person does not take his stand in the middle either'.[53]

This idea is further developed by the same Sūtra in its next verse (ix.28):

> *astîti nâstîti vivāda eṣa śuddhī aśuddhîti ayaṃ vivādaḥ/*
> *vivādaprāptāna duḥkhaṃ na śāmyati avivādaprāptāna duḥkhaṃ nirudhyate//*
>
> '"It exists"/"It does not exist" make up a dispute; "purity"/"impurity" make up a dispute. For those involved in dispute, Ill is not appeased. For those not involved in dispute, Ill comes to a stop.'

The idea of *avivāda* is found again in *Samādhirājasūtra* xvii.75 as well as in Chapter xxxix (ed. Dutt, p. 633) and amongst the attributes of the *sar-*

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sages from Buddhist Śāstra literature. – The concept of *yod min med min* = *na san nâsat* in relation to the two *satya*s – namely not non-existent on the *saṃvṛti* level and not existent on the *paramārtha* level – has been studied by H. Tauscher, *Die Lehre von den zwei Wirklichkeiten in Tsoṅ kha pas Madhyamaka-Werken*, p. 56 ff.

[53] Thus the 'middle' is no fixed and reified median position, no *metaxú*. See also *Kāśyapaparivarta* § 60.

Compare the *paramārthalakṣaṇa* given in *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* vi.1:

> *na san na câsan na tathā na cânyathā na jāyate vyeti na câvahīyate/*
> *na vardhate nâpi viśudhyate punar viśudhyate tat paramārthalakṣaṇam//*

vadharmasvabhāvasamatāvipañcita-samādhi listed in Chapter i (ed. Dutt, p. 17, together with *avigraha* and *adhikaraṇavyupaśama*).

Similarly, in the Prajñāpāramitā literature, the absence of dispute as to *dharmas* being empty (*śūnyā dharmā iti vivādaḥ*) is a feature of the seventh stage (*dūraṃgamā bhūmiḥ*) of the Bodhisattva (see e.g. *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā*, ed. Dutt, pp. 216 and 222; and *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* i.61). The development of this idea towards philosophical eirenicism will be further examined in § 6 below.

Teachings such as these on the transcending of any and every extreme doctrinal position (*anta*) as well as all the four positions of a 'tetralemma' (*catuṣkoṭi*) were to undergird the idea that the Mādhyamika indeed has no thesis or doctrinal position of his own at all, or in any case no discursively expressible one – that he is in fact *naṣṭapakṣa* in the words of the verse of the *Kālacakratantra* cited above.

In some of these teachings there is no doubt to be discerned also an important element of *antiphrasis* and *ironia* (in Sūtra texts especially), and of the deliberate use of semantical and logical paradoxes, antinomies and aporias (in Śāstra texts as well as in Sūtras). Such techniques are certainly more than rhetorical or literary figures, and the semantical and logical problems raised are reducible neither to simple turns of phrase nor to 'falsidical paradoxes' (Quine's term). They evidently assist the philosopher initially to engage in philosophical questioning by creating a salutary and productive perplexity (*saṃśaya = the tshom*) – as distinct from mere doubt and uncertainty (*kāṅkṣā = som ñi (vimati)* or *saṃdeha/(ā)śaṅkā = dogs pa*), and in particular from that unsalutary and unproductive *vicikitsā = the tshom* which constitutes one of the five *nīvaraṇas* 'obstacles'.[54]

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[54] In the Abhidharma *vicikitsā* is also an *aniyatabhūmidharma*. As for *saṃśaya*, it can thus operate as a counterpart to *nirṇaya* or *niścaya*, and like the latter it is occasionally even described as a *jñāna*. But in the *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* (21-23) ascribed to Nāgārjuna, *the tshom = saṃśaya* has been rejected as a significant philosophical instrument. – Cf. K. Butzenberger, 'Der Zweifel (*saṃśaya, saṃdeha*) in der indischen Philosophie', *BIS* 7 (1993), pp. 59-77.

There are thus created in the philosopher's mind an intellectually productive *tension* between contrary doctrines, and a *torsion* between complementary (or perhaps incommensurable) theories which will preserve him from fixing himself in a hasty and prematurely arrived at doctrinal certainty. Indeed, a doctrinal fixation postulating reified self-existent entities would be the very reverse of the genuine ascertainment (*niścaya* = *ṅes pa*) which the Mādhyamika may seek to achieve, one which on the contrary relates to the non-substantiality of all things (*dharmaniḥsvabhāvatā, dharmanairātmya*).[55]

The abjuring of the tetralemmatic positions is not restricted to exclusively doctrinal concepts, and it has been evoked also in considering the Bodhisattva's coursing (*car-)*, that is, his spiritual practice in the Perfection of Discriminative Insight. Thus, in the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* (i, p. 13) we read that, when a Bodhisattva Mahāsattva courses (*car-)* in *prajñāpāramitā*, he neither 'approaches' (*upê-* 'to regard as, understand') his practice – in the present or the future – as 'I course', nor as 'I do not course', nor again as 'I both course and I do not course', nor even as 'Neither do I course nor do I not course'. This is so, it is explained, because all *dharma*s are 'unapproached', that is to say unappropriated by the Bodhisattva.[56]

The notion that in the Madhyamaka there can be neither a philosophical position nor a thesis was no doubt reinforced by the idea discussed above (§ 3) that all speculative or dogmatic views (*dṛṣṭi* = *lta ba*) are to be relinquished by the Mādhyamika.

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[55] On this ascertainment, see Section III, § 10 below. It has to be noted, however, that in his *PPMV* i.1, (p. 55 ff.) Candrakīrti has relativized the staus of *niścaya* in Madhyamaka thought.

[56] See *Aṣṭasāhasrikā prajñāpāramita* (ed. Rajendralal Mitra), p. 13: *evaṃ caran bodhisattvo mahāsattvaś carati prajñāpāramitāyām/ sa hi caraṃś carāmîti nôpaiti, na carāmîti nôpaiti, carāmi ca na carāmi cêti nôpaiti, naiva carāmi na na carāmîti nôpaiti, cariṣyāmîti nôpaiti .../ tat kasya hetor nôpaiti/ sarvadharmā hy anupagatā anupāttāḥ/ ayam ucyate sarvadharmānupādāno nāma samādhir bodhisattvasya mahāsattvasya...*

6. NON-CONTENTIOUSNESS, PHILOSOPHICAL EIRENICISM AND THEIR ETHICAL AND SOTERIOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS

The *Samādhirājasūtra* (ix.28 quoted above, p. 145) has pointedly drawn attention to the danger of disputes arising from taking up dogmatically fixed, and reifying, doctrinal positions, including even median ones.

In Nāgārjuna's *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* too, the disowning of a thesis and position is not only of logical and ontological significance – as it is in the numerous passages that have been quoted above – but it also has an ethical and, finally, a soteriological value. In this treatise Nāgārjuna has indeed stated not only (*YṢ* 50):

> *che ba'i bdag ñid can de dag/ /rnams la phyogs med rtsod pa med//*
> *gaṅ rnams la ni phyogs med pa/ /de la gžan phyogs ga la yod//*
>
> 'For those great beings (*mahātman*) there is no proposition/position (*pakṣa*), no dispute (*vivāda*). For those having no proposition/position [of their own] how could there be a counter-proposition/position [giving rise to dispute]?',[57]

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[57] This translation of the version by Muditāśrī and Pa tshab of the unavailable Sanskrit original is somewhat uncertain.

The (earlier) version by Jinamitra, Dānaśīla, Śīlendrabodhi and Ye šes sde, included in their translation of Candrakīrti's *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti*, reads:

> *rtsod med che ba'i bdag ñid can/ /de dag la ni phyogs med do//*
> *gaṅ rnams la ni phyogs med pa/ /de la gžan phyogs ga la yod//*

Following this version, *pāda*s a and b could perhaps be rendered: 'Those whose nature is greater (?) non-disputatiousness have no position'. The Tibetan version of Candrakīrti's *Vṛtti* reads: *raṅ gi phyogs khas len pa yod na ni de'i tshe de gzugs pa'i phyir gžan rnams daṅ rtsod par gyur na de dag la ni de lta bu yaṅ med pas de bas na rtsod med che ba'i bdag ñid can no/ / gal te de dag la raṅ gi phyogs med du zin kyaṅ gžan gyi phyogs gžig pa med mi srid de/ de bas na gžan gyi phyogs yod daṅ/ bdag gi phyogs kyaṅ med du mi ruṅ ṅo//*

See also *MA* vi.118 f., where Candrakīrti has described the *vicāra* undertaken in Nāgārjuna's Śāstra as being free of disputatiousness (*rtsod pa = vi-* →

but also (*YṢ* 46):

> *rāgadveṣodbhavas tīvraduṣṭa[?]dṛṣṭiparigrahaḥ |*
> *vivādās tatsamutthāś ca bhāvābhyupagame sati ||*
>
> 'With the assertion of a tenet relating to an entity one espouses terrible and evil views that lead to attachment and repulsion, and from the latter disputes result.'[58]

The non-contentious and philosophically eirenic character of a theory positing no hypostatized entities is here closely linked with dispassion and strifelessness on the ethical level. A passage from the *Kāśyapaparivarta* (§ 142) cited by Candrakīrti (*PPMV* i.1, p. 47.12) has in fact stated that, for the religious person, non-disputatiousness is a paramount quality (*avivādaparamo hi śramaṇasya dharmaḥ*).[59]

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graha, vivāda) and the desire to defeat an opponent.

[58] The Sanskrit text of this verse – quoted by Haribhadra, *Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā* ii.8 (p. 161) – is somewhat uncertain. Concerning absence of *rāga* and *dveṣa* as *nirvāṇa*, see e.g. Saṃyuttanikāya IV, p. 251, quoted in the *Sūtrasamuccaya* (P, f. 221a).

On *YṢ* 46 and 50, see C. Scherrer-Schaub, *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti* (Brussels, 1991), pp. 287-8, 294.

[59] See further *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* v.3 (p. 219) linking *pratijñā* with *vivāda*:

> *yāvat pratijñā kriyate tāvat sarvaṃ sasaṃkaram|*
> *svacittamātraṃ sampaśyan na vivādaṃ samārabhet||*;

and Ārya-Deva, *CŚ* viii.10, on the *dvandvacārin*:

> *svapakṣe vidyate rāgaḥ parapakṣas tu te 'priyaḥ|*
> *na gamiṣyasi nirvāṇaṃ na śivaṃ dvandvacāriṇaḥ||*
>
> 'Being attached to [your] own position and disliking another's position, you will not attain Nirvāṇa: there is no tranquillity for him who lives in oppositions'

together with Candrakīrti's comment: *yatas tu nivartake dharme na kiṃcit karmâsti tasmāc chūnyapakṣaḥ śreyān iti| yas tu śūnyatāmārge* [Tib. *stoṅ pa ñid kyi phyogs*] *rajyati viparīte sasvabhāvapakṣe duṣyati tam upālabhate|* (*CŚ* viii.10)| *| dvividho hi pakṣaḥ samāsataḥ svapakṣaḥ parapakṣaś ca| tatra yadi svapakṣe te rāgo 'sti śūnyapakṣaḥ śreyān iti parapakṣas ca te mithyetikṛtvâpriyaḥ na gamiṣyasi nirvāṇam|... na hy anunayapratighahatasya dvan-* →

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dvacāriṇo nirvāṇam asti| sarvatra hy udāsīnaḥ saṅgacchedād anapāyasukhaikarasaṃ śivam āpnuvanti|; and *CŚ* xii.15:

> *vādasya kṛtaśo dharmo nâyam ukto tathāgataiḥ|*
> *de lta'aṅ 'dis ni gžan smra rnams| |sreg te me yis bud śiṅ bžin||*

with Candrakīrti's comment: *rtsod pa'i don du ma bstan yaṅ chos 'di ni pha rol po'i smra ba sel bar byed pa kho na'o| |me ñe bar len pa ni btso ba la sogs pa'i bya ba'i don du yin la bud śiṅ bsregs pa'i don du ma yin mod kyi| de lta na yaṅ sreg par byed pa'i raṅ bžin yin pas 'dod pa'i bya ba rjes su sgrub ciṅ bud śiṅ yaṅ sreg par byed do| |me ji lta ba bžin du chos thams cad raṅ bžin gyis bdag med par śes pa yaṅ dad pa can gyi rgyud la ñe bar skye ba na de ltar śes par bya ste| ñon moṅs pa'i 'chiṅ ba thams cad sreg par byed pa'i bdag ñid can yin pa'i phyir ro||* See also Candrakīrti, *MA* vi.118.

Similar ideas can be traced back to the old canon, for example the Dīghanikāya (II, pp. 58-59), the Saṃyuttanikāya (I, p. 4) and, especially, the *Suttanipāta* (e.g. the *Paramaṭṭhakasutta, Tissametteyyasutta, Pasūrasutta, Māgandiyasutta, Purābhedasutta, Kalahavivādasutta, Cūḷaviyūhasutta*, and *Mahāviyūhasutta* of the Aṭṭhakavagga; *Suttanipāta* 842 is found in the Saṃyuttanikāya I, p. 12). Still – notwithstanding, e.g., *Suttanipāta* 837 – the perfected Bhikkhu and Arahan may say that he 'speaks' (i.e. advocates a doctrine); but, as one who is expert, he does so following only pragmatic-transactional usage, having found a designation in the world (see the *Arahantasutta* in Saṃyuttanikāya I, pp. 14-15: *ahaṃ vadāmī ti pi so vadeyya| mamaṃ vadantī ti pi so vadeyya| | loke samaññaṃ kusalo viditvā| vohāramattena sa vohareyyâti*).

The above-mentioned passages would suggest a close connexion between absence of strife and contentiousness – achieved through refraining from adhering to one's own theses and attacking others' theses – and the Buddhist ideal of *araṇa*/*araṇā* (Tib. *ñon moṅs med pa*) 'absence of defilement, passion' as a quality of Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas and Buddhas. In Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* i.8, the *raṇa*s are defined as *kleśa*s 'defilements, passions inasmuch as they injure oneself and others' (*raṇā hi kleśāḥ, ātmaparavyābādhanāt*). And according to the same source, vii.35-36, *araṇā* 'passionlessness ~ strifelessness' is a condition where the Arhat does not allow himself to become the objective support (*ālambana*) for the arising of *kleśa*s in others. For the same in relation to a Buddha, see *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* viii.7 and *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* xx.45. This *araṇa* is sometimes →

A different aspect of absence of dispute (*avivāda*) is to be found for example in the the sixth section of Mātṛceṭa's *Varṇārhavarṇastotra*, the Avivādastava, the topic there being the invincibility of the Buddha and the incontrovertibility of the Dharma. Already in section four of this *Stotra* dealing with the Buddha's powers and confidences (*balavaiśāradya*) we read that, in accordance with Dharma, he is unchallengeable (*acodya*) and free from fault (*anavadya*, iv.20; cf. ii.51). Then, in section six, we are told that the Seal of the Teaching (*dharmamudrā*) as set down by the Buddha is unreachable through all disputatious arguments (*agamyā sarvavādānām*) and unbreakable (*abhedyā*) (vi.2); and just as heat is not to be made cold, just so the Dharma, corresponding as it does to the way things really are, cannot be altered and denatured by any assertion (*itītikā* ?) of an opponent in debate (vi.3). The Buddha has alone penetrated the state where there is no dispute (*avivādasthāna*, vi.6cd); and for the Buddha as the expounder of Dharma there is in fact no dispute with anybody (vi.8ab). The entire net of false views (*dṛṣṭijāla*) being simply

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associated with *maitrī* 'friendliness'; see *Abhidharmakośa* iv.56; *Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti* (ed. Jaini), p. 144. Cf. L. de La Vallée Poussin, *L'Abhidharmakośa vii* (Paris-Louvain, 1925), pp. 86-87: 'le pouvoir d'empêcher la naissance de la passion d'autrui'; and F. Edgerton, *BHSD*, s.v. – The concept of *araṇa(vihārin)* has been discussed by M. Walleser, *Die Streitlosigkeit des Subhūti* (Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-hist. Kl., Jahrg. 1917, 13. Abh., Heidelberg, 1917).

In the case of the Mādhyamika, his philosophical endeavour is not directed, as such, to refuting (in the strict sense) another's thesis, inasmuch as the latter simply dissolves, and disappears, in the clear light of Madhyamaka analysis, just as darkness disappears before light or as a mirage vanishes (*VV* 65-66), or as an illusion disappears (*VV* 23, 27). – On the question of *dūṣaṇa* 'refutation' in the Madhyamaka, see below, Section III, § 9.

What the Mādhyamika achieves by means of his *prasaṅga*-type reasoning is, then, the *dissolving*, or *deconstruction*, of all propositional theses positing hypostatized self-existent entities (*bhāva*), rather than a *refutation* in the strict sense which would involve the setting up, within the frame of binary alternatives, of a counter-thesis and the holding of a counter-position presupposing some kind of self-existent entity.

dissolved, on what grounds could there be dispute for the Buddha since dispute is then groundless (*athâmūlaḥ kutomūlo vivādas te bhaviṣyati*, vi.9)? But the Buddha does not himself engage in unilateral assertion (*anekāṃśavādin*, vi.29). Sātyaka/Saccaka's debater's 'fangs' having once been broken in an assembly by the Buddha, the 'horns' of all opponents are as it were fallen out (vi.17); the reference is to a canonical text corresponding to the *Cūlasaccakasuttanta* where the Nirgrantha Saccaka is shown to have been completely silenced and abashed (*maṅkubhūta*) by the Buddha's explanations.[60]

7. THE *avyākṛtavastus* AND THE ĀRYAN SILENCE

A philosophical link (which may be more or less remote according to the context) can furthermore be observed between the philosopher's disavowal of a thesis pertaining to a self-existent entity and the so-called 'points of opinion' which the Buddha is represented as having left unanswered/unexplicated/undecided in his teaching. These are the famous *avyākṛtavastus* (Tib. *luṅ du ma bstan pa'i dṅos po*; Pali *avyākatāni diṭṭhigatāni, avyākatavatthu*) of which slightly varying lists are to be found in the sources. According to Candrakīrti, these points are fourteen in number and concern (1-4) the world of living beings (*loka*) being eternal (*śāśvata*), non-eternal, both, and neither; (5-8) this *loka* having an end (*anta*), not having an end, both, and neither; (9-12) the *tathāgata's* existing, not existing, both, and neither after death; and (13-14) the relation of difference or non-difference between the life-principle (*jīva*) and the body (*śarīra*).[61]

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[60] See Majjhimanikāya I, pp. 227-237. A similar idea of the incontrovertibility of the Dharma, and the *dharmamudrā*s, is also to be found in the **Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* ascribed to Nāgārjuna (see Lamotte, *Le traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse*, iii, p. 1381). Concerning the opposition *ekāṃśa/vibhajya*, see below, p. 155.

[61] See *PPMV* xxii.12; cf. xxv.21-23. Compare e.g. Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* v.22 with commentaries. On the *avyākṛtavastus* cf. K. N. Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist theory of knowledge* (London, 1963), passim; D. Seyfort →

The reasons that caused the *avyākṛtavastus* to be left unexplicated in the scriptural sources of Buddhism have evidently been variously of a paedogogical, psychological or philosophical nature. In the Madhyamaka school, this feature has been connected in particular with the impossibility of meaningfully predicating an attribute of an empty (i.e. null or non-referring) subject term in the frame of linguistic usage, in the same way as no (positive) attribute can be meaningfully predicated of a sky-flower (*khapuṣpa*), the horn of a hare (*śaśaśṛṅga*) or donkey (*kharaviṣāṇa*), or a son of a barren woman (*vandhyātanaya, °putra, °suta*, etc.).[62] Thus,

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Ruegg, *La théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra*, Index s. v.; and C. Oetke, 'Die "unbeantworteten Fragen" und das Schweigen des Buddha', *WZKS* 38 (1994), pp. 85-120. The difference here between (not) being eternal (*[a]śāśvata*) and (not) having a limit/end (*[an]antavant*) is perhaps not entirely clear. The distinction is sometimes taken to be between the temporal and the spatial. It has also been taken to be between eternity as beginninglessness in time and limitlessness as endlessness in time; cf. H. von Glasenapp's observations in his edition of H. Oldenberg, *Buddha* (Munich, 1961), pp. 443-4, who understands *antavant* as 'hat ... (zeitlich) ein Ende'.

It is to be noted that, in the context of the *avyākṛtavastus*, the traditions sometimes take the word *tathāgata* as equivalent to *buddha* – i.e. *de bžin gšegs pa* (as in the Tibetan translation of the *Prasannapadā*) – and sometimes understand it in the sense of a being (*sattva*) – i.e. *de bžin 'oṅs pa* (as in the Tibetan translation of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*).

[62] See Candrakīrti, *PPMV* ix.12 (*śaśaśṛṅga*, in connexion with predicating existence or non-existence of an *ātman*); xxvii.8 (*vandhyātanaya*, in connexion with the relation between the *skandha*s and an *ātman*); xxvii.28 (a *vandhyāputra* cannot be said to be dark or fair, in connexion with the *loka* being neither finite nor endless). The meaninglessness of predicating darkness or fairness of a *vandhyāputra* has also been mentioned by Vasubandhu in his *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (v.22, p. 293.18) in connexion with the relationship between the *skandha*s and a *sattva*.

The question as to the existence/non-existence of *nirvāṇa* as a self-existent positive or negative entity (*bhāva*/*abhāva*) is in addition compared by Candrakīrti with the case of a donkey's horn and a barren woman's son in *PPMV* xxv.5, 8. These comparisons have been employed in other connexions too.

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when commenting on *MK* xxii.11-12, Candrakīrti writes that, respecting a tranquil *(śānta) tathāgata* having no self-existence (*niḥsvabhāva*), there is no room for the tetrads (*catuṣṭaya*) of positions that are constituted (i) by being, not being, both being and not being, and neither being nor not being *śūnya*, (ii) by being eternal (*śāśvata*), etc., or (iii) by having, not having, both having and not having, and neither having nor not having an end (*anta*);[63] indeed, it is precisely because of the unavailability of these tetrads that the Lord has formulated no determinate reply on these points for the world, just as one would not predicate darkness or fairness of a barren woman's son.[64]

The philosophical problem posed by these sets of unexplicated points – and, in particular, by the presence of bi-negation (in the 'neither *x* nor not *x*' formula) among several of them – can be linked, at least indirectly, with that of the Buddha's and the Ārya's silence (*tūṣṇībhāva*). An important difference between non-explication and silence lies, however, in the fact that, whereas meaningful silence – a so to say semioticized aposiopesis – may serve to point to ultimate reality that transcends discursive proliferation (*prapañca*) and dichotomic conceptual construction (*vikalpa*),[65] in the case of the *avyākṛtavastus* it is simply not possible to sup-

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It may be noted that the Indian sources do not distinguish between what is unexemplified in the world (e.g. a horned hare) and what is impossible (e.g. a barren woman's child).

63 See *MK* xxii.11 quoted above, p. 128; and *MK* xxii.12 quoted above, p. 140.

64 *PPMV* xxii.12: *tāny etāni caturdaśa vastūny avyākṛtatvād avyākṛtavastūnîty ucyante/ tatra yathôpavarṇitena nyāyena yathā śūnyatvādikaṃ catuṣṭayaṃ prakṛtyā śānte niḥsvabhāve tathāgate na sambhavati/ evaṃ śāśvatāśāśvatādikam api catuṣṭayam atra na sambhavati/ asambhavād eva ca catuṣṭayaṃ vandhyāputrasya śyāmagauratvādivan na vyākṛtaṃ bhagavatā lokasya/ yathā câitac catuṣṭayam tathāgate na sambhavati evam antānantādikam api śānte tathāgate na sambhavati//*

65 See *PPMV* i.1, p. 57, where Candrakīrti writes that the *paramārtha* corresponds to Āryan silence, so that there is present no discursive proliferation in terms of which there could be either possibility/correctness or impossibility/incorrectness of some thing (*paramārtho hy āryas tūṣṇībhāvaḥ, tataḥ ku-* →

ply one of the traditionally recognized three kinds of explicating answer (: *vyākṛ-)* – viz. the categorical (*ekāṃśena* = *mgo gcig tu*) kind, the kind based on a distinction (*vibhajya* = *rnam par phye ste*) and the kind that consists in further questioning (*paripṛcchya* = *dris nas*)[66] – because they relate rather to empty or indeterminate concepts. To the extent that ultimate reality and null subject terms are both inaccessible to predication in normal linguistic and conceptual *prapañca* and *vikalpa* the two domains are, however, linked, even if in the two cases inexpressibility is due to different reasons.

In sum, the use of bi-negation in the fourth position of the *catuṣkoṭi* and in some sets of *avyākṛtavastu*s – a use that is distinct from the employment of the 'neither *x* nor not *x*' formula with respect to ultimate reality (see p. 109 note 5 above) – and the rejection of all four positions (*koṭi*) of the 'tetralemma' can help create an intellectually clarifying tension in the philosopher's mind between binarily opposed views. (These two distinct uses of the 'neither ... nor' formula – one corresponding to Position IV of the *catuṣkoṭi* and the other relating to the description of the *paramārtha* – have been discussed in our 'The uses of the four positions of the *catuṣkoṭi*' in *JIP* 5 [1977], pp. 16-18.) And the openness thus engendered in the mind is considered philosophically productive, ethically valuable and soteriologically useful. Ultimate reality is, furthermore, so to say expressible by a meaningful, semioticized, silence – in other words by the Āryan *tūṣṇībhāva* which is of course no mere muteness – and by another use of bi-negation (i.e. the second, distinct, application of the 'neither *x* nor not *x*' formula already noted above) employed to point to

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tas tatra prapañcasambhavo yad upapattir anupapattir vā syāt; for the reading, see J. W. de Jong, 'Textcritical notes on the *Prasannapadā*', *IIJ* 20 [1978], p. 33.) Cf. xviii.9 and xxv.24. See also G. M. Nagao, 'The silence of the Buddha and its Madhyamic interpretation', *Studies in Indology and Buddhology* (S. Yamaguchi Felicitation Volume, Kyōto, 1955), pp. 137-51; D. Seyfort Ruegg, *La théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra*, pp. 185, 387-8; C. Oetke, 'Die "unbeantworteten Fragen" und das Schweigen des Buddha', *WZKS* 38 (1994), pp. 85-120.

[66] For Skt. *paripṛcchya* Pali has *paṭipucchā*. In his *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (v.22), Vasubandhu has linked these question with passages from the Mahāsāṃghika canon.

reality which, in the Mahāyāna, is considered to be in itself inexpressible. Such intellectual *tension* – together with a philosophical *torsion* between complementary (or perhaps incommensurable) theoretical formulations – may serve to preserve the philosopher from adhering to any unilaterally fixed and reifying – and also contentious – dogmatic proposition, thesis or position.

A realization of the potentially unilateral character of some philosophical thinking and of the latent contentiousness of much philosophical activity must, however, be balanced by the philosopher's parallel realization that his task is, after all, to elucidate and give clear expression to issues rather than simply to fall into mute (and perhaps 'mystical') speechlessness. In the Indian Madhyamaka Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, not to speak of Bhavya (Bhā[va]viveka), were philosophers in this sense who made full and ample use of reasoning (*yukti*), analysis, argument and exposition; and this kind of philosophy has then been assiduously cultivated in Tibetan seminaries. The two realizations just mentioned taken together continued to motivate the thinking of the Mādhyamikas in Tibet and led to a very remarkable discussion and clarification of the problem as to whether the fundamental principles of the Madhyamaka – and the Mahāyāna in general – permit the philosopher and practiser of the Middle Way to take up a clearly conceptualized, and hence verbalizable, philosophical position expressed in propositions and theses.

8. *Pakṣa, abhyupagama* AND *prasaṅga* IN THE MADHYAMAKA ACCORDING TO JAYĀNANDA

In his *Ṭīkā* on Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra(bhāṣya)* vi.8 concerned with the four negative *pratijñā*s of *MK* i.1 (where the negation is described as non-presuppositional and non-implicative *prasajyapratiṣedha*) the Kaśmīri Paṇḍit Jayānanda[67] – who was active in Tibet and the Tangut kingdom of Mi ñag – took up the definition of the apagogic rea-

[67] On Jayānanda, a teacher and collaborator of Pa tshab Ñi ma grags (b. 1055) and Khu mDo sde 'bar, see above, Section I, pp. 20 f., 42 f.

soning (*prasaṅga*) adduced by an opponent (*phyir rgol* = *prativādin*, i.e. the Mādhyamika respondent) as that which elicits what is unacceptable (*aniṣṭa*) to the proponent (*sṅa rgol* = *vādin*) by means of what the latter has himself accepted (*abhyupagama: thal 'gyur gyi mtshan ñid ni gžan gyis khas blaṅs pa'i sgo nas gžan la mi 'dod pa ston pa gaṅ yin pa...*).[68] The question of what is to count in a proposition as being established by right cognition (**pramāṇasiddha*) – i.e. by direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) or inference (*anumāna*) – is also raised here.

> 'Opponent: If you hold the *prasaṅga* to be a logical reason (*hetu*), it will be either established or not established by a *pramāṇa*. (i) Following the first alternative [that it is *tshad mas grub pa*], because it is then established for both [parties in debate], how can it be said to be asserted by the other [party only]? (ii) Following the second alternative [that it is *tshad mas ma grub pa*], because it is [thereby] said to be unfit to be asserted by the other [party, i.e. the *vādin*], how can it then be said to be asserted by the [other party at all]? – The reply is as follows. That what is established by *pramāṇa* is established for both [parties] is not known by me [the adducer of the logical reason (*hetu*)]. That is, when the proponent (*vādin*) advances a proof (*sādhana*), how – even if it were established for him – does he [the *vādin*] know whether the *hetu* adduced is established by *pramāṇa* [also] for the other [i.e. the *prativādin*]; for the particularity of another's mind is the object of neither *pratyakṣa* nor *anumāna*. [Also,] how does [the *vādin* even] know it to be established by *pramāṇa* for himself; for it could be fallible (*bslu ba*) because of having been grasped for a long time by an erroneous reason (*'khrul pa'i rgyu mtshan gyis ... bzuṅ ba*)? Hence, the self-nature of entities (*bhāva*) has been asserted in virtue of their being asserted to be [established by] *pramāṇa* by both proponent and opponent. Therefore it is said that the other's [i.e. the *vādin's*] proposition (*parapakṣa*) is refuted by means of what he has [himself] asserted.[69]

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[68] D, ra, f. 120a.

[69] In *LRChM*, f. 405a = p. 674, Tsoṅ kha pa has explained: 'The proponent (*sṅa rgol* = *vādin*) does not know the logical mark (*liṅga*) established, or [al- →

Furthermore, with regard to a position [involving] a *svatantra-hetu*, if there is to be an inferential nexus (*vyāpti*) established by *pramāṇa* for both the *probans (hetu)* and *probandum (sādhya)*, there will then be a *svatantra-sādhana*. However, [in a *prasaṅga* where no *svatantra* element is adduced,] no *vyāpti* is established [by a *pramāṇa* belonging to both parties], the *pramāṇa* establishing *vyāpti* being either *pratyakṣa* or *anumāna*. (i) [Now,] to begin with, in this matter, no *vyāpti* becomes established by *pratyakṣa*: whilst, with respect to fire and smoke in the kitchen, one cognizes by *pratyakṣa* and non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) [the *anvaya* and *vyatireka* for invariable concomitance (*avinābhāva*), namely] that if the one [viz. smoke] exists then the other [viz. fire] is present, but if the one [viz. fire] does not exist then the other [viz. smoke] is not present, this is not true for all places [apart from a kitchen]. (ii) Nor [does the *vyāpti* become established] by *anumāna*, for [its] scope is limitedly determined (*yul ṅes pa can yin pas so*). That is, the object of inference is not all things: because wherever there exist a *sādhya* [such as impermanence] and the relevant *liṅga* [viz. the quality of being produced], there arises the cognition of impermanence, etc., but this [inference] is not [produced] in all places and times.

Hence, [*vyāpti* being unestablished for both parties by these two *pramāṇa*s,] because *vyāpti* is established through a simple worldly [i.e. conventional] assertion (*laukika-abhyupagama-*

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ternatively] unestablished, for the opponent (*phyir rgol* = *prativādin*), since the thought (*bsam pa*) of this [*prativādin*] does not come to be established by the *vādin*'s own two *pramāṇa*s [viz. *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*]. Also, [the *vādin*] does not himself know that the *liṅga* is established by *pramāṇa*, since even if determined by himself to be established by *pramāṇa* (*raṅ gis tshad mas grub par thag bcad kyaṅ*), it may [still] be fallible (*bslu ba srid pas so*). Therefore, because there exists no *liṅga* established by *pramāṇa* for both [*vādin* and *prativādin*], it is proper to refute (: *sun 'byin* = *dūṣaṇa*) [the *vādin* opponent's *pratijñā*] by means of this assertion [made by him] even in the absence of [its] establishment by *pramāṇa*, [this refutation] amounting to [mere] assertion [of a *liṅga*] as *pramāṇa* (*[sun 'byin pa de rtags] tshad mar khas blaṅs pa [tsam] la thug pas na*).'

mātra) – but not by a *pramāṇa* – how is it that refutation (*dū-ṣaṇa*) of an opposed proposition (*parapakṣa*) by means of the *hetu* of a *prasaṅga* is not proper?'[70]

9. THE THESIS ACCORDING TO PA TSHAB ÑI MA GRAGS

None of the works of Pa tshab Ñi ma grags (b. 1055) – the Tibetan scholar-translator who was largely responsible, together with Jayānanda, for establishing Candrakīrti's Prāsaṅgika branch of the Madhyamaka in Tibet[71] – is at present accessible, but his views on the subject of the thesis have been reported by later authorities. In the *dBu ma rtsa ba'i šes rab kyi rnam par bšad pa Yaṅ dag lta ba'i 'od zer* by Go ram(s) pa bSod nams seṅ ge (1429-1489), his opinion has been reported in the following words (f. 14b): 'According to Pa [tshab] lo [tsā ba], in the declaration that no thesis exists [for the Mādhyamika] there is no contradiction because, whilst there exists no *pratijñā* of affirmation (*vidhi*) through positive de-

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[70] That is, no *pramāṇasiddha* argument is required to negate an assertion that is based on mere worldly assertion, in other words on one not based on *pramāṇa*.

This passage from Jayānanda's *Madhyamakāvatāra-Ṭīkā* (D, ra, f. 120a-b) is reproduced (with slight variants) in Tsoṅ kha pa's *LRChM*, f. 404b-405b = pp. 673-4, as the first of four *pūrvapakṣa*s relating to the question as to how Madhyamaka theory (*dbu ma'i lta ba*) arises in the conscious stream (*saṃtāna*) according to the Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas. Tsoṅ kha pa then criticizes Jayānanda's view in *LRChM*, f. 408a-b = pp. 678-9. The English translation above makes use of the notes on the *LRChM* by 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa'i rdo rje Ṅag dbaṅ brtson 'grus to be found in: *mÑam med rje btsun tsoṅ kha pa chen pos mdzad pa'i byaṅ chub lam rim chen mo'i dka' ba'i gnad rnams mchan bu bži'i sgo nas legs par bšad pa Theg chen lam gyi gsal sgron žes bya ba las ži lhag gñis bžugs so (Lam rim mchan bži sbrags ma*), ed. Chos 'phel legs ldan (New Delhi, 1972), kha, f. 234b-237a. See also *LŠÑP*, f. 83a-b = pp. 475-6, which refers back to the *LRChM*.

[71] See above, Section I, § 4.2, with p. 22 note 40 on the question of *tshad mas grub pa* and the *thal 'gyur*.

termination (*pariccheda*), it is not the case that there also exists no simple *pratijñā* of negation (*pratiṣedha/niṣedha*) through negative determination (*vyavaccheda*)' (*pa los/ dam bca' med par gsuṅs pa ni yoṅs gcod sgrub pa'i dam bca' med pa yin gyi/ rnam bcad dgag pa'i dam bca' tsam yaṅ med pa ma yin pas/ mi 'gal lo ces*).[72]

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[72] This formulation of Pa tshab's opinion is virtually identical with the opinion cited by rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus, *'Thad pa'i rgyan*, f. 24b4-5, where it is introduced only by *kha cig* without any name being specified: *kha cig dbu ma pa la dam bca' med ces pa yoṅs gcod bsgrub pa'i dam bca' med pa yin gyi/ rnam gcad dgag pa'i dam bca' med pa ma yin pas mi 'gal lo žes.*

See also Roṅ ston Šes bya kun rig, *dBu ma rtsa ba'i rnam bšad zab mo'i de kho na ñid snaṅ ba* (Varanasi, 1975), p. 24: *lo tstsha ba ñi ma grags kyis rtsod zlog gi don yoṅs gcod sgrub pa'i dam bca' med pa yin la/ rnam bcad dgag pa'i dam bca' ni yod pas 'dir skye ba dgag pa'i dam bca' gsuṅs pa daṅ mi 'gal lo žes gsuṅ ṅo*, 'The translator [Pa tshab] Ñi ma grags states that the meaning of the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* is the absence of an affirmative *pratijñā* through *pariccheda*; but since there exists a negative *pratijñā* through *vyavaccheda*, there is no contradiction with what is declared here [in *MK* i.1] regarding the *pratijñā* negating origination'. Cf. Roṅ ston, *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bšad Ṅes don rnam ṅes* (in Trayang and Jamyang Samten [ed.], *Two controversial Mādhyamika treatises*, New Delhi, 1974), f. 33b. See in addition Go rams pa, *rGyal ba thams cad kyi thugs kyi dgoṅs pa zab mo dbu ma'i de kho na ñid spyi'i ṅag gis ston pa Ṅes don rab gsal*, f. 77a-b; Šākya mchog ldan, *dBu ma rnam par ṅes pa'i baṅ mdzod luṅ daṅ rigs pa'i rgya mtsho (dBu ma rnam ṅes)*, x (*Lam dbu ma thabs šes zuṅ 'jug bšad pa*, gSuṅ 'bum, vol. ba), f. 9b; and below, § 15 (for 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa's reference). On the evidence concerning Pa tshab supplied by Roṅ ston in his *dBu ma rtsa ba'i rnam bšad zab mo'i de kho na ñid snaṅ ba* and in his *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bšad*, see P. Williams, 'rMa bya Byang chub brtson 'grus on Madhyamaka method', *JIP* 13 (1985), pp. 210-12. Concerning Roṅ ston's own statement, P. Williams has written (p. 211) that 'Pa tshab's theory applies only to theses concerning the Ultimate Truth [*paramārtha*]. *Then* the Mādhyamika has only negating theses involving negative determination.' It is to be noted, however, that if Pa tshab did really hold this theory on the *paramārtha* level, his theory could be viewed as defective in terms of the analyses of later Tibetan Mādhyamikas (including rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson →

10. THE THESIS ACCORDING TO KHU MDO SDE 'BAR

Khu lo tsā ba mDo sde 'bar – a pupil of Pa tshab as well as a disciple and collaborator of Jayānanda – is reported to have held that the Mādhyamika only negates the assertions of others without himself proposing a thesis of his own.

In Tsoṅ kha pa's *Lam rim chen mo* we find the following account of this doctrine. 'Lo tsā ba disciples of this Paṇḍit [Jayānanda] state the following. For the Mādhyamika there is no setting up of a *pratijñā* apart from the simple negation of an other's [i.e. an opponent's] position, and no *svatantra*[-type proposition] is legitimate because nothing acknowledged in common by both [parties to a debate] – such as a subject of the proposition (*dharmin*) – is established. The result (*phala*) [or purpose, *prayojana*] of analysis through principled reasoning consists simply in rejecting an opponent's [incorrect] established doctrine (*siddhānta*); and because, apart from this, there [then] exists no position of one's own, no *svatantra-hetu* at all is to be stated. This is, therefore, in fact a *prasaṅga*

'grus, on whom see below, § 11); for in the *paramārtha* there is no thesis of any kind. Candrakīrti's school has, moreover, rejected Bhavya's prefixing the qualification *paramārthatas* 'in ultimate reality' to *MK* i.1. It is, however, difficult to be certain just what Pa tshab intended because of the fact that his original works are not available and the context of his statement is therefore not totally clear.

For the distinction between *vyavaccheda* and *pariccheda*, see below, § 16. And on *vidhi* and *pratiṣedha/niṣedha*, see e.g. Prajñākaramati, *BCAP* ix.35 (above, p. 141). Concerning the history of the latter two concepts, see A. Akamatsu, '*Vidhivādin* et *Pratiṣedhavādin*: Double aspect présenté par la théorie sémantique du bouddhisme indien', *Zinbun: Memoirs of the Research Institute for Humanistic Studies*, No. 21 (Zinbun Kagaku Kenkyusyo, Kyōto, 1986).

Gro luṅ pa – the disciple of rṄog Blo ldan šes rab and a younger contemporary of Pa tshab – has discussed at some length the topic of *yoṅs su gcod pa* and *rnam par bcad pa* in his *bsTan rim chen mo*, in the context of the transcendance of existence and non-existence (*yod med las 'das pa, yod med ma yin*, etc.) and discursive proliferation (*spros bral*), and of the absence of views (*lta ba*); see f. 381a ff.

[which may be probative or refuting], and in this matter [of a *prasaṅga* negating the opponent's misapprehensions] a probative *prasaṅga* – amounting ultimately to a *svatantra* one – is in fact a refuting *prasaṅga*. Now, this [refuting *prasaṅga*] being a *prasaṅga* asserting (*abhyupagam-*) both a *hetu* and a *vyāpti*, or what ultimately amounts to assertion, it is not truly [established by] a *pramāṇa*. Based on this [*prasaṅga*], the exclusion of the opponent's assertion, or discursive proliferation (*prapañca*), is effected by means of four [procedures consisting of three types of *prasaṅga* and one *hetu*].'[73]

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[73] In the *LRChM*, ff. 406a-407a = pp. 675-6, this view is reproduced as the second of four *pūrvapakṣa*s summarized by Tsoṅ kha pa that relate to the question as to how Madhyamaka theory arises in the conscious stream according to the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika. Tsoṅ kha pa, who criticizes this view in *LRChM* ff. 409a-410a = pp. 679-81, does not mention the name of its propounder, and his identification as Khu lo tsā ba has been made by 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa in his note included in the *Lam rim mchan bži sbrags ma*, ed. Chos 'phel legs ldan (New Delhi, 1972), kha, f. 237a. See also *LŠÑP*, f. 83a-b = pp. 475-6, referring back to the *LRChM*. – The text of the *LRChM*, together with 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa's notes (reproduced here in round brackets), reads (ii, f. 237a-238a): *(de'i rjes 'braṅs khu lo la sogs kyis dbu ma pa la gžan gyi 'dod pa tsam las raṅ lugs dam bca' mi 'dod tshul ni/ gñis pa) paṇḍi ta de'i slob ma lo tstsha ba dag kyaṅ 'di skad du dbu ma pa la (pha rol po) gžan gyi 'dod pa 'gog pa tsam ma gtogs pa'i (dbu mas) raṅ gi dam bca' ba med ciṅ chos can la sogs pa (rtags khyab rgol ba) gñis ka la grags pa'i thun moṅ ba (žig) ma grub pas (na) raṅ rgyud mi 'thad do/ /rigs pas rnam par dpyad pa'i 'bras bu('am dgos pa) yaṅ (pha rol po) gžan gyi grub mtha' (ṅan pa) 'dor ba tsam žig yin la/ (gžan gyi grub mtha' 'dor ba) de las gžan pa'i raṅ 'dod (kyi dam bca') med pas raṅ rgyud kyi gtan tshigs (ni) rnam pa thams cad du brjod par mi bya'o/ /(skabs 'dir raṅ gis gaṅ yaṅ dam bca' mi rigs pas de sgrub nus pa'i gtan tshigs med la de'i phyir raṅ rgyud kyi gtan tshigs 'dod mi rigs pa/) des na thal 'gyur kho na('i sgo nas pha rol gyi log rtog 'gog pa) yin la (de 'dra'i thal 'gyur) de la yaṅ (sgrub pa daṅ sun 'byin pa gñis yod pa las) (b)sgrub pa'i thal 'gyur ni (thal 'gyur de'i thal chos kyi dam bca' daṅ de sgrub pa'i gtan tshigs sogs sṅa ma kho na daṅ 'dra bas skabs 'dir dam bca' med pas sgrub byed med la gal te sgrub byed de 'dra yod na raṅ rgyud kyi rtags de las med pas na) raṅ rgyud kyi mthar thug pas* →

11. THE THESIS ACCORDING TO RMA BYA BYAṄ CHUB YE ŠES AND RMA BYA BYAṄ CHUB BRTSON 'GRUS

Another early Tibetan treatment of the Mādhyamika's assertion of a thesis (*dam bca'* = *pratijñā*) is found in the commentary on the *Madhyamakakārikā*s and *Prasannapadā* by rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus (d. *c.* 1185) entitled *dBu ma rtsa ba šes rab kyi 'grel pa 'Thad pa'i rgyan.*[74] Reported to have been the pupil of both Jayānanda and Khu mDo sde

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(de 'dra mi 'dod pa'i phyir na) sun 'byin gyi thal ba (ste thal 'gyur) kho na (khas blaṅs par bya)'o/ /(sun 'byin pa'i thal ba) 'di yaṅ rtags daṅ khyab pa gñis (rgol ba gñis kyis dṅos su) khas blaṅs pa'am khas blaṅs pa'i mthar thug pa'i thal ba yin pas yaṅ dag pa'i tshad ma(s grub pa ni) ma yin no/ /(thal 'gyur) 'di la brten nas (rgol ba pha rol po) gžan gyi khas len nam spros pa gcod pa ni (thal 'gyur gsum daṅ gtan tshigs gcig ste/) bži'i sgo nas byed de (de yaṅ 'gal brjod kyi thal 'gyur daṅ gžan la grags pa'i rjes dpag gam gžan grags kyi gtan tshigs daṅ/ sgrub byed bsgrub bya daṅ mtshuṅs pa'i thal 'gyur daṅ rgyu mtshan mtshuṅs pa'i mgo sñoms kyi thal 'gyur daṅ bži'o//... See also Go rams pa, *rGyal ba thams cad kyi thugs kyi dgoṅs pa zab mo dbu ma'i de kho na ñid spyi'i ṅag gis ston pa Ṅes don rab gsal* (gSuṅ 'bum, vol. ca), f. 98b: *thal 'gyur ba chen po khu lo tsā ba mdo sde dpal [sic] gyis bžed pa ni dbu ma la raṅ 'dod kyi dam bca' med ces pa'aṅ don dam bden pa las brtsams te raṅ bžin med pa'am skye ba med pa la sogs pa'i dam bca' cir yaṅ khas mi len pa yin gyi spyir raṅ 'dod kyi dam bca' med pa ma yin te/ tha sñad kyi de kho na dpyod pa'i tshe raṅ 'dod kyi dam bca' yod pas so*; and f. 103b: *khu lo tsā bas/ don dam bden pa las brtsams te raṅ bžin med pa'am skye ba med pa la sogs pa'i dam bca' ci yaṅ khas mi len pa yin gyi spyir tha sñad kyi de kho na la dpyod pa'i tshe raṅ 'dod kyi dam bca' yod ces khyad par phye ba'aṅ mi 'thad de/ de'i don dam bca'i raṅ ldog don dam bden pa las brtsams te med ces smra na ni cig šos la'aṅ mtshuṅs šiṅ/ myu gu lta bu skye med du bsgrub pa'i tshe že 'dod kyi dam bca' med pa'i don yin na ni mtha' bži'i skye ba dgag pa'i dam bca' gsuṅs pa daṅ 'gal ba'i phyir ro//*

[74] On rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus, his date and his relationship to rMa bya Byaṅ chub ye šes (and rMa bya rTsod pa'i seṅ ge), see above, Section I, § 4.2 (and below, pp. 166, 190 f.). Cf. P. Williams, 'rMa bya Byang chub brtson 'grus on Madhyamaka method', *JIP* 13 (1985), pp. 205-25; L. van der Kuijp, *BIS* 1 (1985), p. 55.

'bar, he is considered one of the chief authorities of the early Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka school in Tibet.

Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus held that, from the point of view of the *paramārtha*, the Mādhyamika not only has no *pratijñā* consisting in affirmation (*sgrub pa* = *vidhi*) through positive determination (*yoṅs su gcod pa* = *pariccheda*) but also no *pratijñā* consisting in negation (*dgag pa* = *pratiṣedha*/*niṣedha*) through negative determination (*rnam gcad* = *vyavaccheda*).[75] Still, on the surface level of *saṃvṛti*, the Mādhyamika may entertain both a purely negative thesis (*rnam gcad dgag pa'i dam bca' tsam*) in so far as it relates to the matter under debate with an opponent, and also in general an affirmative thesis (*yoṅs gcod bsgrub pa'i dam bca'*). The Mādhyamika indeed accepts what originates in dependence (*pratītyasamutpanna*) – namely the *nidāna*s from *avidyā* to old age and death – in the manner of a magic show (*māyā*). As for the thesis which the Mādhyamika formulates in a desire to remove the misapprehension (*mithyākalpanā, vipratipatti*) of an opponent, it is a *pratijñā* that, in the opponent's sight (*ṅor* = *anurodhena*, i.e. with regard to the opponent's view only), consists in negation through *vyavaccheda* on the *saṃvṛti*-level. According to Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus, then, one kind of thesis relates to the domain of the surface level (*sāṃvṛta-viṣaya*), where *dharma*s are without self-existence (*niḥsvabhāva*) and *māyā*-like even though they are presented (*snaṅ ba*) on this surface level. Another kind of thesis relates to the realm of the ultimately real (*pāramārthika-viṣaya*) such as is free from any assertion (*abhyupagama*) at all. The first Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus describes as a technically speaking real (*lākṣaṇika*) one because of its being held with sincere commitment (*že bas 'dod pa*). And the second kind he terms an imputational thesis because it is set out merely in virtue of the imputation (*samāropa, adhyāropa*) of designations such as 'unoriginated' (*skye ba med pa* = *anutpanna*) given the Mādhyamika's desire to remove an opponent's misapprehension as to the origination of what exists without in fact being established in the nature of either negation (*pratiṣedha*) or affirmation (*vidhi*). Yet because, in ultimate reality, origination, discursive proliferation (*prapañca*) or assertion (*abhyupagama*) are not considered as pure negated signs (*bkag pa'i mtshan ma tsam*), this is no real (*lākṣaṇika*) thesis negating such. Hence there is no

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[75] See p. 160 note 72 above.

contradiction with the indication that, in ultimate reality, there exists neither a negative nor a positive thesis.[76]

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[76] This is the reply by Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus to the view which maintained that having no *pratijñā* means having no thesis of positive determination rather than not having a thesis of negative determination (i.e. Pa tshab's thesis quoted above, § 9), and to the view which maintained that it means having only a thesis of negative determination (i.e. exclusion) which is formulated in accordance with (*ṅor* = *anurodhena*) the view of the opponent in a desire to negate his misapprehension (i.e. the opinion ascribed to Byaṅ chub ye šes by Go rams pa; see below). These two views Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus then rejects on the basis in particular of *VV* 63ab: *pratiṣedhayāmi nâhaṃ kiṃcit pratiṣedhyam asti na kiṃcit* (cited above, p. 119).

See rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus, *'Thad pa'i rgyan* (Thimpu, 1979), f. 24b-25a.: *de gñi ga yaṅ rigs pas mi 'thad ciṅ slob dpon gyi dgoṅs pa ma yin te/ [VV* 63ab:*] dgag bya ci yaṅ med pas na/ /ṅa ni ci yaṅ mi 'gag go/ /žes pa'i tshul gyis don dam par dgag bya 'gog byed ma grub pas rnam gcad dgag pa'i dam bca' yaṅ mi 'thad ciṅ/ kun rdzob tu/ ma rig nas brtsams rga ba yi/ /mthar thug yan lag bcu gñis kyi/ /rten nas 'byuṅ ba'i bya ba ni/ /kho bos rmi lam sgyu 'dra 'dod/ /ces pa ltar sgyu ma lta bu'i rten 'brel khas blaṅ dgos pas yoṅs gcod bsgrub pa'i dam bca' yaṅ yod pa'i phyir daṅ/ /pha rol po'i log rtog bzlog par 'dod nas de'i ṅor dbu ma pas brjod pa ñid kun rdzob tu dbu ma pa'i rnam gcad dgag pa'i dam bca' yin pa'i phyir ro/ /de'i phyir slob dpon gyi dgoṅs pa'am yaṅ dag pa'i lan ni dbu ma pa'i tshul la don dam par dgag sgrub kyi dam bca' gaṅ yaṅ med mod kyi kho bo cag gis kyaṅ don dam par dgag sgrub kyi dam bca' gaṅ yaṅ byas pa med la/ kun rdzob tsam du 'dir skabs su bab pa rnam gcad dgag pa'i dam bca' daṅ/ spyir yoṅs gcod bsgrub pa'i dam bca' yaṅ byas mod kyi/ tha sñad khas ni ma blaṅs par ṅed cag 'chad par mi byed do/ /žes pa'i tshul gyis kun rdzob tu dbu ma pa la dgag sgrub gñi ga'i dam bca' med par khas mi len to/ /de la'aṅ chos rnams kun rdzob tu snaṅ la raṅ bžin med pa sgyu ma lta bu yin žes pa la sogs pa kun rdzob pa'i yul la daṅ/ chos rnams don dam par skye ba med pa'am/ spros pa daṅ bral ba daṅ/ khas len thams cad daṅ bral ba yin no žes pa la sogs pa lta bu don dam pa'i yul la kun rdzob tu dam bca byed pa gñis las/ daṅ po ni de ltar že bas 'dod pas dam bca' mtshan ñid pa yin la/ gñis pa ni/ dgag sgrub kyi spros pa gaṅ gi yaṅ ṅo bor ma grub par gnas pa la skye ba la sogs par yod par 'dod pa'i log rtog bsal bar 'dod nas skye ba med pa la sogs*

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This doctrine of Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus thus differed from that of Pa tshab's disciple rMa bya Byaṅ chub ye šes. For the latter is reported to have maintained that a negative thesis through negative determination, being held to negate the misapprehensions of the opponent, is made in

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pa'i miṅ gis sgro btags nas bstan pa yin pas sgro btags kyi dam bca' yin gyi/ don dam par skye ba daṅ spros pa daṅ khas len la sogs pa bkag pa'i mtshan ma tsam du yaṅ že bas mi 'dod pas de dgag pa'i dam bca' mtshan ñid pa ma yin pa'i phyir dgag sgrub kyi dam bca' gñi ga med par bstan pa daṅ mi 'gal bar šes par bya'o// See also *'Thad pa'i rgyan*, ff. 7b-8a., 21a, 22b, 24a. At f. 21a7, rMa bya has referred to the *dBu ma'i de kho na ñid gtan la dbab pa* as a source on this topic.

For accounts of the doctrine of Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus, see additionally Šākya mchog ldan, *dBu ma rnam ṅes*, viii (*Chos kyi bdag med sgrub pa'i rigs pa'i gnas la mkhas par bya ba'i le'u*, gSuṅ 'bum, vol. ba), f. 30b f.; x, ff. 9b-11b (referring also to Pa tshab). See also Go rams pa, *dBu ma rtsa ba'i šes rab kyi rnam bšad Yaṅ dag lta ba'i 'od zer*, f. 14b: *byaṅ brtson gyis/ don dam par dgag sgrub kyi dam bca' gaṅ yaṅ med la/ kun rdzob tsam du 'dir skabs su bab pa rnam bcad dgag pa'i dam bca' tsam daṅ/ spyir yoṅs gcod sgrub pa'i dam bca' yaṅ yod pa mi 'gal lo žes pa*; and Go rams pa, *rGyal ba thams cad kyi thugs kyi dgoṅs pa zab mo dbu ma'i de kho na ñid spyi'i ṅag gis ston pa Ṅes don rab gsal*, f. 101b: *rma bya chen po'i žal nas sṅa rabs pa dag dbu ma pa la dbu ma'i lta ba daṅ/ dgag bya daṅ/ 'gog byed daṅ/ bsgrub bya daṅ/ sgrub byed ci yaṅ khas len pa med do žes smra ba ni šin tu mi 'thad de/ tha sñad du dbu ma'i don rten nas 'byuṅ ba yin pas/ khas blaṅ bya'i dbu ma yod dgos pa'i phyir te/ rten 'byuṅ de ñid snaṅ la raṅ bžin med pa'am/ rgyu 'bras de ñid daṅ gžan ñid du med pa khas blaṅs dgos pa'i phyir ro//*; f. 104a: *rma byas rnam par dpyad pa'i tshe dbu ma'i lta ba khas mi len pa yin gyi tha sñad du dbu ma'i lta ba daṅ/ dgag sgrub daṅ/ dam bca' daṅ/ gtan tshigs thams cad khas len žes pa 'thad kyaṅ gžan la grags kyi rjes dpag gi skabs su tshul gsum 'jig rten na grags pa'i tshad mas grub ces pa di ni šin tu 'khrul te/ 'jig rten na grags pa'i tshad ma ni tshig gsal las gsuṅs pa'i mṅon sum la sogs pa'i tshad ma bži yin par raṅ ñid kyis kyaṅ khas blaṅs šiṅ gžuṅ gi don yaṅ yin pas de'i tshe chos can 'jig rten na grags pa'i tshad mas grub par thal ba'i phyir ro/ / ... ces gsuṅs pa draṅs pa daṅ 'gal lo//*; and f. 121b. On this view according to Tsoṅ kha pa and 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa, see below, § 15.

accordance with the latter's view [only], but that, for the Mādhyamika himself, even a purely negative thesis does not exist.[77]

Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus also held that an objectively gained right cognition (*dṅos po stobs žugs kyi tshad ma* = *vastubalapravṛtta-pramāṇa*) has no justified ground (*'thad pa* = *upapatti*) even on the surface level of *saṃvṛti*. And no logical-philosophical system of either negation/refutation (*pratiṣedha/niṣedha*) or affirmation/proof (*vidhi*) – i.e. no *dgag sgrub kyi rnam gžag* – is established even in *saṃvṛti* except through accepting a *pramāṇa* that is merely acknowledged either consensually in pragmatic-transactional usage (*'jig rten la grags pa* = *lokaprasiddha*) or by an opponent in a debate.[78]

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[77] See Go rams pa's report on the opinion of Byaṅ chub ye šes in his *Yaṅ dag lta ba'i 'od zer*, f. 14b: *byaṅ yes rnam bcad dgag pa'i dam bca' yaṅ pha rol gyi log rtog dgag par 'dod nas de'i ṅor byas pa yin gyi dbu ma pa raṅ la dgag pa'i dam bca' tsam yaṅ med do žes pa.* This formulation corresponds with the view quoted by Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus, *'Thad pa'i rgyan*, f. 24b5-6, introduced by *kha cig* without any name being specified: *yaṅ kha cig rnam gcad dgag pa'i dam bca' yaṅ pha rol gyi log rtog dgag par 'dod nas de'i ṅor byas pa yin gyi/ dbu ma pa la dgag pa'i dam bca' tsam yaṅ med do žes zer ro.* Cf. Roṅ ston, *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bšad Ṅes don rnam ṅes*, f. 33b3-4, where this thesis is rejected. See also below, § 15.

According to some sources, Byaṅ chub ye šes was the uncle of Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus, who is often listed as a pupil of the former. See above, Section I, § 4.2.

[78] *'Thad pa'i rgyan*, f. 21a f. on *VV* 29, especially f. 21b5-22a1: *raṅ lugs gžag pa ni/ de ltar dṅos po stobs žugs kyi tshad ma kun rdzob tu'aṅ mi 'thad ciṅ/ pha rol lam 'jig rten la grags pa'i tshad ma tsam khas ma blaṅs na kun rdzob tsam du dgag sgrub kyi rnam gžag gaṅ yaṅ mi 'grub pas/ mṅon sum daṅ/ rjes su dpag pa daṅ/ luṅ daṅ/ ñe bar 'jal ba žes bya ba 'jig rten la grags pa'i tshad ma bžis tha sñad tsam du phyogs gñis dgag sgrub kyi don rtogs par rnam par 'jog pa yin no//* Here rMa bya has recognized on the level of *vyavahāra* only the four *pramāṇa*s of *pratyakṣa, anumāna, āgama* and *upamāna* upon which is grounded kmowledge of the twin categories of *pratiṣedha* and *vidhi* (*phyogs gñis dgag sgrub kyi don rtogs pa*) on the *vyavahāra*-level. Compare rMa bya's discussion reported by Karma Mi bskyod →

Concerning the final sense of the asserted (*khas blaṅs kyi mthar thug pa'i don: abhyupagama*), even if not directly asserted it is still something requiring implicit assertion. When left unanalysed, this is a fallacious appearance (*ābhāsa*) as something established by right knowledge (*pramāṇa*); however, if analysed, the cognitive mode of the holder of the logical reason has reference [solely] to what the opponent asserts to be a non-erroneous *pramāṇa*. Even if, in *saṃvṛti*, there exist both a definitive effecting of ascertainment in the sight of (*ṅor* = *anurodhena*, i.e. in accordance with) the Mādhyamika's own cognition and an entailment of negation (*dgag pa 'phen pa*), these are [solely] established by a mere *pramāṇa* acknowledged by the opponent. But because, even in *saṃvṛti*, there exists no definitive ascertainment established by an objectively gained [*pramāṇa*], nor is *viparyaya* entailed (*bzlog pa 'phaṅs pa*), one must understand that this will amount neither to an autonomous [inference] nor to a *prasaṅga*-type argument involving proof (*sgrub byed 'phen pa'i thal 'gyur*).[79]

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rdo rje, *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bśad*, f. 90a.

79 As opposed to a *prasaṅga*-type apagogic argument that does not involve a proof (*sgrub byed mi 'phen pa'i thal 'gyur*).

See *'Thad pa'i rgyan*, f. 22a5-6: *khas blaṅs kyi mthar thug pa'i don ni dṅos su khas ma blaṅs kyaṅ don gyis khas blaṅ dgos su soṅ ba daṅ| ma dpyad na tshad mas grub pa ltar snaṅ yaṅ dpyad na rtags 'dzin gyi blo'i 'dzin staṅs mi 'khrul ba'i tshad mar pha rol gyi khas blaṅs la ltos pa'o||* (At this point Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus details the four kinds of logical reasons of a *prasaṅga* (*thal 'gyur gyi rtags*) starting with the *'gal ba brjod pa'i thal 'gyur*.) Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus then continues, f. 22b3-5: *kun rdzob tu dbu ma pa raṅ gi blo ṅor mtha' gcig tu ṅes pa bsgrub pa daṅ| dgag pa 'phen pa'aṅ yod mod kyi de pha rol la grags pa'i tshad ma tsam gyis grub pa yin gyi| dṅos po stobs žugs kyis grub pa'i mtha' gcig tu ṅes pa daṅ| bzlog pa 'phaṅs pa ni kun rdzob tu yaṅ med pas raṅ rgyud daṅ sgrub byed 'phen pa'i thal 'gyur du mi 'gyur bar śes par bya'o||*

12. THE THESIS ACCORDING TO SA SKYA PAṆḌI TA

A discussion of the question whether the Mādhyamika maintains a philosophical position and thesis is found in Chapter iii of the *mKhas pa rnams 'jug pa'i sgo* by Sa skya paṇḍi ta Kun dga' rgyal mtshan (1182-1251).[80]

In verse 16 of this chapter of his treatise Sa paṇ observes

phyir rgol grub mtha' mi 'dzin par//
rgol ba'i grub mtha' sun 'byin pa//
rigs pa'i gžuṅ lugs 'ga' la snaṅ//

'In some treatises on reasoning there is found the refutation (*dūṣaṇa*) of the established doctrinal system (*siddhānta*) of a proponent (*vādin*, of an opposing doctrine) without the respondent (*prativādin*, i.e. the Mādhyamika) holding any *siddhānta*.'

In his autocommentary Sa paṇ mentions the Mādhyamikas who, as *prativādins*, refute whatever thesis their opponent asserts concerning existence and non-existence. He here refers to verse 29 of the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*.

Then, under verses 36-37 of the same chapter, Sa paṇ points out that not holding an established doctrinal system (*grub mtha'* = *siddhānta*) can simply result from either ignorance or a fear of error. (i) The first case is of course of little philosophical intertest because nobody would care to engage in a discussion with an ox-like fool. (ii) In the second case, it is appropriate to distinguish between assertion and non-assertion of the non-assertion of a tenet (*khas mi len pa ñid khas len nam mi len*). (a) Were one to assert non-assertion of a tenet, one's thesis of non-assertion (*khas mi len pa'i dam bca'*) would be undermined inasmuch as asserting the non-assertion of a tenet would be like giving a thing the name of 'nameless'. (b) On the contrary, if at this stage one does not assert non-assertion of a tenet, there will inevitably be the assertion of a tenet; the nega-

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[80] See D. P. Jackson, *The entrance gate for the wise (Section III)* (Vienna, 1987), i, pp. 270-2.

In the Sa skya school, the hierarch bSod nams rtse mo (1142-1182) has referred to the question of the *pariccheda* of *śūnyatā* in his comment on the *Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra* ix.40 (f. 327a-b).

tion of a negative (*dgag pa bkag pa*) is equivalent to a positive affirmation (*sgrub pa* = *vidhi*), in the same way as the not not-blue is blue.[81] (*mKhas 'jug*, f. 212b)

There nevertheless exist two additional cases where persons expert in reasoning may also not assert a tenet:

(iii) Non-assertion of a tenet may, on the one side, be due to a deceitful stratagem (*g-yo sgyu*). For example, the Vātsīputrīya may refrain from making a straightforward assertion, saying that the self (*bdag*, i.e. the indeterminate *pudgala* which he posits) is indeterminable (*brjod du med pa* = *avaktavya, avācya*) as permanent or impermanent. This is what Asaṅga has called a 'view of non-assertion' (*khas mi len pa'i lta ba* = *anabhyupagamadṛṣṭi*) which appears in his list of twenty-eight wrong views (*lta log*, i.e. *lta ba ṅan pa* = *asaddṛṣṭi*).[82]

(iv) But, on the other side, non-assertion of a tenet may be used advisedly and in all honesty (*draṅ po*). Thus, the theory of the Madhyamaka is correct because the real nature of things – which is free from discursive proliferation (*spros pa* = *prapañca*) and is not within the scope of words and cognition (*sgra blo'i yul ma yin*) – is beyond [discursive] knowledge and verbal expression (*šes brjod las 'das pa*).[83] So the Son of the Jina will re-

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[81] *sṅon po ma yin pa ma yin na sṅon por 'gyur ba bžin no.* Reference is thus made to double negation, and indirectly to the semantic theory of *apoha*. Here the negation is of the relative (or 'strong') presuppositional and implicative kind (*ma yin dgag pa* = *paryudāsa*). Compare mKhas grub rje's observation cited below (§ 14) on the problem of the assertion of non-affirmation (and also on the thesis of the Hva šaṅ). Like mKhas grub rje, Sa paṇ here makes no distinction between 'internal' negation of the proposition and 'external' negation of the assertion sign, on which see below, p. 225. – For 'nameless', cf. n. 5 on pp. 109-111 above.

[82] See Asaṅga, *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (ed. Pradhan), p. 84; and *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* (ed. Tatia), p. 116: *yadā punas te tāṃ dṛṣṭim ārabhya parair anuyujyante tadā na kiṃcit svayam icchanty abhyupagantum, chalajātibhyāṃ ca parān anuyuñjante.*

[83] Is Sa paṇ alluding here to the doctrine ascribed to rṄog Blo ldan šes rab and gTsaṅ nag pa, in contradistinction to that of Phya pa Chos kyi seṅ ge (see e.g. 'Gos gŽon nu dpal, *Deb ther sṅon po*, cha, f. 10a, and above, Sec- →

main silent.[84] Indeed, according to Nāgārjuna's *Ratnāvalī* (i.61-62), one should ask people – including the Sāṃkhya, the Aulūkya (i.e. the Vaiśeṣika ?), the Nirgrantha (i.e. the Jaina) and the philosophers who advocate the *pudgala* (i.e. the Vātsīputrīyas) and the *skandhas* (the main line of Buddhists) – if they maintain something beyond existence and non-existence; and one should therefore understand the precious Dharma-heritage declared to be the profound ambrosial essence of the Buddhas' teaching which goes beyond existence and non-existence.[85]

Non-assertion of a tenet as a deceitful stratagem is, then, comparable to not acknowledging a theft (that has been committed). But the Mādhyamika's non-assertion is altogether different, for it is comparable to non-acknowledgement when no theft has in fact been committed.[86] (*mKhas 'jug*, f. 212b-213a)

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tion I, § 4.1)? – Concerning the definition of absolute reality (*paramārtha*), see for example Prajñākaramati, *BCAP* ix.2.

[84] The silence of the wise Ārya-Bodhisattva, or of a Buddha, is thus altogether different from the mere muteness of the unlearned. See above, § 7.

[85] *Ratnāvalī* i.61-62:

> *sasāṃkhyaulūkyanirgranthapudgalaskandhavādinam|*
> *pṛccha lokaṃ yadi vadaty astināstivyatikramam||*
> *dharmayautakam ity asmān nāstyastitvavyatikramam|*
> *viddhi gambhīram ity uktaṃ buddhānāṃ śāsanāmṛtam||*

(The Tibetan version differs slightly from the Sanskrit.) Compare the idea of *tattvāmṛta(avatāra)* in *PPMV* xviii.8 (above, p. 127). Cf. *Samādhirājasūtra* ix.27 cited above, p. 145. And on a use of the 'neither *x* nor not *x*' formula where it does not correspond to Position IV of the *catuṣkoṭi*, see above, p. 128 note 30 and p. 155.

[86] *dbu ma pa khas len mi len pa ni ma brkus pa khas mi len pa lta bu yin pas khyad par che'o.* The allusion is to non-presuppositional and non-implicative absolute negation (*med par dgag pa* = *prasajyapratiṣedha*).

13. THE THESIS ACCORDING TO DBUS PA BLO GSAL

In one of the earliest Tibetan doxographical treatises available to us at present, the *Grub mtha' rnam par bšad pa'i mdzod* by dBus pa Blo gsal (*fl.* early fourteenth century), there is expressed the view that the Prāsaṅgika has no theory asserting a tenet (*khas len gyi lta ba*), and that just as he has no proposition/position of his own (*svapakṣa*) to establish so he does not even have to negate another's proposition/position (*parapakṣa*). On the contrary, the Svātantrika is said to seek to establish his doctrine of *śūnyatā* by means of the type of apagogic reasoning which has affirmative and probative force (*sgrub byed 'phen pa*) in addition to such *prasaṅga*-type reasoning serving simply to refute (*sun 'byin pa : dūṣaṇa*) an opposed doctrine.[87]

dBus pa Blo gsal then links the idea according to which the Mādhyamika has no thesis, etc., with the statement in the *Acintyastava* (22-23ab) that all *dharma*s are free from the four positions of the tetralemma (*mu bži = catuṣkoṭi*), as well as with the ideas expressed by Nāgārjuna to the effect that *śūnyatā* may destroy him who has wrongly grasped it (*MK* xxiv.11) and that one is deemed untreatable (*bsgrub tu med pa = asādhya*) if one becomes attached to *śūnyatā* – which, when

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[87] D, f. 101a-b (= K. Mimaki, *Blo gsal grub mtha'* [Kyōto, 1982], pp. 174-8), especially: *slob dpon saṅs rgyas bskyaṅs la sogs pa thal 'gyur ba rnams ni tha sñad du gžan la grags pa'i rjes dpag daṅ/ 'gal ba brjod pa'i thal 'gyur daṅ/ rgyu mtshan mtshuṅs pa'i mgo sñoms daṅ/ sgrub byed bsgrub bya daṅ mtshuṅs pa'i ma grub pa ste rtags bži daṅ/ mṅon sum daṅ/ rjes dpag daṅ/ luṅ daṅ/ ñe bar 'jal ba ste tshad ma bžis stoṅ ñid la sogs par sgrub pa daṅ/ yul daṅ yul can la bden par žen pa 'gog pa na kun rdzob tu yaṅ bden pa med pa'i phyir dam bca' la khyad par mi bžed ciṅ/ dgag sgrub thams cad pha rol po'i khas blaṅs naṅ 'gal gyis de'i blo ṅor byed kyi dbu ma pa la raṅ phyogs bsgrub tu med pa ltar gžan phyogs dgag tu yaṅ med do/ /des na snaṅ bcas kyi yul thams cad rdzun pa daṅ blo thams cad 'khrul pa daṅ khas len gyi lta ba med pa daṅ kun rdzob la bden pa daṅ yaṅ log med pa daṅ don dam spros bral daṅ saṅs rgyas la raṅ rgyud kyi ye šes med par bžed do//*

correctly understood, is release from (or: the expeller, *niḥsaraṇa* = *ṅes par 'byuṅ ba*, of) all dogmatic opinions (*MK* xiii.8).[88]

14. THESIS, ASSERTION AND PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION ACCORDING TO MKHAS GRUB RJE

The complex of problems connected with the status in Madhyamaka thought of a proposition, thesis and philosophical position has received special attention in the *sToṅ thun sKal bzaṅ mig 'byed* (often referred to as the *sToṅ thun chen mo*), an extensive treatise by mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzaṅ (po) (1385-1438) mainly on Madhyamaka philosophy.[89]

The author – often referred to simply as mKhas grub rje or mKhas grub thams cad mkhyen pa – was at first, like his teacher Tsoṅ kha pa (1357-1419), a disciple of the renowned Madyamaka master Red mda' ba gŽon nu blo gros (1349-1412),[90] from whom he received his monastic ordination and under whom he studied the philosophical curriculum including Madhyamaka.[91] Then, in his twenty-third year, he joined Tsoṅ

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88 D, ff. 103a-104b (= Mimaki, pp. 188-98). On the *catuṣkoṭi*, see above, § 5.

89 *Zab mo stoṅ pa ñid kyi de kho na ñid rab tu gsal br byed pa'i bstan bcos sKal bzaṅ mig 'byed*, in vol. ka of the gSuṅ 'bum of mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzaṅ (po). This work is included in the list of mKhas grub rje's writings in the *rNam thar* written by one Svasti (bDe legs or dGe legs ?), f. 11b2 (in vol. ka of the gSuṅ 'bum). English version: J. Cabezón, *A dose of Emptiness* (Albany, 1992).

On the meaning of *stoṅ thun* see above, Section I, p. 52 note 107.

90 See above, Section I, pp. 60 ff.

91 The above-mentioned *rNam thar* by Svasti places (f. 3b2) his ordination in the year *šiṅ mo lug* (1415), when he would have been in his 30th/31st year. This date must be wrong if Red mda' ba died in 1412. Was the year of mKhas grub rje's ordination then 1405 (*šiṅ bya*), when he would have been about the age usual in Tibet for ordination? This is the year that Sum pa mkhan po Ye šes dpal 'byor actually indicates in his *Re'u mig* for the ordi- →

kha pa. mKhas grub rje succeeded his senior co-disciple rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen (1364-1432) – himself the direct successor of Tsoṅ kha pa – on the abbatial seat of dGa' ldan monastery. The *sKal bzaṅ mig 'byed* was written down by mKhas grub rje's disciple Blo gros chos skyoṅ (see f. 235a5).

The following is a summary of salient points in the treatment of our problem in the *sToṅ thun chen mo* in the context of mKhas grub rje's discussion of various opinions concerning the difference between the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika branches of the Madhyamaka (ff. 145b-156b).

mKhas grub rje opens his discussion with a quotation of the opinion of many 'later' persons who lay claim to being modern Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas.[92] According to them, even in worldly pragmatic-transactional usage (*tha sñad = [loka]vyavahāra*), the Prāsaṅgika has no doctrine of his own (*raṅ lugs = svamata*), no propositional thesis (*dam bca' = pratijñā*), and no assertion (*khas len = abhyupagama*). Otherwise, they argue, the

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nation. However, mKhas grub rje's *gSan yig* (gSuṅ 'bum, vol. ka, f. 3a1) gives for this event the *khyi lo* (1406). In his *rNam thar* of mKhas grub rje (vol. cha of the gSuṅ 'bum, f. 5a), dKon mchog 'Jigs med dbaṅ po gives the year *šiṅ mo lug* (1415), in his subject's 31st year.

[92] *phyis kyi dbu ma thal 'gyur bar khas che ba dag maṅ po.* mKhas grub rje does not specify who these persons were. The qualification *phyis* 'later, modern, latter-day' would apparently exclude such masters as the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna of the 'Great Debate of bSam yas' (see below). – A related view is mentioned by Tsoṅ kha pa, who writes *da lta dbu ma thal 'gyur bar 'dod pa dag* 'present-day [scholars] maintaining they are Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka' in his *LRChM*, f. 407a2 = p. 676. The persons in question have not been identified in the annotated edition of the *LRChM* (the *Lam rim mchan bži sbrags ma*).

It is to be noted that Roṅ ston's follower Go rams pa has so to speak returned the compliment, using the parallel expression *phyis kyi raṅ dgar btags pa'i rnam gžag* to refer to Tsoṅ kha pa's interpretation of the Madhyamaka, though not immediately in the context of the question of the *pratijñā* and *pakṣa*, but in connexion with the problem of the negandum in the Madhyamaka and the appropriateness of *pariccheda* in addition to *vyavaccheda*; see Go rams pa, *Ṅes don rab gsal*, f. 105b1, referred to below, § 17.

Prāsaṅgika would not differ from the Svātantrika – i.e. from the Mādhyamika who conventionally adopts autonomous inferences (*svatantrānumāna*) and formal probative arguments (*svatantraprayoga*) to establish the understanding of the theory of the Middle (*dbu ma* = *madhyamaka*).[93] To support his view the opponent cites Nāgārjuna's *VV* 29-30 and 63ab with Candrakīrti's *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* 50; Ārya-Deva's *CŚ* xvi.25; and Candrakīrti's *PPMV* i.1 (p. 16.2 and p. 23.3) and *MA* vi.171 ff. and vi.81. (*TThCh*, ff. 145b5-146b2)

mKhas grub rje replies by formulating a *prasaṅga*-type argument reducing this view to absurdity in the following words:

> '[According to you,] the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika – the subject (*chos can* = *dharmin* 'locus') [of the proposition] – proves (*thal* = *prasajyate*) not to advocate (*smra ba*) an established philosophical system (*grub mtha'* = *siddhānta*) because he does not accept/assert (*khas len pa*) any doctrinal position whatever.[94] [Now,] if this is what you hold, [the Mādhyami-

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[93] cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India*, pp. 58-59, 61 f.

For Mādhyamikas in Tibet who disavowed the thesis see above, § 8 ff.; this approach is considered to be implicit also in the principle of 'neither existent nor non-existent' (*yod pa ma yin med pa ma yin*) discussed above, § 5; and below, § 17.

[94] In Tibetan philosophical literature, the verb *thal (= prasajyate)* can be used not only in the way familiar to us from Indian treatises to designate an undesired 'occurrence', or consequence, in an opponent's argument or doctrine, but also to formulate an argument that does not involve its proponent in the ontic-epistemic and logical difficulties pointed out for example by Candrakīrti in his critique of Bhavya's *svatantrānumāna* and *svatantraprayogavākya*. The sense of a result or consequence that logically occurs – i.e. (correctly) turns out/ensues/proves to be the case from the speaker's point of view – was adopted by the Tibetan Thal 'gyur ba to give expression to his own argument in a non-asserting (and non-reifying) statement, i.e. one that neither presupposes nor implies the hypostatized self-existence, as an object of right knowledge (*gžal bya* = *prameya*), of the entities being talked about, inclusive of the valid means of right knowledge (*tshad ma* = *pramāṇa*) itself. →

> ka's supposed] status as the best of all advocates of a doctrinal position [which you also allege][95] is ruined. [That is,] the person advocating such [a view] – the subject – proves to have a *pratijñā*, for he is one who proposes a thesis (*dam 'cha' ba po*) owing to his conceptual attachment to some hypostatized thing [in the proposition] "I have no *pratijñā* whatever"'.[96] (*TThCh*, f. 146b4-6)

The opponent, believing he has discovered a flaw in mKhas grub rje's reply, then retorts that to assert that the denial of an assertion is itself an assertion[97] is like requesting from somebody who has just told one that he possesses no goods whatever (*nor ci yaṅ med do*) that 'possession' called 'nothing whatever'.[98] – mKhas grub rje retorts that this reply is totally

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For the *prasaṅga*-type reasoning used to bring out a consequence undesired by the opponent by taking his thesis as the logical reason (*rtags*) in the Mādhyamika's apagogic reasoning, the term *thal ṅag* is also employed.

For the two senses of *khas len pa* = *abhyupagam(a)*, see p. 106 note 3 above.

[95] See below, *TThCh*, f. 149b3-4.

[96] *de ltar smra ba po'i gaṅ zag khyod chos can| dam bca' yod par thal| khas len ci yaṅ med do žes bden žen gyis dam 'cha' ba yin pa'i phyir.* – For the term *bden žen*, compare below, f. 150b2: *dṅos por mṅon par žen pa* = *bhāvābhiniveśa*, i.e. conceptual commitment, or attachment, to a *bhāva* conceived of as having self-existence (*svabhāva*, 'aseity') or as being *bden (par) grub (pa)* 'established hypostatically'.

This *prasaṅga*-type argument used by the Thal 'gyur ba includes a *pratijñā*, a *prasaṅgāpādana* and a *nigamana*, which have been mentioned by Candrakīrti, *PPMV* xxi.2 (see above, pp. 130, 137). See also below, Section III.

[97] *khas len med pa de ñid khas len yin no žes zer ba.*

[98] *ci yaṅ med pa žes bya ba'i nor de byin cig ces zer ba daṅ mtshuṅs so.*

On *MK* xiii.8 – where Nāgārjuna has characterized *śūnyatā* as release from all views (*dṛṣṭi*) and has also described those who hold the view of Emptiness (*śūnyatādṛṣṭi*) as incurable –, Candrakīrti gives as an example somebody who, when told by another that he will give him no goods what- →

inappropriate. For what we have stated, mKhas grub rje observes, is that your inveterated averring that there is no assertion of a tenet is itself an assertion; but we have certainly not stated that non-assertion is assertion.[99] (*TThCh*, ff. 146b6-147a1)

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ever (*na kiṃcid api paṇyam*), replies: 'Give me that "no-goods-whatever"'; see above, p. 134. – The negation in this example is interpreted as *prasajyapratiṣedha (med dgag)*, i.e. as non-presuppositional and non-implicative absolute negation whereby nothing else is indirectly affirmed, in contradistinction to *paryudāsa (ma yin dgag)*, i.e. presuppositional and implicative negation whereby something is indirectly affirmed. See also Buddhapālita on *MK* xiii.8.

In its application to the problem of the assertion of philosophical tenets (*khas len* = *abhyupagama*), the question is whether the Mādhyamika's statement 'I have no *pratijñā*, no *abhyupagama*, etc.' entails the assertion of a *pratijñā* or is simple negation affirming nothing else. For mKhas grub rje's opponent, it is evidently only negative and entails no indirect assertion of anything (even the affirmation of having a 'no-thesis'). But it still risks taking on the character of a positive assertion (in some ways comparable to Position IV of the *catuṣkoṭi*). Alternatively, if interpreted negativistically, the statement could come close to the generic 'Theory of the Hva šaṅ' at the 'Great Debate of bSam yas', which mKhas grub rje rejects below (f. 152a-b).

99 *kho bo cag gis khas len med par že bas smras pa de ñid khas len yin no žes smras kyi/ khas len med pa khas len yin no žes ma smras pa'i phyir ro.* Here mKhas grub rje calls attention to the non-affirmative character of the negation in the statement 'There is no *abhyupagama (khas len med pa)*', which is a case of *prasajyapratiṣedha*; but he considers that the opponent's inveterated and sincerely committed averring (*že bas smras pa*) does not correspond to this non-presuppositional and non-implicative negation.

Tsoṅ kha pa has phrased this point slightly differently in his *LRChM* (f. f. 411b = p. 684): *'di ltar kho bo cag khas len med pa de ñid khas len no žes mi smra'o/ /'o na ci žig smras sñam na/ khas len med do žes že bas smra ba des khas len med par khas blaṅ dgos so/ žes ston pa yin pas raṅ tshig gi bsal ba spoṅ bar mi nus so//* 'Accordingly, we do not maintain that non-assertion itself is an assertion. – Objection: What then do you maintain? – [Reply:] It being shown that this inveterated averring [by you] of non-assertion has to be asserted as non-assertion, [your] rejection of [your] own statement cannot be →

To bolster his interpretation mKhas grub rje then quotes passages from works by Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti where an accepted doctrine has in fact been explicitly mentioned.[100] Accordingly, these masters of the

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avoided.' (In the expression *žes bas smra ba, že bas* has been glossed by *thabs kyis* 'methodically' and *rim gyis* 'in order' in the annotated edition of the *LRChM*, ii, f. 247b4.)

[100] mKhas grub rje makes particular reference to *VV* 28cd:

> *saṃvyavahāraṃ ca vayam nânabhyupagamya kathayāmaḥ//*
>
> 'We do not make (philosophical) statements without accepting pragmatic-transactional usage' [cf. *MK* xxiv.10];

to *YṢ* 7cd:

> *de phyir dam pa rnams kyis kyaṅ/ /sgyu ma byas lta'i 'gog pa bžed//*
>
> 'Therefore [P and D here read *de bžin* 'thus'] the excellent ones also accept cessation (*nirodha*) as something created in a magic show (*māyā*)';

to *YṢ* 45:

> *gaṅ dag brten nas dṅos po rnams/ /chu yi zla ba lta bur ni//*
> *yaṅ dag ma yin log min par/ /'dod pa de dag ltas mi 'phrog//*
>
> 'Holding that entities, which [are born] in dependence, are neither true nor false, like the moon reflected in water, they are not carried away by a view';

to *MK* xxiv.18ab:

> *yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṃ tāṃ pracakṣmahe/*
>
> 'We consider origination in dependence to be Emptiness';

and to *PPMV* i.1 (pp. 54-55):

> *idampratyayatāmātreṇa saṃvṛteḥ siddhir abhyupagamyate/ na tu pakṣacatuṣṭayābhyupagamena sasvabhāvavādaprasaṅgāt, tasya câyuktatvāt/ idampratyayatāmātrābhyupame hi sati hetuphalayor anyonyāpekṣatvān nâsti svābhāvikī siddhir iti nâsti sasvabhāvavādaḥ//*
>
> 'The establishment of the surface-level is accepted through pure-conditionship-by-this, but not by accepting the four positions [ne- →

Madhyamaka can both be clearly seen to have recognized that a Mādhyamika does have a philosophical system (*rnam par bžag pa* = *vyavasthā*) establishing a doctrine and accepted position (*khas len* = *abhyupagama*). And one should not, therefore, imagine that the contrary view represents some acme of *siddhānta*; for to do so is simply to proclaim oneself to be one who – because of lack of philosophical ability due to an inferior intellect and capacity – is no Mādhyamika of either variety, Prāsaṅgika or Svātantrika.[101] (*TThCh*, ff. 148a1-149b4)

The opponent then asks: Well then, how are we to interpret the meaning of the Madhyamaka sources? (*TThCh*, f. 149b5-6)

In reply mKhas grub rje points out that *VV* 29, in which Nāgārjuna states that he has no *pratijñā*, relates to a particular objection raised by his opponent who had argued (as quoted in *VV* 1): 'If there is no self-existence for all entities, then your [i.e. Nāgārjuna's] statement (*vacana*), [which is therefore itself] without self-existence, cannot controvert self-existence [maintained by us].' mKhas grub rje then provides the following interpretation of this crucial passage: Were the Mādhyamika, who has affirmed that all *bhāva*s are without *svabhāva*, then to affirm that a statement propounding that all *bhāva*s are without *svabhāva* exits by self-nature (*raṅ bžin gyis yod pa*), that would indeed be a fallacy (*skyon* = *doṣa*) for him. But because, in the Mādhyamika's doctrine (*lugs* = *mata*), no statement propounding any such thing is in fact established by self-nature (*ran bžin gyis grub pa med pa*), the fallacy of internal inconsistency (*naṅ 'gal gyi skyon*) alleged by the opponent does not arise. (*TThCh*, f. 150a1-3)

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gated in *MK* i.1]. Because [in the latter case] there would thus occur (the undesired consequence of) the doctrine of [an entity] having self-existence, and because this is not justified. When pure-conditionship-by-this is accepted, given the interdependence of cause and effect, there is no establishment [of things] in self-existence. Hence there is no doctrine of [an entity] having self-existence'; etc.

[101] The opponent also considers the Madhyamaka in the interpretation of its Prāsaṅgika branch to be the highest of the Siddhāntas or schools of Buddhist thought recognized in the Grub mtha' literature of India and Tibet. Cf. above, *TThCh*, f. 146b5.

However, mKhas grub rje explains, one must not conclude from this that Nāgārjuna taught that, *in general (spyir)*, no *pratijñā* exists for the Mādhyamika. And *VV* 30d – 'Because of the absence [of *pramāṇa*s such as direct perception leading to affirmation and denial, 30c], no such charge (*upālambha*) [can be levelled] against me' – means: While in accordance with what has been previously stated it is taught that, in respect of a valid means of right knowledge (*tshad ma* = *pramāṇa*) and a [corresponding] object of knowledge (*gžal bya* = *prameya*), there exist no thing apprehended (*dmigs bya*) and no apprehender (*dmigs byed*) established by self-existence (*raṅ gi ṅo bos grub pa*), it has not been taught that there exist no valid means of knowledge and no object of knowledge arising in conditioned dependence (*rten 'byuṅ* = *pratītyasamutpanna*). (*TThCh*, f. 150a3-4)

In his *Vṛtti* on *CŚ* xvi.25 – 'It is not even remotely possible to level a charge against one who has no proposition/position [positing some entity as] existent, non-existent and both existent and non-existent' – Candrakīrti has shown that the doctrine of Emptiness (*śūnyatāvāda*) cannot become the target of refutation (*sun 'byuṅ* = *dūṣaṇa*). But, mKhas grub rje points out, since the opponent has stated that he does not advocate even Emptiness, how could there be place for the non-existence of any tenet whatever?[102] Ārya-Deva's meaning is therefore that, because it involves

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[102] *khyod ni stoṅ pa ñid du 'aṅ mi 'dod do žes smra bas na 'dod pa gaṅ yaṅ med pa 'i khams su ji ltar ruṅ.*

That is, it is only in terms of the theory of *śūnyatā* that it is possible to have no propositional thesis positing some kind of entity having self-existence. In the absence of the theory of *śūnyatā*, the philosopher inexorably falls either into the extreme of eternalism (*śāśvatānta*), and substantialism, or into the extreme of nihilism (*ucchedānta* 'annihilationism'). But for him who accepts that all entities are Empty of self-existence – and for him alone – everything holds together, as Nāgārjuna has stated in *MK* xxiv. 14:

sarvaṃ ca yujyate tasya śūnyatā yasya yujyate/
sarvaṃ na yujyate tasya śūnyaṃ yasya na yujyate//

and *VV* 70:

prabhavati ca śūnyatêyaṃ yasya prabhavanti tasya sarvārthāḥ/
prabhavati na tasya kiṃcin na prabhavati śūnyatā yasya//

no position falling into the extremes (*mthar lhuṅ gi phyogs*) of positing existence, non-existence, etc., established by self-nature, the doctrine of Emptiness cannot at all be criticized. (*TThCh* f. 150a4-6)

When introducing Nāgārjuna's statement in his *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* (46, cited above, p. 149) that in asserting a tenet concerning such an entity one espouses terrible and evil views in which attraction and repulsion arise, from which disputes result, Candrakīrti has stated (*YṢV* 46):

> 'Persons who do not comprehend this real nature (*dharmatā*) of non-origination in conditioned dependence (*pratītyasamutpāda*) construct in their imagination an own characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*)[103] for entities.'

Therefore, mKhas grub rje explains, one who has no such proposition/position (*pakṣa*) asserting an entity established by self-characteristic (*dṅos po raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub par khas len pa'i phyogs*) does not become engaged in disputes (*rtsod pa* = *vivāda*) involving the proof of one's own proposition/position (*raṅ gi phyogs* = *svapakṣa*) and the rebuttal of another's proposition/position (*gžan gyi phyogs* = *parapakṣa*), activities that result from conceptual attachment to an entity.[104] However, this is certainly not to say that it has been taught that the Mādhyamika has no doctrine of his own (*raṅ lugs* = *svamata*). (*TThCh*, f. 150a6-b2)

Therefore, when Candrakīrti states in his *PPMV* (i.1, p. 16) – where the passages in question from the *VV* and the *CŚ* have been quoted as testimony – that there is no affirmation of any other position (*pakṣāntarā-*

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[103] Here in Candrakīrti's usage, *raṅ gi mtshan ñid* = *svalakṣaṇa* (which Scherrer-Schaub translates as 'caractère propre') does not evidently refer to the self-characteristic (*raṅ gi mtshan ñid*) of Tsoṅ kha pa's and mKhas grub rje's terminology (which appears to derive from Bhavya [Bhā(va)viveka]). See below, Section III, p. 236 note 6; and *KNZB* § 2.

[104] cf. *bden žen* above, f. 146b5, and p. 176 note 96. Thus, the assertion of a *pakṣa* involves in the final analysis the positing of an entity having self-existence, in other words the *bhāvābhiniveśa* or *bden žen* referred to here and elsewhere. Cf. Haribhadra's comment on *YṢ* 46 in his *Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā* ii.8 (p. 161).

bhyupagamābhāva), the meaning is to be understood in the same way as indicated above. (*TThCh*, f. 150b2-3)

In *VV* 63ab – 'I negate nothing and there exists nothing to be negated' – the meaning is: I do not negate anything established by self-nature. This being a case of a negative inferential nexus based on inconsistency (*'gal khyab*),[105] no negator (*'gog byed*) is established by self-characteristic (*raṅ gi mtshan ñid*) because there is no imputation (*sgro 'dogs* = *samāropa*) whatever of a negandum (*dgag bya* = *pratiṣedhya*) established by self-nature. In our own doctrine, an unreal (*rdzun pa* = *alīka*) *māyā*-like negandum and negator are accepted; and this is what Nāgārjuna has stated in *VV* 23 when he compared this negation with a magic show. (*TThCh*, f. 150b3-4)

Accordingly, when Candrakīrti states in his *PPMV* 'Because we have no *pratijñā*',[106] this means that there is no autonomous propositional thesis (*raṅ rgyud kyi dam bca', svatantrā pratijñā*),[107] not that the Mādhyamika has no doctrine of his own (*raṅ lugs* = *svamata*).[108] (*TThCh*, f. 150b5-6)

Moreover, were there no *abhyupagama* and no *pratijñā* whatever, there would then be no possibility of taking refuge (*skyabs 'gro* = *śaranagamana*) in the ordinary and extraordinary Refuges by admitting the Three Jewels (*ratnatraya, triratna*) which can, in the future, arise in one's own conscious stream (*rgyud* = *saṃtāna, saṃtati*),[109] and also by admitting the Buddha already perfected in another's conscious stream as Teacher (*ston pa* = *śāstṛ*), the Dharma as Path, and the Community (*dge*

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[105] For a classification of types of negative inference, see e.g. Mokṣākaragupta, *Tarkabhāṣā* (ed. Rangaswami Iyengar), p. 31.7 ff (= ed. Krishnamacharya, GOS, p. 16.20 ff.). Cf. Y. Kajiyama, *An introduction to Buddhist philosophy* (Kyōto, 1966), p. 81 ff.

[106] *raṅ la dam bca' ba med pa'i phyir.* See *PPMV* i.1, p. 23; cf. pp. 16 (quoting *VV* 29-30 and *CŚ* xvi.25), 19 and 34.

[107] For the expression *svatantrā pratijñā*, see *PPMV* i.1 (p. 16.12).

[108] The following lines take up technical points raised by Candrakīrti in his *MA* (vi.171-5 and vi.81).

[109] cf. *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* ii.11; Śāntideva, *BCA* ii.26 f.

'dun = *saṃgha*) as the Friend on the Path, etc. Nor would it be possible to form the altruistic intention (*lhag bsam* = *adhyāśaya*) consisting in vowing (*dam 'cha' ba*) to remove the Ill (*sdug bsṅal* = *duḥkha*) of all sentient beings,[110] to form the Thought of resolve (*smon sems* = *praṇidhicitta*) consisting in vowing to attainhood buddhahood for the benefit of others, to form the Thought of execution (*'jug sems* = *prasthānacitta*) consisting in vowing to observe the practice (*spyod pa* = *caryā*) of the Bodhisattva,[111] and to form the Thought of elimination (*spoṅ sems*) consisting in vowing to reject all obstacles to the observances (*bslab pa* = *śikṣā*) of the Bhikṣu. The sprout that gives birth to the great medicinal plant of the Tathāgata healing all living beings would, as a consequence, be uprooted.[112] – Objection: [In our position] there is no fault because, although in this case there is no advocating of a *pratijñā* (*dam mi 'cha' ba*) with respect to a doctrine of one's own (*raṅ lugs* = *svamata*), there is [still] *abhyupagama* in accord with another's underatanding only.[113] – Reply: It would as a consequence be very clearly established that your discipline (*tshul khrims* = *śīla*), your production of the Thought [of Awakening] (*sems bskyed* = *[bodhi]cittotpāda*) and your taking refuge would all be mere pretence (*smras chos tsam*), and they would not be sin-

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[110] On *adhyāśaya* see *Bodhisattvabhūmi* § 2.3 (pp. 312 f., 333); Asaṅga, *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* § 2.34; Prajñākaramati, *BCAP* iii.9-10; Haribhadra, *Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā* iv.24-26 (p. 585).

[111] On *praṇidhicitta* and *prasthānacitta*, see *BCA* i.15-17.

[112] For the *bhaiṣajyamahāmahīruha*, cf. *PPMV* xx.1 (*avataraṇikā*, p. 431.8).

[113] *gžan ṅo tsam du khas len pa*. – The opponent here extends to the sphere of general ethical and philosophical praxis the principle adopted by the Prāsaṅgika who, when engaging in a discussion by means of *prasaṅga*-type reasoning, argues *ad hominem* (in the non-pejorative sense) in accord with (*anurodhena*) what another has acknowledged (*paraprasiddha*) and thus rejects – or rather dissolves – others' theses without accepting any counter-theses of his own (*svaprasiddha*); see *PPMV* i.1. pp. 18, 24 and 34-37. (This is possible for the Prāsaṅgika because his negations are technically of the *prasajyapratiṣedha* rather that of the *parudāsa* variety; see p. 171 note 86 and pp. 176-177 notes 98-99 above.)

cerely committed (*že bas ma yin*).[114] Were we to agree without compunction to whatever fault [another may] utter on the ground that he [has spoken] thus also, it would indeed be very strange![115] (*TThCh*, ff. 151b6-152a6)[116]

Many who hold themselves to be meditators (*bsam gtan pa*) of the snowy mountains [of Tibet] talk, in exalted cryptic terms (*skad gsaṅ mthon po*), of theory (*lta ba*) free from all asserted tenets (*khas len* = *abhyupagama*), of meditative realization (*sgom pa* = *bhāvanā*) free from all mentation (*yid la byed pa* = *manas[i]kāra*), of [philosophical] practice (*spyod pa* = *caryā*) free from all negation and affirmation (*dgag sgrub* = *pratiṣedha-vidhi*), and of a Fruit (*bras bu* = *phala*) free from all wishes and qualms (*re dogs*). And they imagine that understanding is born in the conscious stream when – because in a state where there is no mentation about anything whatever (*ci yaṅ yid la ma byas par bžag pa na*) there arises something like the non-identification of anything (*gaṅ la'aṅ ṅos gzuṅ med pa 'dra ba žig šar ba*) – one thinks that there exists nothing in relation to which there is either posive or negative predication (*'di yin daṅ 'di min ci'aṅ mi 'dug*). By so doing one has proclaimed great nihilism where there is nothing to be affirmed according to a doctrine of one's own (*gaṅ yaṅ raṅ lugs la khas blaṅ rgyu med pa'i chad pa chen po*), as well as the thesis of the Hva šaṅ in which nothing can be the object of

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114 Compare Nāgārjuna's discussion in *MK* xxiv of the question whether the theory of *śūnyatā* cancels the four noble truths, etc.

115 It is, therefore, not legitimate to extend to all cases of ethical and philosophical praxis the logical principle that has been correctly applied by the Prāsaṅgika, but only (according to mKhas grub rje) in his *prasaṅga*-type arguments dissolving the assertions of other philosophers who posit some kind of entity having self-existence. In mKhas grub rje's opinion, then, the two situations are entirely different and exlude the kind of extrapolation to which his opponent falls prey.

116 In the final lines of this section mKhas grub rje has discussed the question as to how the Prāsaṅgika really differs from the Svātantrika, criticizing and refuting his opponent's misapprehensions on this subject. See also above, *TThCh*, f. 145b6.

mentation (*ci yaṅ yid la byar mi ruṅ ba'i hva šaṅ gi dam bca'*).[117] (*TThCh*, f. 152a6-b2)

In sum, according to mKhas grub rje and his dGa' ldan pa school, the Mādhyamika's refraining from asserting a thesis (*dam bca'*) or tenet (*khas len*) is to be understood

(i) neither as total and universal rejection of any philosophical, and ethical, praxis or position in surface-level pragmatic-transactional usage,

(ii) nor, on the contrary, as a quasi-thesis (which would in effect be comparable to Position IV of the *catuṣkoṭi*, where an indeterminate entity 'x' is posited and defined, by bi-negation, as being without the predicates 'A' and '-A' – in terms, perhaps, of a logic which is not two-valued and based on the principle of logical bivalence, or in terms of some putative 'logic of mysticism' postulating an ineffable entity).

(iii) In particular, the Mādhyamika's theory is not to be identified with what has conventionaly been called in Tibet 'the theory (*lta ba*)/method (*lugs*) of the Hva šaṅ', namely the idea that philosophical theory in the highest sense is free from all mentation (*manas[i]kāra*), that philosophical praxis is free from both negation and affirmation and that the Fruit of spiritual insight is free from all wishes and qualms. mKhas grub rje has indeed pointedly referred to this theory as the *dam bca'* 'thesis' of the very Hva šaṅ who had imagined that his insight was free from any such factors. – In this connexion it is to be observed that the bulk of the Tibetan tradition from at least the thirteenth century – the time of Sa skya Paṇdi ta (1182-1251) – has regarded the discussion with the Chinese Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna (Ho-shang Mo-ho-yen) at the 'Great Debate of bSam yas' or 'Council of Tibet' as bearing on the question of philosophical theory and praxis, and not as a largely political struggle for

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117 mKhas grub rje thus considers that the Hva šaṅ indeed does prove to have a thesis, if only a negativistic and quietistic one. See above, *TThCh*, f. 146b-147a; and p. 170 note 81, p. 174 note 92 and p. 176 note 98 above.

dominance between Indian and Chinese missionaries and between Tibetan factions allied with them. (It has to be recalled, furthermore, that in his treatment of some of these problems in his *Bhāvanākramas*, Kamalaśīla already connected them explicitly with classical themes alluded to in the Sūtra literature.) Thus, although the discussions at the 'Great Debate of bSam yas' may have had local or even international political dimensions, in the Tibetan view from quite early times they were in fact grounded in fundamental – and urgent – philosophical and religious issues. It should be further noted that the Tibetan expression *hva śaṅ gi lugs/lta ba* used to designate the teachings discussed by Kamalaśīla and other authorities is a generic term which takes the Hva šaṅ as a largely emblematic figure, and that some of the teachings so labelled are not in fact attested in our sources as having been actually taught by the Ho-shang Mo-ho-yen.[118]

(iv) The disowning of any propositional thesis, tenet and philosophical position cannot represent the total and complete philosophical and ethical outlook of the (Prāsaṅgika) Mādhyamika as one who – in contradistinction to the Svātantrika – would have no philosophical doctrine of any kind. For, according to mKhas grub rje and his school, whereas to establish the Mādhyamika's theory and understanding the Prāsaṅgika does indeed differ from the Svātantrika by not employing an autonomous inference having an (epistemo)logically grounded inferential reason let alone a full autonomous formal probative argument, he nevertheless has a philosophical theory – the *śūnyatādarśana* and *niḥsvabhāvavāda* – which he upholds by philosophical investigation and discusion, and by his *prasaṅga*-type reasoning which dissolves – or deconstructs – any self-existent entity asserted in a thesis grounded in the belief in any such *bhāva*. In fact, in accordance with Nāgārjuna's comment on *VV* 64, although the statements of the Mādhyamika are not supposed to be factitive, or to possess probative force in virtue

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118 See D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Buddha-nature, Mind and the problem of Gradualism in a comparative perspective.*

of a formal process of proof or disproof, they are said to have an epistemologically indicative or informative (*jñāpaka*) force that expresses – 'makes known' (*jñāpayati*) – a philosophical content: namely that all entities (*bhāva*) are without self-existence (*niḥsvabhāva*) and Empty (*śūnya*).[119] And the difference between the Prāsaṅgika and the Svātantrika does not, therefore, lie in the latter being allowed a philosophical thesis and position while the former is simplistically denied them.

15. THE QUESTION OF THE THESIS IN TSOṄ KHA PA'S *Lam rim chen mo* AND IN 'JAM DBYAṄS BŽAD PA'S COMMENTS

In his *sToṅ thun chen mo* mKhas grub rje largely adopted explanations concerning the thesis and related problems given by his teacher Tsoṅ kha pa (1357-1419) in a work completed in his middle forties, the *Lam rim chen mo* (dated to 1402 in the biographies), and elsewhere.[120]

Under the rubric devoted in the great *Summa* represented by the *Lam rim chen mo* to explaining how the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika branches of the Madhyamaka differ in negating the negandum (*dgag bya 'gog pa*, i.e. hypostatic self-existence or substantialism) – and before pro-

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[119] See below, p. 208.

[120] See *Byaṅ chub lam rim chen mo/che ba (LRChM)*, ff. 404b-419a = pp. 673-695, and in particular ff. 410a-418b = pp. 681-95 containing Tsoṅ kha pa's reply to an (unidentified) opponent's *pūrvapakṣa* cited at f. 407a-b = pp. 676-8, which is the third of four *pūrvapakṣa*s examined by Tsoṅ kha pa in his discussion of the difference between the Prāsaṅgika and the Svātantrika branches of the Madhyamaka. (An English rendering of this section of the *LRChM* has been published by A. Wayman, *Calming the mind and discerning the real* [New York, 1978], pp. 284-309. It is not included in the French version of the *Lam rim* published by G. Driessens, Yonten Gyatso and M. Zaregradsky, *Le grand livre de la progression vers l'Eveil*, Tome second [Saint-Jean-le-Vieux, 1992].) – This topic has also been treated by Tsoṅ kha pa in his commentary on the *MK* – the *NŠRG* – and on the *MA* – the *GR*; see also his *LRChB*, f. 171b5 ff.

ceeding to explain his own doctrine (*raṅ lugs*) on how the theory of the Madhyamaka arises in the conscious stream following Candrakīrti (*LRChM*, f. 419a1 ff. = p. 695 ff.) – Tsoṅ kha pa has set out four doctrines connected with the question of the existence of a thesis in the Madhyamaka. This he does with respect to the problem of the Svātantrika's autonomous inference (*svatantrānumāna*) as opposed to the Prāsaṅgika's *prasaṅga*-type reasoning (ff. 404b3-408a3 = pp. 673-8). This exposition of the four doctrines in question is followed by his critique of each (ff. 408a3-419a1 = pp. 678-95). The first doctrine is explicitly ascribed by Tsoṅ kha pa to Jayānanda, while the second is laconically attributed to a disciple of this Kaśmīri master. The last two doctrines are, however, left unattributed in the *Lam rim chen mo*.[121]

Valuable, and much needed, light on Tsoṅ kha pa's *Lam rim chen mo* has been shed by 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa'i rdo rje Ṅag dbaṅ brtson 'grus (1648-1721) in his notes on this work and elsewhere.[122] These notes in their turn raise a number of problems concerning the attribution and exegesis of the four doctrines in question, in particular with respect to Tsoṅ kha pa's fourth *pūrvapakṣa*.

With regard to Pa tshab Ñi ma grags, 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa has observed in his *Grub mtha' chen mo*[123] that it could not really have been his opinion that the Mādhyamika maintains no philosophical position at all. For in his reply to an enquiry from the *dge bšes* Šar ba pa (1070-1141) Pa

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[121] See above, § 8 and § 10. On the *pratijñā, anumāna, ubhaya[pra]siddhatva*, and *prasaṅga* in Tsoṅ kha pa, see below, Section III, §§ 3-10; on the question of *paraprasiddha*, see Section III, §§ 11-12; and on the need for ascertainment (*niścaya*), see Section III, § 10.

[122] This work has been cited above in note 70.

[123] The *Grub mtha'i rnam bšad raṅ gžan grub mtha' kun daṅ zab don mchog ti gsal ba kun bzaṅ žiṅ gi ñi ma luṅ rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu'i re ba kun skoṅ*, ii (Madhyamaka chapter), f. 29b f. The same author has also treated this problem in a refutation of the view of sTag tshaṅ lo tsā ba (born 1405) entitled *Tshig gsal stoṅ thun gyi tshad ma'i rnam bšad zab rgyas kun gsal tshad ma'i 'od brgya 'bar ba sKal bzaṅ sñiṅ gi mun sel* (gSuṅ 'bum, vol. da).

tshab is reported to have declared that the two *satya*s (viz. the *saṃvṛti*° and the *paramārtha-satya*) are both required on the level of the Ground (*gži*), that the two forms of spiritual Equipment (*tshogs gñis*, viz. the *puṇya*° and *jñānasambhāra*) as well as Intellect (*šes rab*) and Means (*thabs*) are required on the Path (*lam*), and that the two Kāyas (*sku*, viz. the *dharmakāya* and the *rūpakāya*) are both necessary on the level of Fruit (*'bras bu*).[124] As noted above, Pa tshab's opinion was that having no thesis means the absence of an affirmative thesis of *pariccheda*, but not the absence of a simple negative thesis of *vyavaccheda*.[125]

For Tsoṅ kha pa's account of the doctrines of Jayānanda and Khu mDo sde 'bar (his first and second *pūrvapakṣa*s) see §§ 8 and 10 above.

As for the fourth and final *pūrvapakṣa* relating to the problem of the thesis cited by Tsoṅ kha pa in the *Lam rim chen mo*, it refers to an argument which includes a refutation of the opinion that the Mādhyamika has neither a proposition/position constituting a doctrinal system of his own (*raṅ lugs kyi phyogs: pakṣa*) nor any valid means of right knowledge to prove it (*sgrub byed kyi tshad ma: pramāṇa*). According to this opinion, the Mādhyamika's procedure consists in first negating an objectively gained[126] *pramāṇa* – i.e. direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*) – where one accepts a system comprising a means of correct knowledge and its object (*gžal bya* = *prameya*) established in virtue of the characteristic of reasoned analysis of reality (*rigs pas rnam par dpyad pa'i raṅ gi mtshan ñid*). The Mādhyamika then himself establishes, by means of a perfect logical reason, the fact of the non-substantiality of entities by adducing – against the opponent (who advocates the existence of

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[124] *Op. cit.*, f. 30a.

[125] On Pa tshab see above, § 9. And on the distinction between *rnam (par) bcad (pa)* = *vyavaccheda* and *yoṅs (su) gcod (pa)* = *pariccheda*, see above, §§ 9, 11; and below, § 16.

[126] *dṅos po stobs žugs* = *vastubalapravṛtta*. Inferential knowledge is gained by objective validation (*vastubala* variety), and also, secondarily, by consensual validation through convention or reliable scriptural authority (the *āpta* variety). For the terms *vastubala* (and its synonyms), see e.g. Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇavārttika*, Svārthānumānapariccheda 65, 130; Pratyakṣapariccheda 45, 185; and Kamalaśīla, *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* 135.

entities having a substantial self-nature) – a probative proposition (*bsgrub pa'i ṅag*) after having accepted (*khas blaṅs nas* = *abhyupagamya*) in pragmatic-transactional usage simply a *pramāṇa* and *prameya* recognized in the every-day consensus (*'jig rten grags pa* = *lokaprasiddha*) – a procedure that does not, therefore, involve a philosophical analysis (*ma dpyad pa*) of reality. However, according to this opinion, this probative procedure employed by the Mādhyamika does not make him a Svātantrika precisely because it is here established by a *pramāṇa* that is *lokaprasiddha* only, that is, by a means that does not involve the philosophical examination of reality.[127]

Now, in 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa's annotations on the *Lam rim chen mo*, this fourth *pūrvapakṣa* is ascribed to a certain rMa bya, a follower of Pa tshab (see § 11 above).[128] But according to 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa's *Grub*

[127] *LRChM*, ff. 407b-408a = p. 678.

[128] See 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa's note in the *Lam rim mchan bži sbrags ma*, kha, f. 240b5: *bži pa sṅon gyi pa tshab kyi rjes 'braṅs rma bya ba sogs kyi lugs ni...* This note appears to refer to rMa bya *et al.* as the propounders of the entire fourth *pūrvapakṣa* discussed and then rejected in the *LRChM* (rather than just to the advocates of the doctrine which has been rejected within this *pūrvapakṣa*). – According to the Madhyamaka chapter of 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa's *Grub mtha' chen mo*, ii, f. 103a4 = ca, f. 60b, a pupil of rMa Byaṅ named bSod nams rdo rje held that the Svātantrika used autonomous (*raṅ rgyud*) reasoning to establish his own position and to negate an opponent's, whereas the Prāsaṅgika did so by only adverting to arguments recognized by his opponent and dissolving them by *prasaṅga*-type apagogic reasoning. (But against this view, 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa remarks that the Svātantrika as well as the Prāsaṅgika has made use of *prasaṅga*-type arguments.)

The Tibetan historiographical and doxographical traditions know of (at least) two early Tibetan masters of the Madhyamaka named rMa bya: rMa bya Byaṅ chub ye šes – a disciple of Pa tshab – and rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus – a disciple of Jayānanda, Pa tshab, Khu mDo sde 'bar, Thaṅ sag pa, and Phya pa Chos kyi seṅ ge (1109-1169), and (according to some sources) a nephew of Byaṅ chub ye šes. The dates pose a problem, however, and the name of Phya pa's disciple is also given as rMa bya rTsod pa'i seṅ

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ge (is this possibly a third rMa bya, or is he identical with Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus?). The traditions appear confusing on this point. See above, Section I, p. 50 ff.; and Section II, § 11.

However this may be, in *LRChM* ff. 407b-408a = p. 678 together with 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa's annotations in the *Lam rim mchan bži sbrags ma*, kha, f. 240b-241a, rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus is reported to have rejected the view of earlier scholars according to which the Mādhyamika has no doctrinal position of his own (*raṅ lugs kyi phyogs*) and entertains no *pramāṇa* establishing such a position, and to have himself held that the Mādhyamika establishes, by means of a perfect logical reason (*hetu*), the fact of the non-existence of any hypostatized entity (*bden par med pa*, i.e. an entity supposed to possess self-existence, *svabhāva*) by adducing a probative statement (*sgrub pa'i ṅag: sādhana-vākya*, e.g. *MK* i.1) against the Substantialist opponent who accepts hypostatized entities. This he is stated to have done (i) after having rejected the objectively gained (*vastubalapravṛtta*) *pramāṇa*s of *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* that would be involved in accepting any system of *prameya* and *pramāṇa* postulated in virtue of a self-characteristic (**svalakṣaṇa*) susceptible of being analytically investigated by reasoning (*rigs pas rnam par dpyad pa'i raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyis gžal bya daṅ tshad ma'i rnam gžag khas len pa'i dṅos po stobs žugs kyi tshad ma mṅon rjes gñis ka bkag nas*); and (ii) by himself accepting a *pramāṇa* and *prameya* that are consensually acknowledged without philosophical analysis on the level of pragmatic-transactional usage alone (*tha sñad du ma dpyad pa'i 'jig rten grags pa'i tshad ma daṅ gžal bya khas blaṅs nas*). Nevertheless, according to this account, in so doing a (Prāsaṅgika) Mādhyamika does not identify himself with the Svātantrika; for, unlike the latter, he is proceeding by means of a *pramāṇa* that is only consensually acknowledged and which does not therefore entail analytical philosophical investigation (*ma dpyad pa'i 'jig rten grags pa'i tshad ma'i sgo nas 'jog pa'i phyir*). (Cf. Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus, '*Thad pa'i rgyan*, f. 22b: ... *dṅos po stobs žugs kyis grub pa'i mtha' gcig tu ṅes pa daṅ/ bzlog pa 'phaṅs pa ni kun rdzob tu yaṅ med pas raṅ rgyud daṅ sgrub byed 'phen pa'i thal 'gyur du mi 'gyur bar šes par bya'o*).

With this compare, however, 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa's remark in his *Grub mtha' chen mo*, ii. f. 30a, where the doctrine ascribed to rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus (in his comment on the *Prasannapadā* and in his *dBu ma'i stoṅ thun*) – and also to rGya dmar ba and other early Tibetan Mādhyamikas – is

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mtha' chen mo rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus – who is there stated to have possessed only partial familiarity with the basic text and explication of the Madhyamaka (*dbu ma rtsa 'grel phyogs byed pa*) – held in his comment on the *Prasannapadā* and in his *dBu ma stoṅ thun* that, for the Mādhyamika, there exists neither a theory consisting in a position of his own which is to be asserted nor a valid means of correct knowledge possessing probative force.[129] This view is thus in apparent disagreement with what 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa has himself indicated about rMa bya's view in his annotation on the *Lam rim chen mo*.

As noticed above (§ 11), according to Go rams pa it was rMa bya Byaṅ chub ye šes who maintained that a *pratijñā* of negative determination (*vyavaccheda*) negating an opponent's misapprehensions is formulated with regard to the latter's understanding, but that the Mādhyamika himself entertains not even a purely negative *pratijñā*. As for Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus, Go rams pa has ascribed to him the view that there will be no contradiction if, in ultimate reality (*paramārtha*), there is neither an affirmative nor a negative *pratijñā* whilst, on the surface level (*saṃvṛti-*

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that the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika has neither a proposition/position of his own (*svapakṣa*), as a theory (*darśana*) to be asserted, nor a probative *pramāṇa*, and that the Prāsaṅgika rejects all unilateral positions involving existence and non-existence by the *prasaṅga*-type argument based on mutual incompatibility (*dbu ma pa la raṅ phyogs khas blaṅs rgyu'i lta ba ci yaṅ med ciṅ/ de ñid kyis sgrub par byed pa'i tshad ma yaṅ med la gžan gcig tu yod med kyi mtha' thams cad naṅ 'gal thal 'gyur gyis 'gog pa yin žes smra tshul tshig gsal gyi bšad pa maṅ po daṅ dbu ma'i stoṅ thun dag las bšad pa ltar ro*).

On the *dṅos po stobs žugs kyi tshad ma* = *vastubalapravṛtta-pramāṇa* and on the *dgag sgrub raṅ rgyud* being accepted, according to Pa tshab and to rMa bya's pupil bSod nams rdo rje, by Bhavya and his Svātantrika school but not by Candrakīrti and his Prāsaṅgika school, see 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa, *Grub mtha' chen mo*, ii, f. 103a (cited above in Section I, p. 47 note 97 and p. 55 note 116).

The early history of the Tibetan Madhyamaka will require further study before it will become possible finally to clear up all such historical and doctrinal problems.

129 *Grub mtha' chen mo*, ii, f. 30a3-4 (quoted in note 128).

mātra), there exist a merely negative thesis which determines negatively (: *vyavaccheda*) the matter being specifically debated as well as an affirmative thesis of positive determination in general (*spyir*).[130] Of these two doctrines, it appears to be the one ascribed by Go rams pa to rMa bya Byaṅ chub ye šes that corresponds most closely to the one 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa has ascribed to rMa bya Byaṅ brtson in his *Grub mtha' chen mo* (and which corresponds to the one rejected by the proponent of the fourth *pūrvapakṣa* in Tsoṅ kha pa's *LRChM*). On the contrary, the thesis ascribed by Go rams pa to rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus appears to be the position of the proponent of the entire fourth *pūrvapakṣa* discussed in the *LRChM*, and identified with that of Pa tshab's disciple rMa bya, by 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa in his annotation. This latter doctrine indeed agrees with what Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus has set out in his '*Thad pa'i rgyan*.[131]

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[130] On these two doctrines see above, § 11.

[131] See above, § 11. Provisionally therefore – and until further clear and conclusive evidence becomes available – it may be suggested that 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa's ascription to rMa bya of the fourth *pūrvapakṣa* in the *LRChM* is correct if this rMa bya is identified with Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus, and that the ascription to Byaṅ (chub) brtson ('grus) of an opposed view in 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa's *GCh* was an error (or an oversight due conceivably to the circumstance that 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa was quoting this opposed *pūrvapakṣa* view from the '*Thad pa'i rgyan*, where Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus has quoted it [f. 21a-b] prior to criticizing it [f. 21b f.], this unattributed opposed view being evidently that of rMa bya Byaṅ chub ye šes). Cf. P. Williams, 'rMa bya Byang chub brtson 'grus on Madhyamaka method', *JIP* 13 (1985), p. 212.

It is difficult, however, to accept the suggestion made by Paul Williams, *JIP* 13 (1985), pp. 216-18, that the unqualified ascription to Byaṅ brtson of the view that the Mādhyamika has no *pratijñā* made by 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa in his *Grub mtha' chen mo* – much of which is a critique and refutation of sTag tshaṅ lo tsā ba's views – was a polemical distortion and a 'debating trick against sTag tshang lotsawa, who was an admirer of Byang chub brtson 'grus' (p. 217). According to Williams (p. 216), 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa 'was primarily concerned to discredit Byang chub brtson 'grus' simply because 'sTag tshang lotsawa seems to have rather admired Byang chub brtson 'grus'. Williams' argument is all the more difficult to accept because, in his note on the *LRChM*, 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa has (as acknowledged by Wil-
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Another early Mādhyamika who has been mentioned in this connexion by 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa is rGya dmar ba.[132]

These masters, 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa specifies, held that all extreme positions which unilaterally postulate existence and non-existence are simply to be negated through the *prasaṅga*-type argument of internal inconsistency (*naṅ 'gal*).[133]

The relevant works of rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus – with the important exception of his commentary on the *MK*[134] – as well as those of Pa tshab, Khu mDo sde 'bar and rGya dmar ba are unfortunately not now accessible. And the views of most of these early Tibetan masters of the Madhyamaka are therefore known to us at present only from references in later sources.[135]

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liams) given a correct identification of rMa bya's views, and that the polemical and malicious procedure imputed to him would have been exceedingly risky for anybody attempting to perpetrate it – the more so when the perpetrator himself elsewhere gives another (correct) identification.

132 *Grub mtha' chen mo*, ii, f. 30a2.

This is evidently Gaṅs rGya dmar ba Byaṅ chub grags of sTod luṅ(s), a disciple of Gaṅs pa še'u and of Khyuṅ Rin chen grags (cf. above, Section I, pp. 35-36).

133 See *Grub mtha' chen mo*, f. 30a.

The *prasaṅga*-type argument based on internal inconsistency in an opponent's propositions is one of the four arguments characteristic of the Mādhyamika mentioned for instance by dBus pa Blo gsal in his *Grub pa'i mtha' rnam par bšad pa'i mdzod*, f. 101a-b (= Mimaki, p. 176), and by Tsoṅ kha pa in his discussion of the second *pūrvapakṣa* (ascribed to Khu) in the *LRChM*, f. 406a5 = p. 675. See also Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus, *'Thad pa'i rgyan*, 22b2.

134 See above, § 11.

135 It is to be observed that Tsoṅ kha pa is stated to have upheld in his youth the idea of positionlessness. Thus, in mKhas grub rje's *gSaṅ ba'i rnam thar* of his master, in the section on the latter's meeting with his fellow seeker *bla ma* dBu ma pa, we read that when seeking to reach the correct understanding
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16. THE APPLICATION OF POSITIVE DETERMINATION (*pariccheda*) AND NEGATIVE DETERMINATION (*vyavaccheda*) IN TSOṄ KHA PA'S *Draṅ ṅes legs bšad sñiṅ po*

In a major work composed later than the *Lam rim chen mo*, the *Draṅ ṅes legs bšad sñiṅ po* (dated to 1408 in the biographies) completed in his early fifties which thus represents his mature thinking, Tsoṅ kha pa has also touched on the problem of the Mādhyamika's philosophical thesis when discussing and criticizing the opinions of earlier scholars who had held that the Mādhyamika employs a logical reason and inference to negate (*'gog pa*) substantial self-nature (*raṅ bžin*), but that he never employs a logical reason and inference to prove (*sgrub pa*) absence of self-nature (*raṅ bžin med pa*).[136]

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of the Madhyamaka Tsoṅ kha pa once enquired of Mañjughoṣa whether his Madhyamaka theory corresponded to the Svātantrika or Prāsaṅgika system; and the Bodhisattva is stated to have replied that Tsoṅ kha pa's theory in fact then represented neither. This was because at that time he had no *abhyupagama* whatever. See mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzaṅ, *Rin po che'i sñe ma*, f. 2b: *rje btsun la lta ba'i dri ba raṅ šas cher mdzad/ de dus ṅed kyi lta ba 'di thal raṅ gaṅ yin žus pas/ gaṅ yaṅ min gsuṅs/ de dus rje 'di'i thugs la yaṅ khas len ci yaṅ med ciṅ/ gaṅ du'aṅ bzuṅ mi ñan par lta ba de thugs la bde ba tsam yod par 'dug go//* But when he later achieved the correct understanding of the Madhyamaka after great effort Tsoṅ kha pa progressed beyond this still incomplete view.

On the contrary, according to Go rams pa, this earlier Madhyamaka view of Tsoṅ kha pa's was in fact the right theory of the *yod min med min gyi lta ba* – i.e. *spros bral* – transmitted from Žaṅ Thaṅ sag pa, this theory being according to him quite distinct from the Hva šaṅ's. See Go rams pa bSod nams seṅ ge, *lTa ba'i šan 'byed*, f. 17b; and below, § 17.

[136] See *LŠÑP*, ff. 108a6-112a2 = pp. 517-23, especially f. 109b6 f. = p. 519 f. An English version is to be found in R. Thurman, *Tsong Khapa's Speech of Gold in the Essence of True Eloquence* (Princeton, 1984), pp. 378-81 (cf. L. van der Kuijp, 'Apropos of a recent contribution to the history of Central Way philosophy in Tibet', *BIS* 1 [1985], pp. 47-74).

According to the *Legs bšad sñiṅ po*, their view was incorrect. This is so because, for the understanding of Emptiness and non-substantiality, positive determination (*yoṅs su gcod pa*) of negation (*bkag pa*, i.e. *niḥsvabhāvatā*) is required in addition to negative determination (*rnam par bcad pa*) of the negandum (*dgag bya*, i.e. *svabhāva*). And these two aspects of determination are in fact found to be inseparable.[137] (*LŠÑP*, f. 110b2-3 = p. 520)

Moreover, in this context Tsoṅ kha pa has called attention to the fact that pure exclusion (*bcad [pa] tsam*) of the negandum is not confined to the Prāsaṅgika's procedure alone, and that it is employed also by the Svātantrika. For in addition to implicative and presuppositional negation (*ma yin dgag pa* = *paryudāsa* or relative negation), Bhavya has fully acknowledged the role of non-implicative and non-presuppositional negation (*med par dgag pa* = *prasajyapratiṣedha*, i.e. absolute or exclusion negation) and the method of reasoning which employs it. (*LŠÑP*, ff. 108b-109a = p. 517; f. 110a3-6 = pp. 519-520; and f. 111a5 = p. 521; see Bhavya's *Prajñāpradīpa* i.1 with the *Tarkajvālā*, D, f. 59b, on *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* iii.26)

It is furthermore impossible to maintain that, for the Madhyamaka, there is no real content (*brjod bya* = *abhidheya*) in scriptural texts (*luṅ* = *āgama*), no object of knowledge (*šes bya* = *jñeya*) in knowledge (*šes pa* = *jñāna*), and nothing to be established (*bsgrub bya* = *sādhya* 'probandum') for a logical reason (*rtags* = *liṅga* 'probans'). However, over and above pure negation (*bkag tsam*) of the negandum (i.e. *raṅ bžin* = *svabhāva*), *prasajya*-negation neither presupposes nor implies a self-nature of non-existence (*dṅos med kyi ṅo bo ñid* = *abhāvasvabhāva*, of an entity). (*LŠÑP*, ff. 110b-111a = pp. 520-521)

When it is known that the negation to be established in *MK* i.1 has the form of *prasajyapratiṣedha* (cf. *LŠÑP*, f. 109a2 = p. 518), one therefore understands that there is established the pure negative determination of

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[137] On negation (*dgag pa* = *pratiṣedha/niṣedha*) by *rnam [par] bcad [pa]* in relation to affirmation (*sgrub pa* = *vidhi*) by *yoṅs [su] gcod [pa]*, and on the *rnam gcad dgag pa'i dam bca'* in relation to the *yoṅs gcod bsgrub pa'i dam bca'*, see also rMa bya, *'Thad pa'i rgyan*, e.g. ff. 7b, 24b-25a (above, § 11); and p. 160 note 72 above.

origination in ultimate reality without there additionally being the establishment of the existence of some (putative) ultimately real non-origination (*don dam par skye ba rnam par bcad tsam sgrub kyi/ de min pa'i don dam pa'i skye med yod par mi sgrub pa*). (*LŠÑP*, f. 111b2 = p. 522)

In other words, alongside negative determination (or exclusion) of hypostatic establisment (*bden [par] grub [pa]* of any self-existent entity) there will be no positive determination of some *hypostatically established* absence of hypostatization (*bden med bden grub*). But, of necessity, positive determination of non-hypostatization (*bden med*) must still accompany negative determination (exclusion) of hypostatic establishment (*bden grub*, of any entity).[138] (*LŠÑP*, f. 111b3-4 = p. 522) This is to say that, in the Mādhyamika's understanding of reality in his conscious stream (*saṃtāna*), there is both *vyavaccheda* of hypostatic establishment and *pariccheda* of non-substantiality.

Now, in *VV* 26 it is declared:

> *naiḥsvābhāvyānāṃ cen naiḥsvābhāvyena vāraṇam yadi hi/*
> *naiḥsvābhāvyanivṛttau svābhāvyaṃ hi prasiddhaṃ syāt//*
>
> 'Were the rejection (*zlog [pa]*) of [things, *bhāva*, as] having no self-existence to be effected by [the assertion of a statement, *vacana*, itself] having no self-existence (*raṅ bžin med ñid*), once having no self-existence [affirmed by this statement] is stopped (*log na*) self-existence [as the contrary of what was expressed in the statement now set aside as being itself without self-existence] would become established (*rab grub 'gyur*).'[139]

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[138] Compare Tsoṅ kha pa's reply to the second *pūrvapakṣa* in *LRChM*, f. 409a-b = p. 680: *gžan gyi grub mtha' la sun 'byin pa'i thal 'gyur byed na ni raṅ bžin yod pas bkag pa ñid raṅ bžin med pa bsgrubs pa yin par sñar rtsod zlog rtsa 'grel las gsuṅs pa ltar yin pas de la phuṅ gsum med do/ /de lta min na raṅ bžin med pa bsgrubs pa yin gyi raṅ bžin yod pa bkag pa min no žes bzlog nas smras na lan ci yod/ raṅ bžin med pa yoṅs su gcod na raṅ bžin gdon mi za bar rnam par bcad dgos pas so sñam na/ de lta na raṅ bžin yod pa rnam par bcd na'aṅ gdon mi za bar raṅ bžin med pa yoṅs su gcod dgos pa mtshuṅs pa yin no//*

[139] Having referred back to the opponent's *pūrvapakṣa* contained in *VV* 3, *VVV* 26 explains: ... *yadi naiḥsvābhāvyena vacanena naiḥsvābhāvyānāṃ* →

Nāgārjuna is considered by his Mādhyamika followers to have, by means of this reasoning, taken account of the opponent's argument (reported in *VV* 3) that, if the substantiality of entities were simply denied by a statement which is without self-nature and hence insubstantial, these entities would after all, as it were by default, be found to be in possession of self-existence. According to Tsoṅ kha pa, then, in the understanding that all things are without self-existence (*niḥsvabhāva*) and hence Empty (*śūnya*), there is to be found a positive as well as a purely negative component; and the Mādhyamika can then be said to entertain a philosophical position and a corresponding thesis. The positive component in the Mādhyamika's understanding of reality does not, however, represent any kind of self-existence (*svabhāva*), any more than the Mādhyamika's thesis depends for its validity and effectiveness on possessing a *svabhāva*.

Moreover, it will be impossible to negate both existence in ultimate reality and non-existence in ultimate reality (*don dam par yod med gñis kyaṅ de daṅ 'dra bas gñis ka dgag mi nus la*); for these are contradictories one of which must (according to the law of contradiction) be affirmed if the second is negated. But it still remains possible for both existence in ultimate reality (*don dam par yod pa*) and the existence in ultimate reality of non-existence in ultimate reality (*don dam du med don dam du yod pa*) to be negated together, these not being contradictories.[140] (*LŠÑP*, ff. 111b-112a = p. 522)

In sum, *both* members of the first (contradictorily opposed) pair – where negative determination (*rnam par bcad pa*) does not bring with it any positive determination (*yoṅs su gcod pa*) – cannot indeed be negated in the process of the Mādhyamika's reasoning leading to understanding of reality. But *both* members of the second (not contradictorily opposed)

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bhāvānāṃ vyāvartanaṃ kriyate tato 'yaṃ dṛṣṭānta upapannaḥ syāt/ iha tu naiḥsvābhāvyena vacanena bhāvānāṃ svabhāvapratiṣedhaḥ kriyate/ yadi naiḥsvābhāvyena vacanena bhāvānāṃ naiḥsvābhāvyapratiṣedhaḥ kriyate naiḥsvābhāvyapratiṣiddhatvād eva bhāvāḥ sasvabhāvā bhaveyuḥ/ sasvabhāvatvād aśūnyāḥ syuḥ/ ... Here in the commentary *vāraṇa* is glossed by *vyāvartana* 'exclusion', and *nivṛtti* is explained by *pratiṣedha* 'negation'.

[140] In these pages of his *LŠÑP*, Tsoṅ kha pa has provided an explanation of *prasajya*-type and *paryudāsa*-type negation.

pair – where negative determination does bring with it the positive determination in question – can be so negated.

This is, then, precisely what the Mādhyamika does in his reasoning leading to understanding of reality.[141] And in this way the Mādhyamika will thoroughly establish, by means of both scripture (*luṅ* = *āgama*) and reasoning (*rigs pa* = *yukti*), the profound Middle Way free from objectification (*dmigs med*) which avoids the twin extremes of maintaining a hypostatically real (*bden pa*) negation (*bkag pa*) and a hypostatically real negandum (*dgag bya*). (*LŠÑP*, f. 112a1-2 = pp. 522-523)

For both Tsoṅ kha pa and mKhas grub rje, and for their commentators, the question whether the Mādhyamika entertains a propositional thesis, tenet and philosophical position is thus no longer a purely methodological or logical problem. It has acquired an epistemological – and even gnoseological – as well as an ontic significance of fundamental importance. And it turns out to be inseparably linked with the question as to how the theory (*lta ba* = *darśana*) and understanding (*rtogs pa* = *adhigama*) of reality arises in the philosopher's conscious stream (*saṃtāna*) according to the two branches of the pure Madhyamaka school, the Prāsangika and the Svātantrika.

17. Notes on some later Tibetan scholars' views on the thesis, assertion and discursivity

Tsoṅ kha pa's interpretations met with strong opposition from a number of masters such as the eminent Sa skya pa scholar Roṅ ston Šākya rgyal mtshan/Šes bya kun rig (1367-1449) and his pupil Go ram(s) pa bSod nams seṅ ge (1429-1489).

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141 A correlation between positive determination (*yoṅs su gcod pa* = *pariccheda*) and negative determination or exclusion (*rnam par bcad pa* = *vyavaccheda*) appears in Dharmakīrti's discussion of the *anupalabdhihetu*. See his *Hetubindu* (ed. Steinkellner), p. 25* f. Cf. below, Section III, p. 287.

Roṅ ston discusses the question of the *pratijñā* in his commentary on the *Madhyamakakārikā*s, the *Zab mo'i de kho na ñid snaṅ ba*[142], and in his commentary on the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, the *Ṅes don rnam ṅes*[143]. In the colophon to the latter work (f. 152a), particular mention is made of rMa Byaṅ (presumably rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus). And in the colophon to the first work (p. 334) it is said that Roṅ ston founded his understanding on the nectar of Pa tshab's well-formed formulations and that he followed the instruction (*man ṅag*) of Žaṅ Thaṅ sag pa Ye šes 'byuṅ gnas 'od, which he had received in an unbroken transmission.

In his *Zab mo'i de kho na ñid snaṅ ba*, after quoting the interpretation given by Pa tshab of the principle that the Mādhyamika has no thesis,[144] Roṅ ston cites an objection and gives his reply to it in the following words.

> '[Opponent:] This [opinion of Pa tshab] is not correct. For there not only exists a negative *pratijñā* but there also exists an affirmative *pratijñā*, since the Mādhyamika too holds [the thesis found in *MK* i.1 of] the non-origination [in substantialist terms] of a [hypostatized] product from a [hypostatized] cause. [Indeed,] were this [thesis] not held, because of giving up origination in dependance there would then ensue the [unwarranted] denial (*apavāda*) of cause and effect. – [Reply:] This [objection] does not invalidate the Translator [Pa tshab]'s intention (*abhiprāya*). For what the Translator has stated relates to reflection on ultimate reality (*tattva*); and when there is examination by reasoning there exists not the slightest *dharma* established in positive determination (*pariccheda*).'[145]

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[142] *dBu ma rtsa ba'i rnam bšad Zab mo'i de kho na ñid snaṅ ba* (Varanasi, 1975), pp. 22-31.

[143] *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bšad Ṅes don rnam ṅes* (in: Trayang and Jamyang Samten [ed.], *Two controversial Mādhyamika treatises*, New Delhi, 1974), ff. 33b-37b, 41a-42a.

[144] See above, § 11.

[145] See the *Zab mo'i de kho na ñid snaṅ ba*, pp. 24-25: *'ga' žig de mi 'thad de/ dgag pa'i dam bca' yod par ma zad/ sgrub pa'i dam bca' yaṅ yod pa'i*

→

Roṅ ston then proceeds to cite the following further objection and gives his reply:

> '[Opponent:] For the Prāsaṅgika, there exists a *pratijñā* belonging to one's own doctrine (*svamata*), because there exists a thing (*artha*) that one advocates and which one asserts as a thesis. As for an autonomous (*svatantrā*) *pratijñā*, it does not exist. For, since there exists no *dharma* asserted as a thesis which is established independently because [by definition] an *artha* that is *svatantra* is autonomous, a hypostatized entity (*bden dṅos*) is the object of negation. – [Reply:] Well then, for the Svātantrika too there would not exist a *svatantrā pratijñā* [such as] "There exists a *pudgala*"; for there exists no *pratijñā* to the effect that a *pudgala* is established by self-nature, and an independently established *pudgala* is the object of negation.'[146]

Turning to his own system (*raṅ lugs*), Roṅ ston states the following:

> 'For the Prāsaṅgika also there most certainly must be a *pratijñā*, for Nāgārjuna has stated in his *VV* (28cd: *saṃvyavahāraṃ ca vayaṃ nânabhupagamya kathayāmaḥ//*) "We do not make (philosophical) statements without accepting pragmatic-transactional usage". There exists a negative *pratijñā* through negative determination, in accordance with the statement here [in

phyir te/ rgyu las 'bras bu 'byuṅ ba dbu ma pas kyaṅ 'dod pa'i phyir ro/ /gal te de ltar mi 'dod na/ rten 'brel spaṅs pas rgyu 'bras la skur pa 'debs pa'i ñes pa yod do/ /žes brjod do/ /'di ni lo tstsha ba'i dgoṅs pa mi gnod de/ lo tstsha bas de kho na ñid sems pa'i dbaṅ du byas nas gsuṅs pa'i phyir daṅ/ rigs pas rnam par brtags pa na yoṅs gcod du grub pa'i chos cuṅ zad kyaṅ med pa'i phyir ro//

146 *Op. cit.*, p. 25: *yaṅ 'ga' žig thal 'gyur ba la raṅ lugs kyi dam bca' yod de/ raṅ gi mṅon par 'dod pa'i don dam bca' ba yod pas so/ /raṅ rgyud kyi dam bca' ni med de/ raṅ rgyud kyi don ni raṅ dbaṅ yin pas raṅ dbaṅ du grub pa'i chos dam bca' ba med de/ bden dṅos 'gog pa'i phyir/ žes 'dod do/ /'o na raṅ rgyud pa la yaṅ gaṅ zag yod ces pa'i raṅ rgyud kyi dam bca' med par 'gyur te/ gaṅ zag raṅ bžin gyis grub par dam bca' ba med pa'i phyir daṅ/ gaṅ zag raṅ dbaṅ du grub pa 'gog pa'i phyir ro//...*

MK i.1] of a thesis negating origination in terms of the four extreme positions.'[147]

Concerning the affirmative *pratijñā*, Roṅ ston finds examples of it in Sūtra (e.g. the assertion that the Tathāgata possesses the four *vaiśāradyas*) and Śāstra (including Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra* i.1b) (*op. cit.*, pp. 28-29). He then continues (*op. cit.*, p. 29) by distinguishing between three distinct ways of asserting a *pratijñā* (*dam 'cha' tshul*): (i) assertion as a thesis in accordance with the view of another only (*gžan ṅo kho nar dam bcas pa*, e.g. *MA* vi.44 and 81), (ii) assertion as a thesis in agreement between both parties to a discussion (*gñis ka mthun par dam bcas pa*, e.g. asserting that *rūpa*, etc., originate in dependance, something which is asserted both by those who are familiar with philosophical systems and by those who are not), and (iii) the special assertion of a thesis (*thun moṅ ma yin pa'i dam bca'*, e.g. the assertion that what is *pratītyasamutpanna* is *niḥsvabhāva*, this proposition not being held by the Mādhyamika in common with other philosophical systems).[148]

Roṅ ston furthermore draws a distinction between a *dam bca'* = *pratijñā* and a *raṅ rgyud kyi dam bca'* = *svatantrā pratijñā*. The first kind, formulated with the intention of negating only another's proposition/position (*parapakṣa*), is referred to as *dam bca' tsam* (= *pratijñāmātra*); and the second kind is formulated with the intention of proving one's own proposition/position (*svapakṣa*) (*op. cit.*, pp. 30-31).

Thus, the Prāsaṅgika's declaration that a *svatantrā pratijñā* is incorrect is made relatively to analysis of ultimate reality. But, when *vyavahāra* is set forth, there is a way in which there exist both a *svatantrā*

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[147] *Op. cit.*, p. 28: *raṅ lugs bžag pa ni/ thal 'gyur ba la'aṅ dam bca' gdon mi za bar yod par bya dgos te/ rtsod bzlog [VV* 28cd] *las/ tha sñad khas ni ma blaṅs par/ / ṅed cag 'chad par mi byed do/ /žes gsuṅs pa ltar ro/ /rnam bcad dgag pa'i dam bca' yaṅ yod de/ 'dir [MK* i.1] *mtha' bži'i skye ba dgag pa'i dam bca' gsuṅs pa lta bu'o//* See also Roṅ ston's *Ṅes don rnam ṅes*, f. 34a, which in addition cites e.g. *YṢ* 45.

[148] See also Roṅ ston's *Ṅes don rnam ṅes*, ff. 36b-37b, where reference is made to three kinds of *abhyupagama*: (i) *dgos pa'i dbaṅ gis gžan ṅor khas blaṅs pa*, (ii) *raṅ gžan mthun pa'i khas len pa* and (iii) *raṅ kho nas khas len pa*.

pratijñā and a logical reason (*liṅga*) (*op. cit.*, p. 31: *thal 'gyur bas raṅ rgyud kyi dam bca' mi 'thad par gsuṅs pa ni| don dam dpyod pa'i dbaṅ du byas pa yin la| tha sñad rnam par 'jog pa'i tshe ni| raṅ rgyud kyi dam bca' daṅ rtags yod pa'i tshul 'og nas 'chad do*). In his comment on the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, Roṅ ston includes a section (ff. 41a-42a) in which he examines, with respect to the *paramārtha*, what is meant be saying that there is no *pratijñā* and no *hetu* (of the kind found in a *svatantrānumāna*). And in his conclusion, where he quotes Jayānanda, he explains that one must indeed state that there exists no *pratijñā* wherein a *dharma* established by self-nature is asserted, but that, in pragmatic-transactional usage (*vyavahāra*), there still exists a *pratijñā* asserting a purely designational *dharma* (f. 41b: *raṅ bžin gyis grub pa'i chos khas blaṅs pa'i dam bca' med ces 'chad par byed dgos kyi tha sñad du btags pa tsam gyi chos khas len pa'i dam bca' ni yod pa yin no| |žes rgya cher bstan zin to*).

A full analysis of Roṅ ston's views, as well as of the Mādhyamika masters mentioned in the remainder of this section, would exceed the limits of the present study.[149]

Go rams pa (Go bo rab 'byams pa) bSod nams seṅ ge (1429-1489) has laid great store by the traditional description of reality in terms of neither existence, nor non-existence, nor both (conjunction), nor neither (bi-negation), that is, as being without all discursive proliferation (*niṣprapañca*):

> *yod min med min yod med min| |gñis ka'i bdag ñid min pa'aṅ min||*
> *mtha' bži las grol dbu ma pa| |mkhas pa rnams kyi de kho na'o||*[150]

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[149] cf. J. Cabezón, 'Rong ston Shākya rgyal mtshan on Mādhyamika thesislessness', in: *Tibetan studies (Proceedings of the Seventh Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Graz 1995),* vol. i (Vienna, 1997), pp. 97-105.

[150] See Go rams pa, *lTa ba'i šan 'byed* and *rGyal ba thams cad kyi thugs kyi dgoṅs pa zab mo dbu ma'i de kho na ñid spyi'i ṅag gis ston pa Ṅes don rab gsal*, f. 21a, 35b, etc. Both the exegesis and the Tibetan translations of this 'floating verse' have, however, proved problematic (cf. K. Mimaki, *Blo gsal grub mtha'*, note 516). At the end of the first *pāda*, Go rams pa's *Ṅes don* →

As seen above (§ 5), this principle has been addressed in several statements by Nāgārjuna, Ārya-Deva and Śāntarakṣita. And it has been explicitly formulated for ultimate reality in terms of freedom from all four extreme positions (*anta*) and the *catuṣkoṭi* by Mādhyamikas such as (the Tantrika?) Ārya-Deva and Advayavajra.[151]

In his *lTa ba'i šan 'byed Theg mchog gnad kyi zla zer* – where he also reviews many of the problems raised in the *dka' gnad brgyad* literature – Go rams pa explains what he considers to be the true meaning of his school's principle of 'neither existence nor non-existence' (*yod min med min ... = na san nâsan ...*). This dictum he interprets not as meaning 'non-existent in ultimate reality (*paramārthatas: don dam du yod pa min*) and not non-existent on the surface-level (*saṃvṛtitas: kun rdzob tu med pa min*)' – that is, as Tsoṅ kha pa has understood it – but rather as synonymous with freedom from all discursive proliferation (*spros bral = niṣprpañca*) in terms of the four extreme positions. Go rams pa argues that this interpretation can in no way be equated with the 'Theory of the Hva šaṅ' (*hva šaṅ gi lta ba*), which he opposes just as much as Tsoṅ kha pa did (see ff. 5a-b, 16a-17b).[152]

Go rams pa states that the Prāsaṅgika has a *pratijñā*, which however differs from that of the Svātantrika by not being autonomous (*svatantra*) (f. 33b). That is, for the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika, Nāgārjuna's disown-

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rab gsal (f. 21a) reads *yod med yin*. And the second *pāda* of the *Jñānasāra-samuccaya* version (D, f. 27b3), reads *gñis ka'i bdag ñid kyaṅ min pas*. The version of the verse in dBus pa Blo gsal, *Grub mtha'*, f. 103b reads: *yod min med min yod med min/ /gñis min bdag ñid du yaṅ med/ /mtha' bži las ni ṅes grol ba/ /de ñid dbu mar mkhas rnams bžed//*. See above, p. 143, for the Sanskrit text.

The name is sometimes written Go ram pa, but since *rams pa* is the correct orthography for the abbreviation of *rab 'byams pa*, a title for a scholar, this form has been preferred here to *ram pa*.

151 See above, p. 143 f. See also above, p. 122.

152 For Go rams pa's discussion of the *dkar po chig thub* theory associated with the Hva šaṅ, see his *Ṅes don rab gsal*, f. 173a. Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Buddha-nature, Mind and the problem of Gradualism in a comparative perspective*, pp. 104-05.

ing of a *pratijñā* relates to the level of ultimate reality (*de kho nar*); but this does exclude his holding one in pragmatic-transactional usage (*tha sñad du*).[153]

Go rams pa rejects Tsoṅ kha pa's above-mentioned use of positive determination (*yoṅs gcod* = *pariccheda*) in addition to exclusion by negative determination (*rnam bcad* = *vyavaccheda*).[154]

This complex of problems has also been touched upon in connexion with the Mādhyamika's avoidance of the four extreme positions (*mtha'* = *anta*) on the side of an object (*yul* = *viṣaya*), and with his elimination of conceptual attachment to existence and non-existence on the side of the suject (*yul can* = *viṣayin*), by the Sa skya pa scholar Ṅag dbaṅ chos grags (1572-1641) in his doxographical treatment of the Indo-Tibetan doctrinal systems, the *Bod kyi mkhas pa sṅa phyi dag gi grub mtha'i šan 'byed mtha' dpyod daṅ bcas pa'i 'bel ba'i gtam skyes dpyod ldan mkhas pa'i lus rgyan rin chen mdzes pa'i phra tshom bkod pa*.[155] This master dwells in addition on the importance of clearly distinguishing this correct theory from what was known in Tibet as the Hva šaṅ's theory, that is, an attitude usually described as anti-intellectual and quietistic. And he considers refraining from any philosophical position whatever, described as the 'doctrine of the Hva šaṅ', to constitute a denial of Sūtras such as the Prajñāpāramitā.[156]

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[153] *Ṅes don rab gsal*, f. 98a5. Go rams pa has discussed the question whether the Mādhyamika entertains a thesis also at ff. 32b ff., 94a ff., 101b and 104a, as well as in his *dBu ma rtsa ba'i šes rab kyi rnam par bšad pa Yaṅ dag lta ba'i 'od zer*, f. 13b f.

[154] *Ṅes don rab gsal*, f. 36b. For a critique of Tsoṅ kha pa's doctrine in the *LŠÑP* and of his special doctrines (such as those included in the *KNZB*) – referred to disparagingly as a *phyis kyi raṅ dgar btags pa'i rnam gžag* – see f. 105b-117a, the question of the *pratijñā* being discussed (f. 106b f.) in connexion with the concept of the *raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa* and the *svatantrānumāna*.

[155] *Grub mtha'*, f. 110b ff.

[156] *Ibid.*, f. 112b.

Karma Mi bskyod rdo rje's (1507-1554) opinion to the effect that the Mādhyamika has no *pratijñā* on either the *paramārtha* or the *vyavahāra* level is to be found in his *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bšad dpal ldan dus gsum mkhyen pa'i žal luṅ Dvags brgyud grub pa'i šiṅ rta* (f. 73a f), where he has rejected the view of both the dGa' ldan pas and Roṅ ston (on the four *vaiśāradya*s).[157] In recent times, the principle that the Mādhyamika holds no thesis whatsoever has been defended by the dGe 'dun chos 'phel (? 1903/1905-1951) in his *Klu sgrub dgoṅs rgyan*.[158]

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[157] cf. P. Williams, *JIP* 13 (1985), p. 212. – On Mi bskyod rdo rje's work, see P. Williams, 'A note on some aspects of Mi bskyod rdo rje's critique of dGe lugs pa Madhyamaka', *JIP* 11 (1983), pp. 125-45; and D. Seyfort Ruegg, 'A Karma bKa' brgyud work on the lineages and traditions of the Indo-Tibetan dBu ma (Madhyamaka)', in: G. Gnoli *et al.* (ed.), *Orientalia Iosephi Tucci memoriae dicata*, vol. 3 (Rome, 1988), pp. 1249-80.

See further the seventh and final topic in the *Ṅes šes rin po che'i sgron me* of 'Ju Mi pham rnam rgyal (1846-1912) on the question whether, in the Great Madhyamaka free from discursive proliferation, there is a philosophical position or assertion (*abhyupagama*): *spros bral dbu ma chen po la khas len yod dam med* (Sichuan ed. of 1997, p. 39 ff.). Mi pham's treatment – the commentary to which by Khro šul 'Jam rdor discusses also the views of Roṅ zom Chos kyi bzaṅ po, Kloṅ chen pa, Dharmaśrī and 'Jigs med gliṅ pa amongst others – will require separate investigation. Cf. F.-K. Ehrhard, 'Observations on Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka in the rÑiṅ-ma-pa school', in: *Tibetan studies* (Proceedings of the 4th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Munich, 1988), pp. 139 ff.; and J. Pettit, *Mipham's Beacon of Certainty* (Boston, 1999), pp. 371 ff.

[158] See D. Lopez, 'dGe 'dun chos 'phel's position on *Vigrahavyāvartanī* 29', *Buddhist Forum* 3 (1994), pp. 161-84.

18. SOME THEORETICAL ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Very important, indeed fundamental, issues in philosophy and systematic interpretation are raised by the Mādhyamika's disowning of a thesis that are additional to the textual-exegetical problems pointed out at the beginning of this study. Is this disavowal to be interpreted as a universal and so to say free-standing one – perhaps as a systematic and methodical scepticism or agnosticism – or is it confined rather to a particular context? If it is context-bound, it is necessary to determine just what the philosophical context is in which it is set. But if it is on the contrary a universal disavowal of any and every thesis in any context whatsoever, a number of questions arise. Does such a disavowal simply represent a clever (or perhaps rather a crude) device to gain immunity from philosophical criticism. Is it perhaps somehow an extension of the eristical (or sophistic) *vitaṇḍā/vitaṇḍāvāda*, or of the sceptical (or sophistic) *amarāvikkhepa/vācāvikkhepa* mentioned (and, in the case of Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta/Saṃjayin Vairaṭīputra, criticized) in the old Buddhist canon?[159] Is a statement disowning a *pratijñā* a semantic paradox and, if self-referential, is it self-defeating? Or will it apply, metatheorertically, to other theses only? What would be the status of a philosopher's statement disowning any thesis and position? Would it be antirational and, in effect, antiphilosophical? And how would a universal disavowal of any and every philosophical proposition and position together with its verbal statement fit in with Madhyamaka thinking as a whole, where philosophical doctrines have in fact been enunciated and where, according to Candrakīrti, theses have indeed been advanced by Nāgārjuna (see p. 129 f. above)?

In accordance with the second, and narrower, of the two uses of the word *pratijñā* noticed above (§ 2), in the textual and philosophical context in which it appears in the *VV*, the statement 'I have no *pratijñā*' may

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[159] In the *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* ascribed to Nāgārjuna, *vitaṇḍā* (*sun ci phyin du brgal ba*, § 56) and *saṃśaya* (*the tshom*, §§ 21-23) have, however, both been criticized. See above, p. 138 note 41; and p. 146 note 54.

be understood as signifying: I have no propositional thesis asserting a hypostatized entity (*bhāva*) having self-existence (*svabhāva*).

This interpretation has not claimed a special and peculiar status – formal (logical) or semantic and ontic-epistemic – for this statement of Nāgārjuna's, or for the content of the *pratijñā* thus repudiated by him. Rather, taking due account of the philosophical context in which it is embedded, it has considered the statement 'I have no *pratijñā*' to be not a generally valid universal proposition but, instead, a context-bound one relating to any *pratijñā* that postulates an entity having reified self-existence. Indeed, as has been stated in the *VV(V)* as well as in other treatises ascribed to this Madhyamaka master such as the *MK*, entities originating in dependence (*pratītyasamutpanna*) on non-reified causes and conditions are themselves all without self-existence (*niḥsvabhāva*), or Empty of self-existence (*svabhāvaśūnya*).[160] As for these statements of the Mādhyamika affirming *niḥsvabhāvatā* and *śūnyatā*, they are of course no less devoid of *svabhāva* than any thing else.

According to Nāgārjuna's *Vigrahavyāvartanī* (64), moreover, although his statements are not held by the Mādhyamika to be factitive in the sense of *making* entities (*bhāva*) Empty of self-existence, they nonetheless possess an indicative, i.e. informative (*jñāpaka*), function that *reveals* a philosophical content, namely the fact – the state of affairs – that all *bhāva*s are *niḥsvabhāva* and *śūnya*.[161]

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[160] It may be noted here that in his article 'Bhartṛhari's solution to the liar and some other paradoxes' in *JIP* 23 (1995), pp. 381-401, J. Houben has concluded (p. 395) that Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* iii.3 (Sambandhasamuddeśa) 20-28, 'amounts, in fact, to a strong defence for the Mādhyamika position, as held e.g. in Nāgārjuna's *Vigrahavyāvartanī*'.

[161] *VVV* 64: *niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā ity etat khalu vacanaṃ na niḥsvabhāvān eva sarvabhāvān karoti/ kiṃ tv asati svabhāve bhāvā niḥsvabhāvā iti jñāpayati/ tad yathā kaścid brūyād avidyamānagṛhe devadatte 'sti gṛhe devadatta iti/ tatrâinaṃ kaścit pratibrūyān nâstîti/ na tad vacanaṃ devadattasyâsadbhāvaṃ karoti, kiṃ tu jñāpayati kevalam asambhavaṃ gṛhe devadattasya/ tadvan nâsti svabhāvo bhāvānām ity etad vacanaṃ na bhāvānāṃ niḥsvabhāvatvaṃ karoti, kiṃ tu sarvabhāveṣu svabhāvasyâbhāvaṃ jñāpayati/*

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As for Candrakīrti's observation in the *PPMV* (p. 24; see § 4 above) to the effect that the Mādhyamika's reasoning founded on the adducing of a consequence undesired by an opponent (*prasaṅgāpādana*) results solely in the negation of the opponent's thesis (*parapratijñāpratiṣedhamātra-phala*), it has no doubt to be read in the context of *MK* i.1 under which rubric it appears, and which negates – through non-implicative and non-presuppositional negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*) – all the 'tetralemmatic' theses relating to the origination of an entity (*bhāva*) listed and rejected by Nāgārjuna in this verse. If, then, this observation of Candrakīrti's is in this respect context-bound, rather than a universally applicable principle or metarule, it is not established that it is to be understood as a generally valid proposition stating that, never and nowhere, does the Mādhyamika hold a philosophical position, and that, universally, his reasoning seeks exclusively to refute, and deconstruct, all opposed theses without ever proposing any thesis or doctrine of his own. Candrakīrti has repeated this observation at *PPMV*, p. 34 (*parapratijñāniṣedha<mātra>phala*), which also forms part of his extended comment under *MK* i.1 even though it relates more particularly to the fault of the inconclusiveness (*anaikāntikatā*) of the logical reason detected by him in an argument of Bhavya's. Concerning Candrakīrti's rejection of a *svapratijñā* see p. 129 above.

The further question as to whether the view that the Mādhyamika's statements are immune to falsification and to being countered by an opposed thesis is antiphilosophical remains to be considered here. Even if it is accepted that the Mādhyamika's statements do not make entities Empty

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The fundamental principle that it is not entities such as *śūnyatā* and *niḥsvabhāvatā* that *make* things devoid of self-existence and Empty, but that *dharma*s *are* by nature simply, and precisely, *śūnya* and *asvabhāva*, is to be found explicitly stated in *Kāśyapaparivarta* § 63. See also what is said of all factors beginning with materiality in the *Śatasāhasrikā prajñāpāramitā* (ed. Ghoṣa, p. 930): *na rūpaśūnyatayā rūpaṃ śūnyam, rūpam eva śūnyatā śūnyatâiva rūpam*, etc. This principle has been thematized also in the *Prajñāpāramitāhṛdayasūtra: rūpaṃ śūnyatā śūnyatâiva rūpam/ rūpān na pṛthak śūnyatā śūnyatāyā na pṛthag rūpam/ yad rūpaṃ sā śūnyatā yā śūnyatā tad rūpam/ evam eva vedanāsaṃjñāsaṃskāravijñānam* (where, in the textual tradition of the first sentence, the reading *śūnyatā* alternates with *śūnyam*).

of self-existence, but simply reveal this to be so, it may well be thought that his theory, and his statements expressing it, should be open to debate and to possible refutation. And it might then be argued (in a Popperian fashion) that any theory constructed in such as way as to make it proof against objections and refutations is not rational and is antiphilosophical because it would be unfalsifiable.

Now, there is no cogent evidence for the Mādhyamika's having deliberately set out to develop his basic theories, and to formulate his statement of them, in a manner uniquely calculated to make them immune to objections and refutations. Rather, their unassailability (if such it may be called) is the by-product of the fundamental Madhyamaka principle of Emptiness (*śūnyatā*) – which simply does not posit any entity having *svabhāva* and does not, therefore, propound theories concerning the properties of such an entity – as well as of its method of *prasaṅga*-type apagogic reasoning in which statements are as it were neutralized both ontologically (inasmuch as they do not presuppose hypostatized entities) and logically (inasmuch as the *prasajya*-type of negation so frequently employed by the Mādhyamika represents non-presuppositional and non-implicative [i.e. 'weak', 'it is not the case that ...'] negation which does not entail the categorical affirmation of a contrary or contradictory). Nor does it appear that the Mādhyamika's *prasaṅga*-type reasoning was itself developed with the main aim of providing a sophistical debater with a form of argument calculated to be unassailable. The unassailability in question being restricted to a specific form of statement – namely one in which entities supposed to have a reified *svabhāva* are deconstructed by apagogic reasoning – it does not seem possible to cite it as unambiguous and decisive evidence for suspecting the Mādhyamika of having deliberately sought in general to avoid rational argument for whatever reason (even for such a salutary one as the eirenic desire to avoid disputes).[162]

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[162] See above, § 6. A trace is nevertheless to be found of the idea that – whilst most of the Mādhyamika's arguments function like sharp weapons – his holding neither an autonomous thesis (*raṅ rgyud kyi dam bca'*: *svatantrapratijñā*) nor an autonomous logical reason (*rtags* = *liṅga*) functions like very fine mail-armour (*go ca srab daṅ 'dra ba*) that offers no point of entry (*glags* = *avakāśa*) for any charge (*klan ka* = *upālambha*). See Roṅ ston's →

The representation of reality in the gnoseology of the Madhyamaka, as well as the eirenic attitude that the Mādhyamika has been seen to adopt, would then appear to have nothing to do either with a basically antiphilosophical stance or with philosophical indifferentism. Madhyamaka thought must, for instance, be distinguished from Jaina Perspectivism (*anekāntavāda, nayavāda*). And it is clearly not a way of thinking that abjures any and every philosophical theory; even currents of thought that have kept most closely, and literally, to the 'neither...nor' view (see above, §§ 5,17) would not deny that the Buddha and his great followers did have a philosophical teaching. Madhyamaka thought is, moreover, not well described either as agnostic or as relativistic. Nāgārjuna has provided definitions of reality (e.g. the *tattvalakṣaṇa* in *MK* xviii.7 and 9), as well as a positive statement about *śūnyatā* (e.g. in *MK* xxiv.18) and about the *paramārtha* (in e.g. *MK* xxiv. 8-10), but all the while refraining from asserting any tenet constructed round the positing of a self-existent entity and from postulating any thing in terms of the four positions of the 'tetralemma' (*catuṣkoṭi*).

In sum, since Nāgārjuna and his faithful followers have not accepted any entity endowed with self-existence, and since their philosophy therefore has no room for theses asserting anything about its ontological status in such terms, the question of their falsification and refutation can no more arise than that of their verification and proof: proof (*vidhi*) and disproof (*pratiṣedha*) will, strictly speaking, come into operation only in relation to views (*dṛṣṭi*) involving hypostatized entities, for which the Madhyamaka has no place at all.

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commentary on the *Madhyamakāvatāra* (*Ṅes don rnam ṅes*, f. 43b-44a).

It is at present uncertain just how widespread this view of the matter may have been in India and Tibet. In the other sources studied here, this concept is not present in any pronounced and explicit form, the references to the Mādhyamika's immunity to *upālambha* and *adhilaya* in Nāgārjuna and Ārya-Deva being evidently viewed rather as a by-product of the Madhyamaka theory of *niḥsvabhāvatā* and *śūnyatā* (see above, § 2), which of course have behind them a history in the Prajñāpāramitā and other Mahāyānasūtras.

According to later Mādhyamika thinkers such as Tsoṅ kha pa and mKhas grub rje, this refraining from positing an entity in a speculative and dogmatic view (*lta ba* = *dṛṣṭi*), and from constructing a philosophical system of propositions asserting some thing about the ontic-epistemic and logical constitution of such an entity, should not, however, be considered tantamount to the total rejection of any philosophical theory (*lta ba* = *darśana*), doctrine (*smra ba* = *vāda*, *'dod pa*/*lugs* = *mata*), position (*phyogs* = *pakṣa*), thesis (*dam bca'* = *pratijñā*) or assertion/affirmation (*khas len pa* = *abhyupagama*). And, as seen above, they have sought to show that the great Mādhyamika thinkers from the time of Nāgārjuna – and including not only the Svātantrika Bhavya (Bhā[va]viveka) but also the Prāsaṅgika Candrakīrti – entertained philosophical doctrines and theses (so long as these did not assert an entity having a *svabhāva*) in conformity with the theory of the Emptiness of self-existence (*svabhāva-śūnyatā*).

Tsoṅ kha pa and his followers have paid careful attention in particular to developing a gnoseological theory that is both testable and ascertainable, and a mode of reasoning that is validatable. In working out this theory and mode of reasoning, they and their school have elaborated a remarkable synthesis between Madhyamaka thought and certain logical and epistemological ideas going back to Dignāga and Dharmakīrti that were adopted by Indian Mādhyamikas such as Bhavya, Śāntarakṣita and Jitāri. But since they have built on the foundations of Candrakīrti's Prāsaṅgika branch of the pure Madhyamka, this synthesis is distinct both from Bhavya's Svātantrika branch of the pure Madhyamaka and from Śāntarakṣita's synthesizing Yogācāra-Madhyamaka.[163]

In sum, for this Tibetan school of Madhyamaka thought, there can be no question of the Mādhyamika's having rejected all philosophical doctrines and theses in the sense of statements with a meaningful philosophical content, and of having repudiated a well-founded gnoseology embracing principled reasoning (*rigs śes*) leading to the comprehension (*rtogs pa* = *adhigama*), and ascertainment (*ṅes pa* = *niścaya*), of non-substantiality and Emptiness in which a positive determination (*yoṅs su*

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[163] See Section III below.

gcod pa = *pariccheda*) of negation plays a fundamental part beside negative determination (*rnam par bcad pa* = *vyavaccheda*) of the negandum (*dgag bya*) (see § 16 above). It is, nevertheless, to be observed that even though Candrakīrti indeed made use of the concept of ascertainment, he at the same time appears to have relativized the status of ascertainment in Madhyamaka thought in his critique in *MK* i.1 (pp. 54-57) of the process of ascertaining (*niści-*) and of ascertainment (*niścaya*) as its result.

The Madhyamaka school in India and Tibet has, it is true, recognized – like its Mahāyānist predecessors in general – that only the Āryan Silence (*ārya-tūṣṇībhāva*) is so to speak adequate to ultimate reality (*paramārtha*) as such. The disowning of a *pratijñā* being discussed may in fact be considered, in a certain sense, as the corollary of this silence. But what applies to the *paramārtha* does not apply to surface-level *vyavahāra* or *saṃvṛti*, and in particular to the progressive stages in which the comprehension of reality is generated in the conscious stream (*saṃtāna*) of the philosopher and exercitant. And it is of course just on this level that philosophical thinking and discourse actually operate. At this level Tsoṅ kha pa and mKhas grub rje have sought to show that the principle of the absence of a thesis (*pratijñā*), assertion (*abhyupagama*) and philosophical proposition/position (*pakṣa*) in the Madhyamaka must not be overstretched or applied indiscriminately. It was in this respect that they have differed very significantly from several other Tibetan interpreters of the Madhyamaka, as well as from the so-called 'Method of the Hva šaṅ' and from several modern writers on this school.[164]

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[164] In his 'Remarks on the interpretation of Nāgārjuna's philosophy', *JIP* 19 (1991), pp. 319-20, C. Oetke has written: 'The very idea that the *paramārtha*-level of the phenomenal world is *nirvāṇa* involves that on that level neither the proclamation of Buddhist doctrine nor the propagation of Nāgārjuna's teaching can be taken as existing entities and the same verdict holds for any event whatsoever. This immediately enables us to understand both why Nāgārjuna faced the problem of justifying his activity of proclaiming and teaching something, which is the main subject of the VV, and why he could make a statement to the effect that there is no assertion of his own. In the light of what has been said above a denial of the existence of any assertion of his own should be taken as pertaining to the *paramārtha*-level, because the main tenet logically entails precisely this. The prose commentary →

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on *kārikā* 29 of the VV supports this assumption, because it probably conveys that the non-existence of one's own as well as any other *pratijñā* is necessitated by the fact that all things/*bhāvas* are void. Therefore probably both Padhye's [A. M. Padhye, *The framework of Nagārjuna's philosophy* (New Delhi, 1988)] and the "traditional" interpretation of the famous *Vigrahavyāvartanī* passage are wrong, because they assume that some specific peculiarity of Nāgārjuna's own assertions or theses is at stake, whereas in reality nothing is implied which holds for Nāgārjuna's assertions in contradistinction to any other statements.'

A few remarks are required. (i) It is not clear what Oetke considers the 'traditional' interpretation to be. There are in fact several interpretations that can be described as traditional, most of which he has passed over in silence. The overwhelming majority of interpretations from the Madhyamaka school known to the present writer have held that, in respect of the *paramārtha*, no assertion whatever (even one by Nāgārjuna or the Buddha himself) will be a real, self-existent (i.e. hypostatized) thing. No other interpretation is indeed available within the frame of Madhyamaka (and Mahāyānist) thought, based as it is on *śūnyatā* and *dharmaniḥsvabhāvatā/dharmanairātmya*. And any attempt to ascribe an ultimately real status to the entity that is Nāgārjuna's statement would fall under the eternalistic extreme (*śāśvatānta*), which the Mādhyamika (along with all Buddhists) avoids. It is, then, hard to understand how *this* standard Madhyamaka view – which is indeed 'traditional' (and which seems besides to converge with the interpretation that Oetke has himself given) – could be described as 'wrong'. (ii) If, then, the claim that the Mādhyamika (and, indeed, the Mahāyānist) has no *pratijñā* on the level of the *paramārtha* is uncontroversial (it is indeed so to the point of being obvious, and almost trivial, since it is not clear what a *pratijñā* that is ultimately real [*pāramārthikā*] could possibly look like), the real philosophical problem for the Mādhyamika will lie elsewhere than in respect to the level of the *paramārtha*: it concerns the exact status, in the pragmatic-transactional usage (*vyavahāra*) of philosophy, of the Mādhyamika's statements (and the Buddha's verbalized teachings), and the question as to how correct doctrinal statements (such as those of the Madhyamaka, or of the Buddha) relate to the generating of the understanding of reality in the conscious stream (*saṃtāna*), which as a process belongs to the *saṃvṛti* level (even though it has in view the *paramārtha*). (In sources relating to – or making use of – the Svātantrika, this belongs to the level of the *paryāyaparamārtha* and the *mthun pa'i don* →

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dam pa; on this, and on the question of the knowability of the *paramārtha* as the object of *rigs šes*, see recently H. Tauscher, *Die Lehre von den zwei Wirklichkeiten in Tsoṅ kha pas Madhyamaka-Werken*, p. 291 ff. and, p. 326 ff.) (iii) The question has arisen whether the qualification (*viśeṣaṇa* = *khyad par*) *paramārthatas* 'in ultimate reality' is to be supplied in the interpretation of *MK* i.1 (as Bhavya and the Svātantrikas have held [see *Prajñāpradīpa* i.1 (ed. Walleser), p. 11, and *PPMV*, p. 25 ff.], from which view Oetke's does not seem to differ), or whether, even on the *saṃvṛti* level, no entity exists – in terms of any of the four (positive or negative) positions of the 'tetralemma' (*catuṣkoṭi*) – *in virtue of self-existence* (*svabhāvatas*, this being an essential specification that is expressed in Tibetan by *raṅ bžin gyis, raṅ gi ṅo bo ñid kyis, raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyis*, etc., which steers clear of the annihilationist extreme [*ucchedānta*]), which is the Prāsaṅgika view. It is, accordingly, concerning specially the level of *saṃvṛti* or *vyavahāra* that traditional interpretations have differed, as seen above. (iv) What distinguishes Nāgārjuna's statements from those of Substantialist (*svabhāvavādin*) philosophers is that his are deemed neither to presuppose nor to imply the existence of any hypostatized entity having self-existence; and he does not, indeed, hold any *pratijñā* positing them in terms of any of the (positive or negative) positions of the *catuṣkoṭi*. About this much Mādhyamikas of various tendencies have been basically in agreement. But what they have disagreed about is whether Madhyamaka philosophy (and Nāgārjuna's words) contain *pratijñā*s such that do not presuppose or imply such self-existent *bhāva*s, in other words whether Nāgārjuna (and the Madhyamaka) admits any kind of *pratijñā* at all. In the view of Tsoṅ kha pa and his school, *pratijñā*s not positing self-existent entities are, as seen above, indeed to be found in the Madhyamaka; and this conclusion is supported by the fact that even a major Prāsaṅgika authority such as Candrakīrti has spoken of *pratijñā*s to found in the *MK*, as also seen above (§ 2). On the contrary, following some other Tibetan Mādhyamikas who also considered themselves to be Prāsaṅgikas, the Madhyamaka admits no *pratijñā*, no *abhyupagama*, no *pakṣa* of any kind. But according to Tsoṅ kha pa and his school this view of certain other Tibetan Mādhyamikas brings them very close to the eponymous 'Theory of the Hva saṅ' (because they both tend to a view where the negandum (*dgag bya*] is delimited in too broad a fashion [*khyab ches pa*]).

Oetke earlier presented his view on the matter of the *pratijñā* in a fuller form in 'Rationalismus und Mystik in der Philosophie Nāgārjunas', *StII* 15 →

(1989), pp. 1-39. There he rejected the thesis (which he labels T7) that, for Nāgārjuna, no philosophical content of a thesis, no philosophical position, is tenable on any level (p. 26). And he examined the thesis (labelled T8) that, in terms of its intention, Nāgārjuna's philosophy represents no philosophical thesis and no philosophical standpoint (p. 22 f.). Now, in note 7 on p. 26, Oetke has written: 'Die Auffassung, daß Nāgārjunas Leugnung einer eigenen Behauptung in der oben genannten Passage der VV keinen stichhaltigen Beleg für die Ansicht der Unhaltbarkeit jeglicher (philosophischer) Position abgibt, wird auch in dem Aufsatz von D. Seyfort Ruegg ["Does the Mādhyamika have a thesis and philosophical position?", in: B. K. Matilal and Robert Evans (eds.) *Buddhist logic and epistemology* (Dordrecht, 1986)] vertreten. Es besteht jedoch ein wesentlicher Unterschied hinsichtlich der Begründung dieser These. Für Ruegg [! lies: für Tsoṅ kha pa und seine Schüler] läßt sich aus der Aussage N.s, es existiere keine *pratijñā* von ihm, eine absolute Bestreitung eigener philosophischer Thesen und die Negierung jeglicher philosophischer Position, deswegen nicht zwingend ableiten, weil die Möglichkeit besteht, daß der Sinn des in jener Aussage vorkommenden Terms *pratijñā* spezifischer ist als derjenige, der der linguistischen Bedeutung der Ausdrücke "(philosophische) These/Doktrin/Position" entspricht. Es könnte nämlich *pratijñā* im Sinne von "These, Behauptung, die eine Entität voraussetzt/postuliert" ("thesis/assertion positing an entity") intendiert sein. N. wollte demzufolge lediglich sagen, daß er keine Thesen aufstelle, in denen die "substantielle Existenz einer Entität" behauptet wird. ... Gemäß dem, was im Vorangehenden über den Charakter von Existenzaussagen in der Madhyamakalehre gesagt worden ist, dürfte [!] es zwar der Meinung des Begründers des Madhyamaka entsprechen, daß keinerlei Behauptungen auf der Ebene der höchsten Wahrheit Gültigkeit besitzen können, bei denen die Existenz von Entitäten vorausgesetzt wird, und es wäre [!] auch durchaus denkbar, daß der Verfasser der VV die Aussage machte, er vertrete keine These, mit der die Existenz ingendwelcher Dinge (auf der höchsten Wirklichkeitsebene) behauptet wird. Doch – wenngleich vielleicht N. derartiges gesagt haben k ö n n t e [!] – so scheint dies nicht die tatsächliche Pointe der oben diskutierten Passage der VV zu sein. Hält man sich an das, was in dem vorliegenden Text ausdrücklich gesagt wird, so ist mit der Leugnung eigener Behauptungen nicht intendiert, etwas für die Madhyamakadoktrin Spezifisches festzustellen. Aus der von uns vorgeführten (durch den Prosakommentar gestützten) alternativen Deutung ergibt sich, daß die Annahme einer →

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speziellen Verwendung von *pratijñā* im Sinne von "These/Behauptung, die die Existenz von Entitäten voraussetzt" gar nicht erforderlich ist, um die Konsequenz abzuwehren, daß der Verfasser der VV an der zitierten Textstelle das Vorhandensein jeglicher eigener philosophischer Positionen bestreiten will. – Es ist beachtenswert, daß der Eindruck, in Kārikā 29 der VV gehe es um eine speziell die eigene Philosophie oder die eigene Person betreffende Aussage, suggeriert wird, wenn man den Ausdruck *nāsti (ca) mama pratijñā* durch "Ich habe (aber) keine These/Behauptung", "I have no *pratijñā*/thesis/assertion" o. dgl. wiedergibt, wie es zahlreiche Interpreten und Übersetzer tun. Diese Suggestion besteht hingegen nicht, sobald man jene Phrase nicht minder korrekt und noch buchstäblicher übersetzt durch "Es gibt/existiert (aber) keine Behauptung von mir".'

The distinction suggested by Oetke in this last sentence is anything but clear to me. Nor can I understand how Nāgārjuna's statement '*nâsti ca mama pratijñā*' can be said by Oetke not to have been intended by this Madhyamaka master to state something in regard to Madhyamaka doctrine ('ist ... nicht intendiert, etwas für die Madhyamakadoktrin Spezifisches festzustellen'): after all, the *VV* does say '*mama*'. It seems that in Oetke's view (see *StII* 15, p. 21 [quoted below] and pp. 29-32; *JIP* 19, p. 319 [quoted above]) this statement of Nāgārjuna's would apply to any thesis on the level of the *paramārtha*. From certain Prāsaṅgika sources, however, it appears that Nāgārjuna's disowning of a *pratijñā* will apply also to the *saṃvṛti* level – that is, to the *vyavahāra* of philosophical discourse and debate – to the extent that any *pratijñā* presupposes or implies the existence of a *bhāva*, or *dharma*, possessing a (positive or negative) *svabhāva* (which would then lie outside the domain of *pratītyasamutpāda*). (As already observed above, pp. 108, 197 and 207, this is certainly not to claim some *special formal* or *semantic* status either for Nāgārjuna's statement repudiating a *pratijña* or for the content of the *pratijñā* so disowned, only to consider the statement *context-bound*.) That there can exist no thesis, etc., on the level of the *paramārtha* – which by definition is in itself beyond *prapañca, vikalpa, abhilāpa, vyavahāra*, etc. – would seem to be axiomatic for these sources, and therefore uncontroversial, as already pointed out above, even though opinions have in fact differed as to whether the *paramārtha* is knowable (*šes bya* = *jñeya*, as distinct from not being the object of words and mental construction, on which point there was no disagreement; for the opinion of, e.g., rṄog Blo ldan šes rab, who denied this knowability and thus differed from Tsoṅ kha →

pa, see Section I, § 4.2 above). (This indeed led to the view discussed above that, ultimately, only silence could be appropriate on the level of the *paramārtha*.)

On p. 21 Oetke has written: 'Die Pointe der Replik N.[s] könnte demzufolge sehr wohl darin liegen, daß der Autor klarstellen will, daß s e i n e These von der Nichtexistenz eines Eigenwesens nicht als eine Aussage über letztlich existent angenommene Entitäten gemeint ist ... Gleichwohl kann es sich aber in seinen Augen und auch de facto um eine These handeln.' – Just how this last interpretation is thought by Oetke to differ from interpetations examined in the first (1983) version of the present study is not clear to me.

In his two articles Oetke has avoided considering the history in India and Tibet of the exegetical and philosophical problems in question which have been identified, in a highly relevant and interesting way, by the Madhyamaka traditions that were reviewed in the 1983 version of the present study (to which he has nowhere referred, citing only its brief summary of 1986). Is this just because many of them are late, and hence perhaps 'unoriginal' and somehow 'unauthentic'? Or is there another reason, which Oetke has not specified? To the present writer the analyses found in these Madhyamaka sources appear at least as valuable philosophically as what is being produced by modern writers on the subject, which has all too often rested on ignorance – or unexplained neglect – of Madhyamaka tradition. In any case, what was presented in our 1983 study (and hence in its summary of 1986) was not merely the present writer's own view ('für Ruegg') but that of several of the sources studied. (I indeed think that the analyses presented by Tsoṅ kha pa and his followers possess considerable philosophical value in addition to their historical importance, and that they therefore deserve more attention and serious consideration.)

More recently, in *WZKS* 40 (1996), p. 184, Oetke has summed up his own view in the following words: 'Es geht hier [in *VV* 29] wohl um die Frage der Existenz von Äusserungs- und Behauptungsakten (auf der höchsten Wirklichkeitsebene) generell und nicht um den (illokutionären) Status von Nāgārjunas eigenen Aussagen, und auch nicht um die Natur der Wortinhalte bzw. der mit Worten ausgedrückten Propositionen.' However – and whatever may be thought about the possible illocutionary, and perlocutionary, status of Nāgārjuna's statement on which my article of 1983 touched in its final part – it seems that very much more is involved than the (in the Mahā-

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19. SOME LOGICAL, EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND SEMIOTIC ISSUES IN A MODERN PERSPECTIVE

From the evidence assembled above it appears that the Mādhyamika's approach to the question of the *pratijñā* has been closely linked with his rejection of epistemic commitment to any proposition or assertion (positive or negative) presupposing or implying the existence of a hypostatized entity that possesses self-existence (*svabhāva*, 'aseitas') and is definable in terms of the binary categories of dichotomizing conceptual construction (*vikalpa*) and the quaternary categories of the 'tetralemma' (*catuṣkoṭi*). And his statement 'All entities are without self-existence' or 'All entities are Empty [of self-existence]' is not only exclusively informative (*jñāpaka*) – rather than factitive (*kāraka*) or probative (*sādhaka*) – but it is empty of propositional content postulating things as reified, substantial entities.

Hence, in the background of the Mādhyamika's disowning of a *pratijñā*, there evidently stood, on the side of the ontic-epistemic and logical, the idea that things are in reality free from all four conceivable positions of the *catuṣkoṭi* and that certain points are unexplicated (*avyākṛtavastu*), as well as the principle that ultimate reality (*paramārtha*) as such is discursively inexpressible (*anabhilāpya*).[165] Furthermore, and not solely on the ethical side, there was the idea that contentiousness (*vivāda*, etc.) and vain arguing should be eschewed. But for the Mādhyamika, and for the Prāsaṅgika above all, the reason for disowning a *pratijñā* was evidently more specific. For it was bound up also with the question whether a

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yāna, and in the Madhyamaka in particular, undisputed) non-existence of speech-acts on the level of the *paramārtha*: this poses no problem. In the context of everything said in the *VV*, it seems that – quite apart from *not* positing any ultimate, *pāramārthika*, status for his own statements which would endow them with some superior logical, semantic or probative force – Nāgārjuna is refusing to entertain a thesis positing/presupposing/implying any entity having a *svabhāva*.

[165] It is imposible to enter here into the question alluded to above (note 5) as to whether ascribing the property of inexpressibility to the inexpressible – i.e. to the *paramārtha* – would be self-falsifying/self-refuting.

commonly acknowledged (*ubhaya[pra]siddha*) locus of inference (*dharmin*) is even available in any debate between two opponents whose views and presuppositions differ appreciably concerning the given. In other words, it was considered highly problematical whether in such an argument a genuine thesis could be effectively formulated at all.[166]

Still, in *VV* 29, Nāgārjuna made his statement 'I have no thesis' in the context of his rejection of any entity (*bhāva*) possessing self-existence, and of his disowning any thesis positing/presupposing/implying such an entity, be it positive or even negative (see §§ 2 and 18 above). In other words, the exclusion of theses here appears more closely linked with the theory of *niḥsvabhāvatā* than with any of the other concepts just mentioned.

Formally speaking, Nāgārjuna's statement 'I have no *pratijñā*' may look to us like a (semantic) paradox. In the light of the evidence studied above it seems possible to understand it not as a first-order utterance in the object language but as a second-order metalinguistic one stipulating that none of the Mādhyamika's statements is to be taken as a thesis positing/presupposing/implying the existence of an entity having self-existence (*svabhāva*). Since Nāgārjuna's philosophy in fact functions not as a speculative or dogmatic ontic-epistemic and logical system with a set of asserted propositions postulating *bhāva*s possessing a reified *svabhāva*, but rather as a discourse expressing the theory of the origination in conditioned dependence (*pratītyasamutpāda*) of things that are all Empty (*śūnya*) of *svabhāva*, his statement 'I have no *pratijñā*' will be intelligible under this interpretation. (In terms of Indian śāstraic method, this statement has the function of a *paribhāṣā* or rule of procedure and interpretation.) It might then be understood as metaphilosophical (metatheoretical).[167]

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[166] See in particular the first chapter of Candrakīrti's *PPMV* and later works depending on it.

[167] Since the publication of the earlier (1983) version of the present study, where reference was made (p. 234) to the metatheoretical function of Nāgārjuna's statement, C. Oetke seems to have arrived at a parallel (but not identical) result in his article 'Rationalismus und Mystik in der Philosophie →

It is at the same time likely that this statement was meant to be self-referential, but without being self-falsifying (or meaningless). Were it the case that this statement is *not* self-referential – that is, were it admitted that this statement at least possessed *svabhāva* – an inconsistency with Nāgārjuna's basic philosophy would arise; for he repeatedly explains that there exists no entity at all which possesses a reified *svabhāva* and is not *niḥsvabhāva/śūnya*. As observed above (pp. 108, 197 and 207-8), Nāgārjuna was in fact perfectly prepared to accept that, like everything else, his own statements are themselves Empty of self-existence: they possess no special ontic-epistemic and logical status making them other than (in his terminology) without self-existence (*niḥsvabhāva*) and Empty (*śūnya*), and setting them apart philosophically from all other things.[168] But, as also remarked above (§ 2), this situation in no way impairs or negates the informative efficacy of the Mādhyamika's philosophical statements – which, in any case (see §§ 2 and 18), are not considered by Nāgārjuna to *make* things Empty of self-existence. Nor, as already observed (§ 18), does there appear to exist any cogent reason for regarding his statement 'I have no *pratijñā*' as a desperate attempt by him simply to immunize his philosophy against refutation and falsification.[169]

The interpretation of his statement 'I have no *pratijñā*' as metalinguistic (metatheoretical) may dispose of the suspicion that with this statement Nāgārjuna has fallen into either mere sophistry or a logical fallacy (compare the history of the Liar paradox in Western thought). But to suggest that it may be understood as metalinguistic is decidedly not to imply that Nāgārjuna has here disregarded the principles of logical bivalence and the excluded middle, on which his reasoning is in fact so often based, or that

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Nāgārjuna's', *StII* 15 (1989), where he writes (p. 20): 'Aus der diskutierten Passage der VV [29] läßt sich mit hinreichender Sicherheit nur ein metaphilosophisches Theorem über philosophische Tätigkeit, jedoch keines über philosophische Inhalte ableiten'.

[168] See in particular *VVV* 24. – The idea that Nāgārjuna's statements might possess a special status has been examined by C. Oetke, *StII* 15 (1989), pp. 23-25.

[169] cf. also D. Seyfort Ruegg, *The literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India*, p. 22.

he virtually accepted a multivalued logic.[170] In any case, in the last analysis, the question whether Nāgārjuna's statement should be assigned to a

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[170] cf. our 'The uses of the four positions of the *catuṣkoṭi*', *JIP* 5, p. 49 ff. And on the excluded middle in Madhyamaka thought see D. Seyfort Ruegg, *The literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India*, Index s. u. *tṛtīya(-rāśi)*.

On a possible link between the Liar paradox and a multivalued logic (including a value additional to truth and falsity), see R. L. Martin (ed.), *Recent essays on truth and the Liar paradox* (Oxford, 1984), p. 2, etc. See also the article 'Sui-falsificateur' by B. Godart-Wendling in: *Encyclopédie philosophique universelle II: Les notions philosophiques* (Paris, 1990), vol. 2, pp. 2495-8, as well as her *La vérité et le menteur: Les paradoxes sui-falsificateurs et la sémantique des langues naturelles* (Paris, 1990) which contains a history and critique of the problem considered in terms of two-valued as well as three-valued logic. Recently P. Balcerowicz, 'Formal analysis of *Catuṣkoṭi* – A Buddhist anticipation of Multiple-valued Logic', in: P. Piekarski *et al.*, (ed.), *International Conference on Sanskrit and Related Studies* (Jagiellonian University, 1993) (Cracow, 1995), pp. 27-43, has argued for interpreting the 'tetralemma' in terms of a three-valued logic; but he has not considered the strong indications against this view contained in Madhyamaka literature. See also p. 109 note 5 above, as well as the discussion in T. Tillemans, 'La logique bouddhique est-elle une logique non-classique ou déviante?', *Les cahiers de philosophie: L'Orient de la pensée, philosophies en Inde* 14 (1992), pp. 184-98.

In his *Ṭīkā* on Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu* iii.52, Dharmottara has touched on the Liar Paradox involved in the utterance '*sarvaṃ mithyā bravīmi*, Everything I speak falsely', considering whether it is to be interpreted as itself false (*asatyārtha*) – i.e. as (self-referentially) included among all the speaker's false utterances – or as true (*satyārtha*) – i.e. as (metalinguistically or metatheoretically) excluded from all the speaker's false utterances to which it refers – and concluding in favour of the latter alternative because this interpretation alone makes the utterance effective and meaningful. Already in Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* iii, Sambandhasamuddeśa 25, a Liar Paradox is to be found. By saying of the utterance '*sarvaṃ mithyā bravīmi*' that it is 'not intended' (*naitad vākyaṃ vivakṣyate*) Bhartṛhari shows that he does not take it to be self-referential (thus appearing to envisage for it a metalin- →

guistic or metatheoretical status). For a recent discussion of this see J. Houben, *Saṃbandha-Samuddeśa*, pp. 227-8. Then in his Sambandhasamuddeśa 26-27 Bhartṛhari proceeds to take up the question of a *pratijñā* described as *asādhikā* 'non-probative'. Is this possibly a reference to a *pratijñā* that is *jñāpakā* only, as with Nāgārjuna (such, however, is not Helārāja's interpretation)? In any case, Bhartṛhari considers that an expressive (*vācaka*) proposition (e.g. one stipulating such a non-probative thesis) will not embrace itself as an intended content (*pratipādya*), in other words, evidently, that it is not self-referential:

asādhikā pratijñêti nêyam evâbhidhīyate|

In order to make sense of Nāgārjuna's statement, however, it may well be unnecessary, and indeed inappropriate, to treat his 'I have no *pratijñā*' as not self-referential and as metalinguistic (the Mādhyamikas do not themselves seem generally to have resorted to this explanation).

H. K. Ganguli, *Philosophy of logical construction* (Calcutta, 1963), pp. 195-6, has dealt with Nāgārjuna's statement under the denomination of 'the paradox of "void"'. Recently I. Mabbett, 'Is there a Devadatta in the house', *JIP* 24 (1996), pp. 294-320, has discussed the question whether Nāgārjuna either falls prey to or evades the Liar Paradox going back to Eubulides, and concludes, no doubt rightly, that he does not. Mabbett distinguishes five current interpretations of *VV* 29 'I have no *pratijñā*', and he writes that he prefers the interpretation that, on the level of conventional truth, phenomena can be treated as manifestations of immutable essences but, on the level of ultimate truth, immutable essences do not exist: phenomena are merely manifestations of other phenomena (pp. 299-300). Mabbett's third interpretation (p. 299: 'absolute reality transcends language and concepts, so that no proposition can capture ultimate truth') would seem to cover the *na sat nâsat* ... view discussed above (§ 5), but not the eirenic position (p. 302) also discussed above (§ 6). In connexion with *VV* 29, Mabbett distinguishes further between a proposition having an abstract content (i.e. a *pratijñā*) and an utterance (i.e. a *vacana*); and he explains that while the second as a particular event may be unreal, the first can still have a real meaning, although he concedes that this does not mean that Nāgārjuna actually had this distinction clearly in mind (pp. 306, 312). – Aspects of the problem have also been touched on by T. Wood, *Nāgārjunian disputations: A philosophical journey through an Indian looking-glass* (Honolulu, 1994), and by K. Patel, 'The

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second-order metalinguistic level appears to be of rather subordinate importance for the actual history of Madhyamaka thought: Nāgārjuna and the Mādhyamikas have in fact expounded the philosophy of the Madhyamaka without actually developing the idea of a metalinguistic function for the statement *nâsti ca mama pratijñā*.[171]

Any antirational and antiphilosophical appearance that the statement 'I have no *pratijñā*' might *prima facie* seem to have (cf. § 18 above) results moreover from not taking account of the possibility that it belongs to a pragmatic use of language, and that it serves to induce (in an as it were perlocutionary fashion) careful reflection on the nature and purpose of Madhyamaka – and Buddhist – philosophy.[172]

When subjecting an assertion to analysis based on pragmatics and speech-act theory, semioticians and philosophers have found it to be made up not only of a *propositional content* (sometimes termed its *phrastic* component) but of two further, illocutionary, components, namely the *modal* (sometimes described as the 'it-is-so' *tropic*) and the *performative* (sometimes described as the 'I-say-so' *neustic*). This is so, according to this type of analysis, whether or not the utterance includes an explicit sign of modality and subscription. Moreover, any of these three components of assertion being negatable, the semiotician and logician operates with a corresponding set of three distinct kinds of negation: the *propositional* (i.e. negation of the phrastic content), the *modal* (i.e. negation of the tropic) and the *performative* (i.e. negation of the neustic).[173]

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paradox of negation', *Asian Philosophy* 4 (1994), pp. 17-32. It would take us too far from the matter under discussion to address the views expressed by these two authors.

171 Even if Nāgārjuna's use of the word *pratijñā* in *VV* 29 is found to be metalinguistic, Candrakīrti's use of the word to describe Nāgārjuna's theses (noted above, § 2) will still belong to another level of language (i.e. the first-order referring level).

172 On some pragmatic aspects, and on the perlocutionary, see below.

173 For this kind of analysis and its terminology, see J. Lyons, *Semantics*, vol. 2 (Cambridge, 1977), pp. 749 f., 768 f., 802 f. In addition to concepts →

That ordinary context-free propositional negation is not the only kind of negation operating in the Mādhyamika's disowning of a *pratijñā* is probably sufficiently clear in the light of what we know of Madhyamaka thought. This is because propositional negation is logically *presuppositional* and *implicative*. That is, in propositional negation (in e.g. the utterance 'The grass is not red'), just as much as in assertion (in e.g. the utterance 'The grass is green'), the maker of the utterance is committed to the truth of an underlying proposition presupposing the existence of the entity being referred to (e.g. grass, of which a property such as colour may be meaningfully predicated or negated). This is also the principle operating in *paryudāsa*-type ('strong', i.e. presuppositional and implicative) negation as opposed to *prasajya*-type ('weak' i.e. non-presuppositional and non-implicative 'it is not the case that ...') negation.

The question then arises whether the Mādhyamika's disowning of a *pratijñā* can be appropriately analysed in terms of the two additional kinds of negation just mentioned relating to the other two components of an assertion usually not taken into account in discussions of the propositional calculus, viz. modal negation and performative negation. It is at all events reasonably clear that a form of 'external negation' of the assertion sign (cf. Frege's $\vdash$) – i.e. negation of the modal and negation of the sign of subscription – rather than 'internal negation' – i.e. negation of the propositional content – is to be taken into consideration when the subject of the embedded propositions (*bhāva*s, etc.) is Empty (*śūnya*) and therefore logically null, that is, when the existential presupposition fails or is not determinable in the frame of the positions of binary *vikalpa* and the quaternary *catuṣkoṭi*.

Certain considerations adduced by the Mādhyamika when explaining his disowning of a *pratijñā* might be cited in support of an analysis in terms of the negation of the modal (or 'tropic') 'it-is-so' component of assertion. Historically, the Mādhyamika's rejection was no doubt very often a denial in philosophical debate of another philosopher's opposed

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developed by J. L. Austin, J. Searle, *et al.*, Lyons has made use of ideas and terms employed by R. M. Hare in his article 'Meaning and speech acts', *Philosophical Review* 79 (1970), reprinted in his book *Practical inferences* (London, 1971), pp. 74-93, where the tropic is defined as the sign of mood, and the neustic as the sign of subscription.

assertion; and in speech-act theory denial may be defined as *context-bound negation* of another's assertion. It is true, however, that against this analysis there stands the Mādhyamika's observation that denial of a *pratijñā* may itself be construed as another *pratijñā*.[174] But the reason for this objection seems to lie in the fact that the Mādhyamikas would in all likelihood have regarded such denial not as equivalent to external negation of the modal but as internal propositional negation. It would then also fall within the scope of presuppositional and implicative *paryudāsa*-negation, where denial of a proposition commits one to the affirmation of the contradictory (or contrary) of the proposition and, thus, to admitting its presupposition. This is of course precisely what the Mādhyamika does *not* do.

The analysis of the Mādhyamika's disavowal of a *pratijñā* in terms of performative negation – i.e. of the 'I-say-so' sign of subscription (the 'neustic') – would then appear promising, providing an interesting avenue of approach. This interpretation would be consistent with the Mādhyamika's employment of non-presuppositional and non-implicative *prasajya*-type negation (for example in *MK* i.1) whereby he is not committed to the affirmation of the contradictory or contrary of the proposition he is negating.[175] In speech-act theory such negation has been described as the *illocutionary act of non-commitment*.

Concerning finally the *perlocutionary effect* of the kind of speech act that expresses non-commitment to the content of any propositional assertion or thesis presupposing, or positing, self-existence (*svabhāva*) – e.g. of a *bhāva*, of self (*ātman*) and of what is commonly supposed to belong to self (*ātmīya*) – , it will clearly be of considerable gnoseological significance and soteriological value in inducing careful reflection on the nature and goal of Madhyamaka philosophy. In terms of Buddhist thought as a whole, it will conduce to the freedom of sentient beings (*sattva*).

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[174] See, e.g., the observations by Sa skya paṇḍi ta and mKhas grub rje quoted above, §§ 12 and 14.

[175] Context-bound denial by negation of the modal is, however, also commitment-free with regard to presupposition, e.g. in the classic example of the denial of the proposition that the present king of France is bald.

The notion of *performative negation* appears, then, to approach certain purposes envisaged by the Mādhyamika in disowning a thesis and assertion, as well as in his use of non-presuppositional and non-implicative *prasajya*-type negation (as opposed to presuppositional and implicative *paryudāsa*-type negation). It thus appears all the more appropriate to consider the Mādhyamika's disowning of a *pratijñā* in terms of a *pragmatic* rather than of an exclusively *propositional* – and ontic-logical – analysis of assertion and its negation in view of the fact that the Madhyamaka (and indeed the Mahāyāna as a whole and parts also of the Śrāvakayānist traditions of Buddhism) has so often engaged in the analysis, dissolution and deconstruction of language and its conceptual categories.

This same approach will be pertinent also to the consideration of the *ethical* dimension of refraining from taking up a contentious position to which attention has been drawn above (§ 6).

Whether or not the kind of semiotic analysis just discussed relating to external negation as opposed to internal, propositional, negation proves in fact to be applicable to the disavowal in Madhyamaka thought of a *pratijñā* (it does not in any case seem to be directly and immediately applicable to the *statement* 'I have no *pratijñā*' where, syntactically and semantically, the negation is not external), it does appear to be pertinent to the explication of the kind of statement represented by by *MK* i.1 – 'Never anywhere do any entities exist originated from self [i.e. themselves], nor from an other, nor from the two, nor from no cause' (see § 1 above) – where the negation has been regularly understood in Madhyamaka thought as the non-presuppositional and non-implicative *prasajya*-type negation rather than as the presuppositional and implicative *paryudāsa*-type of negation.

In this section reference has been made to work in semiotics, pragmatics and speech-act theory as a potentially useful heuristic instrument when explicating what the Indian and Tibetan Mādhyamikas have had to say on the subject of philosophical positions and theses. The historian of the Madhyamaka – and indeed of Indian and Tibetan philosophy as a whole – must certainly beware of anachronistically transposing and arbitrarily superimposing on modes of thought which originated in their own particular, and quite specific, historical and intellectual settings the concepts and methods of modern philosophy and semiotics since the latter

have evolved, mostly in the West, in the course of distinct historical developments. The Indian and Tibetan philosophical doctrines and methods have first to be understood 'emically' in their own right, in other words within the frame of the concerns of the Indian and Tibetan thinkers and of the ideas they have developed over the centuries.

Still, in studying Indian and Tibetan thought, the importance of linguistic and philosophical pragmatics probably deserves attention. Besides, philosophical comparison across cultural boundaries may possess heuristic and clarificatory value. But 'etically' oriented comparison can, it appears, be legitimately and effectively undertaken only on a solid 'emic' foundation.[176]

20. CONCLUSION

It seems correct to say that the Mādhyamika's methodological – and no doubt metatheoretical – statement 'I have no *pratijñā*' is to be situated within the realm of philosophical discourse, in other words that its locus is the surface level (*saṃvṛti*) of transactional-pragmatic usage in and of the world (*lokavyavahāra*). The same applies to his (context-bound) disowning of a thesis. Yet the philosophical context of the statement expressing disavowal as well as the disavowal itself is the fact – the true state of affairs – that all things are without self-existence (*niḥsvabhāva*), that they are Empty (*śūnya*) of *svabhāva*; and this *niḥsvabhāvatā* and

[176] This 'emic' foundation, in its systematic and historical dimensions, is what has often been missing in recent discussions of the philosophical materials covered in this section. This is, however, not the place to embark on a discussion of the requirements and the problems of 'comparative philosophy', a concept that goes back well into the nineteenth century; cf. W. Halbfass, *India and Europe: An essay in understanding* (Albany, 1988). The idea of comparative philosophy has been thematized in a number of publications since P. Masson-Oursel, *La philosophie comparée* (Paris, 1923), passing through D. Ingalls, 'The comparison of Indian and Western philosophy', *JOR* 22 (1954), pp. 1-11, and E. Deutsch and J. Larson (ed.), *Interpreting across boundaries* (Princeton, 1988).

śūnyatā in fact pertain to the level of ultimate reality (*paramārtha*).[177] None the less, as such, both a proposition and a statement giving expression to it remain *vyāvahārika* and *sāṃvṛta*, for it is precisely on the level of transactional-pragmatic discursivity that philosophical thinking and exposition operate.

The philosophical propositions or statements in Madhyamaka thought, which are properly described as true, may also be situated on this level of transactional-pragmatic usage and of *saṃvṛti*: as propositions and statements they continue to belong to the realm of discursive thinking and language. Yet such a proposition/statement – for instance *MK* i.1 discussed above – does pertain to reality, to the true state of affairs for things.

Later Madhyamaka works, from the *Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha* ascribed to Bhavya onwards, have then developed the idea of a conceptualized and discursive (**saparyāya = rnam graṅs daṅ bcas pa*) *paramārtha*. This form of *paramārtha* is additional to the *paramārtha* properly speaking, which is described as **aparyāya = rnam graṅs ma yin*, i.e. as beyond conceptual thinking and language. This two-fold division of the *paramārtha* is attested not only with a Svātantrika-Mādhyamika like Bhavya – and then with Yogācāra-(Svātantrika-)Mādhyamikas such as Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla – but also with the Prāsaṅgika Tsoṅ kha pa.[178]

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[177] This two-sidedness of the proposition/statement finds a kind of parallel in the two aspects of *pratītyasamutpāda*. This might perhaps be expressed by saying that, as including (extensionally) all conditioned things originating in dependence (*pratītyasamutpanna*) and whose nature is to be Empty of self-existence (: *śūnyatva*), *pratītyasamutpāda* belongs to the level of *saṃvṛti*. But as the fact, or true state of affairs, of dependent origination that relates (intensionally) to all conditioned things, *pratītyasamutpāda* pertains to the the ultimate reality of their Emptiness (*śūnyatā*), i.e. to *paramārtha* or the *tattva* (cf. *PPMV* vii. 15-16; xviii.10 on the *laukika tattvalakṣaṇa*). See D. Seyfort Ruegg, *The literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India*, p. 44 note 110.

[178] The earliest identified clear reference to this division of the *paramārtha* is found in the *Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha* ascribed to Bhavya (D, f. 329b). It is not certain, however, whether the Bhavya to whom this text is ascribed →

In Madhyamaka thought there has arisen the further question as to whether the proposition/statement negating origination in terms of any of the four positions of the tetralemma found in *MK* i.1 should be qualified by the restriction *paramārthatas* 'in ultimate reality'. Bhavya (Bhā[va]-viveka, sixth century) did this in his *Prajñāpradīpa* (i.1). But in his *Prasannapadā* (i.1) Candrakīrti (seventh century) has rejected this qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) on the ground that the idea of the origination of a *self-existent* entity in terms of any of the positions of the tetralemma is not only unacceptable on the level of the *paramārtha* (on which point there is no major difference of opinion between him and Bhavya) but that even on the level of the *saṃvṛti* it is incoherent in so far as the idea of a *self-existent* entity taking on origination is unintelligible.

In the middle period of the history of the Madhyamaka school – the time of Bhavya and Candrakīrti[179] – any concern with the pragmatics of language and with pragmatic-transactional usage (*vyavahāra*) became largely overshadowed by the more specifically ontic-epistemic and logical problems with which Mādhyamikas were becoming involved in the course of their discussions and debates with other schools of thought. In particular, from the time of Bhavya who responded to impulses received from the Pramāṇa-school of Dignāga (*c.* 480-540), Madhyamaka philosophy became increasingly concerned with the proposition and the ontic-epistemic and logical problems connected with the employment of inferences (*anumāna*) and formal probative arguments (*prayoga[vākya]*) in

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is identical with the author of the *Prajñāpradīpa* and the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikās*; cf. our 'On the authorship of some works ascribed to Bhāvaviveka/Bhavya', in : D. Seyfort Ruegg and L. Schmithausen (ed.), *Earliest Buddhism and Madhyamaka* (Leiden, 1990), pp. 67-68. In the *Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha* the **saparyāya-paramārtha* has been further subdivided into **saparyāya* reasoning (*rigs pa rnam graṅs daṅ bcas pa*) and that form of *paramārtha* in which origination is negated (*skye ba bkag pa'i don dam*) (see *MK* i.1). See also *Tarkajvālā* iii.26 (D, f. 59a-b). – For further details on the divisions of the *paramārtha*, see H. Tauscher, *Die Lehre von den zwei Wirklichkeiten in Tsoṅ kha pas Madhyamaka-Werken*, p. 291 ff.

179 For the periodization of Indian Madhyamaka thought, see our *Literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India*.

engendering the understanding of reality. Later Mādhyamikas such as Śāntarakṣita and Jitāri clearly show the influence of Dignāga's successor Dharmakīrti. And the question of the *pratijñā* and *pakṣa* then tended to be treated above all in terms of the thesis in an inference or formal probative argument rather than in the broader context of assertions or speech acts. Still later, in Madhyamaka thought in Tibet, the problem of the *pratijñā* and its rejection came to be closely associated with the division between Bhavya's Svātantrika and Candrakīrti's Prāsaṅgika schools of Madhyamaka.[180]

A significant and very interesting exception to this general trend was, however, constituted by the discussions associated with the 'Great Debate of bSam yas' at the end of the eighth century. The so-called 'Theory/Method of the Hva šaṅ' (*hva šaṅ gi lta ba/lugs*) at issue in this debate has been linked with the rejection of all forms of conceptual construction, and indeed of all action, salutary as well as non-salutary, at all stages of spiritual intuition.[181] In a certain sense this negative attitude towards both philosophical thinking and ethical or religious praxis may be regarded as coordinate with the idea that ultimate reality and the understanding of it are totally free from any proposition or thesis and its assertion, indeed that only 'Āryan Silence' can really be appropriate to this level (see above).

Even so, a consideration of philosophical and linguistic pragmatics still proves useful when studying what can perhaps be best described as the Mādhyamika's *neutralization* of the *pratijñā* as a thesis positing self-existent entities (cf. p. 210 above). This neutralization is found to bear on the propositional content of an assertion – the ontological presupposition of the proposition in terms of reified self-existence (*svabhāva*) being annulled together with its truth/falsity (truth-value) – and on the question of the principle of logical bivalence when *prasajya*-negation is in operation (e.g. in *MK* i.1). There is to be found here a cancellation of two sides of the assertion sign: *viz.* the performative component – the 'I-say-so'

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180 See Sections I and III.

181 See above, p. 185; and Section I.

(*'pratijāne'*) commitment to propositional content – and the assertoric component – the 'it-is-so' (*pratijñā*) modal.

According to the Mādhyamika, genuine philosophical activity is possible for the philosopher and practiser of the Middle Way despite – or rather, perhaps, precisely because of – the suspension of all the above-mentioned components of a proposition or thesis presupposing the self-existence of a hypostatized entity. And far from frustrating the correct gnoseological comprehension of reality by, for example, making ascertainment and falsification impossible, this neutralization has tended to be regarded by the Mādhyamika as a necessary – albeit not sufficient – condition for this comprehension.[182]

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[182] The present study has been mainly concerned with the history and the philosophical and semiotic status of the Mādhyamika's statement 'I have no *pratijñā*'. Further work has still to be done on the history and status of *prasajya*-negation and the Mādhyamika's *prasaṅga*-method in particular. Section III below is intended as a contribution in this direction.

III

ON EPISTEMOLOGICAL-LOGICAL (*pramāṇa*) THEORY AND THE ONTIC IN TSOṄ KHA PA's MADHYAMAKA PHILOSOPHY

1. INTRODUCTION

Nāgārjuna, the source of the Madhyamaka school, and even more Candrakīrti, the main representative of its *Prāsaṅgika branch,[1] have frequently been taxed with having discarded both logic and epistemology and with relying only on negative criticism and on the unthinkable and inexpressible of mysticism.[2] Some aspects of this question have been investigated in the previous section.

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[1] Candrakīrti (seventh century) rather than Buddhapālita (*c*. 500 CE) is often considered to be in the strict sense the establisher of the Prāsaṅgika school, although it is recognized that, in important respects, Buddhapālita had already proceeded in important respects like a Prāsaṅgika philosopher. On the term *Prāsaṅgika 'Apagogist', reconstructed from Tib. Thal 'gyur ba, as the name of a school of the Madhyamaka, see above, p. 20 note 38, and below, p. 240 note 11. The designation Svātantrika 'Autonomist' for Bhavya's (Bhā[va]viveka's) school of the Madhyamaka is also reconstructed from the Tib. term Raṅ rgyud pa. As for the name Bhavya, it is being used here although the name of the sixth-century founder of the Svātantrika school is in fact transmitted also as Bhā(va)viveka and Bhāvin.

[2] See, e.g., T. Stcherbatsky, *The conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa* (Leningrad, 1927), *passim*; *Buddhist logic*, i (Leningrad, 1932), pp. 29, 344.

In his lecture *The logical illumination of Indian mysticism* (Oxford, 1977), pp. 19-20, B. K. Matilal has opposed the *prāsaṅgika* (whom he described as 'the vitaṇḍin') to the the advocate of the *pramāṇavāda*, writing: 'The first group consists of those who use only the *reductio [ad absurdum]*
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and the negative form of debate, while the second group comprises those who would establish, in addition to the *reductio*, a system of *pramāṇas* or accredited means of knowledge on the basis of which they would construct a system. One of the platitudes of the *pramāṇa-vādin*, i.e., the second group of philosophers, is that a philosophic debate cannot properly begin unless both parties entering it first admit that *pramāṇas* ... are acceptable realities.' Substantially the same view has been expressed in Matilal's *Logic, language and reality* (Delhi, 1985), p. 14.

The *vitaṇḍā* ('cavil', as a solely negative, and destructive, argument) has, however, been repudiated in Nāgārjuna's *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* (§ 56) and in Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra* (vi.178; see below, § 9), as well as in Dharmakīrti's *Vādanyāya* (ed. Much, p. 61) with Śāntarakṣita's commentary where it is pointed out that without the acceptance of a philosophical theory (*abhyupagama*) there can be no philosophical debate (*vivāda*). (For Vasubandhu's rejection of *vitaṇḍā* in his *vāda*-treatises, see E. Frauwallner, *WZKM* 40 [1933], p. 289.) On the question of the Madhyamaka and *vitaṇḍā*, cf. K. Bhattacharya, *Journal asiatique* 1975, pp. 99-102.; D. Seyfort Ruegg, 'Towards a chronology of the Madhyamaka school', in: L. A, Hercus et al. (eds.), *Indological and Buddhist studies* (Festschrift J. W. de Jong, Canberra, 1982), p. 521 with notes 65-66; and above, Section II, § 4.

Moreover, as we shall see, in addition to the Svātantrikas, some Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas have admitted a *pramāṇa*-system, though of course one that does not accept the ontic-(epistemo)logical presuppositions adopted by the Substantialist schools of Indian philosophy accepting a *pramāṇavāda* to the effect that *pramāṇa* and *prameya* possess a *svabhāva* ('self-nature, self-existence, aseitas') or are established by a **svalakṣaṇa (raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa)*. For an explanation of the translation used here of *pramāṇa* by 'right/correct knowledge/cognition' (rather than by 'valid knowledge/cognition' or by 'authority'), see D. Seyfort Ruegg, '*Pramāṇabhūta, *pramāṇa-(bhūta)-puruṣa, pratyakṣadharman* and *sākṣātkṛtadharman* as epithets of the *ṛṣi, ācārya* and *tathāgata* in grammatical, epistemological and Madhyamaka texts', *BSOAS* 57 (1994), pp. 303-20; id., 'La notion du voyant et du «connaisseur suprême» et la question de l'autorité épistémique', *WZKS* 38 (1994), pp. 403-19.

As for *anubhava* 'experience' *not* being a means of right knowledge of reality, and on the possibility of its being *mṛṣā* 'false', see Candrakīrti, →

From his discussion of the comment on Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamaka-kārikās* by Buddhapālita (*c.* 500 CE), it clearly emerges that Bhavya/Bhā-(va)viveka (sixth century) – whom Candrakīrti (seventh century) designated as the 'syllogist' (*tārkika*) and described as being fond of inference (*priyānumānatā*)[3] – considered that his (proto-)Prāsaṅgika predecessor had left the Madhyamaka philosophy of non-substantiality (*niḥsvabhāvatā*) and Emptiness (*śūnyatā*) open, by reason of his 'exposed' formulations (*sāvakāśavacana*), to attack from its Substantialist opponents.[4] As a philosopher living in the sixth century, Bhavya evidently developed his methodology for use by the Mādhyamika under the influence of masters of *pramāṇa* such as Dignāga (*c.* 500 CE). Bhavya in fact made important moves in the direction of, and apparently in response to, the *pramāṇa-vidyā* being developed in the fifth and sixth centuries. Thus, for the Madhyamaka, he accepted an independent or autonomous inference (*svatantram anumānam*) and formal probative argument (*svatantra-prayoga-vākya*), for which purpose he sought to find terms that were established in mutual agreement (*ubhaya[vādipra]siddha: mthun snaṅ du grub pa*) between the Mādhyamika proponent and his Substantialist opponent.[5]

PPMV, p. 58. (Sometimes *anubhava* is indeed equivalent to *vedanā* or *vedana* 'feeling', e.g. *PPMV* on *MK* xviii.1 [p. 343.9] and xxvi.5 [p. 554.7].) – For the use of the description 'mysticism' in relation to Nāgārjuna, see e.g. T. Vetter, *Acta Indologica* 6 (1984), p. 497 f.

3 *PPMV* i.1, pp. 25.8, 31.1, and p. 16.1.

4 For the term *sāvakāśavacana* (rendered in the Tibetan translation of Bhavya's *Prajñāpradīpa (PP)* as *glags yod pa'i tshig)*, see *PPMV*, p. 24.1 (where the term is rendered by *glags daṅ bcas pa'i tshig*). The expression *glags yod pa'i tshig* in the Tibetan translation of the *PP*, pp. 11-12 and 14, corresponds, moreover, to *prasaṅgavākyatva* in the *PPMV* (ed. La Vallée Poussin), pp. 14-15 and 36, where the Tib. translation has *thal bar 'gyur ba'i tshig/ṅag*; cf. Tsoṅ kha pa, *NŚRG*, f. 31a-b (= p. 52). See below, p. 252 f. Cf. T. Tillemans, 'Tsoṅ kha pa *et al.* on the Bhāvaviveka-Candrakīrti debate', in: *Tibetan studies (Proceedings of the 5th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies*, i, Narita, 1992), pp. 316-26.

5 On the problem of *ubhaya(pra)siddhatva* see below and Candrakīrti's *PPMV* i.1.

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And on the *vyavahāra*-level he admitted an entity that might at least at first sight recall the *svalakṣaṇa* or particular characteristic of the Pramāṇa-school.[6]

For Bhavya's *svatantra-anumāna* and *prayoga(vākya)*, in addition to the relevant passages of Chap. i of Bhavya's *PP* many of which are cited in Sanskrit by Candrakīrti in his *Prasannapadā*, see for example *PP* xiii.1 (D, tsha, f. 147b-148a): *da ni sun 'byin pa'i lan btab pa daṅ/ raṅ dbaṅ du rjes su dpag pa'i mthus 'du byed rnams rnam pa las ṅo bo ñid med pa ñid du bstan pa'i don gyi dbaṅ gis rab tu byed pa bcu gsum pa brtsam mo//...'dir sbyor ba'i tshig ni don dam par naṅ gi dṅos po rnams ni ṅo bo ñid stoṅ pa ñid yin te/ slu ba'i chos yin pa'i phyir/ dper na/ sgyu mkhan gyis sprul pa'i bud med kyi lus bžin no//...* 'Now, in virtue of offering a rebuttal (*parihāra*) of the [opponent's] refutation (*dūṣaṇa*) and of autonomous inference, and in reference to the sense set out as non-substantiality (*niḥsvabhāvatā*), I shall compose Chap. xiii [of the *PP*]... Here there is the formal probative argument (*prayogavākya*): "In reality the internal Bases (*āyatana*) are empty of self-existence, for they are delusive in nature (*moṣadharman*), just like the body of a woman projected by an illusionist".' – Cf. 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa, *Grub mtha' chen mo*, ii, f. 103a f.; and lCaṅ skya rol pa'i rdo rje, *Grub mtha' Thub bstan lhun po'i mdzes rgyan*, ii, f. 45a (= p. 325).

6 Defined as *arthakriyāsamartha* and *paramārthasat* in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*, *Pratyakṣa*-chapter 3, in contradistinction to the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* 'general characteristic' defined as *saṃvṛtisat*.

Compare Bhavya's exegesis of the Yogācārin's *lakṣaṇa-niḥsvabhāvatā* and *parikalpitasvabhāva* in his comment on *MK* xxv (*PP*, D, tsha, f. 242af., especially f. 242a5-b1): *...de mtshan ñid ṅo bo ñid med pa ñid kyis ṅo bo ñid med pa ni rgyu mtshan la sogs pa lṅa po dag gi khoṅs su ma gtogs pa'i phyir ro/ /de de ltar yod pa ma yin yaṅ miṅ don la 'jug pa las kun nas ñon moṅs pa 'gyur te/ ji ltar miṅ don la 'jug pa de ltar byis pa rnams de'i ṅo bo ñid la mṅon par žen par byed do že na/ de la 'dir gal te gzugs žes bya bar yid la brjod pa daṅ/ tshig tu brjod pa'i kun brtags pa ṅo bo ñid gaṅ yin pa de med do že na ni, dṅos po las skur pa 'debs pa yin te/ yid la brjod pa daṅ/ tshig tu brjod pa la skur pa 'debs pa'i phyir ro//* '[Yogācāra *pūrvapakṣa*:] This [constructed nature or *parikalpitasvabhāva*] is non-substantiality by *lakṣaṇa-niḥsvabhāvatā*, for it does not belong to the pentad [of *vastus*/*dharmas*] consisting in *nimitta* etc. [cf. *Madhyāntavibhāga* iii.13 with Sthiramati's *Ṭīkā*; →

LŠÑP, f. 50a-b (= p. 420-1); L. de La Vallée Poussin, *Siddhi*, p. 537-8]. Although it does not exist in this manner, there is Affect (*saṃkleśa*) since a name refers to [its] object, and just as a name refers to [its] object so the foolish conceive attachment (*abhiniveśa*) to its *svabhāva*. – [Bhavya's reply:] Here, in this connexion, to hold that the constructed nature of the conceptualization *(manojalpa) 'rūpa'* and of the verbalization do not exist amounts to denial (*apavāda*) of things, for it is a denial of *manojalpa* and verbalization...' (A translation of the entire passage is to be found in M. D. Eckel, 'Bhāvaviveka's critique of Yogācāra philosophy in Chapter xxv of the *Prajñāpradīpa'*, in: C. Lindtner [ed.], *Miscellanea buddhica* [Copenhagen, 1985], pp. 49-50.) – For Bhavya's critique of the Vijñānavāda, see further his *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* v.55 f. (with lCaṅ skya Rol pa'i rdo rje, *Grub mtha'*, ii, f. 47a f. [= p. 328 f.]).

For Tsoṅ kha pa's interpretation of this passage of the *PP*, and for his attribution to Bhavya of the *raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*, see his *LŠÑP*, f. 50a (= p. 420): *kun btags la mtshan ñid ṅo bo ñid med do žes smra ba'i kun btags de ṅo bo daṅ khyad par du 'dogs pa'i rtog pa daṅ miṅ la byed na de gñis phuṅ por gtogs pas gžan dbaṅ la mtshan ñid ṅo bo ñid med pa'i skur 'debs su bšad pas/ gžan dbaṅ la mtshan ñid ṅo bo ñid yod par bžed do/ /de yaṅ dgoṅs 'grel las raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyis ma grub pas mtshan ñid ṅo bo ñid med par bšad ciṅ 'di dag kyaṅ mdo de'i don gtan la 'bebs pa yin pas/ gžan dbaṅ la raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i ṅo bo yod par bžed par gsal lo//* ... 'If no construction or naming attaching either essence (*svabhāva*) or particularity (*viśeṣa*) are stated in respect to the *parikalpita* – of which it is said that this *parikalpita* has no *svabhāva* –, because both [conceptualization and verbalization] belong to a *skandha* [cf. *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* vii.25], [were one to hold to *lakṣaṇa-niḥsvabhāvatā*] this is stated to represent the denial (*apavāda*) that consists in *lakṣaṇa-niḥsvabhāvatā* for the *paratantra* [cf. *Saṃdhinirmocana* vii.20]. It is therefore held that for the *paratantra* there does exist a *lakṣaṇa-svabhāva*. This [*vyavasthā* as *nāman* and *saṃketa*] is explained in the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* [vii.4] as *lakṣaṇa-niḥsvabhāvatā* [in respect to the *parikalpita*] because of non-establishment by **svalakṣaṇa*; and the meaning of this Sūtra has been settled. It is, therefore, clear that it was accepted [by Bhavya] that in the *paratantra* an essence established by self-characteristic (**svalakṣaṇa-siddha*) exists.' On the basis of this analysis Tsoṅ kha pa classifies Bhavya – even though a Mādhyamika (see *LŠÑP*, f. 91a = p. 488) – as a Substantialist... (For the interpretation of this difficult →

passage, see [Ser byes Tre hor dge bšes] rTa mgrin rab brtan, *Draṅ ṅes rnam 'byed legs bšad sñiṅ po dka' gnad rnams mchan bur bkod pa, gzur gnas blo gsal la dga' ston*, f. 106b-107a. A translation of the entire passage is to be found in R. Thurman, *Tsong Khapa's Speech of Gold in the Essence of True Eloquence* [Princeton, 1984], p. 266. See also J. Hopkins, *Tibet Journal* 14 [1989], pp. 15-16.)

Here Tsoṅ kha pa has not, however, mentioned any direct link with the logicians' concept of the *svalakṣaṇa* 'particular characteristic', the connexion he has made being rather between Bhavya's acceptance (under Tsoṅ kha pa's analysis) of the *raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa* and Bhavya's critique of the Yogācārin's concept of *lakṣaṇa-niḥsvabhāvatā* and his *apavāda* of certain *lakṣaṇa*s. (Here the Svātantrika school's *raṅ gi mtshan ñid* is noted by **svalakṣaṇa* with an asterisk, while the Pramāṇa-school's *svalakṣaṇa* does not carry the asterisk.) It is necessary also to take into account the use of the term *svalakṣaṇa* in the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*. There is also no direct dependence of this concept of **svalakṣaṇa* on the Abhidharma. For the interpretation by Tsoṅ kha pa and his school of the Svātantrika's *raṅ mtshan: *svalakṣaṇa*, and for the idea of *raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa* on the conventional level, see *KNZB* § 2. There is also no direct dependence of this idea of **svalakṣaṇa* on the Abhidharma concept of *svalakṣaṇa* as the own (specific) defining character of a thing. It is, therefore, convenient to distinguish between these distinct concepts of *raṅ gi mtshan ñid* = *svalakṣaṇa* by designating the Abhidharma one of the own (specific) defining characteristic as *svalakṣaṇa*$_1$, the Prāmāṇika's one of the particular (as opposed to the generic) characterisic as *svalakṣaṇa*$_2$, and Tsoṅ kha pa's one of the *raṅ gi mtshan ñid* 'self-characteristic', which he connects with the Svātantrika-Madhyamakas, as *svalakṣaṇa*$_3$.

For Candrakīrti's view of the logicians' *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, see, e.g., his *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti* on verses 8, 57; and *PPMV* i.1, p. 58 ff. And on the *raṅ gi mtshan ñid* = **svalakṣaṇa* which Tsoṅ kha pa connects with Bhavya and the Svātantrikas, see C. Yoshimizu, 'On *raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa* III', Part I, *Journal of the Naritasan Institute for Buddhist Studies*, No. 16 (1993), pp.91-147, and Part II, *loc. cit.*, No. 17 (1994), pp. 295-354; id., 'Tsoṅ kha pa on *don byed nus pa*', in: *Tibetan studies (Proceedings of the Seventh Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Graz 1995)*, vol. 2 (Vienna, 1997), pp. 1103-1120.

In his *Draṅ ṅes legs bšad sñiṅ po* the Tibetan Madhyamaka master Tsoṅ kha pa (1357-1419) has written that Bhavya was, however, evidently unaware of the fundamental philosophical difference between himself and Buddhapālita in respect of accepting or not accepting an autonomous (*svatantra*) reasoning, and that he simply regarded Buddhapālita's method as unsuited for the acceptance of the *svatantra (raṅ rgyud khas len pa 'os med du byas pa)*; and for this reason Bhavya had assumed that for both Buddhapālita and himself the negandum (*dgag bya*) in the case of negation of self-existence in the factors of existence and the individual (*pudgala-dharma-nairātmya*) was therefore identical.[7] But this is in fact not so according to Tsoṅ kha pa, who states that the reasoning (*nyāya* or *yukti*) negating the *svatantra (raṅ rgyud 'gog pa'i rigs pa)* is an especially subtle one among all those reasonings in which the negation of this negandum has been set forth on the ground of dependent origination (*rten 'byuṅ = pratītyasamutpāda*).[8] Concerning the relationship in Bhavya's thought between his acceptance of a *svatantra* inferential sign (*liṅga: raṅ rgyud kyi rtags*) and his doctrine of an entity existing by self-characteristic on the *saṃvṛti* level – i.e. what Tsoṅ kha pa refers to as the *tha sñad du raṅ gi ṅo bos grub pa'i raṅ mtshan* – this Tibetan scholar has furthermore given as his opinion that the latter ontic-(epistemo)logical doctrine constitutes the reason (*rgyu mtshan*) for Bhavya's having accepted in his *svamata* an autonomous (*svatantra*) *liṅga*.[9]

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[7] *LŠÑP*, f. 63b (= p. 443) and f. 81b-82a (= p. 473).

[8] *LŠÑP*, f. 82a (= p. 473-4); cf. f. 90b (= p. 487). Cf. *LRChM*, f. 425a-b (p. 706).

[9] *LRChM*, f. 425a-b; cf. f. 429a2.

For the necessary link existing between the autonomous (*svatantra*) inference and the postulation of an entity established by self-characteristic (*raṅ gi mtshsan ñid kyis grub pa*), see also *LŠÑP*, f. 83b f. (= p. 476f.) (referring to the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra*). Conversely, if no *dharma* established by self-characteristic is postulated, it will be necessary *not* to maintain a *svatantra*-type reasoning according to Tsoṅ kha pa; see *LŠÑP*, p. 476.13-18. Tsoṅ kha pa then specifies that absence of a *pakṣa* is to be explained as non-assertion (*anabhyupagama*) of a thing established by **svalakṣaṇa* or *svabhāva* (f. 84a = p. 477.10: *phyogs med pa ni raṅ mtshan nam raṅ bžin gyis grub pa'i khas*
→

In the event, Bhavya's ontic-(epistemo)logical initiatives in the direction of the logic and epistemology accepted by other Indian philosophers were soon to be severely criticized by Candrakīrti and his Prāsaṅgika followers. For us the question then is: Does this mean that the Mādhyamikas, at least to the extent that they were Prāsaṅgikas, in fact throw overboard logic and epistemology, i.e. *pramāṇa*?

2. SOME FUNDAMENTAL LOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL ISSUES IN MADHYAMAKA: *prayoga(vākya)* VS. *prasaṅga* AND THE PROBLEM OF *pramāṇa* IN RELATION TO *prameya*

A basic difference between the 'Svātantrika' (Tib. Raṅ rgyud pa) and the '*Prāsaṅgika' (Tib. Thal 'gyur ba) Mādhyamikas lies in their gnoseology. That is, it concerns the different modes in which, according to them, understanding of reality arises in the conscious continuum of the philosopher-practiser and the way he ascertains reality through reasoning.[10] Since the Svātantrika following Bhavya accepts an autonomous (*svatantra*) form of philosophical argument embodied in a *parārtha-anumāna* and *prayoga(vākya)* or formal probative argument, he can be designated as an 'Autonomist'. And since the Prāsaṅgika uses instead the *prasaṅga*-type of reasoning – i.e. a form of apagogic argument that discloses undesired consequences that 'occur' or 'eventuate' (*prasañj-)* in opposed views – he could perhaps be designated an 'Eventuationist' or 'Apagogist'.[11]

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len med pa'i don du bšad de). See also lCaṅ skya Rol pa'i rdo rje, *Grub mtha'*, ii, f. 45a-b (= p. 326). (In principle, it might seem possible to suggest that these two components in Bhavya's philosophy are like the two sides of the same coin.)

[10] cf. Tsoṅ kha pa, *LRChM*, ff. 343a ff.(= p. 573 ff.), 404a5 ff.(= p. 672 ff.), 434a4 ff. (= p. 719 ff.).

[11] It should be recalled that the names Svātantrika 'Autonomist'and Prāsaṅgika 'Apagogist' are not actually attested in extant Sanskrit works as designations of the schools of Bhavya (Bhā[va]viveka) and Buddha- →

At the outset it should be emphasized that, long before Bhavya and the split of the Madhyamaka school into Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas, Ārya-Deva and Nāgārjuna himself had made a point of employing methods of discussion and establishing modes of knowing that were logically and epistemologically sound.[12] Yet, at least *prima facie*, any move by a

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pālita/Candrakīrti respectively, and that they are retrotranslations of the Tibetan terms *raṅ rgyud pa* and *thal 'gyur ba* which, as the names of the two Madhyamaka schools in question, evidently became current in Tibet at the time of Jayānanda and (s)Pa tshab Ñi ma grags (born in 1055 ?). Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, *The literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India*, p. 58; and above, Section I, p. 20 note 38, on attestations of the term *raṅ rgyud pa*, etc., in Jayānanda's *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā*.

For the Prāsaṅgika, the designation 'Consequentialist' has also been used since the term *prasaṅga* denotes a consequence shown by the Prāsaṅgika to occur in, or to follow/eventuate from, an opposed view but which is undesired by the opponent. However, in modern philosophical literature where consequentialism appears as an equivalent of teleology, the term consequentialist is being used in a quite different meaning. (Cf. S. Scheffler, *Consequentialism and its critics* [Oxford, 1988].) Even more important is the fact discussed below that, according to Tsoṅ kha pa's interpretation of the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka, the Prāsaṅgika's procedure is not limited solely to demonstrating consequences in opponents' views that are undesired by them, and that the Prāsaṅgika himself regards his *prasaṅga*-type reasoning as valid and as having the force of a *(vyāvahārika) pramāṇa (tha sñad pa'i tshad ma)*. The use of the *thal ba(r 'gyur ba)* or *prasaṅga* in Tsoṅ kha pa's school accordingly renders the expressions 'Conseqentialist' and 'Eventuationist' rather inadequate as a designation for Tsoṅ kha pa's Prāsaṅgika. The word 'Apagogist' is perhaps also not altogether satisfactory; and a *prasaṅga*-type argument is not a *reductio ad impossibile/absurdum* in the sense that all opposed views are refuted in order that the proponent's own counter-view remains as the sole correct one (by *pāriśeṣya*) (see Section II, p. 137 note 41 above). In the circumstances, it is probably best to retain the designations Svātantrika (= Tib. Raṅ rgyud pa) and Prāsaṅgika (retranslated from Tib. Thal 'gyur ba) even though they are unattested in available Sanskrit works as names for two of the main schools of the Madhyamaka.

[12] Nāgārjuna's arguments are for example regularly based on the principles →

Mādhyamika towards a *pramāṇa*-system might seem to have been blocked by Nāgārjuna's critique and dissolution, in his *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, of the epistemological relation existing between a cognition/cognizer and a cognizable/cognized object, that is, the *pramāṇa-prameya* relation. Nāgārjuna summed up his discussion by saying (*VV* 50):

> *nâiva svataḥ prasiddhir, na parasparataḥ, parapramāṇair vā/*
> *na bhavati, na ca prameyair, na câpy akasmāt pramāṇānām//*
>
> 'There is no [hypostatic] establishment of [reified] *pramāṇa*s from themselves, or from each other mutually, or from other *pramāṇa*s, or again by means of [their reified] *prameya*s, or yet for no reason at all.'[13]

And the set of seer (*draṣṭṛ*), seeing (*darśana*) and the visible (*draṣṭavya*) has been analysed in detail and dissolved by Nāgārjuna in Chap. iii of his *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*s, just after his no less radical analysis and deconstruction in Chap. ii of the triad of mover (*gantṛ*), moved on (*gantavya, gata*) and movement (*gati, gamana*).[14]

Moreover, in his *Vigrahavyāvartanī* (29) Nāgārjuna has explicitly disowned any propositional thesis or assertion (*pratijñā*) in the context of his rejection of the hypostatic existence of any reified entity (*bhāva*) endowed with (positive or even negative) self-existence (*svabhāva* 'aseitas'):

> *yadi kācana pratijñā syān me tata eṣa me bhaved doṣaḥ/*

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of contradiction and the excluded middle. And there is little sign here of a 'logic' specific to mysticism, at least of the sort often ascribed to Buddhism (see the discussion by F. Staal, *Exploring mysticism* [Berkeley, 1975], p. 32 ff., on so-called 'Buddhist irrationalism'). For the use of the description 'mysticism' in relation to Nāgārjuna, compare above, p. 233 note 2.

[13] Nāgārjuna's deconstruction of the standard epistemological model founded on a dichotomous (or trichotomous) set of terms was in keeping with the emphasis placed in the Prajñāpāramitā literature on the dissolution, or soteriological 'purification', of the *trimaṇḍala* – e.g. a donor, a beneficiary of the gift and an act of giving.

[14] Or even – based by paronomasia on the meaning 'to know' of the root *gam-* – of the triad of knower, known and knowing.

> *nâsti ca mama pratijñā tasmān nâivâsti me doṣaḥ*||
>
> 'If I had some *pratijñā*, this fallacy [of my statement being unreal and empty, as alleged by the opponent in *VV* 4] would, as a consequence, be mine;[15] but for me there is no *pratijñā*, so that this fallacy is not mine.'

Indeed, as said in the *Ratnāvalī* (ii.4), from a position (*pakṣa*) there arises a counterposition (*pratipakṣa*), but neither obtains in fact (*arthatas*).[16]

Nāgārjuna's critique of reified entities and their supposed connexion in a *pramāṇa-prameya* relation was confirmed and fully supported by Candrakīrti – a successor in time of Dignāga and probably a contemporary of Dharmakīrti (neither of whom is however explicitly named by Candrakīrti in his *Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛttiḥ*).[17] In the introduction to his *PPMV*, Candrakīrti has indeed continued Nāgārjuna's criticism of the *pramāṇaprameyavyavahāra* posited in terms of a cognizable entity only requiring (a valid means of) correct knowledge (*pramāṇādhīna*) in order to be known in any individual case (pp. 58-59), or of a defining characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) in relation to its specific referent (*lakṣya*).[18]

Candrakīrti sums up his discussion of the *pramāṇa-prameya* relation in his *PPMV* on *MK* i.1 as follows (p. 75):

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[15] viz. the defect of insubstantiality and hence non-cogency previously mentioned by the opponent at the beginning of the *VV* and based on Nāgārjuna's having said that all entities are empty.

[16] Compare also the *Ratnāvalī* i.72 on the complementarity of (hypostatic) *astitva* and *nāstitā*. And see Ārya Deva, *Catuḥśataka* xvi.21-22 on *hetu*, example and *pakṣa*. – Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, 'The uses of the four positions of the *catuṣkoṭi*' in: *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 5 (1977), pp. 1-71, and Section II above.

[17] For an explicit reference to Dignāga by Candrakīrti, see his *Bhāṣya* on verse 3 of the final part of the *Madhyamakāvatāra*. Dignāga is of course clearly the object of Candrakīrti's discussions in *PPMV* i.1, pp. 35, 58 f., 68 f.

[18] *PPMV* i.1, pp. 59-60; cf. for example *MK* v.4. On *pramāṇa* and *prameya*, see also *PPMV* i.1, pp. 68-69, 73-75.

> 'These are established in mutual dependence (*parasparāpekṣā*): [that is, there exist] objects of right knowledge (*prameya*) when there exist means of right knowledge (*pramāṇa*), and [there exist] means of right knowledge when objects of right knowledge exist. But it is indeed not the case that there is a self-existent establishment (*svābhāvikī prasiddhiḥ*) of *pramāṇa* and *prameya*. Let there be, therefore, only the worldly (*laukika*) [i.e. transactional-pragmatic convention of ordinary folk] that conforms with what is known by experience (*yathādṛṣṭam*) ... The Blessed Buddhas teach the Dharma taking their stand in a view that is only worldly (*laukika eva darśane sthitvā buddhānāṃ bhagavatāṃ dharmadeśanā*).'

Given Nāgārjuna's radical analysis and deconstruction in successive chapters of his *Madhyamakakārikās* of the dyads and triads of reified entities involved in the notions of moving or seeing, etc., and of his seemingly even more radical critique and dissolution in his *Vigrahavyāvartanī* of both the (hypostatic) *pramāṇa-prameya*-system and of all propositional assertions postulating (reified) entities, the question indeed arises as to whether a Mādhyamika could accommodate either logic or epistemology.

3. THE STATUS OF THE THESIS *(pratijñā)* IN THE MADHYAMAKA

In the previous Section (II, § 2) it was shown how Candrakīrti – without going back on what Nāgārjuna in his *Vigrahavyāvartanī* (29-30) and Ārya-Deva in his *Catuḥśataka* (xvi.25) had said about the Mādhyamika's eschewing a propositional, assertoric *pratijñā* or *pakṣa* involving reified entities – has actually analysed several of Nāgārjuna's *Kārikās* in terms of a full five-membered formal argument (consisting of a *pratijñā* 'thesis, proposition', a *liṅga* = *hetu* '[inferential] reason', a *dṛṣṭānta* 'example, instance', an *upanaya* 'application', and a *nigamana* 'conclusion'; see *PPMV* i.1, pp. 14-21; see also below, § 4, on *MK* iii.2). And an attempt has also been made in the preceding Section to explain why, even for a Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika such as Candrakīrti, this procedure is not inconsistent with the basic principles of his school and why it was not consid-

ered philosophically flawed. For it appears that what Nāgārjuna had rejected was not *any* and *every* philosophical statement, thesis or position whatsoever – several are in fact found in his works – but, specifically, any propositional thesis, assertion or formal probative argument either presupposing or explicitly positing a reified self-existent *bhāva* such as is describable in terms of the hypostatization of any of the four positions of a tetralemma (*pakṣacatuṣṭaya, catuṣkoṭi*).[19]

This is, briefly stated, the position of the Tibetan Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika master Tsoṅ kha pa and his followers. For one of their major philosophical points is that the Mādhyamika does indeed have a thesis (*dam bca'* = *pratijñā*) and position (*phyogs* = *pakṣa*), and that he may employ inferences (*rjes su dpag pa* = *anumāna*) – and even formal probative arguments (*sbyor ba, sbyor ba'i ṅag* = *prayoga[vākya]*) – provided that these *anumāna*s and *prayogavākya*s are not 'autonomous' (*raṅ rgyud pa* = *svatantra*) ones like the Svātantrika's. That is, they must avoid the ontic and logico-epistemological pitfalls into which Bhavya was thought by his critics since Candrakīrti to have fallen in his understandable, but nevertheless vain, attempt to develop 'autonomous' *anumāna*s and *prayogavākya*s with the aim of protecting from attack the points on which (as he thought) Buddhapālita had left himself, and the Mādhyamika, exposed.

The question is, then, how this synthesis was achieved by Tsoṅ kha pa in the face of Nāgārjuna's and Candrakīrti's critique of the *pramāṇa/prameya* dyad, as well as of any *anumāna* or *prayogavākya* having as their subject (*dharmin* 'property-possessor' or qualificand) an entity established as existent by a *pramāṇa*, acknowledged in common (*ubhaya[vādipra]siddha* : *mthun snaṅ du grub pa*) by both parties to a discussion, and thus able (according to usually accepted rules of dialectics and disputation or eristics [*vāda*]) to function as a mutually agreed subject of inference in a debate.[20]

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[19] See also D. Seyfort Ruegg, 'The uses of the four positions of the *catuṣkoṭi* and the problem of the description of reality in Mahāyāna Buddhism' (cited above, p. 243 note 16).

[20] cf. *PPMV* i.1, p. 35.5-6; cf. p. 18.6.

Compare Dignāga's autocommentary on his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* iii.11-12 (*gñis ka la grub chos de las/ /tha sñad yin phyir gñis ka la'am/ /gaṅ yaṅ* →

In the following study of the problem, the main works by Tsoṅ kha pa to be used will be the *Lam rim chen mo* (completed in the author's 46th year [1402]), the *Draṅ ṅes Legs bšad sñiṅ po* (or *gSuṅ rab kyi draṅ ba daṅ ṅes pa'i don rnam par phye ba gsal bar byed pa*, composed in the author's 52nd year [1408]), the commentary on Nāgārjuna's *MK* (the *rNam bšad Rigs pa'i rgya mtsho* or *rTsa še ṭīk chen*, said to have been

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ruṅ ba la bzlog pa'am/ /the tshom chos grub 'dod ma yin//...) on what constitutes proof and disproof: *ya eva tûbhayaviniścitavācī [hetuḥ] sa sādhanaṃ, dūṣaṇaṃ vā, nânyataraprasiddhasaṃdigdhavācī (gaṅ žig gaṅ gñis ka la ṅes pa brjod pa ni sgrub pa'am sun 'byin pa yin gyi/ gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ ba la grub pa'am the tshom za ba smra ba ni ma yin no)* (cf. S. Katsura, 'Inmyō shōrimonron kenkyū – 1', in: *Hiroshima Daigaku Bungakubu Kiyō* 37 [1977], pp. 125-6 [on *Nyāyamukha* 2.4], who corrects to *nânyatarāprasiddha°*). For this see further Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇavārttika-Svavṛtti* 290 (ed. Gnoli, p. 153.19-20) and 18 (p. 13.17), as well as Tsoṅ kha pa, *LRChM*, ff. 420a (= p. 697), 433b (= p. 719). See in addition G. Tucci, *The Nyāyamukha of Dignāga* (Heidelberg, 1930), pp. 13-15, with the fragment *pakṣadharmo vādiprativādiniścito gṛhyate* (in: S. Katsura, 'Inmyō shōrimonron kenkyū – 1', *loc. cit.*, p. 122 [on *Nyāyamukha* 2.2]); Śaṃkarasvāmin, *Nyāyapraveśa* (ed. Dhruva), p. 3.11 ff.; Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇavārttika-Svavṛtti* 15 (*'dvayor' ity ekasiddhapratiṣedhaḥ/ 'prasiddha'-vacanena saṃdigdhayoḥ śeṣavadsādhāraṇayoḥ sapakṣavipakṣayor api*) with Karṇakagomin's *Ṭīkā*; *Pramāṇavārttika* iv.1 f.; *Pramāṇaviniścaya* ii.68, and iii quoted by Śāntarakṣita, *Vādanyāyaṭīkā (ekāprasiddhisaṃdehe...*, ed. Dvārikādās Śāstrī [Varanasi, 1972], p. 135); and *Nyāyabindu* iii.38 (*svarūpeṇaiva svayam iṣṭo 'nirākṛtaḥ pakṣa iti*), 42 (*svayam iti vādinā*), 54 (*...tenaiva svarūpeṇâbhimato vādina iṣṭo 'nirākṛtaḥ pakṣaḥ*), and 58 (*ubhayāsiddha*). – On the need for concordant *abhyupagama* in a genuine debate (which does not admit of mere *vitaṇḍā*: cf. above, p. 233 note 2, and below, § 8), see Dharmakīrti, *Vādanyāya*, pp. 60-61. – Cf. T. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist logic*, ii, p. 172 note; K. Potter, *Indian metaphysics and epistemology (Encyclopedia of Indian philosophies*, Princeton, 1977), pp. 195-6.

In his *LŠÑP*, f. 90a (= p. 486), Tsoṅ kha pa remarks (referring back to *PPMV*, pp. 34-35) that Dignāga too would need to recognize the sufficiency of the *anyataraprasiddha* form of formal probative argument because he has recognized the sufficiency of the *svaprasiddha* form in the cases of the *svārthānumāna* and *āgama(bādha)*.

composed within the year of the writing of the last work),[21] and finally his great comment on Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra*, the *dGoṅs pa rab gsal* (composed shortly before his death in the author's 62nd year [1418]).[22]

4. INFERENCE *(rjes su dpag pa = anumāna)* IN TSOṄ KHA PA'S MADHYAMAKA THOUGHT

To explain his position on this complex matter in his *Lam rim chen mo*[23], Tsoṅ kha pa has taken as his starting point what Nāgārjuna wrote in his *MK* iii.2cd:

> *(svam ātmānaṃ darśanaṃ hi tat tam eva na paśyati|)*
> *na paśyati yad ātmānaṃ kathaṃ drakṣyati tat parān||*
>
> '(This seeing indeed does not see its very own self.) How then will what [viz. the eye] does not see itself, see others [viz. *rūpa*

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[21] See mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzaṅ, *Dad pa'i 'jug ṅogs* (Varanasi ed. of 1966), p. 86; Dar han mkhan sprul Blo bzaṅ 'phrin las rnam rgyal, *rNam par thar pa thub bstan mdzes pa'i rgyan gcig ṅo mtshar nor bu'i phreṅ ba* (the *rNam thar chen mo*) (mTsho sṅon mi rigs dpe skrun khaṅ ed. of 1984), pp. 295-6 and 303-04; and Blo bzaṅ tshul khrims, *bDe legs kun gyi 'byuṅ gnas*, v, f. 73a-b and f. 77b (where an account of the Ming emperor's invitation intervenes). These three works all mention the *Legs bšad sñiṅ po* before the *rTsa še ṭīk chen.* Tshe tan žabs druṅ in his *bsTan rtsis kun las btus pa* (mTsho sṅon mi rigs dpe skrun khaṅ ed. of 1982), p. 212, has placed the *rTsa še ṭīk chen* in 1407, and the *Legs bšad sñiṅ po* in 1408. But the *rTsa še ṭīk chen* itself refers (f. 34a4 = p. 57) to the *Legs bšad sñiṅ po.*

[22] Between the treatments of our topic in these works of Tsoṅ kha pa some differences are to be found, to which the author has himself on occasion called attention. See e.g. *LŠÑP*, f. 88b (= p. 484-485), on a difference from the *LRChM* (cf. below, p. 280 note 77). In Tsoṅ kha pa's final *lam rim*-text, the *Lam rim chuṅ ba* composed in 1415, there is no detailed treatment of the present topic.

[23] *LRChM*, f. 419a ff. (= p. 695), especially f. 429a ff. (= p. 711 ff.).

such as the blue]?'[24]

In Tsoṅ kha pa's analysis, the terms of this question comprise the subject or *dharmin* (the qualificand or locus: eye), the (negated) qualifying property or *sādhyadharma* (the probandum: not seeing visible matter such as the blue), and an inferential reason or *sādhanadharma* (the probans: because of [the eye's] not seeing itself). In other words, Nāgārjuna's statement is construed as an inference (*anumāna*) made up, in the standard way, of a *dharmin (gži chos can)*, a property (*dharma*) to be negated *(dgag bya'i chos)*, and an inferential sign (*liṅga* = *rtags* or *hetu* = *gtan tshigs*).

Now, very clearly, Tsoṅ kha pa did not claim in his analysis given here to be innovating, for he quotes the explanation of Nāgārjuna's rhetorical question given by Candrakīrti in the first chapter of his *Prasannapadā*. There we in fact read (p. 34.6-10):

> 'Having supposed (*pratipanna*) [the proposition] "The eye sees an other" [i.e. visible matter (*rūpa*) such as the blue, even though it does not see itself] <[the Substantialist oponent] is confuted by just the inference acknowledged by him[self]>; and they who maintain [also (*kyaṅ*)] the quality of [the eye's] not seeing itself [on the other hand still] accept a regular concomitance (*avinābhāvitva*) with the quality of [the eye's] see-

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[24] At this point it should be made clear that the negation suggested in Nāgārjuna's rhetorical question in *MK* iii.2 – an utterance in which, according to Candrakīrti and Tsoṅ kha pa, there is embedded the negative inference 'an [entity, i.e. eye] which does not see itself does not see an other [entity, viz. visible matter such as the blue]' (see below) – relates to a cognizer/cognized dyad made up of independent and self-existent substantial entities. Next, in *MK* iii.3, Nāgārjuna shows that fire – thought of as consuming both its fuel and also itself – cannot serve as a counter-instance validating the substantialist model of seeing that he was criticizing; for it is dissolved according to the method that was applied to movement in Chap. ii. (Cf. *LRChM*, f. 432a = p. 716.) The empirical and pragmatic-transactional fact of seeing as such – in which hypostatic entities conceived of as possessing self-existence play no part and are not postulated – is certainly not being denied here.

> ing an other [such as the blue].[25] Therefore, [in reply, the following formal probative inference was formulated by Nāgārjuna in *MK* iii.2:] Wherever self is not seen, there an other is not seen either, as in the case of a pot; now, for the eye, there is no seeing itself; hence, for it, there is indeed (*eva*) no seeing of an other either (*api*). So, [the eye's] seeing of an other such as the blue, which conflicts (*viruddha*) with [its] not seeing itself, is controverted (*virudhyate*) by an inference acknowledged by oneself (*svaprasiddhenaivânumānena*).'[26]

It is to be observed that in so unpacking Nāgārjuna's statement in *MK* iii.2cd Candrakīrti has in effect set up a five-membered formal argument made up of (1) a thesis or proposition (*pratijñā, pakṣa*) together with (2) an inferential reason (*liṅga* = *hetu*), (3) an instance (*dṛṣṭānta*: '... as in the case of a pot'),[27] (4) an application (*upanaya*: 'now ...'), and (5) a conclusion (*nigamana*: 'hence ...').

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[25] The words within pointed brackets have no equivalent in the Tibetan translation (D, G, N and P). La Vallée Poussin's edition of the Sanskrit text reads: *tathā hi| paraṃ cakṣuḥ paśyatîti pratipannaḥ sa tatprasiddhenaivânumānena nirākriyate, cakṣuṣaḥ svātmādarśanadharmāvinābhāvitvaṃ câṅgīkṛtam icchasi* [? for: *icchati*, or rather for *icchadbhiḥ* as in de Jong's note ad locum in *IIJ* 20 (1978), p. 32?] *paradarśanadharmāvinābhāvitvaṃ câṅgīkṛtam*. The Tibetan version reads: *'di ltar gžan mig (b)lta'o žes bya bar rtog pa de ni mig la raṅ gi bdag ñid mi (b)lta ba'i chos kyaṅ 'dod la| gžan la (b)lta ba'i chos med na mi 'byuṅ ba ñid du yaṅ khas blaṅs pa yin te.*

[26] i.e., by the Substantialist opponent (see the note by Bra ti dGe bšes in the annotated edition of the *LRChM*, kha, f. 287b4).

[27] In his comment on *MK* iii.2, Candrakīrti has instead used the example of an ear, etc.: *śrotrādivat*.

5. *Svatantra-anumāna* AS PROBATIVE INFERENCE, *prasaṅgāpādana* AS APAGOGIC REASONING, AND THE PROBLEM OF MUTUAL AGREEMENT (*ubhaya[pra]siddhatva*)

A basic logical and epistemological objection on the part of the Prāsaṅgikas to Bhavya's *svatantra-anumāna* was that it constituted an attempt by this Svātantrika philosopher to gain a common logical-epistemological ground mutually acknowledged by the Mādhyamika – who is by definition a *niḥsvabhāvavādin* – and his Substantialist (*dṅos por smra ba : vastusatpadārthavādin*[28]) opponent, so that a discussion and debate might be meaningfully and regularly conducted between them according to established rules of debate which required, *inter alia*, that the logical reason of an *anumāna* or *prayogavākya* should reside in a subject (*dharmin = chos can*) acknowledged as really established (*siddha*) by both sides.

According to Candrakīrti and his followers, any such attempt is vain and doomed to failure. For however hard the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika might try to gain such commonly agreed ground, the basic differences in philosophical presuppositions between the Substantialist – for whom the terms of his *anumāna* and *prayogavākya* of course have hypostatic self-existence (*svabhāva*, 'aseitas') and are grounded in a theory of reified entities identified as *prameya*s to which correspond the appropriate *pramāṇa*s – and the Mādhyamika – for whom all *dharma*s are on the contrary without self-existence (*niḥsvabhāva*) so that there can be no system of reified *bhāva*s or *prameya*s – preclude the existence of any such common ground agreed by both parties. In other words, according to the (Prāsaṅgika-)Mādhyamika, there exists no *hypostatized entity* established by a reified *pramāṇa* as having self-existence which could be acknowledged in common (*ubhaya[pra]siddha : mthun snaṅ du grub pa*) between

[28] The term *vastusatpadārthavādin* is attested in Haraprasād Śhāstrī (ed.), *Catuḥśatikā by Arya Deva*, Memoirs of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Vol. iii, No. 8 [Calcutta, 1914], p. 492.13 [on *Catuḥśataka* xi.11]).

the *vādin* and the *prativādin*.[29]

The Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika's solution to this problem is, according to Candrakīrti, to make use in philosophical discussion and debate with the Substantialist of inferences whose effect is solely to negate the opponent's assertion, but which do not at the same time involve him in setting up on his own part an autonomous inference (*svatantra anumāna*) (*PPMV* i.1, p. 34). This is the technique known to the Mādhyamika as *prasaṅgāpādana (PPMV* i.1, p. 24.5, and xxi.2, p. 411.7) – or *prasaṅgāpatti* (*PPMV* i.1, p. 24.7) – and defined in the *PPMV* (pp. 24 and 34) as simply resulting in the negation of another's thesis (*parapratijñāpratiṣedhamātraphala*).[30]

Concerning the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika's *prasaṅgāpādana* as used by Candrakīrti, it was doubtless distinct from, and quite independent of, Dharmakīrti's hypothetical negative reasoning (*prasaṅga*) (and *a fortiori* of the fully developed *prasaṅgasādhana* 'hypothetical proof', and the *sgrub byed 'phen pa'i thal 'gyur*).[31]

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[29] See also Candrakīrti's *Vṛtti* on *Catuḥśataka* xvi.21-22 for a rejection of the *svatantra-liṅga* in connexion with a discussion of Dharmapāla's doctrine.

[30] As opposed, e.g., to the usual categoric, probative *sādhana* using a *svatantra-hetu* (or to the technique of the *sādhyaviparyaye [hètor] bādhakapramāṇam*, on which see below, § 14).

[31] For Dharmakīrti's *prasaṅga* or negative reasoning comprising a *reductio ad impossibile*, see *Pramāṇavārttika* iv.12-13 (where it is to be noted that the *sādhana* or *hetu* is *parakalpita* 'constructed by the opponent'). And for his *prasaṅgasādhana (thal ba bsgrub pa)* or hypothetical (quasi-)proof, see *Pramāṇaviniścaya* iii.2. – According to Manorathanandin's *Vṛtti* on *PV* iv.12-13, the *hetu* is not there *pāramārthika* because of the lack of *trairūpya*; and it is then the *prasaṅgaviparyaya* – the contrapositive of the *prasaṅga*-formula – that embraces the *maula(hetu)*. Compare Ratnakīrti, *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* (in *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī*, ed. A. Thakur [Patna, 1957], p. 64.5): *sarvaḥ prasaṅgaḥ prasaṅgaviparyayaniṣṭhaḥ*. For *prasaṅgasādhana*, etc., see p. 288 note 94.

Concerning the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika's *prasaṅgāpādana* or apagogic argument, it is actually not dependent on a Dharmakīrtian *svabhāvapratibandha* between *hetu* and *sādhya*. On the *svabhāvapratibandha*, see e.g. →

6. *Prasaṅgavākya, prakṛtārthaviparyaya, prasaṅgaviparītārthāpatti* AND THE USE OF *prasajya-pratiṣedha* IN THE *prasaṅga*-STATEMENT OF NON-ORIGINATION IN THE MADHYAMAKA

In regard to Buddhapālita's *prasaṅgavākyas*, in Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* on *MK* i.1 there are found allusions to a reversal of an original *prasaṅga*-type proposition (*prakṛtārthaviparyaya*, p. 15.1; D, f. 5b: *skabs kyi don las bzlog pa*) that leads to the emergence of a probandum and its *dharma* (i.e. the *sādhanadharma*) having a reversed meaning (*viparītārthasādhyataddharmavyakti*, p. 15.1; D 5b: *bsgrub pa bya ba daṅ de'i chos bzlog pa'i don mṅon pa*); to a *prasaṅgaviparītārtha* (p. 23.3; D, f. 7b-8a: *thal bar 'gyur ba bzlog pa'i don*) and to the eventual arising of many faults for the opponent owing to the occurrence (or: 'realization', according to the Tibetan version) of the reversal of the *prasaṅga* (*prasaṅgaviparītāpatti*, p. 23.4; D, f. 8a: *thal ba las bzlog pa bsgrubs pa*); to a *prasaṅgaviparītārthāpatti* (p. 24.5; D, f. 8a); and, lastly, to *sādhyasādhanaviparyaya* (pp. 36-37) and *viparītasādhyasādhanavyaktivākyārtha* (pp. 38-39).

It is to be noted that these allusions in Candrakīrti's *PPMV* to a reversal of the *prasaṅga* refer back to objections raised by Bhavya against Buddhapālita's procedure. In the *Prajñāpradīpa*,[32] Bhavya's objections were based on the fact that Buddhapālita's statements were *prasaṅgavākyas* (*thal 'gyur ba'i tshig* in the Tibetan translation of the *PPMV*), i.e. that they were (in Bhavya's opinion) exposed or assailable (*glags yod*

Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇaviniścaya* ii (ed. E. Steinkellner [Vienna, 1973], pp. *10, *40, *46 (cf. Steinkellner's translation [Vienna, 1979], p. 44 note 111). Cf. E. Steinkellner, *WZKS* 15 (1971), p. 202, and *Acta indologica* 6 (1984), pp. 457-76; S. Matsumoto, *IBK* 30/1 (1981), pp. 498-494; S. Katsura, *IBK* 35/1 (1986), pp. 476-473.

[32] *PP* i.1, ed. Walleser, pp. 11-12, 14, 23-24. – The sentence *de ltar na 'dir glags yod pa'i tshig yin pa'i phyir| skabs kyi don dgag pa nus śiṅ bzlog pa'i don gsal ba'i tshig gi don to* – which is parallel to what we read in the *PP* on *MK* i.1 (p. 11, cited in the *PPMV*, pp. 14-15) – appears in *PP* on *MK* ii.18-19 (ed. Walleser, p. 80). See above, p. 235 note 4.

pa'i tshig, as rendered in the Tibetan version of the *Prajñāpradīpa*) – which Avalokitavrata has interpreted (P 86a, D 74a2) as meaning that they are open to objection from the (Sāṃkhya) opponent (*rgol ba gžan gyi klan ka'i glags yod pa'i tshig*).[33] Candrakīrti nevertheless states that a connexion with the 'reversed proposition' holds only for the opponent, and not for his own school because it has no thesis (*PPMV*, p. 23: *prasaṅgaviparītena cârthena parasyâiva sambandho, nâsmākaṃ, sva-pratijñāyā abhāvāt*). And he adds that when a *prasaṅga* is adduced by the *niḥsvabhāvavādin* against a *sasvabhāvavādin*, there is no reason that a reversed *prasaṅga*-proposition should eventuate (*PPMV*, p. 24.2-3: *prasaṅga āpadyamāne kutaḥ prasaṅgaviparītārthaprasaṅgitā*). Candra-kīrti then observes that since *prasaṅgāpādana* has as its result simply the negation of the opponent's *pratijñā*, there exists no occasion for a re-versed *prasaṅga*-proposition.[34]

Candrakīrti does not seem to have accepted on his own account the reversal of a *prasaṅga* (much less its contraposition, i.e. *prasaṅgavi-paryaya*) either elsewhere in the first chapter of the *Prasannapadā* or in any other chapter of this work. As for Bhavya's objection to Buddha-pālita's *prasaṅga*-statement, it apparently involves the idea not of contra-position but of implicative reversal, namely that a negation of production from self would imply the affirmation of production from an other.[35]

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[33] cf. Tsoṅ kha pa, *NŠRG*, f. 31a-b (= p. 52); and mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzaṅ, *TThCh*, ff. 170b-171a. For Avalokitavrata's explanation, cf. Y. Kaji-yama, *WZKSO* 7 (1963), p. 50.

[34] *PPMV* i.1, p. 24.5-6: *tataś ca parapratijñāpratiṣedhamātraphalatvāt pra-saṅgāpādanasya nâsti prasaṅgaviparītārthāpattiḥ*. The Tibetan translation reads (D, f. 8a): *de'i phyir thal ba sgrub pa ni pha rol po'i dam bca' la 'gog pa tsam gyi 'bras bu can yin pa'i phyir thal ba las zlog pa'i don du 'gyur ba yod pa ma yin no*. Cf. *PPMV* i.1, p. 34.5.

[35] In his discussion of Bhavya's criticism of Buddhapālita's statement '*na svata utpadyante bhāvāḥ/ tadutpādavaiyārthyāt, atiprasaṅgadoṣāc ca/ na hi svātmanā vidyamānānāṃ padārthānāṃ punarutpāde prayojanam asti/ atha sann api jāyeta/ na kadācin na jāyeta//*' (cited in Candrakīrti's *PPMV*, p. 14), J. Hopkins – who has made use of the section on *bzlog don* and *thal ba bzlog pa 'phen pa* in the *dBu ma 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod* (Buxa ed., f. 241b2 f.) by →

'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa Ṅag dbaṅ brtson 'grus – has written (*Meditation on Emptiness* [London, 1983], p. 491):

> 'Bhāvaviveka saw the statement [by Buddhapālita] as indicating two consequences:
>
> 1. It follows that the subjects, things, are produced senselessly because of being produced from self.
> 2. It follows that the subjects, things, are produced endlessly because of being produced from self.
>
> When a consequence implies its opposite meaning, the negative of the reason in the consequence is put as the predicate in a syllogism, and the negative of the predicate in the consequencee is put as the reason in the syllogism. Bhāvaviveka saw these consequences as implying their opposite meaning:
>
> 1. The subjects, things, are not produced from self because their production is not senseless.
> 2. The subjects, things, are not produced from self because their production is not endless.
>
> Candrakīrti answers that Buddhapālita did not state such consequences at all, never mind intending to imply their opposite meaning. Instead, the two consequences should read:
>
> 1. It follows the subjects, things, are *produced again* senselessly because of being produced from self (or because of already existing in their own entities).
> 2. It follows that the subjects, things, are produced endlessly because of being produced from self (or because, although existing in their own entities, there is sense in their being produced again).'

The explanation given by Hopkins in his first paragraph amounts to a statement of contraposition. But the first two reasons adduced by Buddhapālita (*utpādavaiyarthyāt* and *atiprasaṅgadoṣāt*) in fact remain reasons in the form in which they appear in Bhavya's text, even if the reason 'because of futility' has indeed been converted there to 'because of usefulness' (i.e. *janmasāphalya* in the *PPMV*) and the reason 'because of over-extension' (viz. because of being endless) has been converted there to 'because of having an end' (i.e *janmanirodha* in the *PPMV*), so that (according to Bhavya) →

Now, the type of negation operating in Nāgārjuna's rejection, in *MK* i.1, of origination of an (hypostatized) entity (*bhāva*) from itself, from an other, from both, and from no cause at all has been described by both Bhavya (*PP*, p. 10.8) and Candrakīrti (*PPMV*, p. 13.5) as *prasajyapratiṣedha* (*med [par] dgag [pa]*), that is, as a negation that is non-implicative

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Buddhapālita will be in contradiction with the Madhyamaka *siddhānta* (*PP*, p. 12.2-3: *skye ba 'bras bu daṅ bcas pa ñid du 'gyur ba daṅ skye ba thug pa yod par 'gyur ba'i phyir mdzad pa'i mtha' daṅ 'gal bar 'gyur ro*). For, if one assumes that the negation here is of the *paryudāsa* kind rather than *prasajyapratiṣedha*, the proponent of the formula in question will have to maintain that entities originate from an other (see below, p. 256 and p. 264 note 47). So, not only has Buddhapālita's negated thesis 'Entities *are not* produced' been changed in Bhavya's text into a positive statement 'Entities *are* produced', but, in addition, the specification 'from *self*' has been altered there to 'from *an other*' (see below). In other words, in the text of the *PP* (and also in Hopkins's formulation of the consequences he has numbered 1 and 2), no contraposition in the proper sense is to be found. As far as the present writer can detect, then, the question of contraposition or *prasaṅga-viparyaya* in the technical sense was to be raised in connexion with Bhavya's and Candrakīrti's passage dealing with *prakṛtārthaviparyaya* and *prasaṅga-viparītārtha* only in later discussions of the logical questions it poses – though Tsoṅ kha pa for example has expressly given as his view that Buddhapālita's particular *prasaṅgavākya* in question here is, exceptionally, *not* susceptible of contraposition (see below, § 7). (However, on a quite different use of contraposition by Tsoṅ kha pa in engendering the Madhyamaka theory of non-substantiality, see below, § 14.)

See also T. Tillemans, 'Tsoṅ kha pa *et al.* on the Bhāvaviveka-Candrakīrti debate', in: *Tibetan Studies*, i (Narita, 1992), pp. 316-26. In his interpretation of *PPMV* i, p. 13 ff., Tillemans also adopted the idea of contraposition even though he very aptly pointed out that this concept is in fact not used by several of his Indian and Tibetan sources, and despite the fact that the passages he quoted (p. 323) from Tsoṅ kha pa's *GR* and *NŠRG* indeed contain no contraposition of the sort Tillemans correctly formulated on p. 318 of his article when these passages explain the *thal chos bzlog pa'i don* = *prasaṅga-viparītārtha* in Candrakīrti's text.

and non-presuppositional. This is absolute (or 'weak', i.e. 'it is not the case that ...') negation. And unlike relative (or 'strong') negation (*paryudāsa = ma yin [par] dgag [pa]*) – which is implicative and presuppositional inasmuch as it both commits one to holding the opposite of the statement one has negated and postulates the real existence of the thing to which the negated predicate(s) attach(es) – the *prasajyapratiṣedha* does not, then, presuppose the existence of reified *bhāva*s which could meaningfully be said to originate in terms of any of the four above-mentioned positions of the *catuṣkoṭi* 'tetralemma' (*pakṣacatuṣṭaya*), and above all it does not allow the implication that by negating origination from self one is committed to postulating origination from an other.

In his discussion of Buddhapālita's statement '*na svata utpadyante bhāvāḥ ...*' (p. 11), Bhavya (*PP*, pp. 11-12, cited in *PPMV*, p. 14) has nonetheless criticized his (proto-)Prāsaṅgika predecessor's formula on the ground that – since it is formally what is termed a *prasaṅgavākya (thal bar 'gyur ba'i tshig ~ glags yod pa'i tshig = sāvakāśavacana)* – a probandum and probans with 'reversed' (*viparīta*) meaning will emerge through a reversal (*viparyaya = bzlog pa*) of the meaning in question in the first *pratijñā* of *MK* i.1 (*PP*, p. 11, cited in *PPMV* p. 15.1: *prasaṅgavākyatvāc ca prakṛtārthaviparyayeṇa viparītārthasādhyataddharmavyaktau*), namely that birth in the form of origination from an other will both have usefulness (*janmasāphalya*) and not be endlessly repeated (: *janmanirodha*). According to Bhavya, in virtue of this kind of reversal, a Mādhyamika like Buddhapālita will find himself in contradiction with his own established position (*kṛtāntavirodha*, *PP* i.1, p. 12).

However, as already noted above, according to Candrakīrti (*PPMV*, p. 23) a link with a meaning that is the reverse of the *prasaṅga* adduced by Buddhapālita against the Sāṃkhya opponent will in fact not affect the Mādhyamika and arises only for the opponent. This is because the Mādhyamika here has no thesis of his own (*svapratijñā*) – that is, he has negated (by *prasajyapratiṣedha*) all four conceivable positions concerning the origination of a *bhāva*, as stated in *MK* i.1. And for this reason – contrary to what Bhavya has objected against Buddhapālita's formulation – the (Prāsaṅgika-)Mādhyamika does not actually find himself in contradiction with his own *siddhānta*.

Candrakīrti moreover explains (*PPMV* i.1, p. 24) that Buddhapālita has not in fact formulated an assailable statement (*sāvakāśavacana = glags daṅ bcas pa'i tshig[s]*) in which the (Sāṃkhya) opponent will be

able to find an assailable weak point. This is the case according to Candrakīrti because, when the undesired hypothetical consequence is adduced (*prasaṅga āpadyamāne*) by the Niḥsvabhāvavādin against the Sasvabhāvavādin, there occurs no meaning that is the reverse of this *prasaṅga* (*prasaṅgaviparītārthaprasaṅgitā*). And this is so because it is on the intention (*vivakṣā = brjod par 'dod pa*) of the speaker (here Buddhapālita, following Nāgārjuna) that the use of words depends; for words are not as it were agents that could, like watchmen or policemen, overcome their utterer.[36] Candrakīrti sums the matter up (*PPMV*, p. 24) by stating that no meaning eventuates or follows (*prasañj-*) that is the reverse of the Mādhyamika's *prasaṅga* since his adducing of a *prasaṅga* results simply in the negation of the opponent's thesis.

7. TSOṄ KHA PA ON *bzlog don* AND *thal bzlog*: *prasaṅga*-REVERSAL (*prasaṅgaviparīta*) AND *prasaṅga*-CONTRAPOSITION (*prasaṅgaviparyaya*)

The position of some of the Tibetan Mādhyamikas appears more complicated. Tsoṅ kha pa has explicitly stated that the above-mentioned observation by Candrakīrti (*PPMV*, p. 23) concerning the connexion of the reversed statement with the opponent alone (and not with the Mādhyamika himself given the absence of a *svapratijñā*) does *not* signify that the reversal (*bzlog pa = viparyaya*) of *all* apagogic arguments (*prasaṅga*) adduced by the Mādhyamika are accepted only by the opponent to the exclusion of the Mādhyamika himself or that, in general (*spyir*), the Mādhyamika has no *pratijñā* at all.[37] And for Tsoṅ kha pa the references in the *Prasannapadā* to the reversal of a *prasaṅga* (*thal ba [las] bzlog pa* =

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[36] We know from Buddhapālita's discussion that he did not in fact accept any *viparītārtha* of his first *prasaṅga*, i.e. the proposition that a *bhāva* originates from an other.

[37] *NŠRG*, f. 32b (= p. 54): *gžun 'dis dbu ma pas thal ba 'phaṅs pa thams cad kyi bzlog pa pha rol pos khas len gyi raṅ gis khas mi len pa daṅ spyir dam bca' med par bstan pa ma yin no.* On this problem see above, Section II.

prasaṅgaviparīta) have in fact raised questions which prove to be of interest also to the historian of the Madhyamaka and its links with the Pramāṇa school.

In the context of his discussion on Candrakīrti's comment on *MK* i.1, Tsoṅ kha pa has observed that the *prasaṅgaviparītārtha* (which according to the Prāsaṅgikas does not occur for the adducer of the Mādhyamika's *prasaṅga* – the *thal ba 'phen mkhan*) would concern the twin consequences (*thal ba*) of the usefulness (*don bcas*) and non-endlessness (*thug bcas*) of renewed origination (*yaṅ skye ba* = *punarutpāda*) as supposed by the Sāṃkhya – but not, be it noted, of origination in general (*spyir skye ba*); and that, elsewhere, the logician does on the contrary operate with a meaning that is the reverse of the *prasaṅga (thal [bar 'gyur] ba bzlog pa'i don).*[38] Tsoṅ kha pa is here distinguishing between the par-

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[38] See *NŠRG*, ff. 32b-33a (= pp. 54-55); *GR*, f. 90a (= p. 163): ... *de ltar gsuṅs pa ni bdag skye 'gog pa'i skabs kho na yin pas/ dbu ma pas 'phaṅs pa'i thal ba kun la min gyi/ bdag skye 'gog pa'i thal ba gñis la yin no/ /de'i thal chos ni skye ba don med daṅ thug med du thal ba tsam min gyi/ slar yaṅ skye ba don med daṅ thug med yin la/ thal chos de bzlog pa'i don slar yaṅ skye ba don bcas daṅ thug bcas ni graṅs can kho na 'dod kyi/ raṅ la de'i dam bca' ba med pa'i rgyu mtshan gyis/ de khas blaṅs pa'i grub mtha' daṅ 'gal ba med ceś pa'i don te...*

The Tibetan tradition has inclined to use the expression *thal ba 'phen pa/'phaṅs pa (: prasaṅgam ākṣip-)* instead of *thal ba (b)sgrub pa (prasaṅgam āpāday-)* found in the *PPMV* and reproduced from there by Tsoṅ kha pa in his commentaries and treatises. Tsoṅ kha pa also has *thal chos bzlog pa'i don 'phen mkhan (NŠRG*, p. 55.10), *bzlog pa 'phaṅs pa* (p. 56.14)/*'phen pa* (p. 56.16), and *bzlog don 'phen pa (GR*, p. 164.3). (However, the *thal ba 'phen pa* to the extent that it belongs to the technique of *prasaṅgaviparyaya* or contraposition in the Pramāṇa-school is apparently distinct from the *thal ba (b)sgrub pa* belonging to Madhyamaka apagogic reasoning.)

On *prasaṅga*s that are *ākṣepaka* of a *sādhana (sgrub pa 'phen pa)* and those that are not *ākṣepaka* (*sgrub pa mi 'phen pa*), see for example Sras Ṅag dbaṅ bkra šis, *Tshad ma'i dgoṅs 'grel gyi bstan bcos chen po rnam 'grel gyi don gcig tu dril ba blo rab 'briṅ tha ma gsum du ston pa legs bšad chen po mkhas pa'i mgul rgyan skal bzaṅ re ba kun skoṅ* (bKra šis 'khyil ed.), f. →

ticular case of the two-fold *prasaṅga* implicit in *MK* i.1 – namely the faults of futility and endlessness cited by Buddhapālita in the course of his negation (p. 11) of the Sāṃkhya opponent's postulation of origination from self, etc. (referred to by Bhavya in *PP*, pp. 11-12, and by Candrakīrti, *PPMV*, p. 14) – on the one side, and on the other side the logical-epistemological status of *prasaṅga*-type statements in general (which are, apparently, susceptible of *viparyaya* or contrapositon).

Thus he has explained:[39]

> 'In Candrakīrti's statement '*niḥsvabhāvavādinā sasvabhāvavādinaḥ prasaṅga āpadyamāne kutaḥ prasaṅgaviparītārthaprasaṅgitā' (PPMV*, p. 24.2-3), it is not a question of the *prasaṅga* in general but of the two-fold *prasaṅga* negating origination from self [cited by Buddhapālita, p. 11] ... Therefore, [Candrakīrti's] statement '*tataś ca parapratijñāpratiṣedhamātraphalatvāt prasaṅgāpādanasya nâsti prasaṅgaviparītārthāpattiḥ' (PPMV*, p. 24.5-6) signifies that even though the above-mentioned *prasaṅga* [of Buddhapālita] does not prove (*sgrub pa*) absence of origination from self due to the logical arguments that repeated origination (*slar yaṅ skye ba*) – the

144b-148b. – Cf. T. Tani, *IBK* 32/2 (1984), pp. 1106-1100, and 36/1 (1987), pp. 481-472; id., '*Rang rgyud 'phen pa'i thal 'gyur*', in: *Tibetan sudies* (Narita, 1992), pp. 281-301; S. Onoda, 'Phya pa Chos kyi seṅ ge's classification of Thal 'gyur', *Berliner Indologische Studien* 2 (1986), pp. 65-68, and *Tibet Journal* 13 (1988), pp. 36-41; and T. Iwata, *Prasaṅga und prasaṅgaviparyaya bei Dharmakīrti und seinen Kommentatoren* (Vienna, 1993).

[39] *NŠRG*, f. 33a-b (= pp. 55-56): '*raṅ bžin med par smra bas raṅ bžin daṅ bcas par smra ba la thal ba sgrub pa na thal ba las bzlog pas don can du thal bar ga la 'gyur te/' žes pa yaṅ thal ba spyi min gyi bdag skye 'gog pa'i thal ba gñis so// ... de'i phyir 'thal ba sgrub ba ni gžan gyi dam bca' ba 'gog pa tsam gyi 'bras bu can yin pa'i phyir thal ba las bzlog pa'i don du 'gyur ba yod pa ma yin no' žes gsuṅs pa ni/ sṅar bšad pa'i thal ba des thal ba chos bzlog pa'i don slar yaṅ skye ba don daṅ thug bcas kyi rtags kyis bdag skye med pa mi sgrub kyaṅ dgos pa med pa min te/ graṅs can mi 'dod pa'i skye ba don daṅ thug med bsgrubs pas graṅs can gyis dam bcas pa'i bdag las skye ba ṙnam par bcad pa tsam žig sgrub pa'i dgos pa can yin pa'i phyir ro žes pa'i don no//*

meaning of the reversed predicate of the *prasaṅga* (*thal chos bzlog pa'i don*) – has [according to the Sāṃkhya opponent's thesis] usefulness and coming to an end, it nonetheless is not without a purpose. For it has the purpose of establishing the [Mādhyamika's] simple negative determination (*rnam par bcad pa tsam žig* 'exclusion' [i.e. the *med dgag* = *prasajya-pratiṣedha*]) of the origination from self accepted by the Sāṃkhya by means of establishing that this origination is both futile and endlessly repetitive.[40] Such is the purport.'

According to Tsoṅ kha pa, then, Candrakīrti's statement that *prasaṅgāpādana* results solely in the negation of another's *pratijñā* is to be interpreted in a special manner. That is, whereas the above-mentioned *prasaṅga* cannot directly *prove* the non-origination of a *bhāva* from itself in the manner of an autonomous (*svatantra*) inference, the statement is nevertheless not unmotivated. And this motivation lies precisely in establishing the *simple exclusion* of that origination from self asserted by the Sāṃkhya opponent by establishing the futility and infinite regress involved in such repeated origination, consequences which would of course be unacceptable to the Sāṃkhya too. Such simple exclusion (i.e. purely negative determination (*rnam par bcad pa* = *vyavaccheda*) thus correlates with non-presuppositional and non-implicative negation (*prasajya-pratiṣedha*). This *prasaṅga* has accordingly the function of an *apagogic reasoning* that points up a consequence undesired by the opponent.

Tsoṅ kha pa has next explained:[41]

'In adducing a *prasaṅga (thal ba 'phen pa)* having the form "If for a sprout one asserts existence by self-nature established in self-existence, this will not come about in dependence on a seed, for [*ex hypothesi* the sprout already] exists by self-exis-

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40 i.e., a fact that has not been accepted by the Sāṃkhya, but which has been pointed out by Buddhapālita.

41 *NŠRG*, f. 33b (= p. 56): *myu gu la raṅ gi ṅo bos grub pa'i raṅ bžin yod pa khas len pa na sa bon la brten nas 'byuṅ bar mi 'gyur te| raṅ gi ṅo bos yod pa'i phyir žes pa'i thal ba 'phen pa lta bu la ni brten nas 'byuṅ ba'i phyir myu gu la raṅ gi ṅo bos grub pa'i raṅ bžin med do žes thal chos bzlog pa rtags su byas nas thal rtags bzlog pa'i dam bca' sgrub pa šin tu maṅ ṅo||*

tence", the reverse (*viparīta*) of the predicate of the *prasaṅga (thal chos bzlog pa)* "There exists for a sprout no self-nature established in self-being, for it has originated in dependence (*pratītysamutpannatvāt*)" is treated as the logical reason. And there then exist many proofs of theses where the reason of the *prasaṅga (thal rtags bzlog pa'i dam bca')* is reversed.'[42]

In other words, for Tsoṅ kha pa, in the last case of the *prasaṅga* that concerns the sprout, the process will consist not only in *apagogically* establishing a (hypothetical) consequence (as already noted for *MMK* i.1), but, evidently, in doing so by relying on *contraposition* of the original *prasaṅga*-type statement; Tsoṅ kha pa has however specified that the adducing of a *viparyaya (bzlog pa 'phaṅs pa)* does *not* constitute an 'autonomous' (i.e. *svatantra*) *viparyaya* (*bzlog pa raṅ rgyud*, f. 33b4 [= p. 56.15]). And he has concluded that there are two distinct kinds of *prasaṅga*-type reasoning, one of which allows of *viparyaya* in the sense of contraposition whereas the other (the one in question in *MK* i.1) does not.[43] Moreover, although the Mādhyamika admits (*khas len pa = abhyupagam-)* the establishment of a probandum (*bsgrub bya sgrub byed = sādhyasādhana*) belonging to his own system (*raṅ lugs = svamata*), this is not, according to Tsoṅ kha pa, equivalent to the Mādhyamika's admitting a *svatantra-sādhyasādhana* (as Bhavya and the Svātantrikas would have him do).[44] And Tsoṅ kha pa insists that Candrakīrti's saying

[42] i.e., is negated and functions by contraposition as the predicate in a *prasaṅgaviparyaya.*

[43] It would indeed appear that the three arguments *a contrario* that Candrakīrti has quoted in his *PPMV*, p. 24-25, from the *MK* – namely v.1, iv.2 and xxv.4 – and containing the expression *prasajyate* or *prasajyeta*, and which he has described as involving *prasaṅgāpatti*, are susceptible of *viparyaya*. See Tsoṅ kha pa, *NŠRG*, p. 129.7-8 (on *MK* iv.2): *bzlog pa 'phen pa.*

[44] *NŠRG*, f. 33b (= p. 56): *de ni bzlog pa 'phaṅs pa yin kyaṅ bzlog pa raṅ rgyud 'phaṅs pa min žiṅ thal ba la yaṅ bzlog pa 'phen pa daṅ mi 'phen pa gñis yod do/ /des na raṅ lugs sgrub pa'i sgrub bya sgrub byed khas len kyaṅ raṅ rgyud kyi bsgrub bya sgrub byed khas len pa min no//*

Tsoṅ kha pa evidently considers that the Mādhyamika may use a contra- →

(*PPMV*, p. 23.3) that the *prasaṅgaviparītārtha* affects only the opponent, but not the Mādhyamika because the latter has no *pratijñā* of his own, should not be taken to signify that the Mādhyamika does not accept (*khas len pa*) any *viparyaya* of all formulations of a *prasaṅga* (*thal na 'phaṅs pa thams cad kyi bzlogs pa*) and that, *in general*, he has no *pratijñā* at all (*spyir dam bca' med pa*). For further discussion of this point – which Tsoṅ kha pa describes as very difficult to comprehend – he refers (f. 54a4 = p. 57) to the treatment of it in his *Draṅ ṅes legs bšad sñiṅ po*.[45]

It appears that Tsoṅ kha pa's treatment here of the *prasaṅga* and its *viparyaya* draws on developments in logic that were probably unknown to (or at least unexploited or deliberately passed over by) Candrakīrti. For while Tsoṅ kha pa – perhaps influenced by the Tibetan translation of Candrakīrti's expression *prasaṅgaviparītārtha* by *thal bar 'gyur ba bzlog pa'i don* – introduces into his discussion the question of the contraposed *prasaṅgaviparyaya*, it would seem that Candrakīrti had in mind only the reversal of a *prasaṅga* whereby the negation of origination from self might (wrongly) be thought to imply the affirmation of origination from an other. Thus, at *PPMV* p. 15.1, he has referred to a *prakṛtārthaviparyayena viparītārthasādhyataddharmavyakti* (*skabs kyi don las bzlog*

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posed form of the *prasaṅga* that has as its logical reason the fact that things originate in dependence (*pratītyasamutpanna*), which he adduces against the Sāṃkhya in order formally to ground an assertion which is founded on the implication of the Sāṃkhya doctrine of *satkāryavāda* but which is in fact unacceptable to the Sāṃkhya as well as to the Mādhyamika. That is, the Mādhyamika induces in the Sāṃkhya a recognition that the contraposed form of the *prasaṅga* originally adduced against him by the Mādhyamika is equally unacceptable to him (the Sāṃkhya). This move compels the Sāṃkhya to realize the inconsistency in his assertion of the *satkāryavāda*; for the *prasaṅgaviparyaya* in question involves a hypothetical consequence that even the Sāṃkhya cannot accept, namely that a sprout exists independently of its seed.

On *pratītyasamutpanna* in a *paraprasiddha-anumāna*, see *LŠÑP*, f.90a-b (= p. 487).

[45] *NŠRG*, f. 32b (= p. 54.18-20), quoted on p. 257 note 37 above. See above, Section II, § 16.

pas bsgrub par bya ba daṅ de'i chos bzlog pa'i don mṅon pa) and given as an example the proposition *parasmād utpannā bhāvāḥ* ('Entities originating from an other') as the *reverse* of *svata utpannā bhāvāḥ* ('Entities originating from self'). The first proposition corresponds of course not to the contraposition of the second, but rather to the implication of the negative statement *svata utpannā na vidyante bhāvāḥ* if *paryudāsa*-negation rather than *prasajyapratiṣedha* was operating in it. And when referring to a *prasaṅgaviparītārtha (thal bar 'gyur ba bzlog pa'i don)* in *PPMV*, p. 23.3, Candrakīrti has explicitly specified that it is inapplicable to the Mādhyamika because of the fact that he has no thesis of his own asserting the origination of (reified) entities in terms of the tetralemma of *MK* i.1. But here again Candrakīrti's reference to the *prasaṅgaviparīta* does not appear to have anything directly to do with what was known in the Pramāṇa school as *prasaṅgaviparya*, that is, with contraposition of a hypothetical inference.

It might then seem, *prima facie* at least, that the remarks in Tsoṅ kha pa's *rTsa še ṭīk chen* (f. 32b f. [= p. 54 f.]) as well as in his definitive *dGoṅs pa rab gsal* (f. 89b f. [= p. 163]) that *thal ba bzlog pa* does not, *exceptionally*, operate in the case of Buddhapālita's double *prasaṅga* relating to *MK* i.1, whereas it does operate in the normal way in other cases, could be due to a conflation of the *thal ba (las) bzlog pa bsgrub(s) pa* = *prasaṅgaviparītārthāpatti* being discussed by Candrakīrti in his *PPMV* (pp. 23-24) with the *thal bzlog* = *prasaṅgaviparyaya* (where the *thal chos bzlog pa* is used as a *liṅga*) and with the *bzlog pa 'phaṅs pa*/*'phen pa* which became of major importance in the Pramāṇa school's logic and was then adopted in the Madhyamaka school by the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas and by later Tibetan Mādhyamikas such as Tsoṅ kha pa himself. For the *thal ba 'phen pa*, in so far as it makes use of the technique of contraposition (*prasaṅgaviparyaya*), is in fact distinct from the *thal ba (b)sgrub pa (prasaṅgāpādana* or *prasaṅgāpatti*) belonging to the philosophical reasoning of Candrakīrti's Madhyamaka school.

A further source for possible confusion is the fact that the Tibetan expression *thal ba (b)sgrub pa* corresponds not only to *prasaṅgāpādana* (e.g. in the Tibetan translation of trhe *PPMV*), but also to the term *prasaṅgasādhana*.[46]

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[46] See above, p. 251 note 31.

But Tsoṅ kha pa could hardly have been unaware of the distinction between the Mādhyamika's apagogic reasoning (*prasaṅgāpādana*, on which is after all based Candrakīrti's rejection of Bhavya's claim that a *prasaṅgaviparītārtha* could affect Buddhapālita's statements) on the one side and on the other the contraposed *prasaṅgaviparyaya* developed in the Pramāṇa school (together with the hypothetical proof, *prasaṅgasādhana*; see below). But he has joined a discussion of these two things when discussing *PPMV* i.1, pp. 23-24. This is perhaps best explained, not by supposing a misapprehension or conflation on Tsoṅ kha pa's part, but by developments in the theory of the *thal ba* and the *thal ba bzlog pa'i don* subsequent to Candrakīrti that took place especially in Tibet, and also by his particular exegesis of this passage of the *PPMV*. Final clarification of this matter will have to await further research; in the mean time, mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzaṅ's treatment of the matter in his *sToṅ thun chen mo* can be profitably consulted.[47]

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[47] On the *sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramāṇa* and the *prasaṅgaviparyaya*, see below, § 14.

It is known that the Tibetan philosopher-logicians, for example the school of gSaṅ phu Ne'u thog (on which see Section I above), devoted special attention to the *prasaṅga*. What sGom sde Nam mkha' rgyal mtshan (1532-1592) and A kya yoṅs 'dzin dByaṅs can dga' ba'i blo gros (1740-1827) are concerned with in their *thal bzlog* treatises is, evidently, not the *prasaṅgaviparyaya* in the sense of a contraposed *prasaṅga*-statement. And they deal with origination from the other (*gžan skye*) arising, by implication, as the *reversal* of origination from self (*bdag skye*) if *paryudāsa*-negation (rather than *prasajyapratiṣedha*) operates. – See sGom sde Nam mkha' rgyal mtshan, *Thal bzlog dka' ba'i gnas gtan la 'bebs pa, 'Jam pa'i dbyaṅs sGom sde Nam mkha' rgyal mtshan gyis mdzad pa'i tshig gsal gyi lde mig* in: *The obligatory texts (Yig cha) for the study of Mādhyamika of Byes grwa-tshaṅ of Se-ra Monastery*, published by lHa mkhar yoṅs 'dzin bsTan pa rgyal mtshan (Mādhyamika Text Series, vol. 4 [New Delhi, 1973]); and A kya yoṅs 'dzin dByaṅs can dGa' ba'i blo gros, *dBu ma'i thal bzlog gi brjed byaṅ tshigs bcad ma* (published by lHa mkhar yoṅs 'dzin bsTan pa rgyal mtshan in Mādhyamika Text Series, vol. 3 [New Delhi, 1972], as well as by Lama Guru Deva in *The collected works of A-kya Yoṅs-ḥdzin*, vol. 1 [New Delhi, 1971]).

Compare, however, mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzaṅ, *TThCh*, ff. 168b- →

177b. There the principle of contraposition apears to be evoked when mKhas grub rje cites an opponent's interpretation (*kha cig na re*) both of the Sāṃkhya's objection to the Mādhyamika as formulated by Bhavya and of Candrakīrti's reply (f. 169b-170a): *de ltar na thal 'gyur gyi rtags bzlog pa bsgrub bya'i chos daṅ/ thal 'gyur gyi bsgrub bya'i chos bzlog pa gtan tshigs su 'gyur bas dṅos po rnams skye ba don bcas daṅ thug bcas yin te/ gžan las skye ba yin pa'i phyir/ /žes pa gtan tshigs yaṅ dag tu khas len dgos pas/ de ltar na raṅ gi grub pa'i mtha' daṅ 'gal bar 'gyur ro/ /žes bya ba yin la/ dpal ldan zla bas skyon de ñid spoṅ ba'i tshul ni/ dbu ma pa yin na raṅ rgyud khas len pa mi rigs pas thal 'gyur gyis 'phaṅs pa'i sgrub byed khas mi len la/ thal 'gyur bkod pa tsam gyis sgrub byed 'phen pa yaṅ ma yin te/ smra ba pos sgrub byed 'phen par 'dod nas smras pa ma yin pa'i phyir daṅ/ sgra rnams ni smra ba pos brjod par 'dod pa'i don tsam ston pa yin gyi smra ba po raṅ dbaṅ med par byed pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro/ /des na pha rol po la khas blaṅs naṅ 'gal ston pa'i thal ba 'ba' žig pa tsam yin pas skyon med do žes lan 'debs pa yin no žes zer ro/ /de ni šin tu mi 'thad de/...*

When giving his own interpretation, mKhas grub rje also operates with the principle of *reversal* (f. 170b f.), stating how the arguments serving as the inferential *liṅga*s in Buddhapālita's *prasaṅga*-statement negating (renewed) production *from self* – viz. *atha sann api jāyeta* and *na kadācin na jāyeta* – and the *sādhya* – viz. *na ... utpadyante bhāvāḥ* – might yield by implication – through reversal (*bzlog pa*) and on the assumption that the negation was of the *paryudāsa*-variety (and not of the *prasajya*-variety which involves *rnam par bcad pa tsam*) – the affirmation of usefulness (*don bcas : sāphalya*) and non-endlessness (*thug bcas : janmanirodha*) of production *from an other* (ff. 170b-172a). But this assumption does not in fact correspond to the view of the Mādhyamika, for he of course employs *prasajyapratiṣedha*. And mKhas grub rje then demonstrates the incorrectness of deducing production from a (reified) other on the basis of the negation of production from a (reified) self (f. 173a). Next (ff. 174a-177b), the *thal ba[r 'gyur ba las] bzlog pa'i don* is taken up once more and described as a matter that is exceedingly difficult to fathom (f. 174b1). The ground for Bhavya's criticism of Buddhapālita was, mKhas grub rje recalls, the fact that the latter has not set out a *trirūpa-liṅga* proving the Mādhyamika's position, and that he has explicitly (*tshig zin la*) stated merely a *prasaṅga* showing that the acceptance of the reverse position is excluded [on the grounds of the resulting futility (*don med*) and the endless repetition (*thug med*) of production] (*dam bca' de'i bzlog phyogs khas len pa*

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8. *Prasaṅgāpādana (thal ba [b]sgrub pa ~ thal ba 'phen pa)* AS A SPECIAL FORM OF INFERENCE ACCORDING TO TSOṄ KHA PA

Because in *PPMV* i.1 Candrakīrti has described the Mādhyamika's *prasaṅgāpādana* (p. 24.5) and *anumāna* (p. 34.5) as issuing exclusively in the negation of the opponent's assertion, it has often been supposed not only that the terms of the Prāsangika-Mādhyamika's inference are unreal (*asiddha*) for him, but also that his *prasaṅga*-type apagogic arguments may as a consequence have for him no logical-epistemological force and cogency.

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la ston pa'i thal 'gyur tsam žig, f. 174b3-4). But according to Bhavya it is not sufficient to set forth *don med* and *thug med* as *liṅga*s to establish one's own system, for which a proper *trirūpa-liṅga* is required (f. 175a). However, Buddhapālita's purpose was not of course to show that some other kind of production, such as from an other, is *don bcas* and *thug bcas*. Nor was it only to establish that *don med* and *thug med* eventuate from the Sāṃkhya's theory of production from self, but to have the *bzlog pa'i don* of the two *prasaṅga*s – viz. *dṅos po rnams chos can/ skye ba don med par thal/ bdag las skye ba'i phyir* and *de chos can thug med du skye bar thal/ bdag las skye ba'i phyir*) – establish the Madhyamaka thesis that entities are not produced from self (f. 175a-b). But the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika does this by apagogic rather than by categoric *svatantra*-type reasoning; and in debate he employs for this purpose a *paraprasiddha-anumāna* (see below). At f. 176b, mKhas grub rje cites a pair of *prasaṅga*-statements concerning (non-)production from self where the (for the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamika counterfactual) *hetu* of the first is converted by contraposition into the *sādhya* of the second by negating it (*de la thal 'gyur ni myu gu chos can slar yaṅ skye ba don bcas daṅ thug bcas min par thal/ bdag las skye ba'i phyir/ žes pa daṅ/ des bzlog pa sgrub byed 'phaṅs pa ni myu gu chos can/ bdag las skye ba med de/ slar yaṅ skye ba don bcas daṅ thug bcas yin pa'i phyir/ žes pa...*). While the first *prasaṅga*-statement is essentially apagogic and deconstructive only, the second is described as implying a probative demonstration (*sgrub byed 'phaṅs pa*) (though from the Mādhyamika's point of view the reason is of course a counterfactual).

According to Tsoṅ kha pa this is not so. In the first place, in the inference embedded in *MK* iii.2cd (see p. 247 above), the terms are *in pragmatic-transactional usage (tha sñad du = vyavahāratas)* existent for the Prāsaṅgika too.[48] And the difference between him and his Substantialist opponent[49] therefore lies not within the strict domain of *anumāna* but in the above-mentioned difference in their respective philosophical presuppositions (the eye and visible matter having hypostatic self-existence – *svabhāva* 'aseitas' – for the Substantialist whereas for Candrakīrti they of course do not). For the Prāsaṅgika proponent, then, the *dharmin* exists in the domain of pragmatic-transactional usage (*vyavahāra*), which is the proper domain of *anumāna* and *prayogavākya* too.

Therefore, to use Tsoṅ kha pa's terminology, it is necessary clearly to differentiate between total, nihilistic, non-existence (*med pa*) unrestricted by any specification – which the Mādhyamika as an advocate of the Middle Way between eternalism and annihilationism certainly does *not* assert – and non-existence specified in respect to hypostatic self-existence (*raṅ gi ṅo bos med pa*, i.e. non-substantiality, *nairātmya, niḥsvabhāvatā*) – which the Mādhyamika does maintain. Correspondingly, it is no less essential clearly to differentiate between unspecified (i.e. pure and simple) existence (*yod pa [tsam]*) of things – which the Mādhyamika accepts on the level of pragmatic transaction (*tha sñad = vyavahāra*) or *saṃvṛti* (*kun rdzob tu = saṃvṛtyā* 'on the surface level') – and existence of (reified) entities in the absolute *pāramārthika* sense (*don dam du = paramārthatas* 'in ultimate reality') – which the Mādhyamika does not accept.[50]

This analysis of inference and argument following Nāgārjuna's model of the eye's seeing opened the way for Tsoṅ kha pa to build Dharmakīrti's logic into his Madhyamaka theory. This he has done on a large

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[48] To have such pragmatic-transactional (*vyāvahārika*), and surface-level (*sāṃvṛta*), existence is regarded as sufficient since *anumāna* and *prayogavākya* themselves belong to the transactional level of *vyavahāra/saṃvṛti*.

[49] Including in this case, according to Tsoṅ kha pa, Bhavya and his Svātantrika followers. See *LRChM*, f. 421a-b (= p. 698-9), f. 425a (= p. 705), f. 428a-b (= p. 710); *LŚÑP*, f. 81b-83b-85b ff. (= pp. 472-476-480 ff.). See Section I, note 196 f.

[50] See e.g. *LRChM*, f. 424b-425a (= p. 705), and f. 432b (= p. 717).

scale, including the *trirūpa-liṅga (tshul gsum)* the very first requirement of which is that the logical reason should reside in a (transactionally real) locus or qualificand (*dharmin*). And it is in this way that, contrary perhaps to first appearances, *pramāṇa (tshad ma)* acquired an important place in Tsoṅ kha pa's Madhyamaka thought.

Indeed, in Tsoṅ kha pa's philosophy, the Madhyamaka's rejection of hypostatized self-existence (*raṅ bžin gyis yod pa, ṅo bo ñid kyis yod pa*) – the *bden grub* – does not in fact exclude what is termed establishment by right cognition (*tshad mas grub pa*). And what exists on the pragmatic-transactional level (*vyavahāratas*) – and accordingly that which arises in dependence (*pratītyasamutpanna*) – may be described as established by right knowledge, this *pramāṇa* being purely a pragmatic-transactional (*tha sñad pa = vyāvahārika*) one.[51]

Now, this *pramāṇa*-doctrine does not rest on a substantialistically conceived dyadic system of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* (nor on a substantialistically conceived triadic system consisting of the former pair associated with a cognizer or *pramātṛ*), as did the system criticized by Nāgārjuna in his *Vigrahavyāvartanī* and elsewhere, but rather on a logic and epistemology in which, for pragmatic-transactional (*vyāvahārika*) purposes, the terms of the system exist without being hypostatically established (*bden par grub pa*).

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[51] On the concept of the *tshad mas grub pa* and its applicability to the pragmatic level (*vyavahāra*), and to the *pratītyasamutpanna*, see e.g. *LRChM*, f. 368a f. = p. 613 f.; *LŠÑP*, f. 83a-b = p. 476 (*rten 'brel tshad mas grub pa*) and f. 106b = pp. 513-14 (... *tha sñad du yod pa la tshad mas grub pa dgos pa'i phyir ro/ /de lta na tha sñad du yod pa rnams miṅ gi tha sñad kyi dbaṅ gis bžag pa tsam yin pa 'gal lo že na, skyon med de/ gaṅ zag lta bu kun rdzob tu yod pa de miṅ gi tha sñad kyi dbaṅ gis bžag pa tsam mo žes pa'i tsam gyi sgras gaṅ zag miṅ gi tha sñad kyi dbaṅ gis ma bžag pa gcod kyi/ gaṅ zag tshad mas grub pa yaṅ mi gcod la miṅ gi tha sñad kyi dbaṅ gis gaṅ bžag thams cad kun rdzob tu yod par ston pa yaṅ min no*); *GR* f. 101a = pp. 183-4 (*tha sñad du yod pa la ni tshad mas grub pa žig dgos so*); *NŠRG*, f. 19a = p. 32 (*tha sñad kyi dbaṅ gis bžag pa tsam žes pa'i tsam gyi sgras kyaṅ don raṅ gi ṅo bos yod pa gcod kyi tshad mas grub pa mi gcod do*).

Accordingly, Tsoṅ kha pa's Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka thought has discarded the prerequisite of *ubhaya(pra)siddhatva* or *mthun snaṅ du grub pa* – i.e. the being ontic-(epistemo)logically acknowledged or established in common between proponent and opponent – demanded by Bhavya following an old *vāda*-tradition,[52] but without giving up the logical-epistemological principle of *pramāṇa* as developed by Dharmakīrti that the subject or qualificand (*dharmin*) in an inference must not be entirely fictional and unreal (*asiddha*).[53] This is because, whilst the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika's *dharmin* is certainly not *raṅ gi ṅo bos grub pa* 'established in self-existence' and *bden par grub pa* 'hypostatically established', it is not unreal either inasmuch as it exists on the level of pragmatic-transactional usage (*tha sñad du yod*).[54]

9. On refutation (*dūṣaṇa*) and proof (*sādhana*) with Candrakīrti and Tsoṅ kha pa

The question of the ontic-epistemic and logical status of reasoned criticism and refutation (*dūṣaṇa*) in relation to what is to be refuted (*dūṣya*) – that is, the status of the opposite of logical establishment (*sādhana*) in relation to what is to be established (*sādhya*) – has been discussed at some length by Candrakīrti in his *Madhyamakāvatāra* vi.171-8. This section follows immediately on Candrakīrti's discussion of the link

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[52] See above, pp. 245 (with note 20), 251.

[53] See *PPMV* i.1, pp. 28-30, on *asiddhādhāra*, which is described by Candrakīrti himself as a *doṣa*.

[54] It is important to observe, however, that the Substantialist's *dharmins*, *in so far as they are posited (as they in fact are by him) as established in self-existence (i.e. hypostatically)*, do not, for the Mādhyamika, really exist even on the pragmatic-transactional and relative level: they are in fact mere fictions or constructs devoid of reality. According to Candrakīrti, origination (*utpāda*) conceived of as a process of production of one reified entity having a *svabhāva* from another reified entity also having a *svabhāva* is thus an altogether incoherent and anomalous concept, which is as unacceptable on the level of *saṃvṛti* as it is on that of *paramārtha*. See *PPMV* i.1, p. 25 f.

between a cause and its result (*hetu-phala*) conceived of as a pair in a relation of either connexion (*prāpti*) or disconnexion (*aprāpti*).[55]

Whereas Candrakīrti has there described the logical *hetu* in an argument as in the strict sense lacking *upapatti* 'justified ground/warrant' (*'thad pa = upapatti*), he has nevertheless stated that a reasoned refutation – albeit empty of self-existence (*svabhāvaśūnya*) – is efficacious in rejecting faults contained in an opposed position, and that a well-grounded logical reason, although also empty of self-existence, does establish a *sādhya* (see *MA* vi.175 with *Bhāṣya*).[56] Thus the Mādhyamika does not find his arguments exposed to attack (*sāvakāśa*) by an opponent's *dūṣaṇa* 'refutation' and *parihāra* 'rebuttal'; for these are based on a duality constructed merely on the basis of what is nominally existent (*prajñapti-sat*, i.e. they do not relate to real things).[57]

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[55] Concerning further the question of *thal ba(r 'gyur ba) mtshuṅs pa* 'same predicament' also treated in *MA* vi.172-6, compare the *samaprasaṅgitā* in *PPMV* vii.31 (p. 173.6) and *tulyaprasaṅgatva* in *PPMV* xvi.2 (p. 287.2). (The latter terms appear to be distinct from *sādhyasama = bsgrub par bya ba daṅ mtshuṅs pa*, i.e. the fallacy of circularity in argument, a term that is found in *MK* iv. 8-9, *VV* 28 and *VVV* 69, and several times in the *PPMV* [e.g. vii.11, p. 153.5]. But compare *MA* vi.174-5 which quotes *MK* iv.8. See above, Section II, p. 124 note 25.)

[56] Compare the treatment, in *VV* 23-27 and 61-69, of *vāraṇa* or *pratiṣedha* and *pratiṣedhya* (p. 119 f. and p. 197 f. above).

[57] Candrakīrti here cites Nāgārjuna's *MK* iv.8 and Ārya-Deva's *CŚ* xvi.25 (p. 122 f. above).

Candrakīrti in addition observes that the (Svātantrika's) objection that what has been in question in the discussion with the Substantialist-opponent is an *utpādakahetu (skyed par byed pa'i rgyu)* – and not the *(abhi)vyañjaka-hetu (gsal bar byed pa'i rgyu)* against which there was raised the argument involving a relation of *prāpti* or *aprāpti* – and that his argument therefore contains no specious argument (*jāti*, i.e. a *dūṣaṇābhāsa* according to Dignāga and Dharmakīrti) will be unavailing. For the Substantialist opponent will still remain unsatisfied with the counter-argument and will oppose to it his own, so that the (Svātantrika-)Mādhyamika's counter-argument will prove to be exposed to attack (*sāvakāśa*), whether the cause is an *utpādakahetu* or an →

Candrakīrti states, nevertheless, that in the Madhyamaka there should be no place for mere *vitaṇḍā* 'cavil'. For the Śāstra of the Madhyamaka intends to express the cessation of dichotomizing conceptual construction (*rtog pa ldog pa ñid brjod par 'dod pa*), and 'this *has* been stated by us'. Moreover, because there exists (in reality) no entity to be rejected (*bsal bar bya ba'i dṅos po*), no opposed position (*parapakṣa*) is in reality being rejected. Hence, because by definition a caviller (*vaitaṇḍika*) is one who rejects another's position without setting forth any position of his own, how could there be any question of our (the Mādhyamikas) being mere *vaitaṇḍikas*?[58] The defining characteristic of *vitaṇḍā* is therefore altogether absent in the true Mādhyamika (*MABh* vi. 178).[59]

Elements of this discussion from Candrakīrti's *MA* have been introduced by Tsoṅ kha pa into his treatment of the status, in his own system (*raṅ lugs* = *svamata*), of an inferential *liṅga* (*bsgrub bya sgrub pa'i rtags*) given the absence in the Prāsaṅgika system of any autonomous

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(abhi)vyañjakahetu. (On *utpāda* as distinct from *abhivyakti*, cf. *PPMV* i.1, pp. 21.9-22.8.) Moreover, in his reply, the Svātantrika does engage in a specious argument (*jāti*) when, in order to establish what the Mādhyamika has asserted (*pratijñātārtha*, i.e. non-substantiality), he refutes the Substantialist opponent's *sādhana* (thus implicitly accepting a logical reason established in common under the principle of mutual agreement according to which he proceeds; see Jayānanda's *Ṭīkā*, D, f. 282a and note 67 in H. Tauscher's translation of the *Madhyamakāvatāra* [Vienna, 1981]). Candrakīrti therefore concludes that his own rebuttal (*parihāra*) of the Substantialist opponent is far superior to the Svātantrika's (*MABh* vi. 175). Furthermore, when a reasoning based on *prāpti* or *aprāpti* is employed in the analysis of causation, neither a *(jñāpaka)hetu* making known what is to be established (*sādhya*) nor the *sādhya* itself exists hypostatically, so that the Svātantrika will find himself once again in desperate straits since he has left the straight road of non-substantiality and follows the winding path of bad speculation (*kutarka*) (*MABh* vi.176).

[58] Read (with Tsoṅ kha pa) *raṅ gi phyogs ma bžag ciṅ gžan gyi phyogs bzlog ste...*(i.e. with the negative *ma*). See also *MA* vi.118 on *vāda, vigraha, parapakṣa* and *svapakṣa*.

[59] On *vitaṇḍā* see above, p. 233 note 2 and Section II, § 4.

(*svatantra*) logical reason.[60] Just as, he writes, the relation between cause and result can be properly understood, according to Candrakīrti, only on condition that neither is hypostatized as a self-existent entity – but never if self-existent entities related by either *prāpti* or *aprāpti* are postulated, as has so often been done by other philosophers when they analyse causation –, so a reasoned refutation (*dūṣaṇa*) in due form operates effectively only within the frame of the principle of non-substantiality (*niḥsvabhāvatā*). For a *dūṣaṇa* could never be effective within the frame of any theory postulating either *prāpti* or *aprāpti* between self-existent things.

It is, accordingly, only for the Mādhyamika, who entertains no position (*pratijñā, pakṣa*) postulating reified, self-existent entities, that a relation of *dūṣaṇa* and *dūṣya* can operate effectively. Whereas in the case of his Substantialist opponents – including Bhavya according to Tsoṅ kha pa[61] – no *dūṣaṇa-dūṣya* relation founded on hypostatized entities can be effectively operative.[62]

10. *Pramāṇa*-THEORY, ERROR AND ASCERTAINMENT IN TSOṄ KHA PA'S MADHYAMAKA THOUGHT

To investigate Tsoṅ kha pa's entire theory of *pramāṇa (tshad ma)* fully would take one very far indeed and exceed the limits set for this study. More needs nevertheless to be said here about the concept of *pramāṇa* that he has advocated in connexion with the problem of the relation between the *svatantra anumāna* and *paraprasiddha anumāna*, or between the autonomous formal probative argument (*svatantraprayogavākya*) as used by Bhavya and the special kind of formal probative argument (*sbyor ba'i ṅag = prayogavākya*) employed, according to him, by Candrakīrti and other Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas.

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60 *LŠÑP*, ff. (81b-)83b-85b (= pp. [472-]476-480). Cf. *LRChM*, ff. 416a-418b (= pp. 690-5).

61 See above, p. 267 note 49.

62 cf. p. 270 above.

It has to be noted from the outset that whereas Candrakīrti in his *PPMV* i.1 (p. 25) has used the term *prayogavākya* specifically in connexion with Bhavya's *svatantraprayogavākya* and has stated that Nāgārjuna did not make use of *prayogavākya*s when writing his comment on the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, Tsoṅ kha pa allows the Prāsaṅgika not only an *anumāna* (*rjes su dpag pa*) but also a *prayoga(vākya) (sbyor ba['i ṅag])*, provided that both are understood to be not 'autonomous' (*raṅ rgyud pa* = *svatantra*) like the Svātantrika's, but rather ones acknowledged by the opponent *(gžan la grags pa = paraprasiddha)*.[63] Tsoṅ kha pa's usage may find a certain justification in Candrakīrti's explanations attributing to Nāgārjuna several components of a formal probative argument.[64] In all these cases, needless to say, no self-existent *bhāva* is being posited, and what Candrakīrti and Tsoṅ kha pa say is certainly not meant by them to conflict with *VV* 29-30 discussed above in Section II.

In connexion with his detailed discussion of the difference between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas in his *Lam rim chen mo* Tsoṅ kha pa has explained his concept of *pramāṇa*. Very significantly, he has observed at the outset that the relevant passages of Candrakīrti's *PPMV* i.1 (pp. 30-36) are very difficult to understand (*šin tu rtogs dka' ba*, f. 419a = p. 696).

The need for Tsoṅ kha pa's enquiry arises not only in view of the critique of the Substantialist's *pramāṇa-prameya* model in Nāgārjuna's *VV*, but also because a clear and explicit treatment of *pramāṇa* did not occupy a prominent place in Candrakīrti's *PPMV* i.1, so that the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika has sometimes been suspected of having discarded *pramāṇa* entirely. Whereas for Tsoṅ kha pa – and indeed for much of the Tibetan philosophical traditions – the (valid means of) correct knowledge (*tshad ma*), reasoned knowledge (*rigs šes*) and cognitive ascertainment (*ṅes pa*) were problems of central importance also for Madhyamaka philosophy.[65]

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[63] *LRChM*, f. 429a-b (= pp. 711-12).

[64] See not only *PPMV* i.1, p. 34, quoted above, pp. 248-9 (cf. p. 251), but also Candrakīrti's mention of *pratijñā* in connexion with *MK* i.1 (p. 13.3), viii.1 and xxi.2, and in *MA* vi.8 (p. 81.17-18). Cf. Section II, § 2, above.

[65] It is well known that Tsoṅ kha pa, following the example of his Tibetan predecessors in for example the gSaṅ phu Ne'u thog seminary going back to →

It is indeed on this basis that this tradition has sought to avoid the grave errors of 'ideoclasm', over-emphasis on non-mentation (*yid la mi byed pa : amanasikāra*) and the devaluation or outright rejection of philosophical analysis (*dpyod pa = vicāra*) which it generally ascribed to the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna, that is, to the Chinese Ch'an master Mo-ho-yen who, at the Great Debate of bSam yas toward the end of the eighth century CE, was the protagonist of a purely simultaneist (*cig c[h]ar ba*), 'spontaneist' and non-mentational – i.e. non-analytical and non-conceptualized – teaching of direct, unmediated and face-to-face recognition of inborn and primal Mind (*sems ṅo 'phrod pa, sems rtogs pa*).[66]

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rṄog Blo ldan šes rab (1059-1109), made very extensive use of Dharmakīrti's work. In addition to the latter's minor treatises such as the *Nyāyabindu* and *Hetubindu* and to the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* already extensively employed in Tibet by the 'Middle Tshad ma', Tsoṅ kha pa made use of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, just like his predecessors (such as Sa skya Paṇḍi ta and his disciple 'u yug pa) who developed the 'New Tshad ma' based largely on this work by Dharmakīrti.

Moreover, following on some later Indian masters – Śāntarakṣita (see *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti* 61), Prajñākaragupta, Jitāri, Ravigupta, Mokṣākaragupta –, the Tibetan doxographers undertook a kind of synthesis (or, at least, a rapprochement) of the Madhyamaka with Dharmakīrti's thought. For Jitāri's view on Dharmakīrti's connexion with the Madhyamaka, see his *Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya* iv (ed. K. Shirasaki, *Bulletin of the Kobe Women's University* 18/1 [1985], p. 135 ff.); cf. S. Shirasaki, *IBK* 27/1 (1978) and *Bukkyō Ronsō* 1986; S. Matsumoto, *IBK* 29/2 (1981), pp. 969-966; and D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy*, p. 100. Concerning Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and Prajñākaragupta as well as Jitāri on Dharmakīrti, see recently E. Steinkellner, 'Is Dharmakīrti a Mādhyamika?', in: D. Seyfort Ruegg and L. Schmithausen (ed.), *Earliest Buddhism and Madhyamaka* (Leiden, 1990), pp. 72-90. On Mokṣākaragupta, see Y. Kajiyama, *An introduction to Buddhist philosophy* (Kyōto, 1966), pp. 7-10. Compare also Abhayākaragupta's use of *Pramāṇavārttika* ii.253 in his *Munimatālaṃkāra* (P, f. 189b); cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, in: L. Lancaster (ed.), *Prajñāpāramitā and related systems* (E. Conze Festschrift, Berkeley, 1977), p. 298.

[66] See *LRChM*, f. 424b (= pp. 704-5); *LŠÑP*, f. 90b (= pp. 487-8). Cf. D. →

Pramāṇa – as (valid means of) right knowledge, the reverse of error or deviation (*'khrul ba* = *bhrānti*) – embraces non-error (*ma 'khrul ba*). It is the source of the ascertainment (*ṅes pa* : *niścaya, avasāya*) required for attaining the philosopher's goal, namely understanding of the non-substantiality of the individual and the factors of existence (*pudgala-* and *dharma-nairātmya*) and Emptiness of self-existence (*svabhāvaśūnyatā, niḥsvabhāvatā*) through reasoned knowledge (*rigs śes*).

For *ṅes pa* = *niścaya*, the translation 'ascertainment' is here preferred to 'certainty' or 'certitude' because the reference is to a critical philosophical process realized through analysis (*dpyad pa),* right knowledge (*tshad ma*) and reasoned knowledge (*rigs śes*), and not to a state of either uncritical or quasi-mystical sureness. Philosophical certitude is indeed a problematic thing, as is infallible knowledge. But philosophy is (partly) about the attempt to ascertain things by right knowledge, by a knowledge that is non-failing (*avisaṃvāda* = *mi [b]slu ba*) through corresponding to what is to be known. Philosophical ascertainment is thus quite different from any kind of dogmatic certitude and *a fortiori* from unexamined and unjustified belief. The philosophical endeavour of Tsoṅ kha pa and those who thought like him was to demarcate both reasoned knowledge (*rigs śes*) and ascertainment (*ṅes pa*) from inveterated dogma and 'fool's belief' (*blun dad*).[67]

Seyfort Ruegg, *Buddha-nature, Mind and the problem of Gradualism in a comparative perspective* (London, 1989).

[67] Candrakīrti's view on one kind of determination or certitude was, it is true, more negative or at least deconstructive (see *PPMV* i.1, pp. 56-57); but he has nevertheless recognized *avasā- (ṅes pa)* 'ascertainment' based on reasoning (*PPMV* i.1, p. 58.3-6). For *niścitagrahaṇa, niścaya*, etc. in Dharmakīrti, see recently E. Steinkellner, in: G. Gnoli *et al.* (ed.), *Orientalia Iosephi Tucci memoriae dicata*, iii (Rome, 1988), pp. 1427-44.

The kind of ascertainment (*avasāya* or *niścaya* = *ṅes pa*) and rigorous reasoning (*yukti* = *rigs pa*) looked for in the Madhyamaka, in particular by Tsoṅ kha pa, has doubtless to be distinguished from the positivism and rationalism that some currents of modern thought have attempted to achieve, and of course from the 'mental *rigor mortis*' criticized for example by P. Feyerabend in his *Against method* (London, 1978) and *Farewell to reason* (London, 1987). To be a true Mādhyamika is clearly to be aware of such →

Now, according to Tsoṅ kha pa's view of the matter, in discussion and debate with the Substantialist (*dṅos [por] smra ba : vastusatpadārthavādin*) who in this matter figures as the opponent (*phyi[r] rgol = prativādin*), the (Prāsaṅgika-)Mādhyamika as proponent (*sṅa rgol = vādin*) does in fact (as already observed above) share with the former a *pragmatic-transactional pramāṇa* (*tha sñad pa'i tshad ma = vyāvahārikapramāṇa*) that has the function of correctly cognizing (*'jal ba: pramā-*), e.g., the eye and visible matter.[68] In other words, great though the differences between the Substantialist and the Mādhyamika are in their respective philosophical presuppositions and conclusions, the two parties can still stand on agreed common ground in philosophical discussion and debate, where they will be talking of the same *chos can = dharmin* as the qualificand ('locus') of the logical reason in their *anumāna*s (and *prayogavākya*s).[69]

In this connexion Tsoṅ kha pa has specified a fundamentally important point concerning cognitive apprehension (*'dzin tshul*). His epistemological scheme is described as made up of the following three modes of apprehension:[70]

> (i) a cognition that apprehends its object (e.g. a sprout) as existing by a nature established in self-existence, viz. a cognition

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pitfalls.

Compare the concepts of the direct and immediate knowledge (*pratyakṣa, sākṣātkāra*, etc.) of the sage and the Buddha examined in D. Seyfort Ruegg, '*Pramāṇabhūta, *Pramāṇa(bhūta)-puruṣa, pratyakṣadharman* and *sākṣātkṛtadharman* as epithets of the *ṛṣi, ācārya* and *tathāgata* in grammatical, epistemological and Madhyamaka texts', *BSOAS* 57 (1994), pp. 303-20.

[68] *LRChM*, f. 424a (= p. 703); *LŠÑP*, f. 90b (= p. 488).

[69] This, however, does not, for Tsoṅ kha pa, imply that the subject of the inferences will be in the strict sense ontic-(epistemo)logically *established* in common (*mthun snaṅ du grub pa*), or *ubhaya*[*pra*]*siddha*, as Bhavya had evidently assumed in conformity with the established principle of *vāda* discussed above (p. 245 with note 20, and § 5).

[70] *LRChM*, f. 424a (= p. 703-04).

that takes its object to exist 'in reality/truth', i.e. hypostatically (*bden par yod par 'dzin pa*);

(ii) a cognition that apprehends its object as existing in the manner of an illusory projection (*sgyu ma lta bu* = *māyopama*) but does not itself exist established in self-existence, viz. a cognition that takes its object to exist 'unreally/falsely', i.e. not hypostatically (*brdzun par yod par 'dzin pa*); and

(iii) a cognition that apprehends its object as simply existing as such, without being specified as being either 'real/true' or 'unreal/false', i.e. established/not established hypostatically (*bden brdzun de dag gaṅ gis kyaṅ khyad par du ma byas par spyir yod pa tsam žig tu 'dzin pa*).[71]

Tsoṅ kha pa observes that the second cognitive mode which apprehends things as being *māyā*-like inasmuch as they do not exist in hypostatized self-existence is available only to such persons as have comprehended non-substantiality (*niḥsvabhāvatā, nairātmya*). So long as persons have not reached this high level of understanding, they may be observed to have the first mode of cognition that reifies a thing by grasping it as established hypostatically (*bden [par] grub [pa]*). In addition, however, they have available the above-mentioned third mode of cognition

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[71] This last kind of unspecified, unqualified, cognition has of course to be distinguished from a *dharmin* (the so-called *chos can tsam po*) unqualified as to *saṃvṛti* and *paramārtha* which Bhavya would set up as the *dharmin* of his *svatantrānumāna* as a logical qualificand or locus held in common between a Sāṃkhya and a Mādhyamika – but which has been rejected by both Candrakīrti (*PPMV* i.1, p. 27-30) and Tsoṅ kha pa (*LŚÑP*, ff. 86a-89a [= pp. 481-5]).

One or the other of these three modes of cognitively apprehending the existence of an object is stated by Tsoṅ kha pa to underlie all cognitive modes, there being no cognition in the absence of one of them. Other forms of cognizing an object – for example the one that grasps its object (e.g. a sprout) as existing in the mode of the permanent or the impermanent – are accordingly nothing but subvarieties, and they therefore do not require to be enumerated separately (*LRChM*, f. 424a [= p. 704]). See also *LŚÑP*, f. 90b (= pp. 487-8).

that simply apprehends things without any ontic or (epistemo)logical specification, that is, without either positing them as hypostatically established (following mode i) or knowing them to be unreal/false in the sense of being simply *māyā*-like projections (following mode ii).[72]

It is, then, this last kind of cognitive apprehension that yields the unspecified *pragmatic-transactional pramāṇa* found to be available to both the Substantialist and the Mādhyamika, and which thus makes possible a well-founded and meaningful discussion between both parties to the debate. This is accordingly quite independent of the fact that the two parties do *not* in fact share a common *autonomously probative pramāṇa* (*sgrub byed kyi tshad ma*), or a commonly established (*mthun snaṅ du grub pa : ubhaya[pra]siddha*) – and on the *saṃvṛti*-level virtually self-existent (*raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*) – subject of inference (*dharmin* = *chos can*) that had been posited by Bhavya.[73]

Such a *vyāvahārika-pramāṇa (tha sñad pa'i tshad ma)*, as it is termed, has then to be distinguished from a *svamata-pramāṇa (raṅ gi lugs kyi tshad ma)* in virtue of which a *dharmin* could be thought to be hypostatically established in ontic or (epistemo)logical terms.[74]

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[72] *LRChM*, f. 424a-b (= p. 704).

[73] *LRChM*, ff. 422b6 (= p. 702), 426b1-3 (= p. 707). (With this ontic-(epistemo)logically unspecified factor, compare Candrakīrti's concept of *saṃvṛti-mātra* = *kun rdzob tsam*, on which see *KNZB* § 2.3.3.)

[74] *LRChM*, f. 424a1 (= p. 703).

Furthermore, were it not for the existence of the last of the above-mentioned three modes of cognition, any pragmatic-transactional activity would inevitably involve hypostatic postulation (*bden 'dzin*). A logical impossibility would then cancel out everything that the Mādhyamika must maintain transactionally, namely the sense (*don*) set out without being tainted by a ground for error consisting in an *arbitrary and gratuitous* worldly *vyavahāra* (*'jig rten pa'i tha sñad raṅ dga' ba sṅar bšad pa'i 'khrul rgyus ma bslad pas rnam par bžag pa'i don*). And because of a mistaken theory (*phyin ci log gi lta ba*) – e.g. one postulating a creator-deity (*dbaṅ phyug* = *īśvara*) or one making no distinctions with respect to existence and non-existence (i.e. between pure and simple existence [*yod pa tsam*]/non-existence [*med pa*] and reified existence/non-existence [*bden (par) yod (pa)/med (pa)*]) in virtue of a
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Tsoṅ kha pa next makes an important observation concerning the multifold actions making up preliminary practice. He writes that if all that belongs to the domain of religio-spiritual practice (*spyod pa* = *caryā*) – and which consists in wholesome practice (*dge sbyor spyod pa*) that requires first to be practised through the medium of conceptual construction (*rtog pa: kalpanā*, etc.) – were to be regarded as the mark of a false comprehension of Emptiness (*śūnyatā*), and if all preliminary practice were thus nothing but the grasping of phenomenal signs (*mtshan ma* = *nimitta*) fettering the practiser to the round of existence (*saṃsāra*), the mistaken idea could indeed arise that all wholesome practice was taught by the Buddha only for those persons who have not attained the true and definitive Sense (*ṅes pa'i don* = *nītārtha*) of his Teaching; and any and every conceptual construction would then be regarded as faulty. But it is precisely through such mistaken understanding that many rejections of Dharma have come about. And Tsoṅ kha pa cites the above-mentioned teaching of the Hva šaṅ Mahāyāna (Mo-ho-yen) as an example of such a rejection of practice involving conceptual construction.[75]

Now, whereas inferences (*anumāna*) belong to the domain of conceptualization (*[rnam par] rtog pa* = *kalpanā, vikalpa*), transaction (*tha sñad* = *vyavahāra*) and the surface level (*kun rdzob* = *saṃvṛti*), it has to be noted that Candrakīrti has described *saṃvṛti* as having for its essence an entity realized in error only (*viparyāsamātrāsāditātmabhāvasattākā saṃvṛtiḥ*).[76] For Tsoṅ kha pa, the restriction '*viparyāsamātra*' does not, however, have the effect of precluding what is thus realized from being cognitively realized by a knowledge that is not erroneous/deviant (such as *anumāna* and *rigs šes*). This is because the restriction '*viparyāsamātra*' is considered by him to be intended solely to negate the idea that what belongs to *saṃvṛti* is realized (or realizable) through an analysis (*dpyod*

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hypostatic *svabhāva*) – there would then exist an immense obstacle to the understanding of the true sense (*don*) of the Madhyamaka (*LRChM*, f. 424b2-4 [= p. 704]).

75 *LRChM*, f. 424b (= p. 704); cf. *LŠÑP*, f. 90b (= p. 487-8).

76 *PPMV* i.1, p. 68.7-8. Cf. *PPMV* i.1, p. 30.1-3 (*dharmiṇas tadādhārasya viparyāsamātrāsāditātmabhāvasya pracyutiḥ)*, and xii.10 (p. 234.4: *viparyāsamātralabdhātmasattākā duḥkhādisamvṛtiḥ*). See also *PPMV* i.1, p. 73.6-7.

pa = vicāra) that investigates the 'existential mode' (*yod tshul*, of entities on the level of *saṃvṛti*).[77] A *vyāvahārika-pramāṇa* is in fact still required as a cause of the correct cognition of the *paramārtha* (as stated by Nāgārjuna, *MK* xxiv.10ab: *vyavahāram anāśritya paramārtho na deśyate*).[78]

Finally, in his discussion of the self-characteristic (*raṅ gi mtshan ñid, *svalakṣaṇa*) that he has ascribed to the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika – whom, it is to be recalled, he in this context considers to be a *dṅos por smra ba* or Substantialist – Tsoṅ kha pa takes care to distinguish this concept (which he has criticized) from the concept of *svalakṣaṇa* – the 'own characteristic', i.e. the particular – associated in the Pramāṇa school with the principle of capacity for causal efficiency (*arthakriyā*).[79] And he adds that if Mādhyamikas such as Bhavya – according to whose system there exists transactionally in *dharma*s a **svalakṣaṇa* established in self-existence – also accept in their own system (*svamata*) a *svatantra-liṅga*,

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[77] See *LŠÑP*, f. 88b (= p. 484): *smra ba po'i brjod 'dod ni yod tshul ji ltar yin dpyod pa'i dpyod byed kyis rñed pa dgag par 'dod nas 'tsam' smos kyi/ ma 'khrul ba yin pa'i šes pas rñed pa 'gog pa min te.* Here Tsoṅ kha pa has quoted *PPMV*, p. 68.7-8. Compare above, p. 269 note 54.

In this connexion Tsoṅ kha pa has furthermore pointed out (*LŠÑP*, f. 88b5-6 [= pp. 484-5]) a difference between the explanation given in his *LŠÑP* and that given in his *LRChM* (f. 420a [= p. 697], where he had read *de'i tshe de kho nar* for *tadâiva* in *PPMV* i.1, p. 30.1). Cf. J. Hopkins, *Tibet Journal* 14 (1989), pp. 23-24, who concludes that this reading is an error for *de'i tshe kho nar*, which has then led commentators such as 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa to interpret this passage of the *PPMV* as referring to *tattva = paramārtha*. At f. 36b2 of his *thal bzlog* treatise (cited above, p. 264 note 47) sGom sde Nam mkha' rgyal mtshan has also adopted the reading *de'i tshe de kho nar* of the *LRChM* and interpreted the passage in terms of the *paramārtha (don dam par*, f. 36b4).

[78] See *LŠÑP*, f. 91a (= p. 488): *tha sñad pa'i tshad ma don dam pa 'jal ba'i rgyur med mi ruṅ ba yin pa 'di ñid/*

tha sñad la ni ma brten par/ /dam pa'i don ni rtogs mi 'gyur//

žes gsuṅs pa'i don no//

[79] *LRChM*, f. 423b5 (= p. 703). See above, p. 236 note 6.

the reason is precisely this existence in pragmatic-transactional usage of the **svalakṣaṇa*.[80] Consequently, the question as to whether a *svatantra-liṅga* is or is not postulated as part of one's own system hinges in fact on what Tsoṅ kha pa has termed the very subtle negandum (*dgag bya šin tu phra ba*).[81]

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[80] *LRChM*, f. 425a5-6 (= p. 705); cf. f. 429a2 (= p. 711).

[81] *LRChM*, ff. 425a-b (= p. 705). – The nature of the negandum (*dgag bya: pratiṣedhya*, etc.) according to the different schools of Buddhist thought has been briefly defined by dKon mchog 'Jigs med dbaṅ po in his *Grub mtha'i rnam bžag mdor bsdus pa, Rin po che'i phreṅ ba*. (On this subject see further the indices *s.v.* 'object of negation' in J. Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness* [London, 1983], especially Chart 37 on p. 299, and *Emptiness Yoga* [Ithaca, 1987], and in E. Napper, *Dependent-arising and Emptiness* [Boston, 1989] [especially for the Prāsaṅgika school]; in D. Lopez, *A study of Svātantrika* [Ithaca, 1987] [in particular for the Svātantrika school]; and the index *s.v.* 'negatee' in R. Thurman, *Tsong Khapa's Speech of Gold* [Princeton, 1984].)

The *pramāṇa* ontic-(epistemo)logically *established* in common between a Substantialist and a Mādhyamika, as required by Bhavya, demands in addition an absence of error with respect both to the object that is presented (*snaṅ yul*) in sensory cognition (*dbaṅ šes*) and to the object of conceptual thinking (*žen yul*) in conceptual construction (*rtog pa*). For if error attached to either, there could be neither something *established* in self-existence (as posited by the Substantialist) nor anything that would be *svatantra* (as posited by the Svātantrika), as the commentator Bra ti dGe bšes has observed (f. 278b1-2) on Tsoṅ kha pa's *LRChM*.

On the contrary, according to Candrakīrti's interpretation – following which the above-mentioned putative *pramāṇa*s are erroneous in so far as their objects (*yul*) are cognitively presented (*snaṅ ba*) as *raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa* –, even though there exists no self-nature (*raṅ bžin*) corresponding to the way the Svātantrika's **svalakṣaṇa* is represented in philosophy, the certification of the inferential *sādhya* will nevertheless be effected for a Substantialist in virtue of a *dharmin*, etc., established by sensory cognitions (*dbaṅ šes*) presented as such (i.e. as possessing a *svabhāva* established by self-characteristic [*raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i raṅ bžin*], which sen-

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For Tsoṅ kha pa, a *pramāṇa* is nonetheless found according to the Prāsaṅgika too even in the case of the *paraprasiddha-anumāna* (or the **paraprasiddha-prayogavākya*). As understood by him, this *pramāṇa* is, however, not one that cognizes something established in self-existence and acknowledged in common between the two parties to the debate as so established (*mthun snaṅ du grub pa*). And it is for precisely this reason that we have to speak of the absence of anything *established* equally for both parties (*gñis ka la grub pa : *ubhayasiddha*) – the Substantialist and the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika – but of something that is *paraprasiddha (gžan la grags pa)* or **parasiddha (gžan la grub pa)*.[82]

11. THE LOGICAL-EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND ONTIC STATUS OF THE PRĀSAṄGIKA'S *paraprasiddha*-ARGUMENT ACCORDING TO TSOṄ KHA PA

To take once more the analysis of the case of the seeing eye set forth by Nāgārjuna in *MK* iii.2cd (see above, § 4), it is a fact established by *pramāṇa* that the idea of an eye not seeing itself but seeing an other is inconsistent (*viruddha* 'in conflict') so long as one assumes (as the Substantialist does) that the eye and its cognitive object are reified entities established in self-existence. This is therefore not something that can be settled through mere assertion (*khas blaṅs tsam : abhyupagamamātra*) on the part of the Mādhyamika proponent against the Substantialist opponent (*prativādin*).[83] As Candrakīrti has observed, according to a procedure established in transactions in the world (*laukika vyavahāra*) and applic-

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sory cognitions are withal, for this very reason, erroneous in respect to *pramāṇa*). See *LRChM*, f. 425b2-3, with the comment of Bra ti dGe bšes, f. 278b.

82 *LRChM*, f. 430a1-3 (= p. 713).

83 Concerning the demonstration, based on a *paraprasiddha* argument, that there exists an inferential nexus of pervasion (*khyab pa* = *vyāpti*) between the eye's not seeing itself and its seeing an other being unestablished in self-existence (see *MK* iii.2 cited above, p. 247), Tsoṅ kha pa (*LRChM*, f. 431b [= p. 715]) refers to Buddhapālita, and also to Ārya-Deva's *CŚ* xiii.16.

able equally in logic (*nyāya*), an opponent can be confuted by means of what he himself asserts (*svavacana*, i.e. what is *svaprasiddha* for him), but never exclusively by means of what an other – i.e. the proponent – alone maintains (*paravacana*).[84]

Now, the individual terms of this argument concerning the eye's seeing pose no problem for the Substantialist *prativādin*, for whom both the *dharmin* (eye) and the inferential *liṅga* (because of [the eye's] not seeing itself) are in fact established (*siddha*). Only Nāgārjuna's rejection of the (unnegated) predicate (seeing an other) – which is being here maintained by the Substantialist *prativādin* – by means of a mutually acceptable inferential sign (*liṅga*) was at the outset unacceptable to the *prativādin*. And it has therefore still to be established for his sake by the (Prāsaṅgika-)Mādhyamika through a *paraprasiddha*-argument (i.e. an argument acceptable to the *prativādin*).

But this step is not to be effected through a *svatantra anumāna* (or a *svatantra prayogavākya*), because this would require a *dharmin* that is mutually agreed on between the parties, i.e. one held to be *established* ontic-(epistemo)logically (and hypostatically) in common (*mthun snaṅ du grub pa*); for, as already seen, this is something that is impossible according to the Prāsaṅgika. Rather, it can be effected through the Prāsaṅgika's method of the *paraprasiddha*-argument, which does nonetheless make use of an argument involving a *trirūpa-liṅga* acceptable to the Prāsaṅgika too.

This being the case, it should not be supposed that the showing up of the inconsistency (*'gal ba* 'conflict', i.e. between a self-existent eye-entity's not seeing itself and, nevertheless, seeing an other entity) rests *exclusively* on what is *paraprasiddha*, i.e. on something acknowledged by only *one* party to the debate, namely the Prāsaṅgika's Substantialist opponent. For, as already noted, the inferential *liṅga* (because of [the eye's] not seeing itself) is fully established for *both* the *prativādin* (the Substantialist) and the *vādin* (the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika).[85] And since it is so established, it does not need to be established anew by the *vādin* against the *prativādin* by means of the argument in question.

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[84] *PPMV*, pp. 34.13-35.5. Cf. *LRChM*, f. 433a-b (= p. 718).

[85] *LRChM*, ff. 430b-431a (= p. 714).

Once one understands the philosophically crucial difference between nihilistic non-being (*med pa*) and the non-existence of self-existence (*raṅ gi ṅo bo ñid med pa, raṅ bžin med pa*) and between (hypostatic and eternalistic self-)existence (*bden par yod pa*, etc.) and existence pure and simple (*yod pa [tsam]*, on the *saṃvṛti*-level) – the former member of each of these pairs being rejected by the Mādhyamika who, however, accepts the second member of each pair – one will come to understand how a non-reified *prameya* is correctly cognized by means of a non-reified *pramāṇa* (*raṅ bžin med pa'i gžal bya la raṅ bžin med pa'i tshad mas 'jal ba la sogs pa yaṅ rtogs par 'gyur ba yin no*).[86]

Thus, by means of reasoned and valid argument, the Mādhyamika *vādin* will be in a position to bring the Substantialist *prativādin* to understand that seeing cannot involve self-existent (albeit interacting) reified entities. And to this end an inferential argument for another (*parārthānumāna*) will be required since direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) does not prove adequate for the purpose.[87]

In sum, according to Tsoṅ kha pa, in the formal argument embedded in *MK* iii.2cd, the *dharmin* (eye), the inferential *liṅga* (because of [the eye's] not seeing itself), and the example (pot, or ear) are held by the Substantialist *prativādin* (who does not negate the predicate) to exist (hypostatically, *yod par 'dzin pa*). But they are considered by the Mādhyamika *vādin* (who does negate the predicate) to exist transactionally (*tha sñad du yod pa*). There is therefore no question of these terms of the argument being invalidated by the *vādin's* reasoning (*rigs pas gnod pa ma yin no*).

Yet, so long as an understanding of the theory (*darśana*) of *nairātmya/niḥsvabhāvatā* has not been attained, a person cannot actually differentiate between existence pure and simple (*yod pa [tsam]*) and existence established in virtue of self-characteristic (*raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa'i yod pa*).[88] So it is because they still take absence of self-existence to be pervaded by (nihilistic) non-existence (*med pa*) that philoso-

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86 *LRChM*, f. 432b (= p. 717). See above, pp. 267 f., 276 f. and 278 note 74.

87 *LRChM*, f. 432b4 (= p. 717).

88 *LRChM*, f. 424b-425a (= p. 704-05).

phers have often held that the system of cause and effect (*rgyu 'bras*) cannot be set out in regard to that which is empty of *svabhāva*.[89] Such is the case for the Substantialist *prativādin* who does not clearly differentiate between (hypostatic and eternalistic self-)existence and being pure and simple – but not for the true Mādhyamika who clearly makes this distinction and is consequently able to eschew the extreme of nihilism (*ucchedānta* 'annihilationism') as well as that of eternalism (*śāśvatānta*). And it is, therefore, the sensory object (*yul* = *viṣaya*) imagined by the Substantialist to be established by a *pramāṇa* correctly cognizing (*'jal ba*) it as a *prameya* established in virtue of hypostatic self-existence that is invalidatable or annulable by reasoning (*rigs pas gnod pa*). But what is established only in a pragmatic-transactional cognition (*tha sñad pa'i šes pa*) in the conscious stream of the *prativādin*, the ultimate reality of which is therefore not subject to invalidation or annulment (*gnod pa med pa*), will not have to be negated.[90]

Accordingly, no *pramāṇa* correctly cognizing a *prameya* and established in self-existence is postulated in common in the systems of both the Substantialist *prativādin* and the Mādhyamika *vādin*. At the same time, nothing requires to be proved by the *vādin* for the *prativādin* through an autonomous (*svatantra*) reason. Rather, what the (Prāsaṅgika-)Mādhyamika *vādin* does at this point is to show up the conflict (*'gal ba* = *virodha*) in the Substantialist *prativādin's* own concept postulating the seeing by a self-existent eye of a self-existent object. And this he achieves by means of the above-mentioned inferential *liṅga* or *hetu* (not seeing itself) that is in fact accepted by the *prativādin* as well as by himself, and which is shown to be in conflict with the Substantialist's view of

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89 *LRChM*, f. 425a1-2 (= p. 705). According to Tsoṅ kha pa, in order not to fall into the extreme of nihilism the follower of the Middle Way has to 'save the appearances' by means of the philosophical system (*rnam bžag* = *vyavasthā*) of action and agent (*bya byed*) and of cause and effect (*rgyu 'bras*), which operates on the level of pragmatic-transactional usage (*tha sñad* = *vyavahāra*).

90 *LRChM*, f. 430a-b (= p. 713).

the relation between a *pramāṇa* (e.g. eye-cognition) and its *prameya* (e.g. visible matter).[91]

12. THE *paraprasiddha-anumāna* AND THE *prasaṅgāpādana* AS *pramāṇa* AND AS MAIEUTICS

The Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika's reference to a *paraprasiddha-anumāna* – and even (in the case of Tibetan Prāsaṅgikas) to a **paraprasiddha-prayogavākya* – should not then, according to Tsoṅ kha pa, be understood as conveying or implying that (as *vādin*) he does not himself hold his inferences for another (*parārthānumāna*) or his formal arguments to be valid – that is, that he does not consider them to have the logical-epistemological force of *pramāṇa*. Rather, this type of terminology is said by him to have been employed to indicate that the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika makes use of an inferential sign (*liṅga*) that his opponent accepts in order to bring him to understand that this logical reason precludes his postulating any entity *established* in self-existence.

In this sense, accordingly, the Prāsaṅgika's dialectical method of apagogic reasoning (*prasaṅgāpādana*) functions as a kind of philosophical 'obstetrics' – as a quite special form of *maieutics* – rather than as a regular system of refutation (*dūṣaṇa*) and categoric proof (*sādhana*) of the kind recognized in the autonomous formal probative arguments of the Svātantrikas. In the history of the Madhyamaka school it may be appropriate, then, to describe the Svātantrika's arguments as representing a categoric, probative argument, and the Prāsaṅgika's apagogic reasoning as constituting a kind of elenctic maieutics.[92] For Tsoṅ kha pa, the kind of philosophical maieutics practised by the Prāsaṅgika is to be combined with *pramāṇa*.

It is, therefore, essential clearly to distinguish between a reified *pramāṇa* serving to cognize a reified *prameya* the existence of which in its

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91 *LRChM*, f. 430b1-2 (= p. 713).

92 This is of course not to maintain that the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika's procedure is simply identical with (Plato's idea of) Socratic maieutics.

turn guarantees the *pramāṇa* within the frame of a relation between two independent (albeit interacting) hypostatically self-existent entities – something rejected by Tsoṅ kha pa (following for example the *Vigraha-vyāvartanī*) together with the *chos can daṅ rtags kyi tshul gsum sgrub pa'i tshad ma* (*LRChM*, f. 423b4-5 [= p. 703]) or *raṅ mtshan 'jal ba'i tshad ma* (f. 428b5 [= p. 711]) – and an inference or formal probative argument validated by the *trairūpya*, which is in fact accepted by Tsoṅ kha pa in agreement with Dharmakīrti and the Pramāṇa school.

Thus, in view of his explanation of the logical-epistemological structure and function of *anumāna* and *prayogavākya* and the meaning of *paraprasiddha* for the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika, Tsoṅ kha pa feels free to make full use in his Madhyamaka philosophy of some of the logical and epistemological insights of Dharmakīrti and his school.

13. THE PROCEDURES OF *vyavaccheda* AND *pariccheda* IN MADHYAMAKA THOUGHT

In establishing the philosopher's understanding of the real nature of things (*dharma*) not only negatively (and apophatically) – i.e. as not having self-existence (*svabhāva*) – but also positively (and cataphatically) – i.e. as having the mark of non-substantiality (*nairātmya*) –, Tsoṅ kha pa has made use of Dharmakīrti's twin procedures of *vyavaccheda (rnam par gcod pa)* and *pariccheda (yoṅs su gcod pa)*. For, according to him, not only must hypostatic establishment (*bden [par] grub [pa]*) be excluded through negative determination (*rnam par bcad pa = vyavaccheda*), but the absence of hypostatic existence (*bden med*) must be realized through positive determination (*yoṅs su gcod pa = pariccheda*).[93]

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[93] On these two concepts in Dharmakīrti, see his *Hetubindu* (ed. Steinkellner), p. 25* f. And for Tsoṅ kha pa's discussion of the twin procedures he designates by the terms *rnam par bcad pa = vyavaccheda* and *yoṅs su gcod pa = pariccheda*, see *LŠÑP*, ff. 108a-112a (= pp. 517-23); and *LRChM*, f. 409b (= p. 680): *de lta na raṅ bžin yod pa rnam par bcad na'aṅ gdon mi za bar raṅ bžin med pa yoṅs su gcod dgos pa mtshuṅs pa yin no.* See above, Section II, § 16.

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14. THE USE OF THE *bādhakapramāṇa* AND CONTRAPOSITION IN ATTAINING THE MADHYAMAKA THEORY OF NON-SUBSTANTIALITY (*niḥsvabhāvatā*)

The indirect, and inferentially based, means of correct knowledge known in the Pramāṇa school as the '*pramāṇa* of annulment [i.e. invalidation of a *hetu* "probans"] in the reversal of the probandum (*sādhyaviparyaya-bādhakapramāṇa*)' has been studied in recent years on the basis of works by Dharmakīrti and his commentators and on Mokṣākaragupta's *Tarkabhāṣā*.[94] The *bādhakapramāṇa* is for instance known from its use

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It should be mentioned that (like many other philosophers) Candrakīrti made use of the idea of *pariccheda (yoṅs su gcod pa)*, for example in his *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti* (verses 3, 8, 11-12); but he does not appear to have applied it in this particular way as complementarily opposed to *vyavaccheda (rnam par gcod pa)*.

[94] On the *sādhyaviparyaye (hetor) bādhakapramāṇam*, or *sādhyaviparyaya-bādhakapramāṇa*, see Dharmakīrti, *Hetubindu* (ed. Steinkellner), p. 4.5*: *sā sādhyaviparyaye hetor bādhakapramāṇavṛttiḥ* (Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ*, ii [Vienna, 1967], p. 37: 'Dieser [Nachweis] besteht im Auftreten eines Erkenntnismittels, das den Grund im Gegenteil des zu Beweisenden aufhebt'; Y. Kajiyama, *The Antarvyāptisamarthana of Ratnākaraśānti* (Tokyo, 1999), p. 13: 'valid proof annulling the probans in the contrary of the probandum [which the proponent wants to establish]'); id., *Vādanyāya* (ed. Much), p. 2 (see Much's translation, pp. 4-7). For the *prasaṅgaviparyaya*, see Mokṣākaragupta, *Tarkabhāṣā* (ed. Rangaswami Iyengar), pp. 48-49. And on *prasaṅga, prasaṅgasādhana, prasaṅgaviparyaya* and the *(sādhya)viparyaye bādhakapramāṇam*, see also Ratnakīrti, *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi*, p. 63 f. – On the type of reasoning known elsewhere as the *(bādhaka)pramāṇa* through non-apprehension of the pervader (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*) – i.e. the *vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhipramāṇa* –, the *prasaṅgasādhana* and the *prasaṅgāpādana*, compare e.g. Kamalaśīla, *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* 392-4 (cf. 18, 87, 304). In his comment on verses 392-4, Kamalaśīla (who refers to Dharmakīrti's *Svavṛtti*, p. 26) has specified that an apagogic argument against the opponent (*prasaṅgāpādanaṃ paraṃ prati*) is used in a case where the *hetu* (i.e. '*sattvāt*', in the statement *yat sat tat sarvaṃ kṣaṇikam*) is →

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inconclusive since it is found also in the heterologue (*vipakṣa*), in place of a *prayoga* that relies on *vyāpakānupalabdhi* establishing a negative relation (*vyatirekasādhinī*) and which operates through *svātantrya*. The *Pañjikā* on verses 392-4 explains: *prayogaḥ: yat sat tat sarvaṃ kṣaṇikam, yathā samanantaraṃ pratipāditāḥ kṣaṇikāḥ padārthāḥ| santaś ca bhavatā vyomādayo bhāvā iṣyante iti svabhāvahetuḥ|... 'tvayêṣyante' ity anena prasaṅgasādhanam etad iti darśayati ... | ... na hy asmābhiḥ svātantryeṇa pramāṇatayā vyatirekasādhinyā asyā vyāpakānupalabdheḥ prayogaḥ kriyate| kiṃ tarhi| prasaṅgāpādanaṃ paraṃ prati kriyate| yadi bhavatā teṣāṃ sthirarūpatâṅgīkriyate tadârthakriyāsāmarthyam api nâṅgīkartavyam, tatra kramayaugapadyayogasya tadvyāpakasyâbhāvāt| na hi vyāpakanivṛttau vyāpyam avasthātum utsahate| anyathā vyāpyavyāpakabhāva eva tayor na syāt| tataś cârthakriyāsāmarthyanivṛttau sattvam api teṣāṃ nâṅgīkartavyam| arthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇatvāt sattvasyêti| anenopāyena teṣām abhāva eva pratipadyate|...*

For some modern discussions of *sādhyaviparyaya*, *prasaṅgaviparyaya*, etc., see Y. Kajiyama, *An introduction to Buddhist philosophy* (Kyōto, 1966), pp. 97, 114-17 with notes 260, 301, 302 and 304 ('proof contradicting the opposite of the assertion to be proved', p. 97); id., *The Antarvyāptisamarthana of Ratnākaraśānti*, pp. 14-34, 37; K. Mimaki, *La réfutation bouddhique de la permanence des choses* (Paris, 1976), pp. 55, 59 f. ('preuve qui annule le contraire de l'assertion à prouver', p. 321); K. Bhattacharya, 'Some thoughts on *Antarvyāpti, Bahirvyāpti*, and *Trairūpya*', in: B. K. Matilal and R. D. Evans (ed.), *Buddhist logic and epistemology* (Dordrecht, 1986), p. 93 and note 28; E. Steinkellner, 'The logic of the *svabhāvahetu* in Dharmakīrti's *Vādanyāya*', in: *Studies in the Buddhist epistemological tradition*', p. 313 f. ('valid cognition which negates [the logical reason] in the contradictory opposite [of the argued property]', p. 313; on the meaning of *viparyaya*, see p. 317; and on the applicability of this procedure to all cases of *svabhāvahetu*, see p. 319); T. Tani, 'Logic and Time-ness in Dharmakīrti's philosophy', *ibid.*, pp. 325-401 ('determinant cognition of negating [the hypothetical indicator] in the reverse form of the property to be proved', p. 325); id. '*Rang rgyud 'phen pa'i thal 'gyur*', in : *Tibetan studies* (Narita, 1992). pp. 281-301; id., 'Reinstatement of the theory of external determination of pervasion (*bahirvyāptivāda*)', in: S. Katsura (ed.), *Dharmakīrti's thought and its impact on Indian and Tibetan philosophy* (Vienna, 1999), pp. 363-86; T. Iwata, *Prasaṅga und prasaṅgaviparyaya bei Dharmakīrti und seinen Kommentatoren*
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in establishing the momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*) of things (in the so-called *sattvānumāna* based on the logical reason 'existence'). The principle according to which this form of knowledge operates is that if, in inferential knowledge, the 'pervader' (*vyāpaka* = *sādhya* 'probandum', i.e. the property to be inferred) is not accepted the corresponding logical reason (*vyāpya* 'pervaded' = *hetu, liṅga, sādhana* 'probans') also cannot be accepted; and conversely, if the *vyāpya* is accepted then the *vyāpaka* must also be accepted.[95] This amounts to saying

'If not *s(ādhya)*, then not *(svabhāva)h(etu)*',

which is the contraposition of the standard inferential schema

'If *h*, then *s*'.

The process in question is thus founded on a correctly grounded non-apprehension (or: non-observation) of the probandum (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*) in an inference which, being therefore defeasible, is then annulled.[96]

(Vienna, 1993) ('die gültige Erkenntnis ..., welche im Gegenteil der zu beweisenden Folge ... den Grund annuliert', p. 49); id., 'On *prasaṅgaviparyaya* in Dharmakīrti's tradition – Prajñākaragupta and gTsaṅ nag pa', in: *Tibetan studies* (Proceedings of the 7th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Vienna, 1997), i, pp. 427-37; and C. Yoshimizu, *Die Erkenntnislehre des Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka* (Vienna, 1996). (Cf. S. Onoda, *Monastic debate in Tibet* (Vienna, 1992), p. 71 ff.; and L. van der Kuijp, *JIABS* 16 (1993), p. 284.)

[95] See Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇaviniścaya* iii (P, f. 286a5-7 = D, f. 188a5-7): *gžan gyis kun brtags pas thal ba sgrub pa ... gaṅ yin pa de ni chos gcig khas blaṅs na chos gžan khas blaṅs par bstan pa'i phyir yin te*; cf. T. Iwata, *Prasaṅga und prasaṅgaviparyaya bei Dharmakīrti und seinen Kommentatoren*, p. 23. See further Mokṣākaragupta, *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 49 (in the context of the *prasaṅgaviparyaya*): *vyāpyavyāpakayoḥ sambandhe sati yadi vyāpakaṃ nêṣyate tadā vyāpyam api nêṣyatām/ atha vyāpyam iṣyate tadā vyāpakam apîṣyatām*. Cf. also Dharmakīrti, *Pramānavārttika* iv.12: ... *prasaṅgo dvayasambandhād ekāpāye 'nyahānaye*, and Manorathanandin's *Vṛtti:* ... *yathā cânekaṃ sāmānyaṃ tasmān nânekavṛttîti viparyayaprayoge sādhyābhāve sādhanābhāvaḥ kathyate/ prasaṅgaviparyayo 'tra maulahetuḥ, sādhyasādhanavyāptigrāhakapramāṇasmārakas tu prasaṅge prayoga ity arthaḥ//*

[96] See Dharmakīrti, *Vādanyāya*, pp. 2-3, 16; and Arcaṭa, *Hetubinduṭīkā*, p. →

Whereas the terms *bādhakapramāṇa* and *vyāpakānupalabdhi* are not attested in Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā*, and even though this logico-epistemological theory of *viparyaya* developed in the Pramāṇa school was not set out either in this same author's *Madhyamakāvatāra*,[97] Tsoṅ kha pa has employed the procedure of *(prasaṅga)viparyaya* in his *Lam rim chen mo* under the rubric demonstrating that a cart (*śiṅ rta* = *ratha*), as an assemblage of its component parts, is without self-nature and in fact a mere designation (*prajñapti*). This rubric – entitled 'The virtue of rapidly attaining Madhyamaka theory' (*[de la brten nas] lta ba myur du rñed pa'i phan yon)* – is subsumed under the topic of the non-substantiality of the person (*pudgalanairātmya*) established on the basis of an investigation of the relation between a putative 'self' and the *skandha*s (*LRChM*, f. 434a ff. = p. 719 ff.).

Tsoṅ kha pa's discussion refers back to *MA(Bh)* vi.159-60, where Candrakīrti has examined the relation of identity or difference between a whole (*yan lag can* = *aṅgin*, i.e. an *avayavin*, *sāmagrī* or *samūha*) and its parts (*yan lag* = *aṅga*). Probably the best-known model in Buddhist thought for this type of deconstructive analysis is the aforementioned relation between a cart and its various components, which Candrakīrti has envisaged under seven aspects.[98] In the relevant passage of the *Lam rim*

44: *etac ca bādhakapramāṇaṃ vyāpakānupalabdhirūpam* ... This refers to an epistemologically grounded non-apprehension as opposed to circumstantially contingent non-apprehension (i.e. the not seeing of something visible owing to contingent circumstances). – See E. Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ*, ii, pp. 98, 184, 187 ('Nichtbeobachtung des Umfassenden'); cf. id., *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ*, ii (Vienna, 1973), note 534 (on the *vyāpakadharmānupalabdhi* 'Nichtbeobachtung einer umfassenden Beschaffenheit' [I, p. 56], with note 178 on *viruddhopalabdhi*); id., 'The logic of the *svabhāvahetu*', pp. 318-19; and M. T. Much, *Vādanyāya*, ii (Vienna, 1991), p. 6 f.

97 Dharmakīrti and Candrakīrti are usually dated as contemporaries in the seventh century. But while Candrakīrti has referred to Dignāga (at the end of his *MA*) and discussed his epistemology (in the *PPMV*), he does not seem to have explicitly referred to Dharmakīrti.

98 The seven schemata for examining the relation between a cart and its components are: identity (1), difference (2), container (3), contained (4) and →

chen mo – where Tsoṅ kha pa has followed Candrakīrti's *MABh* (vi.134 ff.) in showing that no relation can possibly be posited between a whole and its parts so long as they are considered to be hypostatized entities (*bhāva*) having self-existence (*svabhāva*) – the procedure in question is connected with what has been described as a process (*rim pa* = *krama*) in three stages whose final stage consisting in the Yogin's examination (*ñe bar brtag pa*) follows on his realizing how to analyse negation of the extreme eternalistic view (*śāśvatānta*), whereby a self-nature is imputed to *dharma*s, and negation of the extreme nihilistic view (*ucchedānta* 'annihilationism'), wherein it is supposed that real origination would be impossible for any thing having no self-nature.[99]

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connexion (5) together with the aggregation of distinct component parts (6) and shape (*saṃsthāna*) as belonging either to the individual components or to their totality (7). See *MA(Bh)* vi.151 f. (with vi.134 on the relation between a forest and its trees); and *LRChM*, f. 434b f. (= p. 720 f.). For the cart example, see also *PPMV* xxiv.18 (and xviii.1 [p. 346.2]). In *MK* chap. x, Nāgārjuna has discussed the relation between fire and fuel by means of a fivefold *vicāra*. A fivefold *vicāra* has also been applied to the relation between a *tathāgata* and the *skandha*s in *MK* chap. xxii.

For an analysis based on the example of the cart, see further the *Vajirā-sutta* in the Saṃyuttanikāya (I, p. 135): *yathā hi aṅgasambhārā hoti saddo ratho iti/ evaṃ khandhesu santesu hoti satto ti sammuti//*; and *Milindapañha*, pp. 27-28 (on *saṅkhā, samaññā, paññatti, vohāra* and *nāma* as dependent designations).

[99] See *MABh* vi.159cd (*...rnal 'byor pas rim pa 'di ñid kyis 'di la rnam par dpyod pa na ches myur ba kho nar de kho na ñid kyi gtiṅ dpogs par 'gyur ro*); and *LRChM*, f. 440a (= p. 729): *(bźi pa rnam pa bdun gyi dpyad pas rtag chad dgag sla źiṅ ñe bar raṅ bźin med par bstan pa'i khyab chos gsum yod par mdor bstan ni/) mdor na śiṅ rta la brtsams nas sṅar bśad pa lta bu'i rnam gźag byas pa 'di la yon tan (khyad par ba) gsum yod de/ chos rnams la (raṅ ṅos nas grub pa'i) raṅ bźin sgro 'dogs pa'i rtag lta dgag sla ba'i yon tan daṅ/ raṅ bźin (gyis) med pa la rten 'brel mi 'thad sñam pa'i chad lta dgag sla ba'i yon tan daṅ/ (rtag chad kyi lta ba spoṅ ba'i) yon tan de gñis dpyod tshul ji lta bu źig byas pas 'grub pa'i (byed lugs) rnal 'byor pas ñe bar brtag pa(r bya ba)'i rim pa'o.* ('Jam dbyaṅs bźad pa's notes contained in the annotated edition of the *LRChM* [kha, f. 311] are given here in round brack- →

The final third stage in this process is described by Tsoṅ kha pa as grounded in *vyāpakānupalabdhi* and the *bādhakapramāṇa* in the following way:[100]

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ets.)

[100] *LRChM*, f. 440b (= pp. 729-30): *(bdun pa dpyod tshul de la raṅ bžin med pa rnam 'grel gyi don du 'chad tshul ni/) gsum pa (de 'dra'i yon tan gñis gaṅ gis 'grub pa'i rnal 'byor pas ji ltar bya ba'i rim pa) ni/ (de kho na ñid 'tshol ba'i rnal 'byor pas thog mar khyab bya khyab byed gñis kyi 'brel ba gžan du mi 'khrul bar ṅes par bya ste 'di ltar) khyab bya raṅ bžin gyis grub (pa de ñid yin) na khyab byed (raṅ bžin gyis) gcig tha dad la sogs pa'i (mtha') rnam pa bdun (po gaṅ ruṅ kho na ma gtogs gžan du 'gro ba med pas na de bdun po gaṅ ruṅ) las mi 'da' ba'i ṅes pa (gtiṅ tshugs par draṅ bar bya'o/ /de ltar khyab bya khyab byed de gñis kyi 'brel ba mi 'khrul ba raṅ bžin gyis grub pa la/ raṅ bžin gyis gcig tha dad sogs bdun po gaṅ ruṅ gis khyab par ṅes pa) draṅs nas de nas (mtha' bdun po) de dag re re la (rigs pa'i) gnod byed bstan pa('i tshe) na/ (mtha') bdun po de dag gaṅ la (khas blaṅs na) yaṅ (rigs pa'i) gnod pa 'bab par (ṅes pa rñed pa'i sgo nas) mthoṅ ba na/ khyab byed (mtha' bdun po gaṅ ruṅ de khegs pa yin la khyab byed de) khegs pa (de ñid kyi)s khyab bya (raṅ bžin gyis grub pa de) yaṅ khegs pa (yin pas na raṅ bžin gyis grub pa khegs pa la ṅes pa rñed pa de) thog mar byas nas (de nas yaṅ nas yaṅ du de ltar dpyad ciṅ) raṅ bžin med pa('i don de ñid) la (ṅes pa je cher 'gro ba'i rgyu mtshan gyi šugs bskyed pa'i phyir/) thag chod kyi ṅes pa maṅ du draṅ (bar bya'o/ /de nas ṅes pa de'i šugs bstan par byas pa) de'i rjes su (šiṅ rta ji ltar snaṅ ba la bltas pas gaṅ snaṅ ba) de ltar raṅ bžin (gyis grub par) med kyaṅ (tshur snaṅ ba tsam žig la) šiṅ rta'i tha sñad ('jog dgos pa la) bsñon mi nus par (ṅes pa rñed ciṅ mthoṅ bar 'gyur la de ltar ṅes šiṅ) mthoṅ ba na/ ('di sñam du) e ma'o/ las daṅ ñon moṅs (pa 'khrul ba sna tshogs su snaṅ bar byed nus) pa'i (sgo nas) sgyu ma mkhan (daṅ 'dra ba 'di ñid) gyis byas pa'i šiṅ rta la sogs pa'i (rnam 'gyur sna tshogs su snaṅ ba'i sgo nas) sgyu ma (daṅ 'dra ba'i chos) 'di ni šin tu (yaṅ) ya mtshan (che) te/ (de ltar ya mtshan che ba'i tshul ni) 'di ltar (sna tshogs pa'i brdzun pa'i raṅ bžin 'di 'dra ba snaṅ ba yin pa la yaṅ ni) raṅ raṅ gi rgyu daṅ rkyen las cuṅ zad kyaṅ (ma 'byuṅ ba'i go rim) ma 'chol (žiṅ ma nor) bar (ni) 'byuṅ la/ (de ltar 'byuṅ tshul ṅes pa can de la bltas na ṅes par bden pa mi bslu ba žig yin dgos rgyu la kho'i raṅ bžin la rigs pas bltas pa'i tshe na ni tshur snaṅ ba de tsam las) raṅ raṅ gi ṅo bo (de ga'i steṅ na)s grub pa'i raṅ bžin yaṅ (ni) cuṅ zad*

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'It being ascertained that, if the pervaded (*vyāpya*) [i.e. the logical reason in an (annulable) inferential process] is established by self-nature, it does not stray from the pervader (*vyāpaka*) [i.e. the *sādhya* or probandum in this inference] – viz. one of the seven forms [of relation examined in Candrakīrti's *MA*] such as being identical or different (*gcig tha dad*) –, then, for each of them, the [correct] annulling [knowledge] (*bādhaka[jñāna]*) is indicated. It being then seen that annulment (*bādha*) touches each member of the heptad [of these positable relations], once the *vyāpya* has been excluded by means of the exclusion of the *vyāpaka*, there shall be achieved in various ways an ascertainment (*niścaya*) that determines absence of self-nature. If it is thereafter observed that in this way, notwithstanding their being without self-nature, the pragmatic-transactional denomination (*vyavahāra*) 'cart' (*ratha*) [nevertheless] cannot be [nihilistically] contested, oh!, most marvellous is the illusory projection (*māyā*) of a cart produced by the illusionist-projector (*māyāvin*) of acts (*karman*) and defilements (*kleśa*)! This is because ascertainment will be achieved respecting the fact that a thing originating in dependence (*pratītyasamutpanna*) is not produced in virtue of any self-nature, considering that, in this way, what arises necessarily from causes and conditions (*hetupratyaya*) is without the slightest self-nature established in self-existence.'

That is, were it the case that the whole and its parts are indeed established by self-nature – corresponding to the *vyāpya* in the (annulable) inference – they will perforce be established in terms of being identical, different, etc. – i.e. the *vyāpaka* in this inference. But through a philosophical analysis such as the examination of the designation (*prajñapti*) 'cart', it is shown that the whole and its parts are in fact not established, in terms

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kyaṅ med (par ṅes) pa'i phyir (na 'di las ṅo mtshar ba žig yod) sñam du rten ciṅ 'brel bar 'byuṅ ba'i don raṅ bžin gyis ma skyes pa('i steṅ nas šar ba) la ṅes pa (bde lag tu) rñed par 'gyur (bas na rnal 'byor pas mtha' gñis spaṅs pa'i don la šin tu 'jug bde) ba'i phyir ro// ('Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa's notes contained in the annotated edition of the *LRChM* [kha, ff. 312a-313a] are given here in round brackets.) Tsoṅ kha pa then quotes two supporting passages from Candrakīrti's comment on the *Catuḥśataka*.

of identity and difference, as relata having self-existence. Consequently, establishment by self-existence of the whole and its parts is unestablished (following the principle that, if the *vyāpaka* is in fact unavailable to the philosopher-analyst, the *vyāpya* cannot be accepted by him). In other words, the Mādhyamika's cognitive procedure for penetrating reality (*de kho na ñid = tattva*), in so far as it is grounded in the *bādhakapramāṇa (gnod par byed pa'i tshad ma)* and in *vyāpakānupalabdhi (khyab [par] byed [pa] mi dmigs pa)* here described by Tsoṅ kha pa, rests on the correctness of establishing the conclusion – namely the property of being without self-nature – by deriving it, through reversal (*viparyaya*), from the (annulable) inference wherein a relation of identity, difference, etc. – the *vyāpaka* that corresponds to the *vyāpya* 'having self-nature' – is predicated of the relata – but where no such *vyāpaka* is in fact apprehendable by the philosopher-analyst. This is, then, what is termed non-apprehension of the probandum of the inference (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*). Nevertheless, Tsoṅ kha pa concludes, this understanding does not represent nihilism whereby *karman* and *kleśa* would be denied and *pratītyasamutpāda* along with the system of cause and effect would be excluded. (The marvel that has been alluded to here is that the opposite is the case.)

In sum, once it is known through philosophical analysis (*rnam par dpyod pa = vicāra*) that the imputed *vyāpaka* is in fact unavailable, from the (annulable) inferential statement

> 'What is established by self-nature [i.e., the *vyāpya* in the inference] is, then, [in self-nature] identical, different, etc. [i.e., the *vyāpaka*, which philosophical analysis – e.g. in the example of the cart – has, however, shown not to be apprehendable]',

it is possible to derive, by a kind of contrapositive reversal (*viparyaya*), the correct knowledge through annulment, namely

> 'What is not [in self-nature] identical, different, etc., [i.e. the *vyāpaka* in the inference] is, then, not established by self-nature [i.e. the *vyāpya*]'.

This may be formulated as

> 'If *h*, then *s*; if not *s*, then not *h*'.

In the particular case under consideration of the origination in dependence (*pratītyasamutpāda*) of things without their having any self-nature, from the (annulable) inference

> 'What is possessed of self-nature [*sasvabhāva*, the *vyāpya* in the inference] is, then, not originated in dependence [*apratītya-samutpanna*, the *vyāpaka*, which philosophical analysis has, however, shown not to be apprehendable)',

it is possible to derive, by a kind of contrapositive reversal, the correct knowledge of annulment

> 'What originates in dependence [*pratītyasamutpanna*, i.e. the *vyāpya* in the inference] is, then, without self-existence [*niḥ-svabhāva*, i.e. the *vyāpaka*]'.

The present passage of the *Lam rim chen mo* demonstrates how a Tibetan Madhyamaka tradition represented by Tsoṅ kha pa has adopted and integrated a logico-epistemological technique of the Pramāṇa school for the purpose of generating the Madhyamaka philosophical theory (*lta ba* = *darśana*) of non-substantiality, namely that the *pudgala* (and indeed all *dharma*s) are without self-nature (*raṅ bžin med pa*)/self-existence (*ṅo bo ñid med pa*).[101]

What in the present context distinguishes the use of this technique is the fact that it no longer simply forms part of an argument, or formal debate, between the advocate of an eternalist (*nityatā*) doctrine, or some form of *pudgala* doctrine, and the Buddhist critic of eternalism or the *pudgalavāda*, and that it has been adopted by the Mādhyamika as a means of generating correct theory in the conscious stream (*saṃtāna*) of the practising philosopher with a view to achieving the ascertainment (*niścaya*) of reality.

15. CONCLUSION

Tsoṅ kha pa's analysis studied here of the nature and function of indirect or inferential cognition, inclusive also of the Mādhyamika's

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[101] Concerning agreement between the Madhyamaka and Pramāṇa schools (*dbu tshad*), see also *LRChM* f. 446b (= p. 739); and above, Section I, p. 91 note 194.

prasaṅga-type apagogic reasoning or *prasaṅgāpādana*, in terms of knowledge that is correct pragmatically and transactionally (*vyāvahārika-pramāṇa*) bears witness to his debt to Buddhist logico-epistemological thought, in particular to Dharmakīrti. This debt Tsoṅ kha pa and his followers have amply acknowledged in a large number of their works.[102] As *vyāvahārika-pramāṇa*, this correct knowledge of the Mādhyamika does not require to be founded ontic-epistemically and logically on reified entities (*bhāva*) possessed of self-existence (*svabhāva* 'aseitas'), that is, on a hypostatized object of knowledge (*prameya*) with its corresponding hypostatized (instrument of) correct knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

Whereas his understanding of the Madhyamaka of course relied chiefly on Nāgārjuna, Ārya-Deva, Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti, Tsoṅ kha pa evidently considered that his exposition of Madhyamaka thought had, in addition, to take careful account of other important developments in Buddhist philosophy, epistemology and logic – and notably of the remarkable (but controversial) attempt made by Bhavya/Bhā(va)viveka (sixth century) to incorporate into Madhyamaka thought certain developments in *pramāṇavidyā* made by Dignāga (*c.* 480-540) as well as, above all, of the major contribution to the Pramāṇa school made later by Dharmakīrti (seventh century) – while seeking all the time to remain true to Candrakīrti's *Prāsaṅgika branch of the Madhyamaka. Besides, in the first chapter of Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* certain ideas of the Buddhist Pramāṇa tradition had been introduced to the Prāsaṅgika tradition, and Dignāga's views were exploited, and also criticized, even though their author was not explicitly named there.[103]

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[102] In Tsoṅ kha pa's collected works there are to be found his notes on the *pratyakṣa*-chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* compiled by his disciple rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen (the *mÑon sum le'u'i brjed byaṅ* [Tohoku no. 5404] in 25 folios) and his commentary on the same subject compiled by mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzaṅ (the *mÑon sum le'u'i ṭīk ka* [no. 5410] in 93 folios), as well as his notes on Pramāṇavidyā (the *Tshad ma'i brjed byaṅ chen mo* [no. 5400] in 44 folios) compiled by Dar ma rin chen, and his *sDe bdun la 'jug pa'i sgo Don gñer yid kyi mun sel* (no. 5416, in 23 folios).

[103] At *PPMV* i.1, p. 19.1-2, p. 35.5-6, and pp. 72-74, Dignāga is cited or referred to; and at *PPMV* i.1, pp. 58-59 and p. 69, Dignāga's theory of two, and only two, *pramāṇa*s is criticized. Dignāga has been explicitly named by →

While it is true that the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika refused the designation of *tārkika (rtog ge pa)* 'syllogist' – an appellation that Candrakīrti has applied to Bhavya (*PPMV* i.1, p. 31.1) as a philosopher characterized by his fondness for autonomous inference (*svatantra-anumāna*) and reasoning (*PPMV* i.1, p. 16.1) –, for a Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika like Tsoṅ kha pa *tarka (rtog ge)* is no more synonymous with the whole of *nyāya (rigs pa)* than it is coterminous with the entire domain of *pramāṇa (tshad ma)*.[104] For him, the *tārkika* view that in a categoric probative inference the *trirūpa-liṅga* requires that there exist entities ontic-epistemically established in common agreement (*mthun snaṅ du grub pa : ubhaya[pra]siddha*) between both parties to a philosophical discussion or debate – these entities being then themselves regarded as hypostatically established (*grub pa*) – is not to be equated with the Pramāṇa school's *trirūpa-liṅga*, which Tsoṅ kha pa in fact considered to be in essence acceptable also to the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika even though the latter admits no reified substantial entities.

Tsoṅ kha pa has then concluded that in the *prasaṅga*-type statement, as an authentic form of reasoning solidly grounded in *pramāṇa*, there is to be found a *trirūpa-liṅga* or inferential sign that is indeed *paraprasiddha* – i.e. established for the opponent (*prativādin*) – but not *necessarily* for the latter *alone*.[105] This is because, in virtue of his theory of

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Candrakīrti at the end of his *MABh* (p. 407).

On the relation between post-Candrakīrti Mādhyamikas and the *pramāṇa*-school, see S. Moriyama, 'The later Madhyamaka and Dharmakīrti', in: E. Steinkellner (ed.), *Studies in the Buddhist epistemological tradition* (Vienna, 1991), pp. 199-210.

[104] Nor in the usage of the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika does *tarka* have the meaning, attested in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (sometimes in connexion with *prasaṅga* as in Keśavamiśra's *Tarkabhāṣā*), of a kind of *reductio ad impossibile*; cf. P. Tuxen, *An Indian primer of philosophy, or the Tarkabhāṣā of Keçavamiçra* (Copenhagen, 1914), p. 54.

[105] Compare T. Tillemans, 'Tsong kha pa *et al.* on the Bhāvaviveka-Candrakīrti debate', in: S. Ihara *et al* (ed.), *Tibetan studies, Proceedings of the 5th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies* (Narita, 1992), p. 317.

pragmatic-transactional right knowledge (*vyāvahārika-pramāṇa*), the Mādhyamika can himself admit as transactionally correct the components of inferential cognition. Nevertheless, in *prasaṅga*-type reasoning, the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika's *liṅga*, or logical reason (*hetu*), still requires to be carefully differentiated from the substantialistically conceived *svatantra-liṅga*, i.e. from the autonomous inferential sign that requires to be established, by means of the ontic-epistemic and logical means of a substantialistically constructed *pramāṇa* system, for *both* the proponent and the opponent according to the familiar rules of Indian debate (*vāda*).[106] Under Tsoṅ kha pa's analysis, furthermore, *prasaṅga*-type reasoning also possesses a property to be established (*sādhya*) by the *liṅga* = *hetu* 'probans'. As such, this type of reasoning can serve to define the process of generation, in the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika's conscious stream (*saṃtāna*), of the understanding of reality, thus setting his procedure quite apart from the one employed to this end by the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika.[107]

In his philosophical procedure, Tsoṅ kha pa has evidently gone further than Candrakīrti in making explicit use of methods of reasoning that belong to the Pramāṇa school going back to Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. As seen above, additional instances of his indebtedness to the Pramāṇa school are his identification of the twin procedures of *pariccheda* and *vyavaccheda* (see § 13 above) and of the logical method of *vyāpakānupalabdhi* (see § 14 above) in attaining the Madhyamaka's understanding of reality. And his view concerning the existence of a thesis (*pratijñā*), or own position (*svamata, pakṣa*), even in Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka thought was very likely not uninfluenced by the Pramāṇa school with which he (like many other Tibetan scholars) had the closest links.[108] Tsoṅ kha pa's

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[106] *LRChM*, f. 433b5-6 (= p. 719): *tshad mas rgol ba gñis ka la grub pa'i rtags kyis bsgrub bya (b)sgrub pa la raṅ rgyud kyi rtags daṅ des mi 'grub par phyir rgol gžan la grags pa'i tshul gsum gyis bsgrub bya 'grub pa la thal 'gyur bar 'jog pa 'di ni slob dpon gyi dgoṅs par šin tu gsal ba yin no.* – Cf. *PPMV* i.1, pp. 34-36.

[107] Compare above, Section I, § 6.

[108] See Section II above. Tsoṅ kha pa was of course not the first Tibetan philosopher to make use of logico-epistemological thought, and in this re- →

idea of a *raṅ gi mtshan ñid* = **svalakṣaṇa* ascribed by him to Bhavya and the Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas appears, however, not to derive directly either from the *svalakṣaṇa* 'particular characteristic' of the Pramāṇa school or from the *svalakṣaṇa* 'own (specific) defining characteristic' of a *dharma* in the Abhidharma.[109]

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spect he continued a tendency found among several Indian and Tibetan thinkers (for instance the teachers of the gSaṅ phu school and of some of the Sa kya pa masters).

[109] See p. 236 note 6 above; and, in Part II, note 13 to the introduction to the translation of the *KNZB* and note 30 to the translation itself.

In his article 'The ontological problem in Tsoṅ kha pa's *prasaṅga* theory: the establishment or unestablishment of the subject (*dharmin*) of an argument', in: *Tibetan studies (Proceedings of the Seventh Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Graz 1995)*, vol. 1 (Vienna, 1997), pp. 157-77, J. Chu has sought to show that in his comment on *PPMV* i.1 Candrakīrti was concerned with refuting the logical fallacy of the thesis (*pakṣadoṣa*) supposed by Bhavya to vitiate Buddhapālita's exposition, but that Tsoṅ kha pa's purpose was rather to criticize Bhavya for his ontological position, deduced from his epistemological presuppositions, that accepted a *svalakṣaṇa* 'self-characteristic' (a variety of *svabhāva* 'self-existence'). He writes (pp. 158-9): 'Candrakīrti's approach is that, starting with the ontological principle which he thinks to have in common with his opponent, i.e. Bhāvaviveka, he finds himself in the position of accusing Bhāvaviveka of this logical fault, i.e. the presupposition being not fulfilled. Tsoṅ kha pa's approach is different: [...] it is the reversed procedure, that is to say, from Bhāvaviveka's epistemological presupposition he deduces his ontological standpoint'. – Whether, in each case, Candrakīrti's and Tsoṅ kha pa's thinking was in fact linear and unidirectional is, however, not altogether certain. For Tsoṅ kha pa the logical, the epistemological and the ontic are closely if not inseparably linked with each other in what has been referred to above as the ontic-epistemic and logical. And this view seems to be foreshadowed in Candrakīrti's successive (but apparently not linear and unidirectional) treatment of logical, epistemological and ontic topics in his 'prolegomena' contained in *PPMV* i.1.

An epistemic-logical facet (inspired by the Pramāṇavidyā of Dharmakīrti) and an ontic facet (grounded in the non-substantialism – *niḥsvabhāvavāda*
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More generally, attention may be called to the fundamental importance that Tsoṅ kha pa has assigned to ascertainment – both as an intellectual process (: *niści-* : *ṅes par byed pa*) and as a result (: *niścaya* = *ṅes pa*) – in the Mādhyamika's philosophical understanding of reality through principled reasoned knowledge (*rigs śes*); whereas, even though he did indeed evoke the concept of ascertainment, Candrakīrti subjected *niścaya* to a radical critique and relativized its status in Madhyamaka thought in his discussion in *PPMV* i.1 (pp. 54-57). Moreover, in Tsoṅ kha pa's philosophy, where investigative analysis (*rnam par dpyad pa/dpyod pa* = *vicāra*) and analytical meditation (*dpyad sgom*) play a primordial rôle, great emphasis has been placed on the significance of *vicāra*; whereas Candrakīrti apparently attached less primary importance to this function in the process of achieving philosophical understanding.[110]

Only combined historical-philological investigation in close association with internal philosophical reconstruction – that is, with the drawing out of systemic philosophical implications from a philosophical corpus – can establish the exact degree to which Tsoṅ kha pa was in fact successful in remaining faithful, as he clearly intended, to Candrakīrti when thus seeking to uncover and exploit what are, so to say, latent or only partly realized virtualities in the latter's thinking. As already observed above, Tsoṅ kha pa's thought has to be understood and evaluated also in the light of the continuing developments in both Madhyamaka and Pramāṇa philosophy that were subsequent or unknown to – or perhaps even deliberately passed over by – Candrakīrti.

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and *śūnyatāvāda* – of the Madhyamaka of Nāgārjuna, Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti) together make up Tsoṅ kha pa's gnoseology. (This gnoseology is, of course, not to be simply equated with epistemology; nor is the ontic here to be equated with an ontology predicated on the existence of a *svabhāva*.)

[110] See for instance *PPMV* i.1, pp. 27.4 and 67.7. Candrakīrti has of course made use of the concept denoted by *vicāra*. And in *MA* vi.118 he has spoken of the analytical investigation found in Nāgārjuna's Śāstra characterized by him as being free from disputatiousness (*rtsod pa* = *vigraha, vivāda*) and the desire to defeat an opponent (on this theme see above, Section II, § 6).

Equally importantly, the question arises whether, by any appropriate measure, Dharmakīrti's thought truly fits the requirements of the Madhyamaka. That is, was Dharmakīrti's philosophy tied exclusively, or at least mainly, to the Sautrāntika and Vijñānavāda schools with which he was connected, or did he develop a logic and epistemology suitable also for use by other schools of Buddhist thought?[111] In the view of Tsoṅ kha pa at all events, the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka is far from having jettisoned logic and epistemology, on which subject he was himself so deeply influenced by Dharmakīrti and his Pramāṇa school. And the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika's *prasaṅga*-type apagogic reasoning was not taken by Tsoṅ kha pa to represent a logic that either wholly superseded, or was altogether discontinuous with, Dharmakīrti's *pramāṇavidyā*. As is well known, a logical-epistemological component has indeed occupied a place of very major importance in much of Tibetan Madhyamaka thought.[112]

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[111] On an aspect of this question, see E. Steinkellner, 'Is Dharmakīrti a Mādhyamika' (cited above, p. 274 note 65). The question of the philosophical position explicitly expressed by Dharmakīrti in his works and that of his ultimate intent (*dgoṅs pa*) can be regarded as two distinct questions. (A comparable problem arises for instance in connexion with Vasubandhu as Vaibhāṣika and as Sautrāntika. And in the Tibetan tradition, although most of Asaṅga's works are of course recognized to belong to the Vijñānavāda, his ultimate intent is nevertheless considered to have been in accord with the Madhyamaka because of the comment on the *Ratnagotravibhāga* which is ascribed to him, and which is held by Tsoṅ kha pa's school to be in accord with the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka.) In other words, Tibetan tradition distinguishes between the position an author may explicitly take up in certain works for paedogogical and didactic purposes and his ultimate and true intent. – For recent discussions of Tibetan views on Dharmakīrti's intent, see L. van der Kuijp, *Contributions to the development of Tibetan Buddhist epistemology* (Wiesbaden, 1983), *passim*; D. P. Jackson, *The entrance gate for the wise* (Vienna, 1987), p. 165 ff.; and G. Dreyfus, *Recognizing reality* (Albany, 1997), *passim*.

[112] Tsoṅ kha pa and his school have indeed been taken to task by critics, both Tibetan and non-Tibetan, for having thus employed a Dharmakīrtian logical-epistemological model in his gnoseology.

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In sum, in Tsoṅ kha pa's interpretation of Nāgārjuna, Ārya-Deva, Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti there is found a confluence – or, at the very least, a close *rapprochement* – of Madhyamaka thought with Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇa system, certain characteristic logical-epistemological methods of the latter finding major applications in the former. This did not, however, lead in Tsoṅ kha pa's philosophy to a simple conflation or confusion of these two traditions in Buddhist thought or to their total identification. Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇa-school and Nāgār-

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Tsoṅ kha pa's treatment of the Madhyamaka investigated above does not, however, appear to reflect any real influence from Dharmakīrti's development of hypothetical reasoning (*prasaṅga*) and the *prasaṅgasādhana* (see above, p. 251 note 31). And it seems that, in connexion with his interpretation of the fundamental character of the Prāsaṅgika's apagogic reasoning (*prasaṅgāpādana*), he did not simply follow Dharmakīrti but, rather, developed and extended Candrakīrti's philosophy.

Tsoṅ kha pa's Madhyamaka does not appear either to be indebted here to Yogācāra-(Svātantrika-)Mādhyamikas such as Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra. He did, however, compose notes on Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, the *dBu ma rgyan gyi brjed byaṅ* (no. 5409) (as well as a very extensive commentary on the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* entitled *Legs bšad gser phreṅ* [no. 5412] in which he made extensive use of the works of the two Vimuktisenas and Haribhadra). In the *LŠÑP*, f. 82a (= p. 473), he has remarked that, contrary to what might be expected, Śāntarakṣita and his disciples did not rebut the criticisms made by Candrakīrti of Bhavya's Svātantrika-Madhyamaka. (For a possible criticism of Candrakīrti by Śāntarakṣita's teacher Jñānagarbha, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India*, p. 70; S. Matsumoto, *Journal of Buddhist Studies* [*Komazawa University*] 15 [1984], pp. 418-385.)

On the integration in Tsoṅ kha pa's school of Pramāṇa (*tshad ma*) and the Graded Path (*lam rim*) into a kind of *tshad ma'i lam* – e.g. in rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen's *Tshad ma'i lam khrid* – see E. Steinkellner, '*Tshad ma'i skyes bu*', in: E. Steinkellner and H. Tauscher (ed.), *Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist religion and philosophy* (Vienna, 1983), pp. 275-84.

juna's and Candrakīrti's Madhyamaka continued to be regarded by him as distinct but, nonetheless, as congruent and hence integratable.[113]

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[113] On this confluence see above, § 10 (with p. 273 note 65), § 14 (with p. 296 note 101), p. 297 note 102 and p. 302 note 112; and Section I, p. 30 note 56 and p. 91 note 194. It is to be recalled that logic (*tshad ma*) and Madhyamaka (*dbu ma*) have remained separate subjects in the curriculum of Tibetan seminaries, including those of Tsoṅ kha pa's dGe lugs pa school.

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